

CONQUEST
AND
DOMINATION
IN
EARLY CHINA

RISE AND DEMISE OF THE
WESTERN CHOU

RALPH D. SAWYER

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Rise and Demise of the Western Chou

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*With the Bibliographic Collaboration of
Mei-chün Lee Sawyer*

西周戰事

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Dedicated to the memory of Peter Liotta
humanitarian, warrior, poet, and novelist

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Preface

Though *Conquest and Domination* would assuredly benefit from further research and contemplation, the time has come to complete my analysis of the Chou conquest. A surpassing drama wrought by grandiose heroes and perverse villains, it might well have been written as a romanticized tale of Virtue ascendant and evil vanquished, however painful for the populace, perhaps even shaped by and appropriately concocted for our high-velocity, multimedia age. This would have allowed vibrantly retelling the Chou's astonishing tale but at the expense of neglecting a wide variety of important historical passages and the long-established depictions that not only underlie all reconstructions of these seminal events but that also founded the historical perspective that prevailed throughout the Imperial Period.

Two less exciting but more methodical approaches suggested themselves as viable. The first is the normally adopted method of systematically, even exhaustively, examining and then consistently integrating all the information available from the disparate sources in a strictly chronological fashion. The second (adopted here), is the somewhat unorthodox method of providing a skeletal characterization of the military events (primarily from the chronicle known as the *Bamboo Annals*) and then examining numerous other historical works in order to flesh out the portrait and ponder a number of significant questions and collateral factors.

Unfortunately, most of the materials that appear to preserve crucial facts and depict key participants were compiled, if not composed, half a millennium or more after the events they recount. Even if they encompass "truths" successfully transmitted by lost chronicles or passed down through oral transmission, the extant literary versions have certainly undergone editing, considerable revision, and often, imaginative additions. Despite fervent scholarly effort over many centuries, the fabricated and extraneous material simply cannot be winnowed out by applying rules of consistency or assessing its coherence with probability. However, completely discarding these records because of their unreliable or nebulous natures would not only make the project impossible but also preclude any understanding of how imperial-era Chinese thinkers perceived their early history, an aspect at least as important as the actual,

perhaps undiscoverable “facts” and potentially of greater historical significance in subsequent ages because of the role of accepted historical and legendary events in court discussions and policy formulation.

Except for a handful of fragmentary inscriptions, the Western Chou also lack the sort of oracular notations that have allowed glimpsing, though not comprehensively reconstructing, critical aspects of Shang history. Fortunately, several thousand bronze inscriptions—virtually contemporary sources that memorialize awards and often collaterally recount, albeit far too tersely, important deeds and events—have been discovered and extensively studied over the past century. Although affected by the randomness or accidental nature of the discovery process and subject to doubts about their exact intent,¹ when coupled with archaeological discoveries (which are themselves subject to similar constraints and interpretation), these inscriptions permit reconstruction of the following core account:

About a century after appearing around Mount Ch'i in the Wei River Valley and beginning to prosper through amalgamation and conquest, a peripheral people of uncertain but probably interior origins, who became known as the Chou, vanquished the dominant but waning Shang in a single battle at Mu-yeh around 1045 BCE. Their victory was engineered by the immediately preceding monarch, King Wen, and his successor, King Wu, in conjunction with several formidable leaders including the Duke of Chou, the Duke of Shao, and the T'ai Kung. Peace prevailed but briefly because the nominal Shang leader rebelled in conjunction with two of King Wu's brothers, who had been entrusted with overseeing the conquered populace. Their suppression, which required three years, had an extended scope because purportedly submissive states to the east and southeast also rebelled and had to be subjugated.

In addition to centuries of critical Chinese scholarship, numerous studies of the early historical writings that discuss or otherwise purport to preserve documents dating to this period have recently been undertaken. Others have contemplated the general issues of historicity, including the validity of revered books and canonical works, but a real consensus has not yet been achieved.² The earliest admonitions reportedly delivered to the Chou troops after the battle and the proclamations subsequently uttered to the shattered Shang, as well as discussions between great historical figures apparently preserved in dialogues found in later volumes such as the *Tso Chuan*, are particularly acute examples. (There are numerous statements in the *Tso Chuan*, often embedded in these dialogues, that

make assertions about remote antiquity for which no other known records exist.)

Lacking embedded reporters and modern recording equipment, the speeches found in the *Shang Shu*, *Tso Chuan*, and even *Kuo Yü*, especially those occurring in a battlefield context, whether brief utterances or highly polished dispositions, simply could not have been recorded by scribes. The main question is whether these sometimes-florid redactions preserve memorable utterances, reflect essential cores, or are purely imaginary verbiage conceived by writers in a far different intellectual and political milieu than the speakers.³ Although not necessarily created *ex nihilo*, the recountings should perhaps be viewed in the manner that Thucydides indicates in his preface to the *Peloponnesian War*.

The primary traditional sources for the history of the period turn out to be highly limited: a focal chapter in Ssu-ma Ch'ien's great synthetic compendium, the *Shih Chi*; the initial portions of several other *Shih Chi* chapters dedicated to the progenitors of the early states, most of whom participated in various ways in the Chou dynasty's founding events; two canonical Confucian works known as the *Shih Ching* (*Classic of Odes*) and *Shang Shu* or *Shu Ching* (generally termed the *Book of Documents*); and the *Yi Chou-shu* (*Lost Documents of the Chou*). However, the *Shih Chi*, compiled just around the end of the second century BCE, was itself based upon ninety or more works, as well as whatever supplementary materials the *T'ai Shih* (Grand Historian) may have been able to peruse.⁴ In contrast, the others purportedly preserve materials dating back to the dynasty's origins or its first centuries.

The disparate character of these materials makes reconstructing the historical events difficult and renders the interpretation of underlying factors and crucial elements highly tenuous, if not overly speculative. In fact, time and again the "evidence," no matter how it might be pummeled, explicated, or contorted, remains insufficient to make a reasonable, not to mention definitive, determination. But this is not to say that nothing is or can be known. Rather, it is knowledge within parameters, constrained by the limited number of realistic possibilities and the need to progress from situation to situation, event to event. The only feasible approach is to evaluate information derived from archaeological discoveries and bronze inscriptions against the insights that might be gained from traditional historical materials, particularly those burnished with the patina of antiquity. Sometimes the results seem obvious, while others can only be deemed best judgment, reasoned assessment, or well-pondered but vague inclination.

It should be noted that, despite having carefully studied

numerous books and articles discussing the bronze inscriptions cited in this book together with plates of rubbings and alternative transcriptions, I have extensively relied upon the wisdom accumulated over the past several decades to resolve highly detailed issues such as probable readings for controversial characters, the identification of people and places, and the attribution of vessels. (Although they are all cited in the endnotes, the important figures in the field range from Wang Kuo-wei, Kuo-mo Jo, and Ch'en Meng-chia through Li Hsüeh-ch'in and Edward L. Shaughnessy, whose book, *Sources of Western Chou History*, proved invaluable when I commenced the intermittent study of bronze inscriptions two decades ago.) Nevertheless, lack of unanimity, even extensive disagreement among experts, still compelled my frequently selecting from among alternatives—based upon their coherence with military issues—in order to produce this somewhat-specialized, idiosyncratic account.

Insofar as our *Ancient Chinese Warfare* extensively discusses the history and nature of the Shang prior to its final collapse, *Conquest and Domination* focuses upon the Chou's gradual evolution, sudden ascendancy over the Shang and peripheral peoples, and three centuries of wavering domination. Although the readership's familiarity with the Shang is not presumed, rather than duplicating the information already provided in our previous work, we have here only characterized them sufficiently to ponder the nature of the foe and the enormity of the conquest. Continuity in the chariots and weapons being employed at the moment of clash and the nature of the changes they underwent during the Western Chou, incremental rather than revolutionary, obviate any need for separate consideration here, though both are worth pursuing in conjunction with the considerable evolution that would be witnessed in the Spring and Autumn and especially Warring States periods. Therefore, rather than a comprehensive analysis of all aspects such as undertaken in *Ancient Chinese Warfare*, *Conquest and Domination* focuses on events and effects, actors and consequences, with an eye to explaining the crucial factors and understanding the developmental dynamics.

Because *Conquest and Domination* is intended to be accessible to anyone with an interest in military history, state ascension, and early China's formative history, rather than just to China specialists, the discussion again proceeds in two streams. The text tries to strike a reasonable balance by providing information essential to the narrative without becoming enmired in overwhelming detail while often (but not exclusively) analyzing events in terms of concepts and insights advanced by the classic Chinese military writers in the Warring States Period. The endnotes contain a collateral expansion of many aspects and subtopics, whether general points of military history or matters of

purely sinological import. A basic map has also been provided, but readers should consult the numerous, vastly superior resources readily accessible on the Internet for precise locations, China's general topography, and especially terrain issues because the latter particularly benefit from satellite imagery.

Consonant with our practice in *Ancient Chinese Warfare*, no effort has been made to provide romanized titles for Chinese and Japanese books and articles in the bibliography itself because entries in Chinese characters are only useful to those with competence in the language. Furthermore, rather than encompassing hundreds of books of merely contextual importance, the bibliography has been confined to the works cited in the notes and a somewhat compressed form of reference has again been employed in the notes themselves.

As usual, I have again translated all the primary material, whether bronze inscriptions or Chou Dynasty odes. Naturally this would not have been possible without two millennia of erudite commentary, numerous contemporary editions, and the insightful versions of modern translators, especially James Legge and Bernhard Karlgren for the documents cited from the *Shang Shu* and the odes from the *Shih Ching*. Readers might well consult James Legge's classic translations of these two works because Legge was a giant, a true progenitor, who labored tirelessly with outstanding Chinese scholars to produce works that retain their value despite advances in scholarship and the discovery of numerous texts and inscriptions. Having been produced well over a century and a half ago under the waning aegis of the Ch'ing Dynasty and couched in rather stilted language (as befits a churchman), they may strike the reader as outdated. However, for most of China's history, these documents and odes, although having supposedly been originally written in a somewhat popular voice (by highly literate composers), had an archaic quality and were increasingly incomprehensible without commentaries and tediously memorized terms.

Once again, while I am responsible for the historical content, writing, military texts, theorizing, and conclusions, Mei-chün has contributed immeasurably to this volume through her management of the vast horde of research materials underlying this work and the preparation of the bibliography, as well as by constantly questioning my analysis and conclusions.

Finally, in order to fully exploit the worldwide possibilities provided by the Internet, avoid having the footnotes truncated, preserve the bibliography intact, and make *Conquest and Domination* available at a reasonable price, I have opted for print on demand and digital publishing. Comments and queries are accordingly welcome through my website, www.RalphSawyer.com.

Ralph D. Sawyer

Spring 2012

A Note on Pronunciation

As I have noted in all my books, neither of the two commonly employed orthographies facilitates the pronunciation of romanized Chinese characters for the uninitiated. Each system has its stumbling blocks, and I cannot imagine that *qi* in *pinyin* is inherently more comprehensible to unpracticed readers than the older, increasingly discarded (and politically disdained) Wade-Giles *ch'i* for a sound similar to the initial part of “chicken” or *xi* for the simple “she,” although they are certainly no less comprehensible than *j* for *r* or even *t* for *d* in Wade-Giles. However, as this work is intended for a broad audience—many of whom will have little experience with romanized Chinese words apart from a few occurrences in the news and my other works in which Wade-Giles has exclusively been used—the hyphenated break between syllables unique to Wade-Giles facilitates pronunciation, and specialists should have equal facility in either system, so we have continued to employ Wade-Giles here with the exception of an idiosyncratic *yi* for *i* and contemporary provincial names.

As a crude guide to pronunciation we offer the following notes on the significant exceptions to normally expected sounds:

t , as in *Tao* : without an apostrophe, pronounced like “d” (*pinyin d*); otherwise “t”

p , as in *ping* : without an apostrophe, pronounced like “b” (*pinyin b*), otherwise “p”

ch , as in *chuang* : without an apostrophe, pronounced like “j” (*pinyin j* and *zh*), otherwise “ch”

k , as in *kuang* : without an apostrophe, pronounced like English “g” (*pinyin g*), otherwise “k”

hs , as in *hsi* : pronounced like English “sh” (*pinyin x*)

j , as in *jen* : pronounced like “r” (*pinyin r*)

Thus, the name of the famous Chou (or Zhou in *pinyin*) Dynasty is pronounced as if written “jou” and sounds just like the English name “Joe.”

I

Ascension and Conquest

Legendary Origins

“Those that the ancients referred to as excelling in warfare conquered those who were easy to conquer; they conquered those who were already defeated.”

Sun-tzu, *Art of War*

The Shang may have initiated Chinese civilization, but the Chou, through warfare and conquest, created its culture, indelibly shaping the arts, protosciences, philosophy, and political concepts.⁵ Unfortunately, inherent organizational shortcomings eventually permitted the emergence of internecine conflict in the Spring and Autumn Period that followed. Thereafter, warfare's ever increasing lethality devastated the infrastructure and decimated the populace, yet also engendered the martial conceptualizations that would constrain conflict dialogue throughout the Imperial Era. Nevertheless, the Western Chou would always be perceived as a fundamentally idyllic age, one unmarked by dissension until unruliness began to fester among the feudal states.

Early texts provide but sparse records of martial events. Even the long sanctioned orthodox history of the period, the “Chou Basic Annals” (“Chou Pen-chi”) preserved in China's first synthetic history, the much acclaimed *Shih Chi*, barely mentions warfare at all, whether between the Shang and the Chou or the Chou and external peoples. Although there are vestiges of conflict in many Warring States and Former Han writings, including *Hsün-tzu*, *Han Fei-tzu*, *Mo-tzu*, and the *Lü-shih Ch'un-ch'iu*, compilations such as the *Bamboo Annals* that contradict this essentially benign portrait came to be disparaged as forgeries. Individual chapters in otherwise highly revered texts—for example, the “Wu Ch'eng” in the Confucian Classic known as the *Shang Shu* or *Shu Ching (Book of Documents)*—also tended to be rejected by bureaucratic literati and scholars alike. Once they were

excised from accepted recensions, they simply disappeared from collective social consciousness.

Through long and diligent study, the thousands of oracular inscriptions recovered over the past century have furnished extensive insights into the Shang Dynasty's history, but few contemporary materials have been discovered that might similarly provide more than a glimpse into the formative personalities and activities marking the incipient Chou. Fortunately the systematic examination of numerous inscriptions from recently discovered bronze vessels (and others no longer extant but preserved as rubbings), augmented by the rehabilitation of the *Bamboo Annals*, sections of the *Yi Chou-shu*, and selected chapters of the *Shang Shu* as comparatively reliable sources, still allows a sketchy, tumultuous overview to be cobbled together.⁶ However, many vital details that would permit a definitive reprisal of the period's military heritage or further substantiate the historical analysis and generalized impressions offered below remain elusive, compelling frequent resort to assumptions and projections.

Several pivotal military events mark the Chou's prehistory and the Western Chou's ensuing three centuries: their initial period of wandering, their astonishing ascension to power, King Wu's dramatic victory at the decisive battle of Mu-yeh, the postconquest consolidation campaign, the unexpected need to suppress a rebellion spearheaded by the king's own brothers, King Chao's ill-fated southern campaign into Ch'u, gradually increasing friction with peripheral peoples, and the final chaotic years during which the state became vulnerable to external invasion and factional conflict precipitated the end of the era. Even then, despite their unremitting decline into virtual nonexistence, the Chou retained a nominal presence for another five hundred years.

Based upon legendary concepts and the imaginative interpretation of totemistic beliefs, scholars have proposed a number of reconstructions for the Chou's early history,⁷ but two theories of origination primarily derived from narratives in the *Shih Chi* (*Grand Scribe's Records*) and odes in the Chou Dynasty *Shih Ching* (*Classic of Odes*)—a western and an eastern—tend to predominate.⁸ Yet crucial questions persist, including whether the predynastic Chou populace was ethnically distinct or somehow derived from common Lungshan precursors and therefore homogenous and culturally related to the Hsia and Shang, but having evolved through different intermediates, politically and culturally different.⁹ Whether they may have originated among the Hsia themselves and claimed a common ancestor in the Yellow Emperor or were a tribal group that emigrated from their original living area when the Hsia was displaced by the Shang and thus embraced a heritage of enmity from the outset, as did

other Hsia remnant groups that had been compelled to seek refuge on the steppe, is also variously argued. ¹⁰

According to traditional written accounts, the earliest identifiable Chou ancestors originally dwelled amid the Hsia well to the north or the east of the latter's historic center prior to embarking on several site movements and finally being forced by more aggressive peoples to migrate into the Wei River Valley. Succinct *Shih Chi* passages that have provided the sanctioned account for two millennia remain the primary textual basis for locating their origins other than around their first archaeologically attested site, Mount Ch'i in Shaanxi. Much entangled by myth, the initial paragraphs stress Hou Chi's devotion to agriculture:

Hou Chi of the Chou was named Ch'i. His mother, a woman of the Yu-t'ai Clan, was called Chiang Yüan. ¹¹ Chiang Yüan was Emperor K'u's principal consort. When Chiang Yüan was in the wilds she saw a giant footprint. Her heart being stirred with delight, she wanted to tread in it but when she did so her body reacted as if she were pregnant. When she reached the appropriate time she gave birth to a son. Regarding him as inauspicious, she abandoned him in a constricted alley.

However, the horses and cows that passed through all avoided stepping on him. She then tried to move him into the middle of the forest but encountered too many people so abandoned him in an ice-filled ditch but then, birds flying by covered and supported him with their wings. Interpreting this as the [work of] spirits, Chiang Yüan retrieved and nurtured him. Because she had wanted to abandon him, she called him Ch'i ["Abandoned" or "Discarded"].

As a child Ch'i seemed to already have the intentions of a great man. To amuse himself he loved to plant hemp and legumes, both of which grew bountifully. When he reached adulthood he loved agriculture and could determine what was suitable for the land. ¹² Where appropriate he sowed and harvested grain and the people all took him as a model. When Emperor Yao heard about it, he appointed Ch'i as an agricultural adviser. ¹³

Because All under Heaven gained the benefits he was seen as having great achievement. Emperor Shun said, "Ch'i, the common people are beginning to starve. Hereafter, direct the planting of the hundred grains." He then enfeoffed him at T'ai, titled him Hou Chi, and established the separate Chi clan. Hou Chi's ascension occurred during the reigns of Yao, Shun, and Yü and throughout his merit was acclaimed.

The description of Hou Chi's activities in the second paragraph provided the impetus for traditional assertions that the proto-Chou, although somewhat distinct (and no doubt subservient), were members of the Hsia rather than a "foreign" group. ¹⁴ But five centuries before the *Shih Chi's* composition, the authors of several odes had already lauded this identification with the Hsia. Not only did the Chou frequently term themselves imitators of the Hsia and true inheritors of Hsia culture, but they also stressed that they were people of the Hsia. ¹⁵

As befits his status as one of legendary progenitors of Chinese civilization, Hou Chi enjoyed astounding longevity. He reputedly served under all three of China's most famous Sage emperors, Yao, Shun, and Yü, or for at least one hundred fifty years, possibly even several hundred if the three cultural paragons are viewed as emblematic of stages of civilization lasting a few hundred years each rather than just titanic mortals. More realistically, even if Hou Chi were a historical figure, he was not one man. Either his name somehow became associated with agricultural responsibility and his successors were known as *Hou Chi*, sometimes understood as Lord of the Millet, or the office, if one were ever formally established, was so titled. In terms of mythology, he fulfilled the same innovative role for the Chou (and thus the Yellow Emperor's extended clan) that Shen Nung, the well-known Sage Emperor and patron spirit of agriculture and medicine, did for the Red Emperor's people. ¹⁶

This vision of their early origins grounded in agricultural advancement was a sacred element in the Chou's postconquest self-perception as well as in later Warring States formulations, the latter no doubt prompted by a desire to esteem the role of Virtue (*Te*) in the Chou's predestined ascension to power and deemphasize the martial aspects. Apart from attracting other tribal members, their comparatively advanced agricultural knowledge may have proven effective in gaining the allegiance of peripheral peoples who could materially benefit from their advice. ¹⁷ It has even been suggested that the name by which the Chi clan came to be known, "Chou," was derived not from their location contiguous to Chou-yüan (the Chou plains) but from the enterprise of agriculture, of feeding the people. ¹⁸

The "Basic Annals" account indicates they were eventually compelled to abandon agriculture and dwell among "barbarians," where a pastoral or semipastoral lifestyle prevailed: ¹⁹

When Hou Chi died his son Pu K'u was established. ²⁰ In Pu K'u's late years the Hsia's governance declined and they abandoned the work of agriculture. Because he had lost his position Pu K'u fled to the region of the Jung and Ti. ²¹ When Pu K'u died his son Chü

assumed power. When Chü died, his son Kung Liu assumed authority.

Even though Kung Liu dwelled among the Jung and Ti peoples, he again cultivated Hou Chi's occupation, concentrated upon plowing and planting, and put what was suitable for the terrain into practice. After traversing the Ch'i-chü River he forded the Wei 22 in order to acquire materials for their employment. Therefore travelers had provisions and those who dwelled in their villages had stores. All the people thus relied upon his beneficence and the hundred surnames embraced him and gave their allegiance. The Tao of the Chou commenced ascending with him. 23 Accordingly, poets have joyously sung of his Virtue.

Pu K'u's movement away from the heart of civilization onto peripheral terrain populated by less developed tribes has stimulated extensive discussion about whether the Chou totally abandoned their agricultural practices and embraced "barbarian" ways during their sojourn in the north. 24 No archaeological evidence presently exists that would allow resolving this question, but the account just cited indicates that Kung Liu revitalized these practices with considerable success after a mere two-generation hiatus. Nevertheless, the "Chou Pen-chi" subsequently notes that "The Ancient Duke, Tan Fu, again cultivated the [agricultural] occupation of Hou Chi," throwing the continuity of practice somewhat into question.

Although compiled roughly fifteen hundred years after the events, this account suggests that the knowledge Hou Chi bequeathed must not have been completely lost; otherwise, Kung Liu and Tan Fu would not have been able to easily revive their advanced agricultural practices. Given the conservative nature of closed societies—synonymous with a strong tendency to resort to known practices and solutions—it is more likely that the proto-Chou continued to raise whatever crops might be viable in the increasingly arid conditions of the steppe despite being forced to embrace some pastoral practices. 25 Since mounted pastoralism had not yet evolved, by pursuing agriculture intermixed with animal husbandry and occasionally shifting their prime dwelling site, they developed a lifestyle highly congruent with others in the northern region, the only distinction perhaps having been their utilization of more productive farming techniques.

The *Shih Chi* account suggests that their travail on the steppe lasted only a few generations. However, the text seems to have greatly compressed the time, and contemporary analysts generally conclude that their self-imposed exile encompassed some five centuries. 26 Even if they didn't fully absorb the practices of nearby peoples, the climate

and terrain probably compelled them to change their lifestyle considerably over five hundred years, and the experience certainly had at least a lingering effect on their cultural orientations. Apart from any need to develop the resilience necessary to cope with unremitting environmental challenges, clashes with entrenched inhabitants who resisted the intrusion of another competitor for the region's scarce resources must have arisen. Records and archaeological evidence may be lacking except for a number of notable villages situated in Liaodong and Inner Mongolia that are marked by well-fortified stone walls, but Shang Dynasty oracular inscriptions show that aggressive groups such as the Kung-fang and T'u-fang already inhabited the region and were actively evolving in response to local stimuli. ²⁷

In addition to nurturing the cohesiveness necessary to not just survive but actually prosper in response to detrimental factors, these challenges probably had a significant impact on the very character of the proto-Chou people. Whatever the implications, no grand or sustainable conclusions can be drawn because their perseverance on the steppe over the centuries was hardly unique. Nevertheless, incipient distinctions between the sparser-material lifestyle of the increasingly semi-nomadic (and subsequently nomadic) steppe peoples and the sedentary but conspicuously opulent inhabitants of the core region had already appeared and would constitute a wellspring of temptation. Some who recognize the Chou's strongly martial character have even speculated that, rather than descendants of what would subsequently be conceived as "Hua-hsia" culture, the proto-Chou are actually offshoots of the Jung Ti or perhaps the Pai Ti, particularly since the Chi clan name is found among such peripheral peoples as the Pai and Ch'üan. ²⁸

Because the Chiang clan noted in Chiang Yüan's name would furnish many Chou consorts and numerous warriors who played key roles in the dynasty's ascension, including Chiang T'ai Kung, ruminations similarly continue about their origins and their overall influence in Chou prehistory. Two views prevail, the first asserting that even though the Chiang were always subordinate, they and the Chi intermarried down through the ages. ²⁹ However, the second, finding no archaeological confirmation for their interaction before the Chou moved to the vicinity of Mount Ch'i, believes they first encountered the Chiang in the Wei River Valley and displaced and amalgamated with them over a wide area through a still uncertain process. ³⁰ (Some Chiang elements apparently remained independent, but even those who were more or less integrated into the Chou retained distinctive aspects.) Variants of the second hold that their first interaction occurred somewhat earlier, while still at Pin in the

Ching River Valley,³¹ and that the Chiang originally (or ultimately) inhabited the upper Wei River Valley. Though arguments continue, to date the original form of the second view remains the best supported,³² and the origins of the Chiang Yüan myth retrospectively attributed to this period.³³

The lack of any evidence for a powerful tribal group in the Wei River Valley until a century or so before the conquest requires that the Chou's origins be sought elsewhere. Unfortunately, the task is rendered difficult because, similar to the Hsia and Shang, they frequently shifted their primary dwelling site during a prehistorical period of migration.³⁴ A single statement in the "Chou Basic Annals"—"Tan Fu departed from Pin, forded the Ch'i and Chü Rivers, crossed over Mount Liang, and stopped below Mount Ch'i"—has always underpinned traditional attempts to determine the Chou's geographic origins and plot the movement of the ever-evolving proto-Chou peoples.³⁵

Of the two main possibilities, the "eastern" thesis postulates that the earliest Chou ancestors first dwelled in Shanxi around the Fen River, well within the Shang's perceptual periphery but were eventually compelled to move westward, thereby initiating a difficult trek that took them across the Ching River and Lü-liang Mountains until they ultimately settled in the general vicinity of Mount Ch'i on the northern side of the Wei River Valley. The western origination envisions the Chou evolving among the peripheral or steppe peoples in Shaanxi's upper Ching River Valley or even further northwest in Gansu's Ching-yang area before gradually moving down along the Ching River.³⁶

It is well recognized that the names of rivers and other prominent geographic features often remain unchanged through the ages, yet definitive confirmation of their probable route cannot be garnered from the name of the interceding mountains because two ranges now bear the designation "Liang." The Lü-liang Mountains, which lie to the west of the Fen River, intervene between it and the Yellow River, while the Liang Mountains, which are interspersed between the Ching River Valley and lower Wei River Valley, run almost down to the rivers' intersection.

In recounting their travail, the "Chou Basic Annals" explicitly notes that Tan Fu, who might well be deemed the Chou's first great chieftain, made them so prosperous by refocusing on agriculture that they attracted the attention of other steppe peoples, including robbers and brigands. In view of their subsequent military campaigns, the pacifistic nature of Tan Fu's response is startlingly incongruent:³⁷

The Ancient Duke, Tan Fu, again cultivated the [agricultural]

occupation of Hou Chi and Duke Liu, accumulated his Virtue, and practiced righteousness, and the people of the state all supported him. The Hsün-yü among the Jung and Ti attacked them, wanting to get their wealth and belongings, so he gave them to them. After that they again attacked, wanting to take the land and people. The people were all angry and wanted to fight.

The Ancient Duke said, "When people establish a ruler, it should be to their advantage. Now these barbarians are attacking and waging war because they want my land and people. What difference is there if the people are with them or with me? The people want to fight because of me, but I cannot bear to slay people's fathers and sons in order to rule them." Then, with his relatives, he departed from Pin, forded the Ch'i and Chü Rivers, crossed over Mount Liang, and stopped below Mount Ch'i.

The people of Pin, supporting their aged and carrying their weak, again all flocked to the Ancient Duke below Mount Ch'i. When the nearby states heard of the Ancient Duke's benevolence, many also gave their allegiance. Thereupon the Ancient Duke discarded their barbarian customs, constructed walls and buildings, and established cities to have them dwell separately. He set up officials for the five offices. The people all sang songs and rejoiced, praising his Virtue.

This brief segment preserves essentially all that has traditionally been known about the Chou's predynastic history. A late, almost purely didactic retelling, it emphasizes Virtue and righteousness, concepts that would fully develop in the later Chou but were only incipient in the late Shang even though the character for Virtue had already appeared in Shang oracular inscriptions and the concept is much emphasized in early Chou materials preserved in the *Shang Shu*.

Several events in the Chou's prehistory might be termed formative, but to the extent that the traditional accounts reflect historical memory, Kung Liu and the Tan Fu stand out. Their actions provide not only evidence of an increasingly formal authority structure within the Chou, but also widespread recognition of the chieftain's power and the clan's identity. Clearly they were clan leaders until they moved to Mount Ch'i and began to amalgamate with the Chiang, whereupon they acquired enhanced status and assumed the authority of great chieftains in the immediacy of acquiring despotic powers. However, long before, their personal strength and charisma had allowed them to order complete migrations of the populace.

Pu Ku's emigration out onto the steppe, away from the Hua-Hsia heartland, may have been prompted by the Shang's conquest of the

Hsia and thus one of several migrations undertaken by Hsia groups. The proto-Chou artifacts that suddenly appeared in the Chou-yüan area indicate the next minimally attested shift occurred during Wu Ting's era—or slightly later, roughly during Yin-hsü's second period—presumably as a result of the clashes with the Shang that are preserved in the latter's inscriptions, after which they disappear from the oracular records. However, Tan Fu's shift from Pin to Mount Ch'i has also been dated somewhat later, to the late twelfth century BCE during Wu Yi's reign.³⁸ Future developments may allow refinement, but, without doubt, the Chou's preconquest history ended with their victory at Mu-yeh in 1045 BCE, some five hundred fifty years after the Hsia's collapse, meaning their evolution essentially spanned the length of the Shang Dynasty. Their gestation around Mount Ch'i, where they nurtured their agricultural foundation, repelled challenges, and conquered nearby peoples, probably covered about a century and a half.

The Chou's migration deeper into the Wei River area has traditionally been attributed to threats from aggressive contiguous peoples, perhaps synonymous with attacks ordered by the Shang during Wu Ting's reign, discussed below. The subtle effects of climatic change that would have rendered mixed-mode survival difficult in the increasingly inhospitable northern zone probably also contributed. Commencing about 2000 BCE, the relatively conducive conditions that had prevailed on the loess plateau of Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, and other regions such as Liaodong declined. The cooler, more semi-arid conditions made traditional farming, already difficult in this marginal area, nearly impossible, forcing the inhabitants—including the Chiang and various members of the Jung and Ti—to increasingly depend upon a semi-pastoral lifestyle marked by periodic shifts of their dwelling sites even though they had not yet acquired the highly enabling skill of horse riding.³⁹

Crisscrossed by rivers and streams and marked by easily worked soil, the Wei River Valley was highly fertile. The plains around Mount Ch'i—which extend some fifty miles east to west and twenty north to south—were characterized by a temperate climate and vigorous vegetation, much in contrast to the comparative coolness and semi-aridity of the Chou's more northerly environment.⁴⁰ The area's being largely uninhabited meant its natural resources had yet to be exploited, and abundant animal life still populated the grasslands and virgin scrub forests of the contiguous mountains. The nearby Mei-yang River Valley (which descends down to the Wei River east of the Ch'i-hsing River around Fu-feng) was, in fact, still so swampy and subject to flooding in the early Chou era that the sparse population was largely confined to higher ground.⁴¹

Soon after their shift, the proto-Chou not only became more organized but also gained the patina of permanency that justifies terming them “the Chou.” As the “Chou Pen-chi” notes, the legendary Tan Fu implemented crucial changes at Ch’i: walls and buildings were constructed, the people segmented according to unknown principles into different towns or quarters, and the beginnings of an incipient bureaucracy established with the appointment of “officials for the five offices.” These innovations reflect a determination to establish a focal power point from which to dominate the valley confines. The walls they erected, a defensive measure already employed by earlier peoples for thousands of years but not previously an important aspect of Chou culture, reinforced their sense of identity as much as they provided an impregnable refuge against attack and created a bastion for projecting power.

Winnowing out the extraneous factors, it appears that the Chou originated in the east among the Hsia, where they began to prosper because of their comparatively advanced agricultural practices., The Hsia’s demise then compelled the Chou to emigrate northward, initiating a lengthy semipastoral period spent among the Jung, Ti, Kuei-fang, T’u-fang (also frequently identified as a remnant Hsia group), and others, possibly in the Chin-chung and Shaan-pei regions on both sides of the Yellow River. ⁴² During these decades, they apparently continued to exploit their agricultural knowledge to the fullest extent possible in the cooler, more arid climate.

Whether due to internal motivation or environmental stress, they eventually commenced moving their center of habitation westward until finally encountering hostile barbarian groups whose aggressive behavior may have been fostered by the Shang. Prompted primarily by incursions, but no doubt also because they had been suffering the adverse effects of ongoing climatic changes, the proto-Chou subsequently moved southwestward, perhaps from the Fen River area into the Ching River Valley and finally down to the Mount Ch’i area, where they apparently subjugated the local Chiang who already populated the upper Wei River Valley. Rather than exterminating them or driving them out, the Chou subsumed the Chiang, and the incipient state became an evolving amalgamation of the two, though the Chi clan would always dominate.

Chou tales of having embraced emergent agricultural practices from the outset, rather than simply having been one of the semipastoral peripheral peoples, might have some unexplored implications, though only if historical memory persists as a nebulous imprint across generations. Ultimately the clan’s sedentary inception is relevant only to the degree that they and their descendants wished to consciously distinguish themselves from “barbarian” groups, however

reluctantly they might have been compelled to acknowledge a period of virtual debasement when they had to adopt the ways of the Jung and Ti, synonymous with an increased emphasis upon animal husbandry and the abandonment of permanent farming sites. Nevertheless, hunting, fishing, and pastoral practices continued to be important in both the pre and postconquest periods, as the massive hunt performed after the victory over the Shang indicates. ⁴³

Precursors of Fate

Traditional accounts fail to chronicle any confrontations with the Shang before the proto-Chou people ventured into the Wei River Valley and embarked on their trajectory of economic development and military expansion.⁴⁴ However, Shang Dynasty oracular inscriptions indicate that the Chou had impinged on their consciousness long before they achieved any real viability in the west. Relations appear to have initially been cordial because one or more of Wu Ting's consorts originated among the Chou and another "Fu Chou" ("Consort Chou") appears in inscriptions dated to the conjoined reigns of Wu Yi and Wen Ting.⁴⁵ Conversely, recently discovered inscriptions from Wu Ting's era inquiring about the possible death of a woman from the Shang royal house who had become the wife of Chung Chou's ruler indicate that, while the Chou still inhabited Pin, marriage relations were apparently practiced in both directions, no doubt to solidify their relationship in the manner that would be adopted by several imperial dynasties.⁴⁶

The Chou's ongoing submission of tribute, including shells, shamans, and beautiful women, provides evidence that they nominally, if grudgingly, recognized Shang overlordship.⁴⁷ Correspondingly, the Shang king occasionally inquired about their general well-being, including whether they would not be harmed by enemies such as the Fang or Ch'üan.⁴⁸ At times, the Chou were referred to as the Chou-fang, indicating that they were recognized as a political entity that lay outside the core Shang sphere of influence; at others, the ruler was termed a *Hou* (Lord) and even ordered to undertake some action,⁴⁹ implying subservient status and integration into the Shang hierarchy. A "commander Chou," presumably the Chou chieftain leading his own troops, also acted in a battlefield capacity similar to the rulers of other subject states in Wu Ting's early period.⁵⁰

Nevertheless, a fairly high-intensity campaign, which targeted the protostate of Chou and succeeded in ending what must have been perceived as their overt rebelliousness for the remainder of the dynasty, seems to have been undertaken late in Wu Ting's reign.⁵¹

Whether it stemmed simply from Shang and Chou interests colliding as a direct result of the Chou's growing presence at Pin or was triggered by a particular event is unknown. ⁵² The Chou may well have been trying to exploit the power vacuum created by Wu Ting's preoccupation with the nearby T'u-fang and Kung-fang to aggressively expand, contrary to traditional accounts.

One possible sequence concludes that the Shang's efforts were initiated in the twelfth month of an unspecified year when the leader of the Ch'üan (Yi), accompanied by his troops, mounted a destructive attack on the Chou. ⁵³ Thereafter, from the third to fifth months of the following year, the king dispatched him, several of the royal clan forces, ⁵⁴ and others to continuously attack the Chou, ⁵⁵ and then had yet another minor lord assault them in the eighth month of that same year. ⁵⁶ Although Wu Ting remained aloof, additional Shang and allied commanders, such as the ruler of Meng and Lord of Ts'ang, were also dispatched at various times, evidence of the conflict's intensity. ⁵⁷ Whether the Chou finally submitted to these onslaughts turns upon the interpretation of one fragmentary strip inquiring whether the Fang would severely harm the Chou. ⁵⁸ Some scholars interpret the king's interest as evidence that the Chou had been subjugated and therefore reintegrated into the Shang domain of submissive entities, but others contend they merely disappeared from the oracle records because they were no longer a matter of concern. ⁵⁹

This sudden inscriptional absence has also been tentatively explained with reference to Kung Liu's emigration from an original site probably in the Fen River Valley out to the middle Ching River Valley or, alternatively, to Tan Fu's emigration downward to Mount Ch'i in order to avoid barbarian ("Ti") pressures. ⁶⁰ Since this transfer presumably shifted them beyond the Shang's immediate sphere of concern, it is thought to thereby account for their apparent quiescence. Although the oracle bones indicate numerous groups apparently assaulted the Chou, since the Ch'üan have been identified as being the K'un Yi, a troublesome group that would frequently clash with the Chou, and as members of the Ti, they may well have been the aggressors responsible for the Chou movement. Moreover, it would be ongoing pressures and finally an invasion by the Ch'üan Jung that would compel the somewhat dissolute Chou rulers to abandon their dual capitals of Feng and Hao in 771 BCE and move eastward, precipitating the historical schism that divides the Western and Eastern Chou.

Somewhat puzzlingly, the traditional materials that record this event—particularly the *Bamboo Annals*—explicitly date the migration to Wu Yi's initial year or roughly fifty years after Wu Ting's demise. ⁶¹ It has also been suggested that the actual migration was the result of

another Ch'üan attack, one completely unrelated to earlier Shang animosity, which had been prompted by a breakdown in Shang authority. ⁶² Pending the discovery of definitive archaeological artifacts, further assessment of these two plausible explanations—defeat or displacement—however remains impossible.

Although the Chou's preconquest history in the Ching River and Wei River valleys was lengthy, the question of its extensiveness similarly remains difficult to resolve. The most likely sequence, assumed herein, correlates Kung Liu's migration with attacks initiated during King Wu Ting's reign rather than the Tan Fu's shift to Mount Ch'i, but the latter coheres more closely with the traditional interpretation derived from the *Shih Ching*. Irrespective of the actual date and whether their prehistory following their clash amounted to one hundred fifty or two hundred years, given the animosity marking Shang-Chou relations as chronicled in the *Bamboo Annals*, the martial nature of the Chou's eventual multidirectional expansion and their formalized role as a frontier bulwark prior to the dynasty's overthrow, the Chou's almost complete absence from the late oracle records remains puzzling.

Thrust to Conflict

As purportedly envisioned by the Chou and idealistically embellished in later historical writings, the epoch-making clash between the Chou and Shang virtually created the conjoined concepts of a Heavenly mandate and nebulous but responsive Heaven. King Wen's righteous destruction of the impious Hsin and his coterie of debauched, parasitic supporters came to be portrayed as the very personification of the archetypal battle of good and evil, Virtue and perversity. Although believed to be similarly motivated, having occurred before the advent of written language, the Shang's earlier conquest of the Hsia lingered only as a legend even in antiquity. However, the Chou's determined, self-proclaimed effort to free the realm from the yoke of suffering and establish a benevolent rule of Virtue subsequently became the inspirational essence for China's moral self-perception. ⁶³ Henceforth, as dynasties decayed and ineffectual rulers became morally corrupt, new champions who offered enticing promises of righteousness, beneficence, and the quick remission of inimical state policies would emerge to rescue the people from impending doom.

Questions have increasingly been raised about the too-conspicuous nature of Chou *Virtue* (as well as the depths of Hsin's perversity) and suggestions have advanced that the extant historical materials from the Chou and thereafter—including the *Tso Chuan*, *Shih Chi*, and so-called authentic *Shang Shu* chapters such as the "Chiu Kao," "K'ang Kao," and "Li Cheng"—were all heavily influenced by

Chou postconquest propaganda intended to justify their usurpation of power. ⁶⁴ Although not without validity, the inscriptions found on numerous early cauldrons such as the *Yü Ting*, *Ta K'o Ting*, *Mao Kuei*, and *Shih Ch'iang P'an* indicate this was a manifest belief, one the leaders had already embraced when they launched the first campaign and continued to reiterate among themselves long thereafter.

The Shang conquest of the Hsia, having been justified in nearly identical terms, has been similarly dismissed as a Chou fabrication, nothing more than an attempt to create a viable precedent for their own rebellion. But it has also been claimed that, with reference to Heaven, the Shang had evolved a distinctive concept of Virtue which essentially amounted to seeing and performing the correct action. King T'ang, acting on behalf of the people, then initiated measures to implement it. ⁶⁵ The Chou in turn essentially reoriented it to emphasize the welfare of the entire populace rather than just the members of the nobility, minimizing the appeal to Heaven except for the mandate. ⁶⁶ Irrespective of the exact contents, to the extent there was any belief in Virtue and a sense they were implementing (or merely according with) some sort of transpersonal or transcendent intent, for at least some of the participants, the image of Virtue enacted must have served as a powerful motivator. ⁶⁷

The concept of justified rebellion need not be considered simply postevent rationalization. Warring States military writings would subsequently discern different types of wars, including righteous wars, and ascribe emotional effects to them. Failing to act would even come to be considered heinous: "When action should be initiated, one who hesitates and is quiet, without advancing, seriously injures all living beings. Weapons are inauspicious instruments, and the Tao of Heaven abhors them. However, when their employment is unavoidable it accords with the Tao of Heaven." ⁶⁸ This is not to deny that Kings Wen and Wu, as well as their supporters, were motivated to overthrow what they viewed as a repressive government, but that any impulse to revolution was complex and no doubt stimulated by many factors including natural animosity, the quest for domination, and freedom from despotic interference.

Later writers amplified the resulting portrait of a tyrannical and perverse ruler for didactic purposes, although not without an occasional dissenting voice such as Tzu Kung who opined that he was not as evil as depicted. ⁶⁹ Nevertheless, by all accounts, Emperor Hsin appears to have been a cruel master who well merited the vile epithets accorded him., His perversities purportedly far exceeded King Chieh's: the exaction of heavy taxes; imposition of onerous labor services, mainly to provide him with lavish palaces and pleasure centers; interference with agricultural practices, causing widespread hunger

and deprivation; indulgence in orgies, debauchery, drunkenness, and wanton violence; the brutal murder of innumerable people, including famous men of Virtue and loyal court officials; and the creation and infliction of inhuman punishments. Social disorder consequently became rampant, and it was believed that Heaven was displeased.

The numerous recovered bronze vessels designed to heat, serve, and consume liquor show that alcoholic libations must have played an important role in Shang rituals and feasting and thus somewhat substantiate Chou denunciations of pervasive inebriation. ⁷⁰ However, despite its being seen in early documents and reflected in a few brief bronze inscriptions, their condemnation appears to have been excessive, as well as proclaimed partly for propagandistic purposes. The king was also said to have been talented, powerful, and fearsome and thus a very formidable enemy, rather than simply a debauched imbecile: ⁷¹

In natural ability and discrimination Emperor Hsin ⁷² was acute and quick, his hearing and sight were extremely sensitive, and his physical skills and strength surpassed other men's. His hands could slay a fierce animal, his knowledge was sufficient to ward off criticism, and his verbal skills were sufficient to adorn his errors. He boasted to his ministers about his own ability, was haughty to all the realm with his reputation, and believed that all were below him. He loved wine, debauched himself in music, and was enamored of his consorts. He loved Ta Chi and followed her words. ⁷³ Thus he had Shih Chüan create new licentious sounds, the Pei-li dance [of licentious women], and the [lewd] music of "fluttering down."

He made the taxes heavier in order to fill the Deer Tower with coins and stuffed the Chü-ch'iao storehouses with grain. He increased his collections of dogs, horses, and unusual objects so that they overflowed the palace buildings. He expanded the Sha-ch'iu garden tower and had a multitude of wild animals and flying birds brought there. He was disrespectful to ghosts and spirits. He assembled numerous musicians and actors at the Sha-ch'iu Garden, made a lake of wine and a forest of hanging meat, and had naked men and women pursue each other in them, conducting a drinking feast throughout the night. The hundred surnames looked toward him with hatred, and some of the feudal lords revolted.

Once the Chou became established in the Wei River Valley, relations with the Shang waxed between conciliatory and openly aggressive. As the chronicle below shows, the last Shang emperors

grudgingly recognized the Chou's might when it suited their purposes (such as conveniently acting as a defensive bulwark against more western enemies) but turned to remedial actions when they felt threatened. However, even as they were gradually losing control of the outer quarters, the Shang's ability to execute King Chi Li and imprison King Wen testifies to their remnant authority. Despite the danger, the historically underestimated Chi Li still vastly expanded the Chou's domain; King Wen then nurtured the state's power, implemented strong economic policies to foster the people's welfare, and fashioned a strong reputation for Virtue; and King Wu completed their preparations by multiplying their alliances, subjugating potential enemies, and forging a formidable army before they undertook the final campaign.

Among the crucial events marking the Chou's fulfillment of their destiny was King Wen's infamous imprisonment, sometimes said to have been for stubbornly offering loyal (and no doubt irritating) remonstrance, but more likely because of his visible success in expanding their domain through military expeditions. Said to have been detained anywhere from one to six or seven years, he reportedly regained his freedom when lavish bribes gathered by his family and other virtuous men appeased Hsin's avariciousness.⁷⁴ Moreover, according to the *Shih Chi*, the gifts presented were so generous and impressive that King Wen, who continued to profess his submission and fealty to the Shang, was even designated as the Western Duke or Lord of the West.⁷⁵ When the title was conferred, he was presented with a bow, arrows, and axes, three symbols of the attendant military responsibilities that would ironically require him to actively protect the empire from external challenges.

Legend holds that during his enforced sojourn he devoted himself to meditation, ordered the *Yi Ching's* sixty-four hexagrams, and appended the Judgments, the latter two transcendently sagacious activities befitting a future cultural legend.⁷⁶ His reign, which began when he was fifty, is said in the *Shih Chi* to have lasted fifty-five years, with his death coming nine years after being released by the Shang. (Such great longevity, which he reputedly shared with the T'ai Kung and the perverse Hsin, is extremely unlikely in an age of short life expectancy.) Upon King Wen's death King Wu ascended the throne and earnestly dedicated himself to fulfilling what they claimed to be the Mandate of Heaven: overthrowing the Shang and establishing the Chou.

Chronicle of Ascension

After having been the subject of leisurely contemplation for centuries, the date of the monumental battle at Mu-yeh and the

inherently related chronologies of the Shang and Western Chou kings prior to the first commonly recognized historically reliable date of 842 BCE, the start of the Kung Ho era, have been assiduously pursued over the past several decades. ⁷⁷ Depending upon the accounts chosen, attribution of inscriptional materials, ⁷⁸ astronomical data extracted, and calculations employed, conquest dates ranging from 1127 BCE to 1018 BCE have been “conclusively” (and often contentiously) derived from the available data by no fewer than fifty Chinese and western authorities. ⁷⁹

The Hsia-Shang-Chou Chronology project assigned a date of 1046 BCE to the Chou conquest, yet overseas scholars and even a few analysts in China have questioned its validity, criticized the methodology, and continued to argue for the appropriateness of other possibilities. ⁸⁰ Although it is a controversy best left to experts with calendrical and astronomical expertise, dating the campaign’s initiation to the late autumn or early winter of 1046 and its conclusion back at the capital of Hao later in the spring of 1045 appear well founded and almost certainly accurate to within a year or two. ⁸¹

Having recently been reinstated as an essentially reliable record of early events, the *Bamboo Annals*’ chronicle of the Chou’s evolution merits recounting before pondering any other textual, inscriptional, or archaeological evidence. Two entries briefly note that after Tan Fu emigrated to Mount Ch’i, the king of the Shang formally bestowed their newly erected city upon them, thereby sanctioning their renewed presence in the Shang sphere of influence. (This implies that the Shang still regarded the Wei River Valley, long since abandoned, as part of their domain. The proto-Chou’s emigration therefore constituted an incursion.) Thereafter, the first reference to Chou military activity occurs in Wu Yi’s twenty-fourth year when Chou forces attacked Ch’eng, engaged them in battle at Pi, and conquered them. Thus, despite Tan Fu’s vaunted nonconfrontational stance, from the outset, it was battlefield achievement that prompted historical notice.

The succeeding entry for Wu Yi’s thirtieth year continues in a martial vein: “Chou’s army attacked the Yi Ch’ü and returned after capturing their ruler.” Four years later, for unknown reasons, King Wu Yi chose to visibly honor Chi Li, the great leader whose contributions would prove instrumental in forging the Chou, by presenting him with thirty *li* of territory, ten sets of jade, and ten horses when he visited the Shang court. ⁸² Essentially a form of enfeoffment, the king’s actions were doubtless intended to at least nominally integrate the Chou into the greater Shang political sphere.

The final Chou entry for King Wu Yi’s reign notes that in his

thirty-fifth year, Chi Li attacked the formidable Kuei Jung in Hsi Luo, thereby garnering his fourth victory during Wu Yi's era. ⁸³ Remarkably, all the martial activities recorded for the brief reign of his successor, Wen Wu Ting, involve the Chou and the latter's growing success so unsettled the king that Wen Wu Ting imprisoned and finally executed Chi Li in his eleventh year. However, near the beginning, in Wen Ting's second year, the Chou experienced a severe reversal when they assaulted the Jung at Yen-ching, ending their string of victories. Yet Chi Li managed to rebound two years later when the Chou vanquished another group of Jung out at Yü-wo. For this achievement (and perhaps others that remain unknown), the Shang bestowed the title of "Mu Shih" upon Chi

Li. Functionally equivalent to "chief shepherd," the emphasis no doubt fell on the shepherd's protective role because the Shang had turned its attention eastward and did not want to be perturbed by incursions originating in the west. Basking in this newly bestowed honor, Chi Li undertook the construction of a new city at Ch'eng in Wen Ting's fifth year.

Before his demise, Chi Li led their forces to victory in two more strikes on external peoples. The first, which unfolded in Wen Ting's seventh year, resulted in defeating the Jung of Shih-hu while the second, four years later, saw them vanquish the Jung of Yi-t'u. Having captured three tribal leaders in the latter encounter, Chi Li ventured to the Shang court to report his victory and present his captives but was unexpectedly executed rather than praised. Although King Wen Ting probably had him slain to quash the escalating military threat, his actions remain puzzling because even if Chi Li had acted presumptuously in undertaking these campaigns, he had voluntarily come to court, thereby fulfilling the basic requirements incumbent on a submissive under lord. Moreover, Wen Ting had found it convenient to allow the Chou to actively screen them from external western enemies, especially after the Chou had been assigned a circumscribed position within the Shang hierarchy and, as recently recovered Chou oracle inscriptions indicate, Chi Li was married to a Shang princess and therefore doubly bound to the Shang ruling clan.

Chi Li amassed an impressive six victories in seven known engagements over the reigns of these two Shang kings, to which should be added two earlier ones presumably also under his personal direction. From the sparse *Bamboo Annals* it appears he was a charismatic leader who never shied away from mounting expansionist military campaigns against peripheral peoples, whether simply to protect the Chou or ensure its growth. However, when King Wen began his reign in Wen Wu Ting's twelfth year, he must have felt it advisable to maintain a low profile and simply consolidate the Chou

position because no further military activity is reported for Wen Ting's waning days or Emperor Yi's succeeding nine year rule. Whether the Chou forces were truly inactive or their campaigns simply entailed no consequences for the Shang and therefore went unrecorded remains unknown.

Emperor Hsin's lengthy reign witnessed the final stages of Chou ascension and the concurrent collapse of the Shang, whose many miseries and deficiencies have traditionally been attributed to the emperor's perversities. Hereafter, as the Chou grew stronger and the Shang remained oblivious to its imminent demise, the *Bamboo Annals* are replete with cryptically recorded battles and baleful omens., From the Chou's perspective, Emperor Hsin's initial year actually began quite auspiciously because he formally recognized the Chou and two other states. Then in his sixth year, King Wen, now known as the Duke of the West (Hsi Po), offered sacrifice (to Heaven) at Pi where his father was buried, a blatant usurpation of imperial prerogative even if Heaven was not an object of Shang worship. ⁸⁴

Meanwhile, the Shang was hardly idle. The royal army attacked the Yu Su and captured the infamous *femme fatale* Tan Yi whom Hsin took back and established in lavish quarters that were described as having "walls of carnation stone and doors all adorned with gems." ⁸⁵ A decade later, in his seventeenth year, the Chou successfully attacked the Ti, another major steppe group in the north, evidence that they had once again embarked on an aggressive course and were not afraid to take the battle to presumably threatening enemies.

The first discernible signs of Shang decline and Chou ascendancy were recorded in Hsin's twenty-first year: "In the first month, spring, the feudal lords came to the Chou court. Po Yi and Shu Ch'i emigrated to the Chou from Ku-chu." Throughout Chinese history the defection of talented officials and moral exemplars would be recognized as one of the prime indications of a doomed state. ⁸⁶ Conversely, the ability to attract them would constitute visible evidence of a state's worth even as it facilitated achieving its destiny because defectors not only bring vital skills but also provide clandestine information about the enemy. Yet the next year, Emperor Hsin still tried to cower the Chou into remaining submissive by holding a "great hunt" in Wei close to the Chou's capital of Ch'eng, perhaps accounting for his ability to summon and imprison King Wen just one year thereafter at Yu-li.

As already noted, King Wen's enforced idleness reputedly allowed him to contemplate numerous abstract issues and contribute to the creation of the famous divination classic known as the *Yi Ching* or *Chou Yi*, a text on change that may reflect a new mode of thinking. ⁸⁷ Almost seven years passed before he was released in Emperor Hsin's twenty-ninth year, no mention of the large bribe otherwise said

to have been paid by various officials and feudal lords appearing in the *Annals* themselves. However, they do record that a number of feudal lords came forth to meet him as he returned to Ch'eng, a truly ominous sign that should not have gone unnoticed in the Shang. If only temporarily, his ordeal must have persuaded King Wen to adopt an ostensibly conciliatory policy because he led the other lords in offering tribute at the Shang court the very next year. Nevertheless, Hsin's thirty-first year saw "the Hsi Po put the army in order at Pi and gain Lü Shang as commander." ⁸⁸

Even though military campaigns were supposed to be mounted on the Shang's behalf and under their explicit authority, King's Wen's actions turned out to be a harbinger of suddenly increased, Chou-originated, martial activity. Prompted by favorable omens that would be interpreted as having received the mandate of Heaven, in Hsin's thirty-second year, "forces from Mi invaded Yüan so the Hsi Po led a force against Mi." King Wen's army must have gained an overwhelming victory because "Mi's forces surrendered to Chou's armies and were removed to Ch'eng" the next year. Entries such as these are interpreted as evidence that the Chou emulated the Shang by enslaving the vanquished, although the degree to which both may have been so-called slave societies remains the subject of heated disagreement.

Apparently impressed by this achievement, Hsin ironically granted King Wen the power as Hsi Po to initiate punitive military actions on his own recognizance. Even though the Chou should have been viewed as a serious threat and military activities vigorously discouraged, they were now surprisingly justified in training and maintaining significant military forces. Evidently the emperor deemed it convenient, economical, or strategically advisable to continue to employ them in an external defensive role, perhaps because he thought it would divert their attention away from the Shang heartland or even debilitate them. If so, he seriously miscalculated because these armed encounters with peripheral peoples, traditionally said to be fierce warriors but perhaps less formidable than reputed, strengthened rather than enervated the Chou.

In Emperor Hsin's thirty-fourth year, after seizing Ch'i and Han and successfully attacking Ch'ung, the Chou suffered an unexpected setback when "in winter, the twelfth month, the K'un Yi encroached upon Chou." The K'un Yi's success in penetrating core terrain may have prompted the capital's movement to Feng within a year even though the people were suffering from a severe famine at the time. The enormous effort involved in moving innumerable objects with primitive wheeled transport and constructing a new city must have imposed great hardship upon the people, contrary to later doctrine

that periods of difficulty require benevolent policies. Inflicting such misery could only have been justified by an ever-present risk of invasion though other factors, including an increasingly insurmountable exhaustion of fertility that mandated the exploitation of new farmland to maintain productivity, which may have been equally important.⁸⁹ The capture of a large number of enemy soldiers may also have played a role because vastly increased terrain would have been required to usefully employ them and this new labor pool certainly would have facilitated the grunt work of transport. Being only a migration in part and thus unlike early Shang shifting of their capitals, it was of course fundamentally expansionist in nature.

By this time the Chou had nurtured considerable support among the feudal lords who, in the spring of the emperor's thirty-sixth year, not only paid their respects at the Chou court, but also subsequently supported King Wen in a coalition attack on the K'un Yi. Apart from the immediate military benefit of neutralizing this persistent enemy, the campaign provided further experience in alliance building and developed expertise in joint field action, thereby nurturing a foundation for future efforts against the Shang, particularly since nothing cements alliances like success. Growing power, a desire to expand their agricultural base, and possibly the need to absorb new prisoners probably prompted King Wen to have his son, the future King Wu, undertake the construction of the third Chou city at Hao which would eventually become a conjoined second capital. No doubt to attract the worthy and augment his reputation for wisdom and sagacity, he also had a royal college built the next year.

Emperor Hsin's thirty-ninth year witnessed the defection of a Shang high official, Hsin Chia, to the Chou, another prominent sign of incipient decay. However, without fulfilling his ambition of overthrowing the Shang, King Wen died in Hsin's forty-first year and was buried at Pi, about thirty *li* west of Feng. The next year, King Wu's first reign year began auspiciously when he received a vermilion covered book of wisdom from Lü Shang, otherwise known as the T'ai Kung, to whom the famous Warring States book of strategy entitled the *Liu T'ao* or *Six Secret Teachings* would, however nominally, subsequently be attributed.⁹⁰ The *Bamboo Annals* also contain an odd entry stating, "a woman was transformed into a man," and a further note that Mount Yao crumbled the next year, both extremely ominous portents for the Shang.

In Hsin's forty-fourth year, King Wu attacked the important Shang client state of Li; in his forty-seventh, yet another Shang official, the *Nei Shih*, opted for the Chou; and in his forty-eighth an odd animal and two suns were reportedly seen. Finally, in what turned out to be a somewhat bizarre, virtual rehearsal for the actual

assault, in Emperor Hsin's fifty-first year, "in the winter, on *wu-tzu* (twenty-fifth), Chou armies forded the Yellow River at Meng-chin but then turned back."

This enigmatic entry is followed in the *Bamboo Annals* by a note on two oft-cited heinous acts generally interpreted as confirming the Shang's perversity: the imprisonment of Ch'i-tzu, a close royal clan member and well-known Worthy, and the murder of Prince Pi-kan, both then followed by the earl of Wei's flight. In consequence, in the fifty-second year, "on *keng-yin* the Chou first began (its movement) to attack Yin (Shang). In autumn, Chou's armies encamped at Hsien-yüan. In winter, the twelfth month, Chou's armies offered sacrifice to Shang Ti. ⁹¹ Yung, Su, Ch'iang, Mao, Wei, Lu, P'eng, and P'u accompanied them. The Chou armies attacked Yin." Although the engagement's outcome is surprisingly left unspecified under Emperor Hsin's reign, for King Wu's twelfth year the *Bamboo Annals* simply state, "On *hsin-mao* the king led the Western Yi and the feudal lords in an attack on Yin that defeated them at Mu-yeh."

The laconic chronicle thus concludes with a succinct understatement bereft of dramatic insight or useful details, raising many questions. Fortunately, many of them can be cautiously fleshed out with the traditionally esteemed accounts preserved in the *Shih Chi's* "Chou Pen-chi" ("Chou Basic Annals") and the information found in the hereditary recounting of the early leaders such as "Ch'i T'ai Kung Shih-chia," as well as confirmed and even expanded with newly discovered inscriptional evidence, including from the impressive bronze vessel known as the *Li Kuei*.

The most important questions entail the Chou's early history and evolution, particularly their apparently ruthless military expansion; the nature of the battle at Mu-yeh, including the forces employed and the level of intensity; the roles of the chariots, infantry, and elite warriors; the actions of key individuals; the number of casualties; relative and absolute dates of the campaign; a reason for the first feint, deliberate rehearsal or mystical qualms; the number of allies actually responding; the Shang's pervasive failure to realize the extent of the Chou threat and its apparently disorganized response; whether Shang forces were already debilitated from other campaigns; the role of righteous motivation in wresting victory; why the Chou kings so carelessly allowed themselves to be imprisoned, even executed; the true martial nature of the Chou enterprise, which consisted of and emphasized, military achievement far more than conquest by Virtue; and how dominant the Chou may have been immediately after the conquest.

Surprisingly, despite commonly employing historical battles to illustrate fundamental concepts and various tactical principles,

imperial-era Chinese military writings rarely cite the Chou conquest and the clash at Mu-yeh. Perhaps Mencius's comments coupled with the adoption of Confucianism as the official state philosophy dissuaded subsequent discussion of any aspects other than the confidence expressed by the participants in the face of baleful omens. The military portions of the famous *T'ung Tien* contain a few references, but they mainly consist of the T'ai Kung's tactical advice and recounting of incidents in which the T'ai Kung denied the inimical import of one or another inauspicious occurrence. ⁹²

Traditional Account

The three *Shih Chi* chapters that succinctly chronicle the Chou's final steps in their focused campaign to overthrow the Shang, augmented by chapters from the *Shang Shu*, provided the crux of the traditional account that held sway for two millennia. ⁹³ Furthermore, in essentially defining the historical interpretation of many epoch-making events the *Shih Chi* depiction would disproportionately constrain imperial debates over martial affairs. Although influenced by Chou propaganda and shaped by Warring States and early Han Confucian thought, these chapters still preserve many essential events, often the only recounting, and therefore merit careful scrutiny.

As might be expected from its title, the probably, but not invariably, exaggerated depiction of Emperor Hsin's increasingly odious behavior in the "Chou Basic Annals" is more extensive and explicit than in the "Yin Basic Annals," though the latter surprisingly describes his flaws in greater detail. ⁹⁴ After noting he had received the throne in preference to his older brothers because of their mother's lowly status, ⁹⁵ the "Yin Pen-chi" comments that Hsin was widely hated for creating several heinous punishments ⁹⁶ and enumerates a few instances of his brutality:

The hundred surnames looked toward him with rancor and some of the feudal lords rebelled, whereupon Emperor Hsin made the punishments heavier and created the method of the fiery pillar. He appointed Hsi Po Ch'ang [King Wen], the Marquis of Chiu, and the Marquis of Eh as his Three Dukes. ⁹⁷ The Marquis of Chiu had a surpassing daughter whom he introduced to Emperor Hsin but she did not enjoy licentious activities. Enraged, Emperor Hsin killed her and had the marquis sliced up and pickled. The Marquis of Eh strongly remonstrated with him and repeatedly angered him, so the emperor also had him killed and dried.

When Ch'ang, the Hsi Po, heard of these things, he sighed. Marquis Hu of Ch'ung learned about it and informed Emperor Hsin who then imprisoned the Hsi Po at Yu-li. Hung Yao, one of

Hsi Po's officials, and others sought out beautiful women, rare items, and superlative horses and presented them to Emperor Hsin who then pardoned the Hsi Po. 98

When the Hsi Po went forth, he presented territory west of the Luo River with a request that the punishment of the fiery pillar be eliminated. Emperor Hsin assented and presented him with a bow, arrows, hatchet, and ax, enabling him to conduct punitive attacks. But then he engaged Fei Chung to oversee the government. Fei Chung excelled at flattery and loved profits, so Yin's officials were not close to him. Emperor Hsin also employed Eh Lai. 99 Eh Lai excelled at vilifying others, so the feudal lords became increasingly estranged.

According to this version, Yin's future nemesis was a compassionate leader who found the plight of the people troubling. Unfortunately having somehow become a highly honored Shang official, he readily became embroiled in court intrigue. The "Chou Pen-chi" offers an expanded account that stresses the stark moral contrast between these two archetypes:

The Hsi Po was called King Wen. He revered the endeavors of Hou Chi and Duke Liu, modeled on the methods of the Ancient Duke and Duke Chi, was sincere and benevolent, respected the aged, and was compassionate to the young. He was courteous and deferential to the worthy and didn't take time for his midday meal in order to attend upon *shih*. 100 For this reason many *shih* gave him their allegiance. At Ku-chu, Po Yi and Shu Ch'i heard that the Hsi Po excelled at nurturing the aged so they went and gave their allegiance. T'ai Tien, Hung Yao, San Yi-sheng, Yü-tzu, Hsin Chi, and other high officials all went and gave him their allegiance.

Marquis Hu of Ch'ung slandered the Hsi Po to Emperor Hsin: "Hsi Po is accumulating goodness and piling up Virtue so that all the feudal lords will incline toward him. This will not be advantageous to your imperial majesty." 101 Emperor Hsin therefore imprisoned the Hsi Po at Yu-li. Being troubled by this, Hung Yao and others sought out beautiful women from among the Yu-hsin, variegated horses from the Li Jung, and nine teams of four horses from the Yu-ching, as well as other rare and unusual objects and had them presented to Emperor Hsin through his favorite minister Fei Chung.

Elated, Emperor Hsin exclaimed: "Just one of these would have been sufficient to free the Hsi Po; how much more so this many!" So he pardoned the Hsi Po and presented him with a bow, arrows, hatchet, and axe enabling him to conduct punitive attacks

and said: “The one who vilified you was Marquis Hu of Ch’ung.” The Hsi Po then presented him with territory west of the Luo River in order to request the elimination of the punishment of the fiery pillar. Emperor Hsin assented.

Given Emperor Hsin’s complacency (discussed below), it is unlikely he would have imprisoned the Hsi Po for secretly implementing beneficent measures. ¹⁰² At the same time, markedly in contrast to Emperor Hsin, King Wen must have embarked upon a deliberate course of conscious self-cultivation and image making in order to attract the relatively unentangled feudal lords and gain the support of the worthy. Whether he was truly motivated to the good or simply believed it offered the most effective method for becoming powerful, his endeavors proved successful:

The Hsi Po secretly practiced goodness and the feudal lords all went to him for adjudication. At this time officials from Yü and Jui had an unresolved dispute so they went to Chou. ¹⁰³ As soon as they entered the borders they found that the farmers yielded the paths demarking the fields to each other and that the people’s custom was always to defer to their elders. Ashamed, even before seeing the Hsi Po the officials from Yü and Jui said to each other, “What we fight over is what the people of Chou are ashamed about. If we go forward with this, it will only be to our insult.” They then returned to their states, yielded the contested land to each other, and went off. When the feudal lords heard about this they said, “The Hsi Po has assuredly received the mandate to rule.” ¹⁰⁴

By asserting that he was already being perceived as a Heavenly sanctioned future ruler, the last line immediately recasts the perception of King Wen’s activities. More importantly, his reputation for Virtue and equitable government reputedly prompted the two minor states of Yü and Jui to send emissaries for Solomon-like adjudication of their dispute. Later embellishments similarly speak of their being so chagrined by the orderly nature of Chou society they mutually reconciled amid protestations of yielding and deference, well befitting the beneficiaries of such enlightenment. As if the incident were not sufficiently compelling, in the late *Shuo Yüan* version Confucius is (spuriously) cited as having extolled King Wen’s Virtue by exclaiming, “How great was King Wen’s Tao! Nothing could possibly be added. Without moving people were transformed, without acting they were completed. Just by sincerely cultivating himself the Yü and Jui achieved peace by themselves.” ¹⁰⁵

Historians have generally located Jui within the intersection of

Yellow and Wei Rivers. ¹⁰⁶ However, recent excavations around ancient Han-ch'eng where Jui's populace apparently emigrated or was moved in the middle of the Western Chou and remained for another two hundred years before the protostate was extinguished by Ch'in, indicates they originally inhabited the Lung-hsien area of Shaanxi and had the Chi surname. ¹⁰⁷ Because of the nature of their dispute, Yü must have shared a contiguous border rather than being situated far off at their later Spring and Autumn site, no doubt the result of the Western Chou practice of reassigning fiefs and transferring people.

Probably because his adherents were growing, King Wen became confident enough to initiate a concerted effort to eliminate nearby threats and construct an opulent new capital (just as chronicled by the *Bamboo Annals*):

The next year the Chou attacked the Ch'üan Jung. The year after they attacked Mi Hsü and the year after that they defeated the state of Ch'i. ¹⁰⁸ When Yin's minister Tsu Yi heard about it, he was frightened and informed Emperor Hsin. Emperor Hsin retorted, "Don't I have the mandate of Heaven? So what can they do?" The next year the Chou attacked Yü. The year after they attacked Marquis Hu of Ch'ung, built the capital of Feng, and descended from Mount Ch'i, moving their capital to Feng. The next year the Hsi Po died and Heir-apparent Fa was established as King Wu. ¹⁰⁹

Although not explicitly mentioned (probably because revenge would be an improper motive for conducting a punitive campaign), Marquis Hu had previously been responsible for King Wen's imprisonment.

The "Yin Pen-chi" expands Tsu Yi's futile encounter with Emperor Hsin with further details and projected dialogue: ¹¹⁰

After the Hsi Po returned to Feng, he secretly cultivated his Virtue and implemented goodness so most of the feudal lords rebelled against Emperor Hsin and went to give their allegiance to him. Because the Hsi Po was increasingly great, Emperor Hsin gradually lost some of his authority. Prince Pi Kan remonstrated with Hsin but wasn't heeded. Emperor Hsin also dismissed Shih Jung, a worthy beloved by the hundred surnames.

The Hsi Po attacked and extinguished the state of Chi. Hearing about it and foreseeing calamity, Hsin's minister Tsu Yi raced to inform the emperor: "Heaven has already terminated Yin's mandate. Neither seers nor the sagacious turtle dare to foretell auspiciousness. It is not that the former kings do not sustain their descendants, but that your majesty is licentious,

brutal, and self-reliant. Thus Heaven has abandoned us and we are not secure even in our meals. There is no pleasure in our Heavenly nature 111 and canonical methods are not practiced. Thus among our people there are none who do not want to perish, saying, ‘Why doesn’t Heaven send down its awesomeness? Why doesn’t the Great Mandate come?’ Now what is Your Majesty going to do about this?”

Emperor Hsin said, “Isn’t my life fated by Heaven!”

Tsu Yi replied, “Hsin cannot be remonstrated with.”

Emperor Hsin’s confidence in his invincibility would remain unshaken until the final day of conflict. Given his reputed talent and intelligence, how he could have become so isolated from reality, so determinedly immersed in debauchery despite numerous warnings courageously voiced by his ministers, remains an enigma. In contrast, King Wen conspicuously focused on Virtue and even employed the period of his confinement to cultivate wisdom, as suited a future cultural paragon. As retold by the “Chou Pen-chi,” had King Wen lived, the interests and personalities of these two powerful rulers would have fated a dramatic clash:

The Hsi Po probably held the throne for fifty years. When he was imprisoned at Yu-li, he apparently increased the *Yi Ching*’s eight trigrams to create the sixty-four hexagrams. When the poets speak of the Hsi Po they see him as receiving the mandate and term him a king when he decided the dispute between Yü and Jui. Ten years later he died and was posthumously titled King Wen. 112 He had changed the laws and measures and ordered and rectified the calendar’s starting date. Looking back, he honored the Ancient Duke as King T’ai and Duke Chi as King Chi. Apparently their kingship commenced with King T’ai.

Given his advanced age, unceasing activity, and the relatively harsh conditions prevailing in the eleventh century BCE, King Wen’s death should not have been unexpected. Insofar as he was thought to have personally received the Mandate of Heaven, the political situation following his death immediately became complicated. His son Fa, who was subsequently accorded the epithet “martial” and thus known as King Wu, not only succeeded him but was also compelled to revitalize the task of empire building:

When King Wu ascended the throne, T’ai Kung Wang served as *Shih* ; Tan, the Duke of Chou, was the *Fu* ; and others, such as the Duke of Shao and Duke of Pi, acted as advisors (*shih*) on the left and right of the king in cultivating the endeavors of King Wen.

In his ninth year King Wu went up to Pi to offer sacrifice and then reviewed the troops in the east, going as far as Meng-chin. He fashioned a wooden spirit tablet for King Wen and carried it about in a chariot amid the Center Army. King Wu termed himself Heir-apparent Fa and spoke of mounting the attack in accord with King Wen's intent, never daring to undertake it on his sole authority.

He then informed the *Ssu Ma* , *Ssu T'u* , *Ssu K'ung* , and others under military stricture, "Be diligent, attentive, and have faith! I do not have any knowledge, but because our ancestors had Virtue, I, their minister and little son, have received their former merit. I have throughout established rewards and punishments in order to secure this merit." Thereafter he mobilized the army. The *Shih Shang-fu* (T'ai Kung) shouted the command: "Unite your masses of common people and your boats and oars. Those who arrive afterward will be beheaded!" 113

When King Wu crossed the Yellow River, a white fish jumped into the king's boat in the midst of the river. King Wu bent over and seized it to use in sacrifice. When he had already completed the crossing, a flame descended from above to below, reaching as far as (above) the king's house. It flowed until it became a bird, red in color with a desolate sound. At this time the feudal lords who assembled at Meng-chin numbered eight hundred. The feudal lords all said, "Yin can be attacked," but King Wu said, "You are not cognizant of Heaven's Mandate. It cannot yet." So he turned the army around and returned. 114

Two years later they heard that Emperor Hsin had become increasingly muddled, chaotic, and brutal, and that he had killed Pi Kan and imprisoned Ch'i-tzu. Grand *Shih* Tz'u and Minor *Shih* Ch'iang, embracing their musical instruments, fled to the Chou. Thereupon King Wu informed the feudal lords everywhere, "Yin has committed great offenses and must be attacked."

The "Yin Pen-chi" chronicles the catalytic loss of these worthies somewhat more dramatically:

Emperor Hsin was increasingly dissolute, chaotic, and undisciplined. Wei-tzu remonstrated with him several times but went unheeded so he plotted with the Grand *Shih* and Minor *Shih* and subsequently departed. 115 However, saying "to be someone's minister means one must fight to the death," Pi-kan strongly remonstrated with Emperor Hsin. Hsin angrily said, "I have heard that sages have seven holes in their hearts" and cut Pi-kan open to observe his heart. Terrified, Ch'i-tzu feigned being crazy and acted as a slave but Emperor Hsin still imprisoned him. Yin's Great and

Minor Music Masters then fled to Chou with their sacrificial musical instruments. Thereupon King Wu of the Chou led the feudal lords in an attack on Hsin.

In recounting the remaining stages of the conquest, the “Chou Pen-chi” offers several figures for the respective forces that demand further analysis despite having become canonical:

To honor King Wen, King Wu led 300 war chariots, 3,000 Tiger Warriors, and 45,000 armored soldiers to the east to attack Emperor Hsin. In his 11th year, the 12th month, on *wu-wu* (the 55th), the entire army crossed the Yellow River at Meng-chin. ¹¹⁶ When the feudal lords had all assembled, (King Wu) said: “Be unremitting and diligent!”

King Wu then composed the “T’ai Shih” and proclaimed it to the masses. ¹¹⁷ “Now King Hsin of Yin employs the words of his consorts and has cut himself off from Heaven. He has vilified and destroyed the Three Uprights, distanced himself from and estranged his father’s and mother’s clans, severed and abandoned the music of his ancestors, and created licentious sounds that he employs to change and confuse the orthodox sounds in order to give pleasure to his consorts. Thus I, Fa, am only respectfully implementing Heaven’s punishment. Exert yourselves, there cannot be a second or third time.”

In the second month, on *chia-tzu* [the first], at the breaking of darkness, King Wu faced Shang opposite the outer suburbs of Mu-yeh and swore an oath. In his left hand King Wu wielded a yellow [bronze] axe, in his right he grasped a white pennon with which to signal. ¹¹⁸ “You have come far, you men of the West!”

King Wu then said, “Ah, esteemed rulers from my states, *Ssu T’u* , *Ssu Ma* , *Ssu K’ung* , martial officials, clan officers, generals, commanders of a thousand, commanders of a hundred, together with men from Yung, Shu, Ch’iang, Mao, Wei, Lu, P’eng, and P’u. Align your dagger-axes, join your shields together, and extend your spears, for I will give you an oath.”

The king then said, “The ancients had a saying, ‘Hens do not cackle in the morning. If a hen cackles in the morning, it is only because of disaster in the household.’ At present King Hsin of the Yin just employs the words of women, has abandoned his ancestors, and his sacrifices receive no response. He has muddled and abandoned his family and state, cast aside and no longer follows his father’s and mother’s clans, so that only those with numerous crimes and escapees from the four quarters are honored, made leaders, trusted, and employed. He uses them to

brutalize and oppress the hundred surnames, bringing about perversity throughout the state of Shang.

“Now I, Fa, am only respectfully implementing Heaven’s punishment. In today’s affair, without going beyond six paces or seven paces, stop and resume proper formation. Exert yourselves! Do not exceed four, five, six, or seven attacks before stopping and reforming. Exert yourselves! Be upstanding as a forest of stalwart trees, be like the tiger, the bear, the wolf, and dragon. At Shang’s outer borders do not forcefully resist those who can flee to us so that we can employ them as labor in our western lands. 119 Exert yourselves! Those who fail will be executed.” When the oath was finished, the assembled feudal lords, troops, and 4,000 chariots deployed into battle formation at Mu-yeh.

Emperor Hsin heard that King Wu had come and similarly sent forth his troops, some 700,000 men, to resist him. King Wu deputed the Shih Shang-fu [T’ai Kung] with a hundred stalwarts to lead the army forward, then the king raced toward Emperor Hsin with the mass of troops. 120 Although Hsin’s army was numerous, they lacked the will to fight and wanted King Wu to quickly penetrate. Thus Hsin’s regiments inverted their weapons and did not fight in order to open the way for King Wu. 121

King Wu raced through them as all of Hsin’s troops collapsed and rebelled. Hsin ran off, returned to Chao-ko, ascended to the top of the Deer Tower, clothed himself in his precious jade, and died by immolating himself. King Wu, holding a large white flag, summoned the feudal lords who all bowed to him in response. King Wu then bowed to the feudal lords.

The feudal lords all followed King Wu into the state of Shang where the hundred surnames were waiting at the border. King Wu then had his many ministers inform Shang’s hundred surnames that “Heaven above has sent down relief.” The people of Shang all bowed twice, knocking their heads to the ground, and King Wu also bowed in response. Thereafter he entered the state and went to where Hsin had died. King Wu personally shot him with three arrows then descended from his chariot, struck him with a light dagger, 122 and decapitated him with the yellow ax, hanging his head on a pole with a great white flag.

When he had finished he went to Hsin’s two favorite concubines but they had already hung themselves. King Wu again shot three arrows, stuck them with his dagger, decapitated them with a black axe, and hung their heads on poles with small white flags. King Wu then went out and returned to the army. 123

In this version the conquest melodramatically concludes when

King Wu conspicuously executes Emperor Hsin (even though he had already died by his own hand in a defiant final gesture), thereby symbolically ending Hsin's innate power as well as concretely expressing his own anger and hatred, righteously motivated or not. With the Shang purportedly acknowledging their defeat and the Chou campaign having achieved its stated objectives, psychologically expressive ritual actions designed to celebrate the victory before the ancestors quickly followed: [124](#)

The next day they cleared the roads and repaired the altars to earth and Emperor Hsin's palace. At the appointed time a hundred stalwarts advanced in front shouldering multipennoned flags. King Wu's younger brother Shu Chen-to advanced the chariot carrying the ever-constant flag of command. [125](#) The Duke of Chou, wielding the Great Axe, and Duke of Pi, wielding the Small Axe, flanked King Wu. San Yi-sheng, T'ai Tien, and Hung Yao all brandished swords to protect King Wu.

The king entered and stood on the south side of the altar, all the others then following him on both the left and right. Mao-shu Cheng presented clear water; [126](#) K'ang-shu Feng of Wei spread out a variegated mat; the Shih Shang-fu [T'ai Kung] led the sacrificial animals; and Yin Yi intoned the offertory prayers, saying: "Yin's last descendant Hsin ended and abandoned the illustrious Virtue of his ancestors, insulted and contumed the spirits, didn't offer sacrifice, and muddled and brutalized the hundred surnames in the city of Shang. His offenses were manifest, heard by August Shang Ti in Heaven above."

King Wu then bowed twice, touching his head to the ground, and said: "I received the great mandate of change to remove the Yin. I accepted Heaven's enlightened Mandate." King Wu again bowed twice, knocking his head to the ground, and then went out.

The T'ai Kung's biography notes that King Wu followed up his announcements at the Shang altars with concrete acts to relieve the people's suffering, efforts no doubt designed to placate their likely hatred of a conqueror and fulfill his oft-noted promise of having mounted the campaign for the benefit of All under Heaven: [127](#)

On the morrow King Wu was established at the altars. He then distributed the money from the Deer Tower and gave out grain from the Chü-ch'iao granary in order to relieve the impoverished people. He enfeoffed Pi Kan's grave and released Ch'i-tzu from imprisonment. They then moved the nine cauldrons, rectified the government of Chou, and began anew with All under Heaven. [128](#)

Clash at Mu-yeh

“The victorious army is like a ton compared with an ounce while a defeated army is like an ounce weighed against a ton! The combat of the victorious is like the sudden release of a pent-up torrent down a thousand-fathom gorge.”

Sun-tzu, *Art of War*

The extensively revised *Shang Shu* chapter “Wu Ch’eng”—variously understood as meaning “Martial Achievement,” “King Wu’s Success,” or “King Wu’s Completion”—that replaced the original version is found among the so-called *Ancient Text* (*Ku-pen*) materials and has therefore been generally viewed as an unreliable post-Han forgery. ¹²⁹ However, it so significantly influenced the traditional interpretation of events at Mu-yeh, as well as the subsequent conception of the nature and purpose of warfare, that the crucial passage must be reprised here: ¹³⁰

On *chia-tzu*, at the breaking of darkness, Shou [Emperor Hsin] led his clan forces, like a forest, to assemble at Mu-yeh. They would not prove to be any enemy for us. The infantry in the front of the army lowered their halberds and collided with those at the rear in order to flee. The flow of blood floated pestles. Once [King Wu] donned his martial armor, All under Heaven were greatly settled.

Because Confucian-imbued bureaucrats who had a vested interest in opposing uncouth militarists and powerful generals would constantly cite it whenever condemning aggressive military measures over the centuries, equally well-known and therefore similarly critical to any understanding of Chinese court debates on martial affairs is Mencius’s condemnation of even this portion for its purportedly brutal characterization: ¹³¹

It would be preferable not to have the *Shu Ching* than to have faith in all of it. From the “Wu Ch’eng” I select only two or three strips, that’s all. ¹³² The benevolent man has no enemies under Heaven. If the most benevolent were to attack the most unbenevolent, how could the blood have floated pestles?

There are men who say, “I excel at deploying troops, I excel at warfare.” This is a great offense. If the ruler of a state loves benevolence, he will not have any enemies under Heaven.

When King Wu attacked Yin with 300 armored chariots and 3,000 Tiger Warriors, the king said: “Do not fear. We bring you peace. We will not take the hundred surnames as our enemies.” It was as if they all lowered their horns and bowed their heads. To conduct a campaign of rectification is to speak about rectifying. Since each of them wanted to rectify themselves, where would warfare have been employed?”

The extant “Wu Ch’eng” chapter is apparently a much-revised, didactically sanitized version rather than the original “Wu Ch’eng” that Mencius must have seen, yet it still contains a remarkably vivid description of bloodshed so extensive that the pestles carried by the soldiers for preparing their grain actually floated. This image certainly originated in concrete battlefield experience, however limited and singular, before being exaggerated by artistic imagination. Nevertheless, even according to this pseudo-“Wu Ch’eng” the battle must have been intense and extensive, entailing innumerable casualties, rather than the deferential exercise that Mencius claimed in rejecting it.

A slightly different interpretation of the key sentence underlying this image found in the *Shang Shu*, one that would have gained Mencius’s approval, is provided by James Legge’s classic translation: “Those in front inverted their spears, and attacked those behind them, till they fled, and the blood flowed until it floated pestles about.” ¹³³ Despite the term for “inverting one’s dagger-axe” (or *ko*, rather than spear, as Legge translates) eventually becoming synonymous with mutinying, the impossibility of this interpretation is beyond conception. For example, why would only the soldiers arrayed in the front ranks embrace King Wu’s righteous actions, not those behind them as well? Even if they were persuaded by his charisma or Virtue, unless they happened to be slaves or conscripts turning on Shang core troops, they would certainly not have been motivated to attack their compatriots. If they were beset by fear or simply lacked the will for combat, the soldiers might have broken and struggled to escape but would hardly have wanted to entangle themselves in fighting with anyone except any officers who dutifully tried to restrain them.

A more reasonable explanation for this immensely famous passage is seen in the excerpt translated above. They simply lowered their weapons, a very natural action given the weight of the stone and bronze dagger-axes and spearheads affixed to the three-foot wooden shafts, thereby conveying the impression of deliberate inversion. Any blood then shed within the Shang troops would have been inadvertent, incurred when they hastily turned and collided with those behind them in their panic to escape or were forced to slash their way to apparent freedom, irrationally flailing about. The real carnage would not have ensued until Chou troops sallied into the chaotic mass of fleeing defenders and fervently inflicted the massive casualties historically witnessed whenever troops armed with pregunpowder weapons broke and fled.

In praising the great victory at Mu-yeh, the well-known *Shih Ching* ode entitled “Great Brightness” (“Ta Ming”) gloriously summarizes the sequence of events. After noting in its earlier stanzas that it is not easy to be king, that (surprisingly) even Heaven cannot simply be relied upon, and speaking about King Wen’s Virtue, it focuses on the battle itself, concluding with an assertion that it ended that same morning: ¹³⁴

The regiments of King Shang of Yin

In assembly resembled a forest.

Stretched out at Mu-yeh,

Awaiting our arising.

“Shang-ti is with you,

Let your hearts have no doubt.” ¹³⁵

At Mu-yeh, boundless and expansive,

The sandalwood chariots gleamed resplendent,

In teams the white-chested horses trodded forward.

At this moment the Shih Shang-fu, an eagle bestirred,

Provided composure to King Wu.

We fervently attacked Great Shang,

After the clash the morning came clear and bright. ¹³⁶

The recently recovered, much-publicized *Li Kuei* (JC 4131), dating to the eighth day after the clash at Mu-yeh commemorates a reward to an official named Li made at Chien garrison. Although the inscription’s transcription and interpretation continue to be argued, it confirms that the battle took place on *chia-tzu* and was quickly over. ¹³⁷ Clearly the Chou had realized the pinnacle of martial excellence

described in the *Art of War* : “In antiquity those who were referred to as excelling in the employment of the army were able to keep the enemy’s forward and rear forces from connecting, the many and few from relying upon each other, the noble and lowly from coming to each other’s rescue, the upper and lower ranks from trusting each other, the troops to be separated, unable to reassemble, or when assembled, not to be well ordered.” ¹³⁸ Furthermore, in mounting an attack that proved so overwhelming that the enemy’s masses were unable to assemble, their forces manifested the behavior of a true king’s army. ¹³⁹

The “Shih Fu” Account

In recent decades, at least two analysts have concluded that the “Shih Fu” or “Great Acquisition” chapter found in the *Yi Chou-shu* (*Remnant Books of the Chou*) not only preserves an original record of the Chou conquest but may even be the excised “Wu Ch’eng” chapter from the *Shang Shu* . ¹⁴⁰ Bereft of battle description and largely devoted to recounting postconquest ceremonies intended to validate King Wu’s seizure of power, it does not require translating in detail. ¹⁴¹ However, the remaining contents vividly contradict zealously held accounts that deny extensive bloodshed occurred at Mu-yeh, preserve the sole record of the Chou’s subsequent military operations to sweep away residual opposition, and provide several valuable dates that contribute to reconstructing the campaign sequence. Furthermore, contrary to the Chou’s avowed objective of simply rescuing the realm from oppression and Mencian assertions of joyful submission and widespread tranquility, the chapter depicts the Chou concluding King Wu’s determined quest for domination by ruthlessly imposing their authority over the realm. (The king’s actions essentially accord with the *Art of War* ’s subsequent observation that “if someone is victorious in battle and succeeds in attack but does not exploit the achievement, it is disastrous.”) ¹⁴²

Postconquest, instead of simply ignoring the multitudinous states or amalgamating them into some sort of minimal confederation, King Wu deliberately ended the independence of many through a series of localized strikes and punitive campaigns. Whether the targeted entities constituted a real threat or were merely viewed as insufficiently deferential remains unknown, but since all the campaigns were short and few captives were taken, they cannot have been too formidable or distant. Ninety-nine so-called “abhorrent states” were ultimately subjugated or exterminated through unknown measures, and another 652 prompted to submit. Because the degree of coercion required to achieve their obeisance is not specified, it is unclear whether the 652 acted voluntarily or were cowered into

submission by the Chou's apparently inescapable power. ¹⁴³ Since the Chou reputedly possessed two-thirds of the realm before initiating their final thrust, and the campaign was supported by eight named and therefore relatively substantial states together with hundreds of minor ones, they may have enthusiastically acknowledged Chou suzerainty. ¹⁴⁴

Altogether seven suppressive strikes, some simultaneously mounted, were undertaken in two spurts by high-ranking Chou military officials. But even before these outwardly directed efforts could be undertaken, the immediately contiguous area, including Chao-ko itself, had to be fully brought under control and defenses mounted. Entrusted to the T'ai Kung, this task was reportedly completed within three days, though not without bloodshed and the seizure of additional prisoners. About this time, Lü T'a was separately deputed to attack Yüeh-hsi Fang or the Yüeh and Hsi-fang. ¹⁴⁵ A few days later, on the ninth, after an officer named Huang Hsin came in to report the casualties inflicted and prisoners taken (presumably in Lü T'a's effort but not necessarily), Hou Lai was sent to attack the Mi-chi at Ch'en. He too must have achieved success because he similarly reported back on the eighteenth or slightly more than a week later.

Three days thereafter Pai T'a was ordered to inspire the Tiger Warriors for an attack on Wei, a target that lay to the north in the immediate vicinity of the sprawling ritual capital of Anyang. ¹⁴⁶ Formidable opposition from Shang clan warriors and other troops must have been expected since the army's elite forces were employed. Within a few days, he returned, his success attested by the seizure of an unspecified number of prisoners.

Depending upon how the dates recorded in the "Shih Fu" are interpreted, ¹⁴⁷ Pai T'a's success apparently ended the major pacification measures undertaken in Mu-yeh's immediate vicinity, none of which could have required more than a day or two to reach their targets. Mopping up and stabilization activities punctuated by ceremonial assertions of authority then continued for another month before the king conducted a final military flourish in the vicinity of the battlefield on the fifty-first. No doubt this grand review psychologically concluded their martial efforts in the east, symbolically prepared the Chou troops for the return march to the heartland, and initiated the departure of any remaining coalition forces to their respective states.

After completing the return trip to the Chou capital of Hao over the intervening thirty to thirty-five days, on the thirty-seventh, King Wu ordered a three-pronged subjugation effort that targeted an equal number of states. Ch'en Pen was deputed to attack Mo, Pai Wei to attack the Hsüan-fang, and Huang Hsin to strike Shu. ¹⁴⁸ Just five

days later, Ch'en and Huang returned and reported the capture of the marques or lords of Huo, Ai, and Yi, together with forty-six minor officials. More surprisingly, they apparently seized 830 chariots, ¹⁴⁹ a startling number for this era despite being distributed between two minor states, suggesting that even though the figure of four-thousand sometimes cited for the coalition forces at Mu-yeh is highly exaggerated, chariots may have already been more widespread than generally realized. Pai Wei also emerged victorious because he arrived shortly thereafter to report the capture of the Hsüan Fang chieftain and the seizure of an additional thirty-two chariots. However, rather than being allowed to momentarily bask in glory, he was immediately ordered to attack Li in an effort that ultimately proved successful. ¹⁵⁰

The conquest and consolidation campaigns were dramatically concluded with a massive hunt that must have employed a sizable number of Chou troops. ¹⁵¹ An astonishing number of animals intended for sacrificial purposes and for feasting the troops, both intended to psychologically conclude their martial activities just as China's early martial writings would advocate, were slain or captured. ¹⁵² The "Shih Fu" preserves an itemized inventory: twenty-two tigers, two panthers (or puma), 5,235 tailed deer, twelve wild buffalo (or rhinoceros-like animal), 721 yaks, 151 large bear, 118 mountain bear, 353 wild pigs, eighteen badgers, sixteen great stags, fifty musk deer, thirty of some other type of deer, and 3,508 doe. Somewhat surprisingly, there is no mention that King Wu ordered the release of the numerous horses and oxen used for the chariots and transport vehicles or the conspicuous gathering and storing away of the army's weapons, contrary to subsequent, popular depiction.

The most significant ritual actions actually occurred after King Wu returned to the capital. Several ceremonies were conducted before the spirits and ancestors, including at least one centered upon ritually presenting the ears of the Shang dead and severed heads of the Shang king and his two consorts, all three of which were hung beneath red or white pennants and carried in on staffs. This was followed by the grand sacrificial slaughter of the hundred perverse officials, another sixty high-ranking officers, and the ritual heads of the forty major families, all of whom were beheaded after one or another ceremony. (The hundred perverse officials were apparently first employed in some sort of archery ritual, perhaps shot with arrows, before being beheaded.) ¹⁵³

No doubt because King Wu had felt their deaths should be exacted in front of his ancestors these prisoners had been forcibly deported to the Chou heartland to await their punishment. In addition, the shift of venue had the advantage of avoiding enraging the local inhabitants and the large numbers of soldiers still about ¹⁵⁴

even though conducting the executions in the ancient Shang capital would certainly have emphasized the change of regime and contributed to establishing the Chou's awesomeness, a crucial component of power.

Despite traditional assertions by Mencius and others that King Wu had publicly proclaimed that only the chief miscreant, not the hundred surnames or the people, would be regarded with enmity, these high officials had been unable to avoid condemnation for conspiring with Hsin and facilitating his perversity. In the context of earlier Shang practices and the nature of the era's warfare their sacrificial execution cannot be deemed surprising or exceptional, especially as the Chou initially followed many Shang ritual practices. The rewriting of the *li*, the forms of court ceremonial and social practices, generally attributed to the Duke of Chou, would require another decade, and human sacrifice would not be discontinued until somewhat later as the impact of the Chou's initially pervasive martial culture diminished. ¹⁵⁵

Contrary to the whitewashed depictions that came to dominate later ages, a few anecdotes still suggest that their battle-hardened warriors advocated the use of brutal severity in concluding the conflict: ¹⁵⁶

After King Wu had conquered the Shang he summoned the T'ai Kung and asked: "What shall we do about their officers and troops?" The T'ai Kung replied: "I have heard that in loving people [the feeling] extends to the birds on the roof but in hating people, even the dregs of their food are detested. Why not slay all our enemies, ensuring that they have no descendants?"

"Impossible," replied King Wu. The T'ai Kung went out, the Duke of Shao came in, and the king asked again. The Duke of Shao replied: "Why not slay those who have committed offenses but give life to the innocent." The king said it wasn't possible so the Duke of Shao went out and the Duke of Chou came in. When the king repeated the question, the Duke of Chou replied: "Have everyone dwell in their houses and farm their fields. Don't change the old for the new, embrace benevolence. If any of the hundred surnames commits an offense, let [the responsibility] lie with one man."

Although the *Yi Chou-shu* account shows that the Duke of Shao's approach prevailed in the immediate postconquest period, history—or at least Liu Hsiang, the *Shuo Yüan*'s compiler—believed that King Wu was in agreement with the Duke of Chou's methods. In the *Shuo Yüan* depiction, the T'ai Kung's viewpoint, one commonly implemented

(though not always articulated) in dramas of personal revenge and the imperial court, is clearly disparaged even though probably consonant with the feelings of most warriors following victory in battle. Similarly, the Duke of Shao, although appearing somewhat more humane and realistic, also fares poorly, whereas the Duke of Chou, incessantly identified with Virtue, promulgates a beneficent policy under which the responsibility (or blame) for any future transgressions would accrue to the king himself.

This spate of symbolic activity concluded several days later with the ritual presentation of ears from the other states, a great sacrifice to Heaven, their legendary ancestor Hou Chi's being celebrated with 504 oxen, and another offering to the hundred spirits, waters, and earth, consuming 2,701 sheep and pigs. King Wu then turned his attention to the colossal issue of controlling the newly defeated but largely unsubmitive Shang populace and trying to nominally administer the now sprawling Chou realm with scant manpower and a nonexistent bureaucracy. According to an embedded summary, Chou forces had slain a total of 177,779 and captured 310,230 people, two of several inconceivable numbers that require further pondering.

Discrepancies and Contradictions

The actions depicted in the sanitized portrait and other traditional materials tend to emphasize the measures that King Wu immediately employed to ameliorate the people's suffering and restore an earlier form of Shang government. He prominently had distributed the materials and treasures that had been exacted from the populace and stored at Deer Tower as well as the grain held in the Chü-ch'iao granary, and he otherwise "made large bestowals within the four seas." (The "Chou Pen-chi" account emphasizes that the recipients were the poor, slaves, and others from among the ordinary people.) This is said to have resulted in the "myriad surnames" joyously submitting to his leadership and to have been followed by the resurrection of measures for social order.

However, contrary to the thrust of these depictions and assertions that King Wu returned Hsin's jade to the people, archaeological evidence indicates considerable material wealth was confiscated from the Shang and recalcitrant states alike. No doubt these spoils were important for manifesting the Chou's majesty and rewarding their numerous allies, clan members, officials, and troops, most of whom probably fought far less for righteousness than for out of fear, loyalty, and tribal identification. The sudden appearance of numerous Shang-style bronze vessels around Tsung Chou, obviously the fruits of conquest as well as conspicuous evidence of the Chou's newly acquired authority over the Shang, are therefore not

unexpected. These large valuables were not only seized from the palaces and dwellings of the nobility, but also plundered from the rich graves around Anyang. It remains unknown whether high Chou officials initiated a systematic effort to recover them or ordinary warriors more interested in material rewards than pontifications about evil and Virtue zealously confiscated them.

Assuming the Chou leadership had been sincere in their preconquest pronouncements and fully intended to respect the sanctity of the deceased, the numerous, recently discovered tunnels penetrating deep into Anyang era tombs does suggest the more likely culprit to have been the uncontrolled behavior of their ordinary troops. Whether this sort of predatory activity occurred following the first or second conquest, or both, is still uncertain, though the animosity marking the second clash and the abandonment of the restraint that had reputedly characterized King Wu's initial campaign suggests the most extensive plundering probably occurred after the rebellion's suppression, particularly if the troops about Anyang really surrendered in the aftermath of Mu-yeh.¹⁵⁷ However, bronze inscriptions show that the seizure of "*chin*" (metal, normally bronze, especially vessels) would be a hallmark, as well as objective, of subsequent Western Chou campaigns against peripheral peoples.¹⁵⁸

Similarly contradictory, but less substantially based, is a passage found in a *Shih Chi* chapter devoted to two key members of the Shang royal family, Wei-tzu K'ai and Ch'i-tzu, titled "Sung Wei-tzu Shih-chia." According to the Grand Historian, while en route to visit King Wu after the first conquest, Wei-tzu passed through Yin-hsü or "the ruins of Yin," originally an apt descriptive term rather than the place name it subsequently became, including when the *Shih Chi* was composed. Wei-tzu was particularly affected by the destruction of the palaces, so complete that wild grains had begun flourishing there. He wanted to cry out in anguish, the best approximation of the term *k'u*, which is normally employed to describe the uncontrollable grief experienced in mourning, but couldn't, yet he felt that weeping quietly (*lei*, letting tears fall) would be too feminine. Thereupon he composed a dirge about the spreading grains that caused the people to weep when they heard it.

Rather than indicating that any sort of rapacious behavior arose or depicting the bloodletting recorded in the "Shih Fu" chapter, in contrast the "Wu Ch'eng" portrays several actions King Wu reportedly took to return the world to normalcy. These include two sacrificial ceremonies dedicated to the ancestors and spirits intended to "announce the completion (*ch'eng*) of martial activities (*wu*)" but neither human sacrifices nor the slaying of prisoners is ever mentioned. They were followed by grants, appointments, and

pronouncements intended to justify their actions as well as the conspicuous distribution of captured royal vessels, no doubt not just to reward the people but also to show that they were not being retained by the king. ¹⁵⁹

Even prior to that, in order to dispel the specter of martial activity,: “in the fourth month, at the first moon, returning from Shang the king reached Feng, whereupon he gave rest to the martial and cultivated the civil. ¹⁶⁰ He returned their horses to the sunny side of Mount Hua and released the oxen in the wilds of T’ao-lin to show All under Heaven that they would not be [again] pressed into service.” ¹⁶¹ Without doubt this would have been an essential step in restoring the primacy of noncombat leadership, reestablishing the decorum of the civil realm in an era characterized by a highly martial ethos, and deemphasizing modes of action that could prove inimical to state building.

The assertion that King Wu “*yen wu hsiu wen*” (“gave rest to the martial and cultivated the civil”) is succinct enough to admit of much ambiguity, including that it refers to storing away their weapons. Moreover, the statement that “he returned their horses to the sunny side of Mount Hua and released the oxen in the wilds of T’ao-lin” re-emphasizes this idea because the passage concludes by asserting it was intended “to show All under Heaven that they would not be employed [again].”

Although the “Shih Fu” and “Wu Ch’eng” accounts seem fundamentally incompatible, putting their weapons away and conspicuously returning to peaceful activities, whether in this abstract form or through the comparatively detailed sacrificial and feasting practices portrayed in the “Shih Fu” chapter, were certainly intended to mitigate the emotional stress that may arise in the process of demobilization. In aggregate, King Wu’s measures well cohere with the need to effect a psychological transition from a martial footing to a peace-oriented mindset in which civility, rather than warrior machismo, prevails. As retrospectively formulated in the *Ssu-ma Fa*, a work that dates to the late Warring States Period, “when the world had attained peace the Son of Heaven had the ‘Ta K’ai’ [‘Great Peace’] music performed [in celebration]. ¹⁶² When they had attained their aim [of pacifying the realm] they sang triumphal songs to show their happiness. They stored away the implements of war, erected the Spirit Terrace, and responded to the labors of the people to show that the time for rest had come.” ¹⁶³

Following the consolidation campaigns and the sacrificial executions, in their fundamentally martial culture it would have especially been necessary to diffuse the violent tendencies associated with pervasive military values and contend with the problems that can

be generated when troops are compelled to suddenly shift from a life of hardship, danger, and forceful response to the stultifying constraints and submission of civil society. As the *Ssu-ma Fa* would note:

In the civilian sphere words are cultivated and speech languid. In court one is respectful and courteous and cultivates himself to serve others. Unsummoned, he does not step forth; unquestioned, he does not speak. It is difficult to advance but easy to withdraw.

In the military realm one speaks directly and stands firm. When deployed in formation one focuses on duty and acts decisively. Those wearing battle armor do not bow; those in war chariots need not observe the forms of propriety (*li*); those manning fortifications do not scurry. In times of danger one does not pay attention to seniority. Thus the civilian forms of behavior (*li*) and military standards (*fa*) are like inside and outside; the civil and martial are like left and right. [164](#)

The *Ssu-ma Fa* also warned against allowing the realms becoming contaminated: “If the form and spirit [appropriate to the] military realm enter the civilian sphere, the Virtue of the people will decline. If the form and spirit [appropriate to the] civilian sphere enter the military realm, the Virtue of the people will weaken.” Failing to preserve an essential core of warrior values, the very ones that allowed them to achieve dominance, during the succeeding centuries of relative peace and internal tranquility would eventually prove fatal to the Chou.

The Aborted Campaign

Throughout its disparate chapters, the *Art of War* stresses the importance of obfuscating the enemy, keeping them ignorant of plans and the focus of strikes in order to compel them to contemplate many possibilities and defend against numerous potential threats. [165](#) However, given King Wu’s highly visible advance toward Chao-ko, this would have been impossible!, Even if Shang real-time intelligence was inaccurate, the so-called rehearsal campaign had already made the objective clear, and no other targets of importance intervened between the Yellow River and Emperor Hsin’s secondary capital. [166](#)

Only the earlier subjugation of Li, an important satellite state potentially blocking access to the Anyang area from out of the T’ai-hang Mountains, could have been a deliberate distraction intended to divert Shang troops to the intervening area and pin them there, effectively reducing the forces capable of immediately responding to the actual attack. (Much has been made of the importance of defeating

Li because it completed the encirclement of the western periphery, but its conquest actually had little strategic value other than ensuring another potential source of troops, whether for primary defense or in reserve, would be available. Conversely, to the extent that the Chou may have ensconced troops there, any occupation forces remaining behind would have been available to act as a pincer force for the mopping-up and consolidation campaigns.)

Although the northern trek through the T'ai-hang Mountains remained a viable option and Li's subjugation appeared to pose a strategic threat, precedent coupled with the need to assemble the coalition's component forces virtually dictated that the Chou's second thrust would follow the original campaign route. In addition, by choosing the less contorted southern river route rather than a difficult trek up the Fen River Valley and through the T'ai-hang Mountains, the second expedition apparently benefited from the experience and firsthand topographical knowledge acquired in the first campaign. As *Art of War* states, "someone unfamiliar with the mountains and forests, gorges and defiles, the shape of the marshes and wetlands cannot advance the army."

Depending upon its location, the strike against Ch'ung could have familiarized them with the approach to the Luoyang area and allowed the acquisition of local guides, natives who gave their allegiance to the Chou, thereby unknowingly heeding Sun-tzu's future warning that "one who does not employ local guides cannot gain advantages of terrain." Moreover, troops in antiquity and later times were frequently compelled to improve existing trails, even undertake road building, just to make them passable for the army's vehicles. The second campaign would have benefited from most of the improvements made during the initial effort, however temporary in nature, because of the shortness of the intervening time span.

It has occasionally been claimed that a significant portion of the Chou's forces remained in the Luoyang area after the aborted first march up. ¹⁶⁷ Bronze inscriptions confirm that a Chou base came into being in this general area at some point during the campaigns, and the prepositioning of a large force would have greatly reduced the initial, logistical burden. However, even if the soldiers immediately engaged in farming activities, sustaining a significant contingent several hundred *li* from the heartland while preparing for a decisive confrontation would probably have been nearly impossible. Their presence would also have blatantly signaled a Chou intention to permanently incorporate the area into their domain and posed an undeniable threat to the emperor that, in the light of his willingness to conduct expeditionary campaigns against significantly less imposing enemies in the far southeast, should have provoked a strong military

response.

Strength and Casualties

One long unresolved question has been the strength of the respective forces and the number of casualties inflicted on them. Without doubt, a significant battle occurred, and the Shang forces, having been quickly routed, suffered a disastrous defeat accompanied by considerable bloodshed. According to a few lines in “Wen Wang” (Mao #235), an ode written in praise of King Wen:

The sons and grandsons of Shang,
Sons and grandsons of Shang,
In their magnificence beyond counting!
Once Shang Ti issued his mandate,
Their lords submitted to the Chou.

Although the “Shih Fu” chapter never mentions the army’s strength, enumerates the allies, or recounts any aspects of the battle, it does offer casualty figures that were supposedly based upon ears taken from the dead, a practice that provided the evidence required to justify unit and individual rewards. The numbers are truly staggering: 177,779 were reportedly slain and another 310,230 taken captive, however “captivity” might be interpreted. The second figure might almost be understandable if it somehow encompassed the total subjugated population rather than being restricted to just soldiers, but the former is incomprehensible given the nature of the weapons employed by both sides and the populations of the two states. Nevertheless, being an exact number, it should not be casually dismissed just because enormity makes it implausible, which is the normal practice of historical military studies ever since Delbruk articulated his principles. ¹⁶⁸

Whether unexpectedly small or astonishingly large, each number should be pondered in the context of plausible force size and the lethality of battle. Even though neither justified nor particularly informative, it has been suggested that an error in the Chinese character *yì*, an enumerator that signified “one hundred thousand” in the early Western Chou’s era, could result in the far more realistic but still startling numbers of 77,779 killed and 30,230 captured. However, these figures are similarly suspect, not the least because they reverse historically attested battlefield ratios in which the number of prisoners normally far exceeds the combat victims. Nevertheless, an alternative suggestion that they should be 17,777 and 31,023 is equally arbitrary and fails to take the exactness of the original figure into account. Irrespective of how they are manipulated or interpreted, they certainly

indicate almost unimaginable carnage and probably the forcible capture of a large portion of the Shang army.

Even if the slain and captured are thought to include the many victims of the subsequent consolidation campaigns, the purported force levels at Mu-yeh should be scrutinized. According to the *Shih Chi* and other accounts the Shang mustered some 700,000 men but the Chou only fielded 300 or 350 chariots, 3,000 elite Tiger Guards, and 45,000 armored soldiers, a massive but still inconceivably paltry force in the face of overwhelming might. However, operational information derived from Shang oracle writings, probable limits to the Shang population, and Hsin's likely inability to summon any but his closest allies makes the absurdity of the Shang number immediately apparent.

Acknowledging this impossibility has prompted diverse, ultimately futile explanations for the 700,000, understanding the figure simply as a general indication of size; an error for what should be 70,000 or 170,000; ¹⁶⁹ the total strength of all the Shang standing armies and their allies; a force vastly (but ineffectually) enhanced by deploying the Shang's supposedly numerous slaves; or simply some sort of offhand attempt to emphasize an actual discrepancy in troop strength and thereby magnify the remarkable Chou victory.

No Shang expeditionary effort, whether under Wu Ting or Emperor Hsin, ever exceeded 15,000 to 20,000 combatants. The largest number levied during Wu Ting's highly martial reign appears to have been the 13,000, nominally fielded under Fu Hao's command, with figures for Hsin's extensive effort in the southeast, although unknown, certainly comparable. The basic army unit, the *shih*, being identifiable with levies and thus a core strength of 3,000, continued until the end of the Shang even though other unit designations would displace them in the records. Being a detached capital, Chao-ko should have had at least one *shih* assigned to protect it, perhaps even two or three because it was strategically poised to thwart Chou and other threats to the ritual center of Anyang that might originate in the west. They would certainly have been augmented to some extent by the clan troops that also functioned as royal bodyguards and were normally organized into contingents of 500 or 1,000 men., Some 10,000 men may thus have been permanently assigned to Chao-ko, a sizable number for the era but a mere fraction of the Shang's military power.

The maximum feasible forces could of course be estimated if any population figures were available for the eleventh century BCE. Unfortunately, although a few population monographs and a number of articles have recently appeared, even the most ambitious multivolume set does nothing more than discuss the general nature of the problem while avoiding all concrete numbers. ¹⁷⁰ Only one historian, pondering the question in some detail, has hazarded some

possibilities based upon the area occupied by Anyang and probable population densities. ¹⁷¹ However insubstantial and dependent upon estimates of occupied terrain and the area devoted to crafts, light industries, and casting workshops, as well as affected by the critical measure of family size, it remains the only method presently available.

Discounting absurd estimates such as the 13,000,000 proposed for the Chou, it appears that 250,000 to 300,000 inhabited the ritual capital of Anyang ¹⁷² and perhaps double that number dwelled in the greater Shang core including Chao-ko and several other fortified towns. However, complicating factors are the extent to which former sites such as Cheng-chou continued to be occupied, if at all; the population density in the broad swath of farmland around Anyang; and how extensive the central government's effectiveness might have been. Questions about the degree of control exercised over subject and client states further muddle the discussion because some forty or more had earlier furnished troops and provisions for Shang military forays, evidence they had been integrated into the Shang empire to a greater or lesser degree. Assuming that one male in every five-person household might serve, anyone capable of fielding an army of 3,000 must have had a minimum population of 15,000. Just forty such states would add 600,000 to the potential Shang count, a fraction of the inhabitants presumably dwelling in contiguous territory. ¹⁷³

The number available to serve in a crisis situation is inevitably far more important than any abstract total. Assuming a submissive Shang populace of perhaps 450,000 in the greater plains area, the probable limit to any effective levy indicates a maximum 90,000 to 100,000 males, stalwart or not, could be summoned. Since the Shang never relied upon the sort of population registration or the draconian controls that would be imposed in the late Warring States Period and probably never maintained more than eight armies or their equivalent in active status in the units that evolved over the dynasty's last century, even this figure should be heavily discounted.

Another factor of potentially significant impact would have been the reluctance of the Shang's more distant satellites and purported allies to become involved in the imminent conflict. Having heard that Li, Yü, and Ch'ung had all been crushed by the Chou juggernaut, many may have opted for passive spectatorship or thrown their support to the Chou as suggested by the oft-repeated claim that the Chou already possessed two-thirds of the realm.

Meanwhile, the Chou's own population, although daily increasing through internal growth and the absorption of other peoples, poses an even greater mystery. The number inhabiting the highly fertile Wei River Valley, particularly those dwelling in their primary cities at Mount Ch'i, Feng, and Hao, probably reached several

tens of thousands but certainly not the millions sometimes claimed or even a substantial part of a million. As sometimes suggested, 60,000 to 70,000 adult males probably represents the maximum number of warriors, both young and old, available for combat. ¹⁷⁴

Without any basis, contemporarily popular accounts sometimes claim that the Shang's 700,000 consisted of 530,000 soldiers and 170,000 slaves, the latter simply having been thrown into the battle at the last moment. Moreover, it is believed that it was they, rather than the battle-hardened core-Shang forces, who refused to fight and turned against their own armies. Although slaves are known to have fought in other cultures, including in the Greek battle at Plataea of 479 BCE, there is no indication in the traditional literature and very little, of rather uncertain nature, in the oracular inscriptions they ever played a role in Shang military efforts. ¹⁷⁵

Whether the Shang was a slave society and, if so, ever impressed slaves for combat rather than confining them to purely ancillary roles remain highly contentious, unanswered questions. However, despite *chung* (眾) being an increasingly seen term for troops in general and the existence of continuing controversy over their nature and role in the Shang, there was little precedent for *chung* being used because of the dangers of flight and rebellion. ¹⁷⁶ If they were in fact slaves, their presence on the battlefield would certainly provide a convenient explanation for at least a portion of the troops being unwilling to fight.

Because the Chao-ko to Mu-yeh area included key agricultural and pastoral terrain, if slaves had been employed in farming it would certainly have been there. In addition, the ruler's presence in Chao-ko would have compelled the nobility to construct seasonal residences where slaves would presumably have been employed in household tasks. Comparatively limited in number, it is unlikely that they would have been trained to fight, possessed weapons, or could have been propelled onto the battlefield in viable contingents. Hsin's confidence coupled with the considerably greater size of the Shang's standing and readily levied forces, all capable fighters who likely expected little difficulty in crushing the paltry Chou army, would probably have precluded him from adopting this sort of ad hoc measure. From his (and no doubt any observer's) point of view, rather than being caught up in a desperate struggle, the Shang faced nothing more than a minor military challenge.

In contrast to well-justified skepticism about the Shang, the Chou numbers appear feasible as long as they are understood as total coalition contributions, not solely Chou warriors. If the Chou actually mobilized six *shih* ("armies"), the very six frequently referred to in subsequent literature and bronze inscriptions as well as the number

that reportedly became a royal prerogative, of 3,000 men each for a total of 18,000 and the eight named allies each similarly furnished a single contingent of 3,000 each for 24,000, the coalition's forces would have already reached 42,000. ¹⁷⁷ Since the 3,000 Tiger Guards, being an elite royal unit, would be counted apart from the six standing armies, the shortfall amounts to only 3,000, a number easily contributed by small contingencies ranging from hundred-man companies to somewhat larger clan forces from just a few of the many unnamed 800 allies that presumably participated in the second effort as well. Supervisory personnel, charioteers, and semimilitary officials would have augmented the basic number somewhat, easily surpassing a total of 45,000.

Facing a highly formidable enemy in a potentially fatal encounter, King Wu would have maximized his forces. Mobilizing a coalition army of this size for an epochal battle would therefore not only have been reasonable, but crucial, and just a decade later the Chou would effectively maintain a minimum of fourteen *shih*, six quartered in the West and eight in the east, for a theoretical 54,000 men. ¹⁷⁸ Similarly, having received word of their approach, the Shang would certainly, if tardily, have responded with a hasty effort to mobilize all their own available forces and as many of their contiguous allies as feasible, and thus managed to perhaps field (a still unlikely) 70,000 men. This would have resulted in a force ratio of somewhat less than two to one. Even if regarded as a purely nominal figure and significantly discounted, the Shang's still massive deployment would have provided a tremendous advantage in cold weapons warfare. In addition, such a dramatic discrepancy in the number of battlefield combatants would have impacted the imagination of both participants and observers.

Irrespective of this explanation and how the numbers might otherwise be reduced, all the traditional accounts thus agree that the Shang vastly outnumbered the Chou, and it has never been doubted that the latter faced a superior enemy occupying familiar ground. But if the constraints imposed by this belief are jettisoned and the figures assumed to be erroneous, a far more realistic estimation can be attempted. Assuming some vestige of recoverable truth, the number interpreted as 700,000 might have been only about 7,000, a highly reasonable figure in view of the number of troops likely to have been immediately available in the Chao-ko secondary capital.

Not only does this number match the size of operational forces frequently mentioned in Shang oracle bones from Wu Ting's era, the 7,000 could have readily been composed solely of clan forces or two armies (*shih*) plus a contingent of imperial bodyguards or palace protectors. Although speculative in the extreme, the deployment of

such a moderately sized force would well cohere with Hsin's sense of immortality or obliviousness—one not unlike that manifested by King Lear in the face of an approaching forest—as well as account for their rapid annihilation by a much greater, rather than vastly outnumbered, Chou coalition force. Conversely, it is also possible that the Chou only mobilized a few thousand men, possibly a nominal 1,000 per *shih* , meaning that the 7,000 would still have outnumbered them.

Trajectory to Power

Although the materials already reprised provide a minimalist account of the Chou conquest, it is pervaded by doubts and marked by lacuna and therefore demands greater scrutiny. Definitive answers may not be forthcoming, yet considerable progress toward a coherent, highly plausible depiction can be achieved. Some grand questions may also be posed, many elements that would become highly important to strategic imperial dialogue examined, and several interesting interpretations of these often-puzzling historical events compared and explicated. The analysis below begins with broad aspects of the Chou's evolution, then discusses the martial nature of their ascension, and finally dissects the conquest itself before pondering neglected military elements and misunderstood factors.

As traditionally retold, the Chou's early history immediately prompts questions about how they managed to transform themselves from a small, presumably self-conscious clan into the realm's dominant power. From their inception their reputedly superior agricultural knowledge may have played a fundamental role in nurturing their own prosperity as well as in attracting immigrants and facilitating the development of alliances with various peoples, including disenchanted Hsia groups. In perpetuating their agricultural heritage, the Chou is said to have dispatched advisers to instruct other peoples and protostates in improved farming practices and the highly critical observance of seasonal constraints.¹⁷⁹ This outreach not only garnered them goodwill and respect but also gave them an opportunity to acquire essential knowledge of the inhabitants, customs, and terrain around the Wei River Valley.

Although evidence for the existence of these practices is lacking, higher levels of material accomplishment, particularly crucial foodstuffs, have always attracted interest and provided the economic foundation for national strength, making the diversion of manpower to military tasks possible. (Conversely, surpassing wealth not only attracts potential immigrants and facilitates alliances; it also encourages invasions and plundering, just as the *Tao Te Ching* prophesizes.)¹⁸⁰ One likely explanation for the Chou's rapid growth is

their successful integration of other peoples through both attraction and subjugation. Although antiquity may not have been marked by major migrations, in the absence of well-demarcated borders and the imposition of the controls that would be witnessed in the Spring and Autumn Period there would have been few obstacles or prohibitions to ongoing population shifts other than those inherently entailed by difficult terrain and tortuous travel.

Rather than just grudgingly allowing their immigration, the Chou appear to have deliberately welcomed other peoples and perhaps allocated land for them for farming in a precursor to later Ch'in practices. Even in an era of limited communications, awareness of their largess would have spread to other areas, explaining claims that ordinary people ventured to the Chou and thereby augmented its manpower. ¹⁸¹ Furthermore, although the motif of recognizing obscure skills and exploiting surpassing wisdom would not become prominent for many centuries, the early Chou leaders seem to have actively sought to acquire men of talent. ¹⁸² It is one thing for the disaffected to flee, another for them to envision a haven in a different state unless a congenial setting has been created where superior men are not only being tolerated but actually honored and entrusted with responsibility. A number of individuals are known to have furnished important counsel to Kings Wen and Wu, including Po Yi, Shu Ch'i, T'ai Tien, Hung Yao, San-yi Sheng, (Hsiung) Yü Tzu, Hsin Chia, and especially Lü Shang, otherwise known as the T'ai Kung. This openness continued postconquest as many Shang members were employed in significant historical, administrative, and command capacities despite their former enemy status.

In addition to being a charismatic group that thus attracted the allegiance of disparate peoples, especially those disenchanted with Shang domination or who were openly antagonistic, the Chou seem to have ruled in part through an avowed policy of tolerant acculturation. Rather than emasculating the diverse peoples that came to populate their domain, they gradually assimilated and transformed them even as they absorbed foreign characteristics themselves. Many of the states that survived into the Warring States Period would retain distinctive features and characteristics, but the concept of the Central State and the Hua-Hsia identity with its emphasis upon agriculture is appropriately said to have arisen with the Chou. ¹⁸³

The moment the Chou evolved from being an extended clan or tribe into an incipient state capable of accommodating the Chiang and other peoples can perhaps be identified with their shift to Mount Ch'i and the accompanying differentiation of functional responsibilities. However, even though the Shang had long dominated the greater political landscape, in their early years of migration away from the

Chinese heartland the proto-Chou had presumably moved through relatively uninhabited areas. Apart from terrain imposed constraints, a concentrated force would have continued unhindered until encountering a fortified site or confronting one of the larger amalgamations of warriors active on the periphery, particularly in the upper Ching River Valley and across the northern zone.

Although the population in the semi-arid north and northwest was relatively sparse, it was hardly nonexistent. Shang oracular inscriptions dated to King Wu Ting's era indicate that aggressive peoples such as the T'u-fang and Kung-fang inhabited the and descendants of the well-known Yang-shao and Lung-shan cultural manifestations, as well as locally defined expressions such as Pan-p'o, are archaeologically well attested. Strong clans and protostates also existed in the southwest (including at San-hsing-tui and Ch'eng-tu), south, and east outside the sphere of Shang control as well as beyond the Chou's early horizons. The eastern groups were generally disparaged as Yi but the others that would subsequently be deemed "barbarians" included the Man, Jung, and Ti. Some of their descendants would eventually establish the states of Ch'u and Ch'in, two expansive entities that would emerge through interacting with Western Chou culture and have a major impact on Chinese history.

These years of travail must have been tumultuous, yet, either because of historical simplification or a desire to whitewash the Chou with the paint of Virtue, they have never been portrayed as strife ridden. Whether compelled by climatic change, soil exhaustion, population growth, or simply a desire to enlarge their "living space," rather than peacefully emigrating into unoccupied territories, the proto-Chou forcefully penetrated contested areas, thereby spawning inescapable conflict. Understanding this process requires recourse to core archaeological evidence even though it is presently limited to discoveries in the Wei River Valley and the Chou's interaction with the Chiang. 184

Fathoming how the Chou nurtured and accumulated power in the centuries that intervened between their departure from under the Hsia's protective umbrella and Tan Fu's final appearance at Mount Ch'i remains problematic. The main possibilities include forcefully seizing particular areas through warfare, whether brief or protracted, thereafter enslaving the survivors; overawing the inhabitants with the specter of overwhelming might, thereby scaring them away or cowering them into submitting; and simply absorbing the populace into a Chou-dominated political and cultural amalgamation through various enticements, a method frequently employed by disparate groups in antiquity.

Despite the *Shih Ching's* tendency to laud the founding fathers'

surpassing Virtue, two odes indicate the Chou's migratory expansion was both deliberate and forceful. Although poetic license and their late composition dates make them highly unreliable historical sources despite possibly having been based upon clan memory or transmitted tales, both have long served a primary role in reconstructing the Chou's early years. More importantly, they are both heavily imbued with martial activities and overtones. The very first verse of "Kung Liu" depicts one of the early stages of any military activity, setting stores aside for a contemplated expedition:

Unwavering was Duke Liu,
Neither sedentary nor lethargic,
Demarking the fields and establishing the borders,
Accumulating and storing.
Packing dried meat and grain,
In bags and sacks,
Thinking to gather and employ them gloriously.
Flourishing their shields, dagger-axes, and battle axes,
He initiated their progression.

The lines leave no doubt that Kung Liu well understood the importance of logistics in not just enabling the army to survive but also ensuring the ampleness required to satisfy the troops. The next stanza, here omitted, indicates that he proclaimed his intentions to the people, then already numerous and dense, without encountering any dissension. The third then depicts the necessary work of reconnaissance and the initiation of the planning process upon finding that the territory, being relatively uninhabited, was conducive to occupation:

Unwavering was Duke Liu,
Venturing to the [land of] a hundred springs,
Admiring the expansive plain,
He ascended a southern ridge,
To observe the heights,
Heights expansive enough for an army.
Thereupon they populated it,
Thence they erected thatched huts,
Where people could converse,
Where speech could be mutually invoked.

These lines preserve the important information that they had been reconnoitering an extremely wet area, a land of a “hundred springs,” much in contrast with the semi-arid terrain they had abandoned in the north. No doubt primarily to ensure they would not suffer drastic damage from seasonal flooding, Kung Liu opted to ensconce them on a noticeable promontory even though they would be farming the land below. Strategic considerations must have weighed heavily because localized heights always provide important defensive advantages, “what might be relied upon” (as stated at the start of the next stanza). In thereby cohering with common practice in the Lungshan era as well as in the Ching River Valley, his measures make the military nature of their migratory expansion even more obvious.

The fourth stanza merely speaks about ritual actions that were performed to enhance his authority as their leader, a necessary stage in solidifying support for the actions that are then described in the fifth:

Unwavering was Duke Liu,
[Their terrain] expansive and extensive,
From the plateaus and the ridges
He assessed the *yin* and *yang* ,
Noted the [water’s] flow and the springs,
And formed his army into three contingents.
He measured the marshy plains,
Apportioned fields for sowing grain,
And measured the sunlight at evening’s approach.
Pin’s inhabitants filled the wilderness.

Even though the terms *yin* and *yang* are anachronistic, charting the marshes and rivers would have been an essential precampaign measure. More problematic is the fragment *ch’i chün san tan* (其軍三單), translated as “formed his army into three contingents” but the subject of long controversy. As commentators noted early on, it seems to have been somewhat incongruously inserted into a stanza concerned solely with administrative efforts, including measuring. Furthermore, the term *chün* (軍) does not appear until the Spring and Autumn Period, appropriate to the ode’s late composition date but not to prequest military organization. If poetic license is assumed, the intent becomes clear—his force was sizable enough to segment into three operational units—though this interpretation has itself occasioned various explanations ranging from three unified contingents to three bodies consisting of men, women, and children.

¹⁸⁵ Inserting the line here also suggests the troops were first rewarded with land allotments, after which their families joined them.

The sixth and final stanza depicts the concluding stage of Pin's occupation and provides an inkling of the burgeoning community's expansion:

Unwavering was Duke Liu,
Having established their dwellings at Pin,
They crossed the Wei in boats,
Taking whetstones and pounding stones.
The foundations and bases being laid out,
The people burgeoned and prospered,
Populating both banks in the Huang valley,
Stretching upstream to the Kuo.
The settlement becoming dense,
They went to the further reaches of Jui.

Their surpassing agricultural capabilities resulted in such rapid population growth they were able to cross the river and occupy (*chia*, pinch or squeeze) both sides of the Wei River, after which they apparently ventured upward toward the area of Jui, a name that would soon reappear in the Chou's history. ¹⁸⁶

One of the most important odes in the Chou cannon, "Mien," provides the classic description of how the accomplishments of the Sage Leader Tan Fu provided the final civilizing and administrative impetus. ¹⁸⁷

Unceasing like the trailing gourds,
The people first burgeoned
In the region of the Chü and Ch'i Rivers.
The ancient Duke Tan Fu
Extracted earth for covering and dug pits for housing, ¹⁸⁸
As they had not yet any dwellings.

The ancient Duke Tan Fu
Raced his horses at the coming of morn, ¹⁸⁹
Coursing westward along the river banks
Until he reached Mount Ch'i below.
There, with his consort from the Chiang,
They settled and dwelled together.

On the Chou plain, luxuriant and rich,
Whose clay yielded tea like sweet dumplings.
There he began, there planned,
Cracking the tortoise shell
Which portended halting that moment,
And erecting their structures there.

Composed and settled,
On the left and the right
He inscribed borders and delineated (plots),
Drained the land and established fields.
Extending from west to east,
Every affair was firmly grasped.

Then he summoned the Minister of Works
And called his Minister of Labor,
Ordering them to erect buildings and houses.
Their lines were straight,
They lashed the boards to frame the soil,
And raised the ancestral temple, stretched and imposing.

"Jung jung ," resounded the soil's digging,
"Hung hung ," its discharge.
"Teng teng ," the heavy sound of their pounding,
"P'ing p'ing ," they repeatedly shaved [the excess].
A hundred sections simultaneously arose,
They did not overstep the great drum's beating.

They erected the great gate,
The great gate looming majestically.
They erected the inner gates,
The inner gates powerful and imposing.
Then they raised the earthen altar,
The origin of all military expeditions.

Even though he could not brook his indignation,
He did not diminish his solicitousness.
Oaks and poplars were torn out,

Passages and roads opened.
The K'un-Yi raced away,
Their horses panting noisily.

The confrontation of the Yü and Jui was settled,
King Wen had piqued their shame.
So I say there were those far afar who became attached,
And I say there were some earlier and others later,
And I say that there were those who raced and made offerings,
And I say there were those who sought defense from insult.

Three aspects apart from the activities undertaken to make the area habitable including deliberately surveying the land, creating roads to facilitate their activities, and especially erecting protective walls—the earliest description of that process—merit note. First of all, despite the continued antagonism shown by contiguous peoples, their achievements succeeded in overawing the K'un Yi, who raced off in apparent fear. Insofar as the K'un Yi are thought to be synonymous with the Ch'üan Yi or Ch'üan Jung, the tribe that had previously attacked the proto-Chou, the tables had now thus turned. ¹⁹⁰

Second, their cultural accomplishments—including the formulation and promotion of such basic virtues as fidelity and righteousness—caused them to be so widely admired that the Yü and Jui were stimulated to emulate them, though only after venturing there to resolve their dispute, as already discussed. Third, and probably most important, the last stanza indicates that their population had rapidly expanded in part because they attracted immigrants who valued Virtue, economic prosperity, and political security as well as offered the downtrodden and disaffected a place of refuge.

The second stanza of an ode titled “Huang Yi” similarly depicts Tan Fu (also known as King T'ai) opening the land by thinning the forests to create a haven for civilization and reiterates that a group known as the Ch'uan Yi fled. ¹⁹¹ Thereafter, despite focusing on their campaigns of expansion, the verses consistently emphasize King Wen's Virtue and outreach rather than the simple act of conquest. Nevertheless, according to the *Bamboo Annals* entry already cited, in Emperor Hsin's thirty-second year, “forces from Mi invaded Yüan so the Hsi Po (Lord of the West) led a force against Mi.” Although an undated Chou divination fragment indicates that an attack on Mi had been contemplated, the conflict's only depiction is embedded in “Huang Yi”:

The people of Mi were disrespectful,
They dared oppose our great state
And invaded Yüan, penetrating as far as Kung.
How awesome was his anger
As [King Wen] ordered the regiments
To thwart their advancing forces,
Solidify the Chou's blessings,
And respond to All under Heaven.

Relying on the heights
They invaded Yüan's borders
And tramped across our high ridges
But never deployed near our mounds, [192](#)
Our mounds or river banks.
Nor did they imbibe at our springs,
Our springs or our ponds.

If the ode preserves any vestigial memories, this attack by Mi's roving forces constitutes a significant precursor to the unremitting steppe-sedentary conflict that would plague imperial China because of the latter's inability to thwart, not to mention deter, aggressive nomadic peoples from penetrating its heavily populated agricultural domain. Moreover, now that border incursions mounted in strength are known to have occurred even prior to King Wu Ting's reign in the Shang, this "effrontery" simply represents a continuation of evolving practice in the interaction zone. However, for the Chou leadership just then self-confidently basking in the glory of celestial indications that portended receipt of the Mandate of Heaven, Mi's presumptuous strike in the comparatively remote region of Yüan naturally loomed large. Apart from the actual military threat to the crucial plains area where agriculture and civilization were now burgeoning, its earthshaking nature demanded the forceful response that repulsed them.

Mi's initial success also provides evidence that, despite having already defeated a number of antagonists and developed dispersed population centers as they moved down the Ching River Valley, the Chou had not fully secured its perceived borders with strongpoints, military encampments, or other perimeter defenses. In addition, the need to mobilize warriors from the Mount Ch'i region contravenes claims that the Chou had already been implementing the "farmer/soldier" ideal long before its believed inception in the Han Dynasty; otherwise, permanent, agriculturally based encampments (*t'un-t'ien*)

would have existed in the ancestral areas. Nevertheless, being located in the upper Ching River Basin near Ling-t'ai in Gansu, neither Mi's existence nor activities should have been unknown or unanticipated.

A Han Dynasty anecdote casts a less-than-laudatory light on King Wen's motivations: ¹⁹³

King Wen said, "I want to employ the army, who can be attacked? The Mi-hsü clan seem to have doubts about me, [perhaps] we can go and attack them first?"

Kuan-shu said, "Their ruler is one of the realm's enlightened rulers; attacking him would not be righteous."

The T'ai Kung said, "I have heard that the former kings attacked the crooked, not the submissive; that they attacked the difficult, not the easy; and that they attacked the excessive, not what did not meet the mark." "Excellent," replied King Wen who subsequently attacked Mi-hsü and extinguished it.

Although fictional and bereft of the initial provocative attack, this dialogue perhaps more accurately reflects the expansionist mindset prevailing at the moment. Ironically, Kuan-shu (who would subsequently lead a rebellion after King Wu's death) thought it would be unrighteous, whereas the virtuous King Wen is portrayed as readily accepting the T'ai Kung's perverse counsel to strike Mi-hsü even though a strike would contravene their reputation for Virtue.

The subsequent attack on Li (Chi), generally thought to have been located in Shanxi south of Ch'ang-chih near the Hu-kuan Pass in the southernmost part of the T'ai-hang Mountains, ¹⁹⁴ was facilitated by employing the protostates of Yü and Jui as a springboard. Li's conquest resulted in Chou forces being poised to freely traverse the heights and access the plains where Chao-ko was located. They then vanquished another large town or protostate named Yü (but a different Chinese character than the Yü previously discussed in conjunction with Jui) on the Ch'in-yang River, itself a major tributary of the Yellow River in southeast Shanxi. Yü's conquest brought them inside the Yellow River's sweep and thus about seventy-five miles from Chao-ko, which lay just across the intervening plains.

The Chou's preconquest expansion next targeted Ch'ung, the final protostate in a sort of downward arc geographically defined by their previous objectives ranging from Mi to Li and Yü. ¹⁹⁵ An early Han retrospective indicates that King Wen first sought to ensure popular support (and presumably historical approbation) by emphasizing the welfare of the people before going forth to punish the ruler's excesses: ¹⁹⁶

King Wen wanted to attack the state of Ch'ung so he first

issued a pronouncement: “I have heard that Marquis Hu of Ch’ung disdains his father and elder brothers, does not respect seniors and the elderly, is not just in deciding law suits, and doesn’t divide wealth equitably. The strength of the hundred surnames is exhausted, they lack clothes and food, so I am about to go forth on a punitive expedition to punish them. It is only for the people that I am attacking Ch’ung. I will order the troops not to slay people nor destroy houses, fill in wells, cut down trees, or disturb the six animals. Anyone who does not follow these orders will be put to death without remission.” When the people of Ch’ung heard about it, they asked to surrender.

This late anecdote reflects not only thinking seen in the *Ssu-ma Fa* and other classic Warring States military writings but also the much-publicized thrust of King Wu’s subsequent proclamations to the Shang populace. However, Ch’ung was reportedly a Shang clan state, one apparently much favored by the emperor and therefore a major obstacle to the Chou’s expansion. The dialogues previously cited also indicate that King Wen had been imprisoned because the earl of Ch’ung had reported on his dissatisfaction (purportedly expressed in a sigh) and that he was “accumulating goodness and piling up virtue so that all the feudal lords would incline to him.” Whether out of enmity or fear, the earl probably had discerned, albeit erroneously, a fortuitous opportunity to garner Hsin’s gratitude. Reviled for his actions, he may yet have been feared for his perspicacity.

Being well protected by substantial walls typical of major Lungshan- and Shang-era towns, the fortified city of Ch’ung required more than thirty days to reduce after initially being besieged. ¹⁹⁷ The assault, the first depicted in any early writing, is purportedly described in the continuation of the ode “Huang Yi”: ¹⁹⁸

Shang Ti ordered King Wen,
“Initiate plans against states of enmity,
Unite with your older and younger brothers,
[Employ] your scaling ladders
And your overlook towers and battering rams,
To attack the ramparts at Ch’ung.”

The overlook towers and battering rams were skillfully deployed;
Atop Ch’ung’s ramparts all was murmuring and talk.
Prisoners for interrogation were seized in succession,
And the left ears [of the dead] orderly arrayed.
[King Wen] offered sacrifice to Heaven and Earth,

To induce their submission,

So that none within the four quarters would dare contume them.

The overlook towers and battering rams rumbled forth,

The ramparts at Ch'ung were pounded and pummeled.

Then they mounted the assault, then the troops surged,

Severing and destroying,

And none in the four quarters contravened them.

For more than two thousand years these lines have traditionally been understood as depicting two deliberately different modes of activity. During the initial stage of methodical preparations and tempered martial activities, King Wen is believed to have harbored the hope that the city would voluntarily submit. The real ferocity then commenced when the leadership refused to yield, though reportedly only after he offered further sacrifices and conspicuously cultivated himself. ¹⁹⁹ However, the verses actually reveal that rather than a glorious manifestation of Virtue that swept all before it, the attack on Ch'ung was a purely military strike that commenced by constructing and deploying their assault equipment even as the all-important capture and interrogation of local inhabitants and troops was undertaken. ²⁰⁰ It entailed intermittent but apparently localized clashes that resulted in the casualties attested by the ears collected to establish military achievement. Thereafter, following the psychologically critical sacrifices that invariably preceded any martial activity and were doubtlessly performed to terrify the enemy, perhaps even induce them to surrender (as indicated in the ode, but from awesomeness rather than Virtue), one or more assaults were undertaken that surmounted the walls, inflicted heavy casualties, and ultimately destroyed the city. Despite repeated pronouncements that humanitarian constraints would be observed, the Chou obviously did not fight with the idea of preserving the enemy that would subsequently be advanced in the *Art of War* nor adopt the compassionate practices outlined in *Ssu-ma Fa*.

Even allowing for poetic exaggeration, the ode's depiction is unfortunately somewhat problematic because it asserts that two basic siege engines were employed, overlook towers and battering rams. ²⁰¹ Rather than an earthen mound or tower erected in place, the former would have allowed the attackers to push forward a prefabricated structure with sufficient height to overlook the walls and rain arrows down upon the defenders, the latter to roll up and commence pounding the gates, always the most vulnerable point in any citadel. ²⁰² However, because there is absolutely no archaeological evidence

for any sort of large wagon until centuries later, much less a wheeled conveyance sufficiently sturdy to move thousands of pounds, the lines reflect inventions prominently employed at the time of composition rather than historical actuality. Nevertheless, the incipient beginnings of sieges and assaults can be recognized in this vestigial memory even though the methods were no doubt confined to simply attacking the gates (including, perhaps, with fire) and employing ladders to scale the walls. Their success against Ch'ung may have been a factor in Emperor Hsin's decision to blunt Chou's oncoming forces in open-field battle rather than exploit the defensive advantages created by Chao-ko's reportedly impregnable fortifications.

As chronicled in the *Bamboo Annals*, Ch'ung was vanquished under King Wen, but Li awaited King Wu's ascension while Yü goes unmentioned. Hardly minor, the difference entails both historical and strategic implications. The former can be deferred, but the orderly progression from north to south, walling off the Shang, is somewhat disrupted by Ch'ung's subjugation, particularly if it lay closer to the Chou heartland rather than far out on the southerly route of access. ²⁰³ For Ch'ung's conquest to have facilitated the construction of a new capital at Feng it must have occurred considerably earlier, under King Wen, and been situated within the Wei River Valley, though still on terrain intervening between Chou-yüan and the vital egress out of Kuan-chung.

Strategic necessity would therefore have required its reduction before another capital could be constructed and the external campaigns against Li, Yü, and finally Chao-ko even contemplated, but its conquest would have constituted a far less threatening event on the Shang horizon. However, if it were located far outside the pass, perhaps in the Luoyang area as often suggested, the subsequent attacks on Li and Yü would have diverted Hsin's attention somewhat northward, implying that any assault on Anyang would come through the T'ai-hang mountain region. ²⁰⁴ (The aborted first campaign largely, if not completely, negated the effect of any "feint east, strike west" misdirection.)

Although no compelling archaeological evidence that might indicate Ch'ung's location has yet been discovered, recently recovered bamboo strips from the state of Ch'u seemingly confirm that the attack on Li was mounted under King Wu's direction in the eighth year of King Wen's regal calendar, the first year of King Wu's actual rule but the second year after King Wen's death. ²⁰⁵ Accordingly, Ch'ung was probably located outside the Wei River Valley and actually had little direct impact on affairs within Kuan-chung except perhaps as a possible platform for Shang strikes into the valley. The subsequent assault on Yü would also have been mounted under King Wu's direct

command, being the second of two positive efforts that would have solidified his authority, helped establish his reputation as an exemplary leader, and freed him of King Wen's shadow.

Puzzling Aspects

Numerous discrepancies are evident in the various accounts of the Chou's military campaigns, some minor but others relatively significant in the context of military history. Although the "Shih Fu" materials can be employed to explicate the information preserved in other depictions and create a basically coherent account, they also raise a number of, perhaps, irresolvable questions and prompt an evaluation of the campaign from the perspective of China's theoretical military writings, especially those originating in the Warring States Period, which will be found at the conclusion of Part I. These include the speed and route of the march, the date of the conflict, and the extensiveness of the consolidation campaign.

Foremost among the overarching questions is why the Chou oligarchs were motivated, or felt compelled, to overthrow their Shang overlords. Given their access to the region's natural resources, lack of interference in their trading activities, ability to pursue their own cultural objectives, and freedom to nurture their own style of materialism, no sound economic reason for rebelling against Shang suzerainty seems to have existed. Furthermore, because the Shang was preoccupied with the Eastern Yi, the essentially independent Chou leadership could have simply maintained its superficial submissiveness and relied upon geostrategic advantages to survive. As long as the Chou continued to be nominally integrated into the perceived hierarchy and showed sufficient respect, such as by continuing to conduct sacrifices to deceased Shang rulers and performing divination within the ancestral structure, Emperor Hsin is unlikely to have deemed them a threat or have been inclined to pursue military activities against them. Because they inhabited a relatively remote, well-protected valley in a time of minimal cart tracks and few chariots, they truly dwelt in a separate world.

Alternatively, they could have provoked Emperor Hsin into attacking and, by holding the passes and exploiting the topographical advantages, particularly the choke points where one man could withstand ten, vanquished the aggressors and created an independent kingdom with minimal military effort. Even if the Shang armies had

remained formidable, they could have been defeated by drawing them into the Wei Valley, where the wet terrain would enmire them, and the surrounding hills could be exploited by masses of archers to wreck havoc, just as Ch'i would at the famous debacle at Ma-ling. ²⁰⁶ The existence of alternatives, even if not fully recognized or completely understood at the time, strongly suggests that they deliberately chose to fight for the heartland and therefore sought to destroy the Shang through a military expedition.

Fathoming their motivation for risking their very existence requires untangling their important beliefs from later imputations. Thucydides identified fear, honor, and economic interest as war's three causative factors, but given that they are not mutually exclusive, interplay among them affects the course of action. ²⁰⁷ The tendency for emotion and passion rather than reason and assessment to dominate perhaps explains Sun-tzu's emphasis upon the need to undertake well-calculated assessments prior to battle, as well as his pronouncements that generals should never engage in combat out of anger or an obsession with fame and honor.

According to the classic military writings and several other (non-Confucian) Warring States works, warfare is innate to mankind. ²⁰⁸ Because it is unavoidable and therefore only temporarily constrainable, the wise make preparations for it while the foolish remain wistful. Within this context, more causes than Thucydides noted are identified:

In general the reasons troops are raised are five: to contend for fame; to contend for profit; from accumulated hatreds; from internal disorder; and from famine. The names [of the armies] are also five: righteous army, strong army, hard army, fierce army, and contrary army. Suppressing the violently perverse and rescuing the people from chaos is termed "righteousness." Relying on [the strength of] the masses to attack is termed "strong." Mobilizing the army out of anger is termed "hard." Abandoning the forms of propriety [*li*] and greedily seeking profit is termed "fierce." Embarking on military campaigns and mobilizing the masses while the country is in turmoil and the people exhausted is termed "contrary." ²⁰⁹

Compassion and righteousness have traditionally been identified as the Chou's sole motivating factors, but a desire for power or an unspoken quest for revenge probably loomed equally large, with the dishonor of continued servitude, however nominal, being particularly rankling. It has even been claimed that, because Shang culture was superior in numerous material aspects and the Shang had a highly developed, though still evolving, writing system, the Chou were not

content with gradually absorbing various aspects but instead sought to usurp the ruler's power, seize the heartland, and reap enormous gains. ²¹⁰ However, even if partially true, claims such as these need to be significantly discounted because, for example, Chou metallurgy was technologically comparable and, while not quantitatively equivalent, clearly sufficient to produce excellent bronze weapons and vessels, though perhaps not with the same degree of intricacy displayed by the best Shang cauldrons.

The crucial question is when the Chou chieftains first conceived the idea of overthrowing the Shang, an act not necessarily synonymous with replacing them throughout the realm, particularly as their immediate postconquest behavior and relatively early *Shang Shu* documents suggest they were initially content with having decapitated the source of perversity. It must therefore be asked when a passing thought became an explicit objective, when actions began to be intentionally structured to achieve this specific purpose rather than just concocted in response to exigencies. How early did they begin to view victory as a real possibility and embrace the quest? And finally, ignoring the likelihood of considerable evolution over the decades, what was their ultimate objective? Simply freedom from interference, total independence, or domination of the realm in imitation of the Hsia and Shang?

Whether elements in a consciously implemented plan or simply discrete actions driven by necessity that evolved into a general sense of purpose, Chou actions from inception to conquest can be interpreted as measures intended to realize a strategic vision rather than just the natural dynamic of a people who aspired to leadership and dominance as they acquired economic and military power. (Whether Chou designs ever rose to the level of grand strategy such as in Rome and Byzantium is a matter for primarily academic debate.)

²¹¹ They first stabilized the immediate area by subjugating and expelling indigenous contenders, then cleared and cultivated the land, and finally imposed control over the roads. According to vestiges in the *Shih Ching* and other traditional texts, they also implemented active defensive measures to thwart incursions by nearby peoples, especially those to their northwest and west, while preparing to engage and defeat them, and eventually conducted several expeditionary campaigns that produced victory.

Chou leadership then turned their attention eastward and began to gradually encroach upon the Shang's domain by subverting the latter's power and influence among contiguous peoples and protostates. Although they were not subjugated by military force, Yü and Jui were co-opted into the Chou sphere and became early clients. The successive victories over Ch'ung, Li, and Yü concluded their

preconquest efforts and resulted in essentially dividing the realm along a north to south line that fell along the eastern edge of the T'ai-hang Mountains and extended down through Meng-chin.

Although their exact locations still cannot be plotted, the allies who sustained the final assault came from west of this boundary and south of the Yellow River and apparently included numerous members of the Jung. However, just prior to the attack, the Chou essentially controlled, either directly or through its allies, territory extending to longitude 112 or 113 degrees east and thus essentially realized the historically famous assessment of having gained the allegiance of two parts out of three, depending upon the Shang's actual expansiveness and how the latter's influence among the generally independent Yi peoples might be assessed. The claim of eight hundred allies, albeit mostly minor chieftains and even individual clan members, would have been geographically feasible and in combination both aspects seem to indicate not just common interest but an actual, vast conspiracy.

Lacking startling new finds, the extant historical materials unfortunately remain insufficient to prove that the Chou's actions were all manifestations of this overriding strategic conception. Their military measures, whether tactics or campaigns, may simply have been prompted by constraints of terrain, the proximity of enemies, or a basic quest for survival yet, in hindsight it certainly appears that the Chou gradually but deliberately whittled away the Shang's sphere of control. Certainly from King Wen onward, particularly after he received Heaven's visible sanctification—the undeniable five-planet conjunction—this defined their intent. Prior to that, although King Chi Li conceivably dreamed of eliminating the Shang, the Chou may have simply been trying to survive by carving out a secure niche in the Wei River Valley. Having been forced there by other, more-warlike powers, they must have painfully learned the hard lesson that military prowess and border security are necessary to survive, not to mention flourish.

King Wen's Kingship

Considerable interest has arisen over the question of when, or even whether, King Wen referred to himself by the august title of king or whether the appellation is nothing more than a posthumous honorific. ²¹² Early Chou vessels and fragmentary oracular inscriptions can be interpreted as suggesting that Chou leaders began calling themselves kings in his reign, perhaps coincident with, or prompted by, King Wen's appointment as Hsi Po. (Further, albeit very marginal, confirmation is perhaps found in the recently recovered *Pao Hsin* bamboo strips.) ²¹³ The view that King Wen and the other Po

styled themselves kings in their own realms rather than presuming to assert their eminence throughout the realm (including in the Shang) also has merit. Unfortunately, vestiges in the traditional accounts are somewhat indeterminate, capable of being forcibly interpreted to suit the analyst's view, just as the Chou oracle bones discussed below.

Although historical works are replete with inconsequential debates over the appearance and meaning of various regal titles, this self-aggrandizement would have entailed real consequences. Employing the title of king would have been tantamount to claiming to be the true leader of an emerging regional polity and both within and without the Chou would have created a sense that, despite resentment or contrary aspirations, it would not only be futile to oppose him, but also advantageous to submit to the inevitable growth of Chou power.

Emblematic of their increasing self-confidence, King Wu's assertion of kingship would have also fostered a greater sense of identity, and therefore unity, among the Chou people. It should have also motivated a more dedicated commitment to the project of ascension, nurtured greater resilience, and prompted increasing self-confidence and thus been a vital psychological cog in developing the combination of authority and charisma—the awesomeness—that would cause others to tremble and submit. Conversely, even though a less regimented sense of hierarchy had perhaps come to pervade the realm in the light of the Shang's retrenchment, the highly volatile Hsin should certainly have deemed this act presumptuous, even rebellious. His puzzling lack of irritation may have stemmed from King Wen's having been appointed as a *po* (duke), both these titles still being insignificant in comparison with the august aura attached to the more recently flaunted sobriquet of *Ti* or “emperor,” albeit a posthumous title that was just beginning to be accorded to his immediate predecessors. Moreover, it was not yet the time when Confucian concepts of a sole, Heaven-appointed ruler would prevail, all other ranks and appointments then being derivatively sanctioned in some inviolate way. ²¹⁴

Virtue and Its Exploitation

Early postconquest vessels already indicate the existence of the concept of Heavenly sanction as well as the need to remove Shang perversity on behalf of the populace. Whether their contents are the result of vigorous propaganda efforts by energetic spin masters—what might be termed the skeptical view—or reflect felt belief (as espoused by later Confucians and others who believed in a world order) remains uncertain. Most likely, they stem from an evolving combination of both, a need for the mandate to motivate and provide justification, but

also a desire to eliminate Hsin for reasons they perceived, however self-persuasively, to be benignly prompted. In addition, even though it has been claimed that the inscriptions on these vaunted bronze vessels were intended for the spirits rather than as (boastful) historical records for posterity, the creators no doubt wanted to ensure their actions were perceived in the proper light, as well as perhaps dissuade others who might become enamored of revolution and therefore be inclined to oppose the newly founded Chou order.

Rather than just a propaganda weapon or the product of enhanced historical portrayals, *Te* (Virtue) seems to have been a real concern at the dynasty's outset and possibly in the preceding century or two, dating back to Tan Fu's reluctance to engage in warfare in order to preserve the people.²¹⁵ According to traditional accounts, King Wen's Virtue—or more likely his ability and political acumen—had become apparent even when he was a youth. The likelihood that Heaven favored him prompted his grandfather, Tan Fu, to bypass Chi Li's two older brothers when designating an heir-apparent in order to ensure that the Chou's fate would eventually be entrusted to King Wen. No doubt a late creation, it purportedly explains why these same two brothers ventured to the wilds of the southeast where they reputedly founded the state of Wu but not whether they voluntarily departed because they wished to ensure the clan's future or were infuriated at being displaced. Irrespective of their motivation, their emigration spared the state further conflict at a precarious moment.²¹⁶

However, as the monarchy became more powerful and increasingly isolated from both clan members and the people at large, the kingship itself seems to have gradually entailed a presumption of Heavenly sanctioned Virtue, whether manifest in the ruler's behavior or not. A highly verbalized aspect of conducting government that was frequently ignored in practice, this emphasis upon *Te* (originally nearly synonymous with measures that promoted the people's welfare) would gradually shift until the stress came to be upon the people serving the ruler.

This development prompted Mencius and other Warring States thinkers to redirect the focus back onto the people's welfare.²¹⁷ The resulting formulations would essentially realize the fundamental *Tao Te Ching* insight that when Virtue declines, people speak of it and compel its performance, often in highly formalized fashion. Ironically, King Wen had visibly attempted to effect a reduction in Hsin's extensive punishments, but later, under the influence of Legalistic thinking, they would again be pervasive, having become virtually the sole means for imposing rather than ensuring social order. Although synonymous with enforced compliance, Ch'in's punishments would be

so repressive they would always be deemed the major factor in prompting the people to revolt.

The need to gain the allegiance of the people by nurturing their welfare would become a fundamental tenet in the strife-torn Warring States Period. Those of a more compassionate bent would advocate the implementation of appropriate policies for purely humanitarian reasons, but the cunning and calculating would exploit beneficent policies to strengthen the state and gain the adherence of the people prior to undertaking long-contemplated military activities. As the Taoist-oriented *Three Strategies* would assert, at the end of the Warring States Period it was believed “a state about to mobilize its army concentrates first upon making its beneficence ample. A state about to attack and seize another concentrates upon first nurturing the people. Conquering the many with only a few [is a question of] beneficence. Conquering the strong with the weak [is a question of] people.” ²¹⁸

Several of the initial chapters of the *Six Secret Teachings* that purportedly preserve the T'ai Kung's early discussions with Kings Wen and Wu depict him as having expounded the need to emphasize the people's welfare: ²¹⁹

Anyone who profits All under Heaven will find All under Heaven open to him. Anyone who harms All under Heaven will find All under Heaven closed to him. Anyone who gives life to All under Heaven, All under Heaven will regard as Virtuous. Anyone who kills All under Heaven, All under Heaven will regard as a brigand. If one penetrates to All under Heaven, All under Heaven will be accessible to him; if one impoverishes All under Heaven, All under Heaven will regard him as their enemy. One who gives peace to All under Heaven, All under Heaven will rely on; one who endangers All under Heaven, All under Heaven will view as a disaster. ²²⁰

Not surprisingly, the *Ssu-ma Fa* particularly identified “those who murder the worthy or harm the people [and are] brutal within their states” as appropriate targets for punitive elimination. ²²¹

Even though these notions were neither so precisely nor extensively articulated at the end of the Shang, they appear to have figured prominently in the Chou's approach to domination. Their concept of *Te* (Virtue) has been characterized as consisting of three core elements: respect for Heaven, filiality, and the preservation of the people. ²²² The first is certainly reflected in the charges lodged against Emperor Hsin and their own belief in the celestial mandate, the third in nurturing the people and presuming to extirpate the realm's chief miscreant. Their own agricultural prosperity also appears to have played a crucial role in sustaining displaced groups who chose to

emigrate into the Chou, thereby strengthening it and fulfilling the third aspect. Perceived restraint in punishments, greater prosperity and material comforts, ²²³ and comparative equality in a populace unburdened by a theocratic hierarchy would have further enhanced the attractiveness and solidity of their society. ²²⁴

Chou motivational efforts were therefore two pronged: condemning the Shang ruling elite, especially the king himself for his many perversities, and conspicuously proclaiming their own, long cultivated Virtue, itself largely synonymous with beneficent policies intended to nurture the people's welfare. The *yin /yang* combination of the two—one negative, the other positive—ostensibly justified their rebellion, a tumultuous military action conducted on behalf of the realm under the sanction of irrefutable celestial phenomena. The chief accusations lodged against Emperor Hsin included disrespect toward Heaven, constant inebriation, licentious indulgence in orgies, and the somewhat odd charge of heeding the opinion of women, of “employing the words of his consorts,” ²²⁵ presumably in ways other than simple sexual dalliance.

More significantly, he was also accused of creating inhuman punishments, such as the burning pillar, to please one of his female companions, acts that apparently had widespread psychological effect on the people and stirred intense resentment. In the context of the Shang's numerous brutal punishments and widespread sacrificial slaying of their enemies and nonpersons, it might have been hardly noticeable but apparently exceeded the tipping point of toleration and thus had magnified impact.

The charge of drunkenness, one apparently much proclaimed prior to the battle at Mu-yeh, was leveled not just at Hsin himself but also Shang royal culture, his excesses having been widely imitated among his entourage. Having become a well attested “cause” for the revolt in the Chou's internal depictions of events, it appears not just in comparatively early documents but also reverberates throughout several primary bronze inscriptions that counsel restraint, including the *Ta Yu Ting*. For example, in “The Admonition against Liquor” (“Chiu Kao”), viewed as one of the earliest credible Chou Dynasty pronouncements, the Duke of Chou emphasized that aspect of Shang's perversity when admonishing Duke Feng on how to govern Wei: ²²⁶

I have similarly heard it said that the most recent descendant of the former kings immersed himself in liquor. His edicts failed to achieve prominence among the people while he persevered in ways that prompted increased anger. So great was his penchant for licentiousness and for indulging in perverse pleasures and holding festivities that he lost the awesomeness of regal

composure. Without exception the people were pained and sorrowed. He remained besotted with wine, never thinking of self-restraint or abandonment. His mind was extremely poisonous and he had no inclination to fear death.

Perversity pervaded the city of Shang yet he was untroubled by Yin's imminent annihilation. Rather than the fragrance of virtue it was the people's resentment that was perceived in Heaven. Even the masses of ordinary people came to immerse themselves in liquor and the stench was noted above. Thus Heaven sent death down upon Yin and had no love for it, solely because of these transgressions. Heaven is not oppressive, the people expedited their own punishment.

Even though the populace suffered from Hsin's oppression and iniquities, broadly justifying the Duke of Chou's claim that "without exception the people were pained and sorrowed," it's doubtful that either the ordinary nobility or common people would have been troubled by his drunken festivities, particularly because they are noted as similarly having immersed themselves in hedonism. Rather, despite the brief United States enactment of prohibition, the historical tendency to debauchery suggests that virtually all those who might have participated did so, only the excluded were ever critical and envious. ²²⁷ Accordingly, why the Chou would find orgiastic fits of drunkenness particularly offensive and grounds for rebellion rather than disdain and disparagement is perhaps more puzzling than not.

Although the charges vehemently lodged against them were probably exaggerated, frequent references to Shang drunkenness in literary sources and bronze vessels imply they had significant veracity. Archaeologically recovered bronze artifacts include a large number of drinking cups and cauldrons, the latter being employed in heating the era's rice wine. These include small *chiieh*, essentially a fancy cup with three legs; a larger *chiieh*; a pitcher normally termed a *ku*; and similar items whose exact function is uncertain but probably were employed to serve and heat wine.

Conversely, Shang drinking appears to have originated in, or at least been a fundamental part of, rituals and ceremonial activity connected with feasting, sacrifices, and the ancestral cult. ²²⁸ Although this doesn't preclude the holding of frequent banquets and daily excesses among the powerful, who were well positioned to emulate the king, it suggests Chou charges of Shang inebriation were somewhat simplistic and more likely mounted for propaganda purposes than out of puritanical impulses, particularly as Chou ceremonies also employed libations and the Chou merely advocated minimizing the consumption of alcoholic libations.

Bizarre behavioral effects may have also resulted from the Shang preference for warm alcoholic beverages because their intricate bronze vessels had a high lead content, the latter's percentage having been increased to facilitate the alloy's flow within the molds. Although the results of ongoing scientific studies on the subject have yet to be published, the amount of lead that might leach into the liquor was probably considerable because of the rice wine's acidity. (Pernicious effects may also have resulted from the foodstuffs they consumed, especially among the rich and powerful whose delectables were prepared in bronze cauldrons rather than the earthen cookware used by peasants.) If so, Hsin's reputed perversity and erratic behavior, even his hubris and sense of invincibility, may have been exacerbated by the effects of lead poisoning resulting from his unusually prodigious consumption of this beverage.

No doubt emboldened by their success, Chou spokesmen espoused a concept of change integral to historical consciousness in their postvictory utterances. Following the second conquest and then Ch'eng Chou's construction, King Wen claimed in the "Tuo Shih" that not only had the mandate shifted, but that events had replicated the Shang's own earlier conquest of the Hsia when the latter had fallen from Virtue. In addition, rather than denigrating all aspects of Shang culture and thereby antagonizing the populace, King Wen praised the Virtue of the earlier Shang kings, conspicuously referred to the positive attributes of their rule, spoke about modeling upon their governance of the people, and emphasized that Shang laws and regulations would continue to be applied in the Yin enclaves to make Chou domination more palatable.

Despite probably not having been overly persuaded by mere verbiage couched in the name of Virtue, the remnant Shang members certainly benefited to the extent that their customs were not forcefully transformed, particularly in the state of Sung. Cultural determinism being a complicating factor, whether they were affected by appeals to their own history depends upon constancy in human nature over time and among civilizations. The psychological impact of removing the onus of brutality, transforming the Chou conquest from a sordid quest for domination into a sort of inevitable unfolding may still have somewhat ameliorated otherwise inescapable animosity. At the same time, these enunciations have prompted scholarly assertions that, rather than being mere myth, the Shang conquest of the Hsia is the creative product of consciously fashioned, dynamic Chou propaganda.

Accordingly, Chou leadership exploited, perhaps even first conceived, the concept of righteously motivated warfare that would subsequently be extensively discussed and adroitly manipulated in the *Ssu-ma Fa* and *Wu-tzu*. Even though they did not specifically

articulate it in terms of *yi* , the Chou clearly believed in the righteousness (*yi*) of their mission and sought to inspire their troops and allies with their vision, thus evincing a sophisticated grasp of the psychology of warfare. All the textual materials attributable to the period ranging from genuine bronze inscriptions to later writings and outright forgeries not only dwell upon Emperor Hsin's perversity but also emphasize that by betraying his ancestral heritage and people, he incurred Heavenly retribution.

One important factor in the Chou's rise from insignificance was their ability to create and then exploit a sense of common interest with their allies. Their consciously nurtured, virtuous image no doubt proved attractive to many state rulers and individuals, but the obverse, a widespread hatred for a tyrannical despot who imposed heavy financial and symbolic demands, probably furnished the real emotional motivation for many who participated. How much the individual states could hope to benefit from Hsin's demise would depend upon the nature of Chou rule, but the inspirational effect of the Chou's charges against Emperor Hsin probably varied according to the individual's position and rank, members of the royalty and minor clans in external states inevitably having a rather different outlook than the average warrior entrusted with the actual fighting. The frequently repeated charges of drunkenness, brutality, and licentiousness were of course designed to demonize the Shang and thereby foster the anger and hatred needed to engender the strong combative spirit required to face a formidable foe, showing that the psychology of combat was already well understood prior to Sun-tzu and the classic military writings. ²²⁹

Tradition emphasizes that Emperor Hsin was deliberately singled out as the sole miscreant, the populace and soldiers being held blameless, much as the *Ssu-ma Fa* would advocate centuries later. ²³⁰ Even if they were not attracted by the Chou's Virtue nor revolted by the vileness of their own king (as Mencius would assert), the possibility that they might escape death presumably deflated the army's fervor and especially vitiated the combat spirit of the conscripts and others reluctantly compelled to participate. Yet care must be exercised in accepting a view of events based mainly upon traditional accounts that betray the heavy influence of early Chou apologists and then later Confucian literati and remain substantially unattested, being essentially a case of the victorious writing their own epithets.

The Chou sought to motivate their people for the conflict, harmonizing their will and unifying their intentions with the king's just as Sun-tzu would emphasize in the initial chapter of *Art of War* . Directing the army's hatred toward Emperor Hsin alone while

simultaneously mandating that his troops be humanely treated could have seriously undermined their battlefield commitment and thus jeopardized the outcome. However, the fervor with which the Tiger Warriors reportedly swept away the opposition provides dramatic evidence that no loss of focus or enervation in their martial *ch'i* had been suffered. Although the Chou forces may have been thoroughly imbued with the need to overthrow a perverse tyrant, they must have viewed the Shang troops simply as enemy forces and sought to achieve victory as quickly as possible, thus accounting for the extensive bloodshed and high casualty rate.

The Mandate and Other Omens

The search for the factors that empowered the Chou's leaders and justified their planned usurpation of imperial authority inevitably leads to their vociferously proclaimed receipt of celestial sanction. The concept of the Mandate of Heaven pervades the few texts generally identified with the immediate postconquest period, particularly the proclamations to the vanquished Shang populace, and is found in the earliest datable bronze inscriptions. Although certainly crucial, numerous questions persist about the nature of the concept and its correlate, Heaven, as well as its inception, visible basis, evolution, and acceptance. Perhaps even more important is whether the Chou oligarchs sincerely believed in its existence or merely created it as a manipulative tool that might be astutely exploited. Uniformity of belief cannot be assumed. Depending upon their motivations and spiritual understandings, the key participants may have embraced highly different views and been marked by attitudes ranging from terrified awe through complete skepticism. Historical vestiges provide clues for resolving many of these issues, but some still lie beyond the limits of knowability.

The Shang Dynasty feared more than revered Shang Ti, a sort of nebulous ethereal power residing in Heaven, one endowed with overarching authority over the royal ancestors who were similarly envisioned as dwelling there. Shang oracular inscriptions show that both were believed capable of affecting many aspects of the earthly realm including environmental phenomena such as rain, heat, and earthquakes. They were also deemed capable of bestowing blessings and directly inflicting pain—even colds, headaches, and toothaches—upon mankind, particularly the ruler himself. Whether because the extant materials are basically inadequate or because of imprecision in these rudimentary, ever-evolving concepts, considerable fuzziness and overlap seems to have existed in their responsibilities. Nevertheless, the shadowy and elusive Shang Ti seems always to have possessed ultimate authority.

Possibly an apotheosized or extremized incarnation of the highest ancestors and probably just an indistinct numinous entity in

the Shang mind, Shang Ti has been thought to have taken the form of a transcendent consciousness, a limited personified entity, or even a celestial body but never an anthropomorphic form.²³¹ Irrespective of how the Shang interpreted his existence or how extensively credence may have varied among individual members of the Shang community, Emperor Hsin apparently believed that Shang Ti had ordered King T'ang to wrest the empire from Chieh, the Hsia's last ruler. Therefore, Shang Ti had not only sanctioned the Shang's legitimacy, but also had never rescinded the mandate.

Oracular inscriptions from Wu Ting's reign indicate a strong degree of respect, even trepidation, toward both Shang Ti and the ancestors when making requests or asking for approval to undertake important actions such as attacking enemy states. However, as the dynasty progressed, its intensity diminished and the prognostication process apparently became more perfunctory until the emperor seems to have been almost offhandedly announcing his intentions to the denizens of the Heavenly realm. If the accusations lodged against the last rulers hold any truth, by their last years, not only had their former piety vanished, they had also completely abandoned their otherworldly orientation to immerse themselves in hedonism, debauchery, and the human.

Whether because of cultural differences or a conscious desire to empower another numinous entity with which they might identify, the Chou came to recognize Heaven itself as the supreme ethereal authority and believe that it could equally affect both the natural and human realms through direct action and other forms of influence.²³² Because the "mandate of Heaven," the crucial sanction for overthrowing the extant order and establishing a new temporal authority, originated with the Chou, it has frequently been claimed that Heaven displaced Shang Ti in their conception. Heaven therefore not only had significantly different meaning and characteristics but also supposedly represented a fundamental reorientation from a personalized ancestral deity to a powerful consciousness capable of responding to the human plight and effecting change.

Once again the issue is surprisingly complex, not the least because the earliest Chou documents include numerous assertions that Shang Ti bestowed the mandate upon them, ordering the elimination of the chief source of perversity and even the extinction of his state.²³³ Most of these are embedded in pronouncements justifying their actions to the Shang populace, suggesting that they were merely shaping the argument in terms of Shang beliefs, but Heaven also appears and is credited with not just sanctioning their actions but doing so in manifest celestial fashion. It might therefore well be asked to what degree *T'ien* (Heaven) displaced Shang Ti as their supreme

numinous entity and what, if anything, the change meant to the era's participants.

Winnowing out sheaves of extraneous material, it appears a fundamental change did occur in the transition from the Shang to the Chou and that as the Chou's story unfolded, Shang Ti, while still nominally acknowledged, became increasingly irrelevant. Even Heaven, viewed as some sort of amorphous power, was conceptually deemphasized despite the early construction of an altar to Heaven (with Hou Chi as a corecipient) as the Chou ruling elite, at least as consciously proclaimed, moved away from simply serving Heaven (and Shang Ti) and obeying its inclinations to a functionally oriented interpretation stressing that Heaven respected Virtue and sought to preserve the people.²³⁴ In fact, in the "Ta Shih," King Wu is portrayed as stating that "Heaven must follow what the people want." This should not be construed as a total rejection of the role and power of Heaven, but a shift from a dictatorial, nebulous deity to a sort of indefinite, increasingly irrelevant, numinous entity. It is therefore symptomatic of the impetus that eventually culminated in Tung Chung-sh'u's views in the Han Dynasty and the contradictory thrust to closely identify the ruler with Heaven, including denominating him as the "Son of Heaven" (*T'ien-tzu*).

Although still in embryonic form and singularly active because of Hsin's pronounced perversity, Heaven's movement had suddenly become responsive, largely because of the people's condition and detestation of their tyrannical ruler. Highly fictionalized *Shang Shu* documents depict King T'ang responding to the people's plight at the Shang's founding, but neither the Shang nor the Chou ever believed the ruler existed for the people, as Mencius would essentially advocate.²³⁵ However, early vestiges indicate the Chou had a concept of the people's welfare and viewed the elimination of their suffering as a justifiable course of action. A brief comment in the *Li Chi*, a Han Dynasty ritual compendium, additionally suggests the Shang had always de-emphasized the human for the transcendent.²³⁶

Even though the concepts of Shang Ti and Heaven merit further analysis, it should not be forgotten that neither was ever the subject of abstract philosophizing in the manner of later Warring States contemplations or the highly esoteric constructs of erudite Buddhism and Neo-Confucianism. Dwelling in the immediacy of their circumstances, Shang and Chou leaders interacted with mythical external forces only to the extent dictated by inherited practices that were slowly evolving and being adopted to suit their intent and circumstances. Although probably not imbued with any great sincerity in observing them, Chou leadership certainly was not ignorant of Shang ritual customs. Nevertheless, finding belief in Shang Ti to be

prevalent, the Chou simply responded to necessity and formulated the change of mandate in terms of Shang Ti's will as well as their own indigenous concept of Heaven.

No clash of gods was framed nor any immediate displacement intended that would have compounded their propaganda efforts or required that the Shang populace suddenly be persuaded of Heaven's existence and power. Being warriors concerned with action and results, rather than denying Shang Ti's existence or trying to negate his power, they simply morphed all his aspects into their more comprehensive nebulosity. However, even though they had purportedly received the Mandate of Heaven, it was not as if lightning bolts had struck the leaders or transcendent messengers had appeared to convey some special ethereal awesomeness. Rather than being implemented by a peal of thunder that signaled the disappearance of Hsin and his coterie of henchmen, the mandate's actualization was predicated upon human effort.

The Chou simply needed to create a groundswell of opinion that would sustain their efforts. Much as supposedly issue-centered, contemporary political slogans that actually minimalize and obscure, the Mandate of Heaven was intended to motivate their own warriors and the realm at large. If active participation could not be elicited, at least acquiescence might be achieved; if not acquiescence, at least violent opposition might be blunted. A crucial event in the Chou's self-perception, a core element in their enunciated purpose, and a magnet for allegiance, the concept was expected to radically affect preexistent views and subvert the Shang's sanctioned authority.

Although the Mandate of Heaven was essentially a self-defined concept, the Chou further justified their usurpation with arguments from precedent. ²³⁷ Rather than simply propaganda intended to persuade the Shang elite that the mandate was not immutable, their early vessels and writings suggest that the incipient Chou had an evolving sense of history, that they deemed the Shang's conquest of the Hsia evidence that temporal power was not everlasting. Assertions in the famous "Chiu Kao" (in which King Wu speaks of using history as a mirror) and "Chao Kao" articulate this appeal, and the "Chou Pen-chi" notes that King Wu was troubled by the possibility that the mandate could be lost, that Yin had in fact lost it. Contrary to Hsin's belief, change was not only possible but imminently actualizable and the moment could not be lost. ²³⁸

Celestial Manifestations

Prophets, messianic leaders, and fervent revolutionaries have long claimed divine sanction and appointments with destiny to justify their activities, however heinous. Although they sometimes cite

physical phenomena and major omens as evidence, personal revelations are more frequently claimed to have empowered them. Later, China would interpret floods, droughts, earthquakes, and eclipses as commentaries on the rulers' efficacy, but the Chou's Mandate turned out to be unique, a rare physical manifestation visible throughout the realm to anyone who cared to turn their eyes skyward.

The hard-won realization that failing to structure human activities in accord with seasonal fluctuations can only result in misery and death stimulated the development of the earliest calendars. However, even the most rudimentary ones require perceptivity, the gradual memorization of observations, and the latter's categorical correlation with celestial phenomena—in short, unremitting conscious effort, great awareness, extensive leisure, and some form of recording. Long experience accumulated over generations might gradually become incorporated into folklore and useful aphorisms, but only a comprehensive calendar such as the lunar version long used in China that apportions the year into twenty-four periods and indicates when to undertake crucial activities can stabilize life and fruitfully modulate agricultural work. Otherwise, seeds may be sown too early, when the ground is too cold or frost still likely, or too late for proper maturation before frigid temperatures end the harvest season, destroying the crops as well future seed stocks. Unexpected eclipses may invoke temporary terror but generally cause little lasting consternation unless they are exploited by shamans or dissidents. In contrast, failing to predict and heed seasonal dictates has real, potentially fatal impact.

These dire consequences made the appearance of individuals charged with calendrical compilation and celestial observation inevitable, though how societies on the cusp of civilization, still struggling with subsistence issues, could have afforded to divert the resources needed to sustain them is another question. Nevertheless, shamans, wizards, and ritualists appeared early on, and this potent knowledge appears to have been preserved primarily among them. However, lacking any form of artificial lighting other than occasional torches and a few dim oil lamps and therefore immersed in almost unbroken darkness, the inhabitants of antique ages were highly conscious of the phenomena unfolding in the Heavens over their villages and above their fields during the night. Even those lacking enhanced sensitivity could not have ignored such dramatic events as the full moon casting its light or been oblivious to the appearance of highly visible planets at dawn or dusk.

Astronomically based work in history and archaeology over the past three decades indicates that ancient China not only developed functional calendars early on but also sought to interpret the

meanings of unusual events. ²³⁹ These ranged from comets and shooting stars to conjunctions of two or more relatively bright celestial objects, whether planets with stars, the moon, or even comets. One relatively short-lived but momentous event, a multiplanet conjunction that recurs slightly more than every five hundred years, was so infrequent it could only have been preserved in legends or laconic chronicles. Nevertheless, a full conjunction preceded the Chou conquest of the Shang and another (though without Venus) roughly coincided with the Shang's ascension, King T'ang having witnessed it in 1576 BCE, some twenty-one years before he actually vanquished the Hsia. ²⁴⁰ However, celestial events that recur at five-hundred-year intervals are too rare to be predictable in a precomputational era while the predictable isn't rare enough to have momentous impact, only ominous significance when not foreseen.

According to the "Chou Yü" section of the *Kuo Yü*, "formerly, when King Wu attacked Yin, Jupiter was in Quail Fire; the moon was in Heavenly Quadriga; the sun was in the ford that Separates Wood; the new moon was in the Handle of the [Southern] Dipper; Mercury was in the Heavenly Turtle; the locations of Mercury, sun, and new moon were all in the north[-east] corner...Jupiter was in the regions of the Heavens allotted to us, the Zhou." ²⁴¹

Without becoming buried in the many complexities entailed by this brief "Chou Yü" passage, it should be noted that three of the five planets—Jupiter, Saturn, and Mars—have a mean conjunction of 516.33 years. If they were not too close to the sun as night transitioned to dawn or day to night, the brightness resulting from their near proximity would have readily attracted attention. When augmented, however briefly, by the appearance of Mercury and Venus, this grand conjunction would have created a spectacle too dramatic to be ignored. Although it has been calculated that they would have been in closest proximity about May 28, 1059 BCE and thus at maximum brightness at dusk for several days on either side of this date, the Chou did not initiate their second expedition until the autumn of 1047, somewhat more than twelve years later, with victory then being achieved at Mu-yeh on March 20, 1046 BCE. ²⁴²

A second, critical factor that proved highly empowering was the tendency to associate a sector of the sky with a clan, tribe, or state, resulting in celestial phenomena being taken as portents associated with groups' destinies rather than simply indeterminate omens. By the moment of conquest, both the Shang and Chou had come to accept this correlation, and it appears that Jupiter's presence in their sector was deemed an indication of ascendancy or virility, as well as a harbinger of military victory. ²⁴³ As preserved in the *Kuo Yü* passage and confirmed by a (metaphorical) statement in the *Bamboo Annals*

that “a red bird alighted on the Chou altar to Earth,” Jupiter had appeared in Quail Fire, the quadrant identified with the Chou, whereas the Shang were correlated in the popular mind with Great Fire (*Antares*).

Heaven’s having indicated its recognition of the Chou is not synonymous with the Chou’s having received a mandate to displace the Shang. Events, in and of themselves, are neutral, subject to perception and valuing, with names (and naming) being the primary means of imputing the latter, just as the *Tao Te Ching* would elaborate. An openness to auspicious omens facilitates their discovery, a predisposition to despair and depression ensures balefulness will be increasingly perceived. Imaginative and persuasive effort was still required on the part of the Chou to formulate a cogent interpretation and convince people, including their own members (and possibly themselves), of its validity. (If the king’s sense of mission had not been pervasive, how would nonbelievers and dissidents have been compelled to participate? It remains unclear whether the early Chou chieftains, including Kings Chi Li and Wen, had such extensive powers of reward and punishment that all the important people, the “big men” of the tribe, had to unquestionably obey their commands or they had to be persuaded to voluntarily participate.) Accomplished through radiating circles, the Chou spinmasters first had to persuade their own members of the Mandate of Heaven’s existence, then disseminate knowledge of its potency before broadly proclaiming its relevance to the realm at large. ²⁴⁴

Other Omens and Their Impact

Although few aspects of the events at Mu-yeh receive much mention in subsequent military literature, incidents in which one or another of the participants not only remained unperturbed but instead fervently dismissed the implications of baleful omens, thereby stiffening everyone to the cause, tend to recur. Since doubt in any form was universally identified as the “greatest disaster that can befall an army,” the early military writings emphasized the need to combat the contagious fear caused by unusual but naturally occurring events. However, mitigating the inimical effects of dire omens and inimical signs in the context of strong belief in divination’s validity and the Mandate of Heaven’s deliberate exploitation posed a serious challenge.

Under the rubric of “The Human in Warfare” the late Sung Dynasty *Hundred Unorthodox Strategies* would assert: ²⁴⁵

In warfare, what is generally referred to as the “human” means that one relies solely upon men and dismisses prodigies and omens. When owls congregate about the command flag, a cup

of wine turns red, or a pennant staff breaks when the army is going forth on campaign, only the commander can quash the effects of these ominous portents. If you extirpate the evil through according with Virtue, employ the straight to attack the crooked, and the worthy to strike the stupid, there should never be any doubts. A tactical principle from the *Art of War* states: "Prohibit perversity and eliminate doubt so that they will die without other thoughts."

As the concluding line to this concise enunciation indicates, the *Art of War* already recognized the need to actively prevent and immediately counteract the negative psychological impact of omens, portents, and weird phenomena.

According to the *Ssu-ma Fa*, commanders can minimize their influence by instilling unshakable confidence in their troops: "When the oath is clear the men will be strong and the effects of baleful omens and auspicious signs will be extinguished. The Tao for eliminating baleful omens is called righteousness. Charge the people with good faith, approach them with strength, establish the foundation of kingly government, and unify the strategic power of All under Heaven." ²⁴⁶ In debunking some old superstitions that might adversely impact the army's ability to maneuver, the T'ang Dynasty's General Li Ching added, "The successful employment of the masses lies in their being of one mind. Unification of mind lies in prohibiting omens and dispelling doubts. Should the commanding general have anything about which he is doubtful or fearful, their emotions will waver. When their emotions waver, the enemy will take advantage of the chink to attack." ²⁴⁷

Although early Chou practice would soon begin to diverge, divination continued to play almost as vital a role as in the Shang when it had been all encompassing, especially under King Wu Ting. ²⁴⁸ Being definitive, life-threatening events, military campaigns did not escape prognosticatory inquiry, and the trepidation inherent to their execution prompted re-evaluation of their appropriateness whenever adverse portents arose. More than a half millennium later the *Ssu-ma Fa* would therefore still proclaim, "Warfare is a question of having Heaven, material resources, and excellence. When the day and time for battle have been appropriately fixed and it is not necessary to change them; when augury by the tortoise shell presages victory; and when events proceed in a subtle, mysterious fashion, this is termed 'having Heaven.'" ²⁴⁹

Even the late Warring States *Six Secret Teachings*, nominally but ironically attributed to the T'ai Kung, who would become the very exemplar of skepticism, contains passages projected back to their

turbulent, prequest days that reflect the need for condemnatory celestial portents to be manifest before military action can be undertaken. ²⁵⁰ In response to King Wen's inquiry about how to vanquish the increasingly perverse emperor, the T'ai Kung reportedly replied, "You should cultivate your Virtue, submit to the guidance of Worthy men, extend beneficence to the people, and observe the Tao of Heaven. If there are no ill omens in the Tao of Heaven, you cannot initiate the movement [to revolt]. If there are no misfortunes in the Tao of Man, your planning cannot precede them. Only after you see Heavenly signs and also witness human misfortune can you make plans." ²⁵¹

Having received the Mandate of Heaven and witnessed any number of brutal and debauched Shang acts, the Chou would seem to have been well poised and completely justified in launching their punitive expedition. However, an incident arose that might have terminated the decisive second thrust at its inception: "Emperor Hsin killed Prince Pi-kan and imprisoned Ch'i-tzu. King Wu, wanting to attack Emperor Hsin, performed divination with the tortoise shell to observe the signs. They were not auspicious and violent wind and rain arose. The assembled dukes were all afraid, but the T'ai Kung stiffened them to support King Wu. King Wu then went forth." ²⁵² In the context of the Shang's extensive divinatory practices, the T'ai Kung's rejection of bad weather and ill portents would have been remarkable. In fact, because the efficacy of martial prognostication and military omens would not be challenged until late in the Warring States, the entire episode is generally considered a late fabrication. ²⁵³

Given the "revolutionary" nature of the circumstances and the resolute personalities of men undertaking the most dangerous enterprise possible, such quibbles pale even as they presume an unproven homogeneity of thought so powerful as to preclude the possibility of the exceptional. Clearly the T'ai Kung felt that even though King Wu claimed to have received the sanction of Heaven, auspicious signs could hardly be expected when a subordinate was about to attack his sovereign. ²⁵⁴ Moreover, he may have felt it would be impossible to cajole their allies into starting out yet a third time, though the overall level of response would probably have been unpredictable because new adherents who wanted to participate in (or feared being left out of) the creation of a new world order might have continued to join.

At the same time, insofar as the Chou claimed that their mandate to overthrow the Shang was attested by Heavenly phenomena, and they were exploiting credence in prognosticatory manifestations, this sort of explicit denial of untoward events is essentially heretical. Even though some sort of magnitude-based

allowance might be claimed—surely the Mandate of Heaven would override locally occurring indications—denying the predictive efficacy of any unnatural event would fundamentally challenge the era's mindset. Somewhat surprisingly, rather than being condemned, the T'ai Kung's dismissal of their efficacy became the basis for enthusiastically rejecting the significance of all portents and associated calendrical superstition.

Any campaign effort that required several weeks from staging to combat in the middle of winter could not have escaped the sort of severe weather that causes flags to be dropped, pennants to be blown into muddy water, or shafts snapped; witnesses birds caught in localized swirls that make them appear to be flying backward; and suffers various disasters brought about by sustained harsh conditions, including unexpected command deaths due to accidents, fatigue, drinking, sickness, or sudden cardiovascular events. Just a few centuries later, certain famous incidents in which successful commanders dramatically ignored signs foretelling doom or fought on the last, highly inauspicious day of a lunar month (such as at the famous battle of Li-Che River) would become increasingly well known, prompting more general assertions of denial. ²⁵⁵

In its current form, the *Wei Liao-tzu*, a late Warring States work, begins by famously condemning reliance upon anything but human effort: ²⁵⁶

King Hui of Liang inquired of Wei Liao-tzu: "Is it true that the Yellow Emperor, through punishments and Virtue, achieved a hundred victories without a defeat?"

Wei Liao-tzu replied: "Punishment was employed to attack the rebellious, Virtue was employed to preserve the people. This is not what is referred to as 'Heavenly Offices, auspicious hours and days, *yin* and *yang*, facing toward and turning your back to.' The Yellow Emperor's victories were a matter of human effort, that's all. Why was that?

"Now if there is a fortified city and you attack it from the east and west but cannot take it, and attack from the south and north but cannot take it, can it be that all four directions failed to accord with an auspicious moment that could be exploited? If you still cannot take it, it's because the walls are high, the moats deep, the weapons and implements fully prepared, the materials and grains accumulated in great quantities, and their valiant soldiers unified in their plans. If the walls are low, the moats shallow, and the defenses weak, then it can be taken. From this perspective, moments, seasons, and Heavenly Offices are not as important as human effort."

Wei Liao-tzu continues his explication by citing the Chou conquest, thereby initiating a practice that would continue throughout the military writings:

“According to the Heavenly Offices, deploying troops with water to the rear is referred to as ‘isolated terrain’ and deploying troops facing a long ridge is termed ‘abandoning the army.’ When King Wu attacked King Chou [Emperor Hsin] of the Shang he deployed his troops with the Chi River behind him and faced a mountain slope. With 22,500 men he attacked King Chou’s hundreds of thousands and destroyed the Shang Dynasty. Yet, hadn’t King Chou deployed in accord with the Heavenly Offices?”

He then concludes with a more recent illustration:

“The Ch’u general Kung-tzu Hsin was about to engage Ch’i in battle. At that time a comet appeared with its tail over Ch’i. According to such beliefs, wherever the tail pointed would be victorious and they could not be attacked. Kung-tzu Hsin said: ‘What does a comet know? Those who fight according to the comet will certainly be overturned and conquered.’ On the morrow he engaged Ch’i and greatly defeated them. The Yellow Emperor once said, ‘Putting spirits and ghosts first is not as good as investigating my own knowledge.’ This means that the Heavenly Offices are nothing but human effort.” [257](#)

This particular exchange would later be incorporated into *Questions and Replies*, a work associated with the famous T’ang general Li Ching and the dynasty’s second emperor. But as if to emphasize the importance of rejecting superstitious constraints, passages in a second chapter of the *Wei Liao-tzu* revisit the topic, albeit with some exaggeration, before venturing a broad condemnation and liberating generals from all such constraints: [258](#)

When King Wu attacked King Chou, the army forded [the Yellow River] at Meng-chin. On the right was the king’s pennant, on the left the axe of punishment, three hundred warriors committed to die, and thirty thousand fighting men. King Chou’s formation deployed several hundred thousand men, with Fei Liao and Eh Lai personally leading the halberdiers and axe-bearers. Their lines stretched across a hundred *li*. King Wu did not exhaust the warriors or people, the soldiers did not bloody their blades, but they conquered the Shang Dynasty and executed King Chou. [259](#) There was nothing auspicious nor abnormal; it was merely a case of perfecting oneself, or not perfecting oneself, in human affairs.

Generals of the present generation investigate “singular days” and “empty mornings,” divine about Hsien-ch’ih, interpret full and disastrous days, accord with tortoise shell augury, look for the auspicious and baleful, and observe the changes of the planets, constellations, and winds, wanting to thereby gain victory and establish their success. I view this as very difficult!

Now the commanding general is not governed by Heaven above, nor controlled by Earth below, nor governed by men in the middle. Thus weapons are evil implements, conflict is a contrary virtue. The post of general is an office of death. Thus only when it cannot be avoided does one employ them. There is no Heaven above, no Earth below, no ruler to the rear, and no enemy in the front. The [unified] army of one man is like the wolf and tiger, like the wind and rain, like thunder and lightning. Shaking and mysterious, All under Heaven are terrified by it.

In the wake of this powerful pronouncement, it is hardly surprising that rejection stories achieved a degree of popular appeal in the Former Han Dynasty, even though the portent theory and the resonance ideas formulated by Tung Chung-shu and others had equally begun to flourish. Works such as the *Shuo Yüan* contain a number of anecdotes centered on the three great figures who participated in the Shang’s conquest: King Wu, the T’ai Kung, and sometimes the Duke of Chou. Insofar as they reflect Warring States thought about the welfare of the people, the importance of Virtue, and the need for talented personnel, as well as embody centuries of anecdotal tradition (which may or may not have a kernel of facticity), these vignettes are of little value for reconstructing the sequence of events. However, because they underpin later interpretations of China’s military history and form the basis of much of China’s subsequent perception of these definitive events, they merit brief retelling in themselves.

The *Shuo Yüan* contains an interesting, though no doubt fabricated, dialogue that justifies abandoning the practice of divination and mounting the contemplated attack because it will benefit the people: ²⁶⁰

King Wu was about to attack Hsin so he summoned the T’ai Kung and inquired, “Without engaging in combat I want to know whether I can be victorious, without performing divination know auspiciousness. Moreover, I want to employ those who are not my people. Is there a Tao for this?”

The T’ai Kung replied: “There is a Tao for it. If you obtain the hearts of the populace and plan against those bereft of the

Tao, then without fighting you will know that you will be victorious. When moral exemplars attack the unworthy, without performing divination they already know it will be auspicious. When others harm the people but you benefit them, even those who are not our people can be acquired and employed.”

“Good,” said King Wu, and then he summoned Duke of Chou and asked: “Men of the world all regard Yin [Hsin] as the son of Heaven [261](#) and Chou as a feudal lord. Is there a way (Tao) for a feudal lord to attack the son of Heaven and be victorious?”

The Duke of Chou replied: “There is no way to be victorious as long as Yin [Hsin] is believed to be the son of Heaven and Chou a feudal lord, so how can you attack him?”

King Wu angrily retorted, “How do you explain what you have said?”

The Duke of Chou replied: “I have heard that one attacks those who preserve the rites is a brigand; one who attacks the righteous is a destroyer; and one who has lost the ability to govern the people is an ordinary fellow. If you attack someone who has lost the people, how will that be attacking the son of Heaven?”

Concurring, King Wu raised their troops, mobilized the army, and did battle with Yin in the wilds of Mu-yeh, severely defeating the people of Yin.

The passage goes on to depict King Wu’s unsullied behavior in conspicuously returning all the treasures and women kept in Hsin’s palace to the feudal lords, thereby garnering a name for being untarnished as well as unaffected by sexual desire. He is further recorded as having opened the granaries and storehouses to the people before setting aside his war chariots, armor, and weapons, even releasing the horses and oxen to prominently show that they would not again be used in warfare, as already noted.

Another anecdote depicts King Wu masterfully explaining away the inauspiciousness entailed by some unexpected events: [262](#)

When King Wu attacked Hsin, he ruined the embankments (on the side) after traversing narrow passageways, broke up the boats after crossing the rivers, [263](#) disassembled the bridges after negotiating valleys, and burned the edible vegetation when they moved through the mountains to show the people that he had no intention of retreating. When they approached a formidable narrows, high winds broke a flag. San-yi Sheng remonstrated, “Isn’t this an evil omen?” [264](#) However, King Wu replied, “No. It’s simply Heaven sending down troops.”

When the wind diminished it was followed by heavy rain. Water covered the earth, creating a morass. San-yi Sheng again remonstrated, "Isn't this an evil omen?" But King Wu replied, "No, Heaven is moisturizing us with water."

And when they [attempted to] perform divination the fire [employed to crack the shell] went out. Once again San-yi Sheng remonstrated, "Isn't this an evil omen?" King Wu said, "It would not be advantageous if we were seeking blessings from the spirits, but is advantageous for a sudden attack on enemy troops, the reason the fire went out." Thus King Wu accorded with Heaven and Earth, contravened three baleful indications, and captured Hsin at Mu-yeh. What he alone saw was perspicacious indeed!

In a depiction that would enhance his reputation as a perceptive, charismatic, and virtuous leader, the T'ai Kung also courageously rejects baleful interpretations. The *Han-shih Wai-chuan* compiled in the Former Han Dynasty preserves a variant of the tale:

While King Wu was en route to attack King Chou [Hsin] his shield 265 got broken into three at Ying-ch'iu and Heaven poured down unceasing rain for three days. King Wu was afraid in his heart and summoned the T'ai Kung to query him about it. "Perhaps King Chou cannot yet be attacked?" "Not at all," the T'ai Kung retorted. "Your shield getting broken into three [indicates] you should divide the army into three. Three days of unceasing rain is just Heaven wanting to wet [clean] our weapons."

The fifteenth or last military section of the pioneering T'ang Dynasty *T'ung Tien*, the first work to illustrate tactical principles with historical examples, includes a brief section on "extending human affairs to destroy disastrous abnormalities" that recounts another incident. 266 Reportedly, when the campaign forces reached Niu-t'ou-shan (Cowhead Mountain) they encountered strong winds and a heavy thunderstorm that broke the pennant staffs on the drum chariots and so thoroughly terrified the outer pair of horses attached to King Wu's chariot that they died of fright. But the T'ai Kung again quashes the effects: "Employing the army in accord with the Tao of Heaven is not necessarily auspicious, contravening it not necessarily baleful. But if you neglect human affairs, the Three Armies will be defeated and perish."

The T'ai Kung goes on to stress that only foolish generals pattern on omens and emphasize that employing the worthy results in victory; therefore, without seeking omens or praying, the army should be ordered to advance. In contrast, despite his subsequent idolization, the Duke of Chou is portrayed as quivering and quaking, fearfully

proclaiming that “the time now contravenes T’ai-sui, 267 prognostication by plastron is pronounced baleful, the milfoil are not auspicious, and star formations have become disastrous so please turn the army about.” In response the T’ai Kung angrily points out that since “Shang has slain Pi Kan, imprisoned Ch’i-tzu, and let the government fall into Fei Lien’s hands, how can there be anything untoward in attacking them? How can dried grass and rotted bones know anything about it?” Following this retort, he “burned the plastrons, broke the milfoil stalks, grasped the drumsticks, and beat the drum to advance the troops, being the first to cross the river. King Wu followed him and they went on to extinguish Chou (Hsin).”

This incident would resonate with later military writers because it was subsequently incorporated in the Sung Dynasty imperial military compendium known as *Wu-ching Tsung-yao* . 268 The Ming Dynasty *Ts’ao-lu Ching-lüeh* similarly cites the T’ai Kung’s fervently articulated disbelief in the predicative value of grass and bones before sweepingly concluding: 269

A ruler who [wants to] flourish his state first cultivates human affairs. When that is complete and he realizes the strategic configuration of power that will result in inevitable victory, then even if Heavenly signs are vague and uncertain, they cannot be relied upon. How much more prognosticatory indications and [auspicious and inauspicious] days and times, how can they be sufficient for deep belief? But from antiquity until the present, many are those who have trod this path, who have been befuddled and mystified and thereby lost opportunities. This sort of deleterious habit urgently needs to be eliminated!”

Martial prognosticatory practices expanded rapidly from the Han Dynasty onward, paradoxically culminating in highly detailed criteria and lengthy but convoluted sections in such important theoretical military works as the early Sung Dynasty *Hu-ch’ien Ching* . Moreover, astute military thinkers such as Li Ching who fundamentally rejected the inimical implications of unnatural phenomena and the employment of divinatory methods nevertheless advocated exploiting them to mystify the enemy:

Li Ching said: “The military is the Tao of deceit, so if we apparently put faith in *yin* and *yang* divinatory practices we can manipulate the greedy and stupid. They cannot be abandoned. [As for selecting astrologically auspicious seasons and days], King Chou perished on a day designated as *chia-tzu* , King Wu flourished on the same day. According to the astrologically auspicious seasons and days, *chia-tzu* is the first day. The Shang

were in chaos, the Chou were well governed. Flourishing and perishing are different in this case.

Moreover, Emperor Wu of the Sung mobilized his troops on a "going to perish day." The army's officers all felt it to be impermissible, but the Emperor said, "I will go forth and he will perish." Indeed, he conquered them. Speaking with reference to these cases, it's clear that the practices can be abandoned. However, when T'ien Tan was surrounded by Yen, Tan ordered a man to impersonate a spirit. He bowed and prayed to him, and the spirit said Yen could be destroyed. Tan thereupon used fire-oxen to go forth and attack Yen, greatly destroying them. 270 This is the deceitful Tao of military thinkers. The selection of astrologically auspicious seasons and days is similar to this."

The T'ai-tsung said: "T'ien Tan entrusted their fate to the supernatural and destroyed Yen, while the T'ai Kung burned the milfoil and tortoise shells yet went on to exterminate King Chou. How is it that these two affairs are contradictory?"

Li Ching said: "Their subtle motives were the same. One went contrary to such practices and seized the enemy, one accorded with them and implemented his plans.

"In antiquity, when the T'ai Kung was assisting King Wu they reached Mu-yeh where they encountered thunder and rain. The flags and drums were broken or destroyed. San Yi-sheng wanted to divine for an auspicious response before moving. This then is a case where, because of doubts and fear within the army, he felt they must rely upon divination to inquire of the spirits. But the T'ai Kung believed that rotted grass and dried up bones were not worth asking. Moreover, in the case of a subject attacking his ruler, how could there be a second chance?

"Now I observe that San Yi-sheng expressed his motives at the beginning but the T'ai Kung attained his subsequently. Even though one was contrary to, and the other in accord, with divinatory practices, their reasons were identical. When I previously stated these techniques should not be abandoned, it was largely to preserve the vital point of *ch'i* before affairs have begun to manifest themselves. As for their being successful, it was a matter of human effort, that's all."

Being a crafty general in Sun-tzu's mold, Li Ching consistently employed every available technique to mystify his own men and thereby wrest unpredictable victories.

The so-called "rehearsal" campaign had similarly been marked by two significant incidents. The first—the white fish jumping into the boat and being seized by King Wu—was viewed as highly fortunate

because white was Shang's chosen color and the sequence of events suggested the Shang was leaping into King Wu's hands. The second actually resolves the long-puzzling question as to why King Wu, after such focal efforts to develop an extensive power base and so many celestial indications of receipt of the Mandate to rule, would abort the strike rather than exploit the astonishing, formidable presence of the hundreds of viable allies and thousands of troops that had assembled at Meng-chin in response to his quest. Even though Emperor Hsin may have misinterpreted King Wu's failure to proceed as a sign of Heaven's continued sanction or possibly Wu's lack of courage, by failing to capitalize on the moment, the Chou king knowingly sacrificed the element of surprise and unmistakably signaled his intentions. ²⁷¹ Futilely troubling their allies could also easily have cost King Wu the essential credibility necessary to undertake the final campaign, prefiguring King P'ing's experience at the end of the Western Chou Period

Over the centuries commentators struggling to find a satisfactory explanation for his inexplicable behavior have suggested that King Wu felt their strength, preparations, training, or unity were insufficient; the size of the response had been overwhelming and they lacked the requisite supplies or plans; the Chou had not brought their chariots, but instead concealed them for explosive use in the actual engagement; the campaign was a test to gauge actual support, as asserted in the T'ai Kung's biography; ²⁷² or that it was simply a rehearsal. In aggregate these explanations all seem relevant and probable, but taken singly none seems likely or adequate.

For example, temporary plans might have been quickly formulated and then revised during the two months required for the campaign; since they would have certainly gone forth with at least minimal supplies, plundering and confiscating the rest en route in the usual fashion from the readily available winter stores would have easily resolved the provisioning problem even if the people did not voluntarily provide them. Additional time doubtlessly allowed the Chou to construct more chariots; however, in view of the reportedly great, initial force discrepancy, even Herculean fabrication efforts would not have dramatically altered the balance of power. Minimal strides might also have been made in other areas, such as in training the troops, and more complex operational tactics prepared, but given the nature of the single clash at Mu-yeh, the final tactics were simplicity itself.

The astute application of modern computational methods to date the ancient astronomical configurations apparently preserved in previously neglected ancient passages has recently resulted in a cogent explanation for King Wu's otherwise inexplicable action. ²⁷³ A key

passage (already seen) in the “Chou Pen-chi” states: “When he had already completed the crossing, a flame descended from above to below, reaching as far as (above) the king’s house. It flowed until it became a bird, red in color with a desolate sound.” King Wu clearly understood the implications of this celestial phenomenon, for he brusquely rebuked his supporters by saying, “You are not cognizant of Heaven’s Mandate. It cannot yet.” King Wu’s determined rejection of their persistent cajoling must have stemmed from his understanding of this readily witnessed phenomenon as distinctly baleful.

As interpreted, Jupiter had not yet completed its twelve-year cycle when King Wu went forth some ten years after the celestial manifestation identified with the receipt of the Mandate of Heaven. It therefore stopped after reaching the former conjunction point instead of advancing into Quail Fire prior to retrograding, a highly negative event because Jupiter’s presence in Quail Fire had presaged victory. Only after another two years would its movement and position be properly auspicious, particularly because it would remain in an appropriate position throughout the campaign. [274](#)

The Chou’s sensitivity to (and exploitation of) celestial phenomena thus provides a strikingly coherent explanation for several crucial aspects of their ascension and their strange campaign behavior. However, it might well be asked why the king would allow this temporal manifestation to delay his actualization of the mandate. Admittedly, this was a far grander occurrence than the baleful omens the T’ai Kung defused, but King Wu might have claimed that Jupiter’s failure to advance ought to have been correlated with waiting for the Chou to attack, letting the initiative fall to the Chou, or just an aberration brought about by the Shang not having yet been toppled. Rather than based on mere whim or trepidation, King Wu’s clear decision was not to proceed in the face of distinctly negative implications from Heaven.

Morale and the Psychology of the Moment

Even though the tactical imbalance of power overwhelmingly favored the Shang, the dynamics of Mu-yeh might again aptly be characterized by Sun-tzu's dramatic description of the impact of strategic power: "The victorious army is like a ton compared with an ounce, the combat of the victorious is like the sudden release of a pent-up torrent down a thousand-fathom gorge." Numerous factors have been cited to explain this astonishing result, some highly probable, others inexplicably conjured up. Emphasis tends to fall upon the psychological aspects, with the battle being envisioned as a zealous exercise in which the Chou's warriors smashed the enemy's ill-fated minions. However, because spirit and demoralization are the products of many disparate factors, both accidental and deliberate, it might be asked which ones proved important.

Hsün-tzu early on identified the consistent implementation of measures designed to gain the willing allegiance of the people as crucial to the Chou's success at Mu-yeh: "According to what I know of the ancient Tao of warfare, the foundation for employing the military in combat lies in unifying the people. If the lictors and populace had not been attached, King T'ang of the Shang and King Wu of the Chou would have been unable to achieve inevitable victory. One who excels at attracting the people's allegiance will also excel in employing the military. Accordingly, the crux of military affairs lies in adroitly attracting the people, that's all." ²⁷⁵

Even Mencius, the most pedantic of all the Confucians, described the dynamics of their success as simply being able to attract the people and explicitly attributed the Hsia and Shang's collapse to their having lost the minds/hearts of the people: "Chieh and Chou (Hsin) lost the realm because they lost the people. One who loses the people has lost their hearts. There is a Tao for gaining the realm: by gaining the people one gains the realm. There is a Tao for gaining the people: by gaining their hearts one gains the people. There is a Tao for gaining their hearts: give them in quantity what they want and do not inflict what they hate upon them. People are attracted to *Jen*

(benevolence) just like water flowing downward.” 276

Although the lack of opposition certainly facilitated the Chou's rise, the enthusiasm and allegiance of the people at large was probably less relevant than Hsün-tzu imagined. This was neither a popular revolution of the sort that would see dynasties overturned nor a strife-filled, interminable partisan battle among fragmented states. Some of the people reportedly greeted King Wu with baskets of silk, but even retrospective portrayals never mention any massive outpouring of support or voluntary offering of foodstuffs despite the immense propaganda potential entailed by such gestures. Conversely, scorched earth measures were inflicted, yet guerillas never harassed the advance. The participants were limited to the troops involved on both sides: the Chou warrior nobility and their close allies pitted against the Shang's clan warriors, soldiers, and the various subordinate groups they co-opted into their military. They merely had to be unified and motivated prior to battle.

As already discussed, the advance to Mu-yeh had been well controlled and the final instructions emphasized measure and constraint, both subsequently perceived as crucial to creating and commanding an effective army: 277

Marquis Wu asked, “What measures will ensure the soldiers will be victorious?”

Wu Ch'i replied, “Control is foremost.”

Marquis Wu again asked, “It is not large numbers?”

Wu Ch'i responded: “If the laws and orders are not clear, rewards and punishments not trusted, and sounding the gongs will not cause them to halt nor beating the drums to advance, then even if you had a million men, what use would they be? What is meant by control is that when stationary they observe the forms of propriety (*li*) and when in action they are awesome. When they advance they cannot be withstood, when they withdraw they cannot be pursued.

Their advancing and withdrawing are measured, the left and right flanks respond to the signal flags. Even if broken off from the main order they preserve their formations, even if scattered they will reform lines. They will hold together in peace, they will hold together in danger. Their number can be assembled together but cannot be forced apart. They can be employed but cannot be exhausted. No matter where you dispatch them, no one under Heaven will be able to withstand them. They are called ‘the troops of a father and son.’”

The final result should be the unity that would be extolled as the very foundation of all military activity in the Warring States military

writings, including the *Art of War* which states that, “one whose upper and lower ranks have the same desires will be victorious.” ²⁷⁸ For example, King Wu’s query about the Tao of the military elicited this response from the T’ai Kung: “In the Tao of the military nothing surpasses unity. The unified can come alone, can depart alone. The Yellow Emperor said that ‘unification approaches the Tao and touches upon the spiritual.’ It’s employment lies in the subtle; its conspicuous manifestation lies in the strategic configuration of power; its completion lies with the ruler. Thus the Sage Kings termed weapons evil implements, but when they had no alternative, they employed them.” ²⁷⁹ And in further commenting upon their current situation—purportedly the preconquest Shang-Chou relationship—the T’ai Kung added, “Today the Shang King knows about existence but not about perishing. He knows pleasure but not disaster.”

Not surprisingly, even though the coalition forces had been hastily convened, post-Warring States military analysts tend to emphasize their cohesiveness. The battle does not appear as a historical illustration for any of the *Hundred Unorthodox Strategies*, but the Ming Dynasty *Essential Strategies from a Grass Hut* adopted *Shang Shu* pronouncements attributed to King Wu incisively assert that “a thousand men with the same mind have the strength of thousand men; ten thousand men with different minds are not worth one man.” It then concludes by citing the example of Emperor Hsin who “had a million subjects with a million minds, whereas the Chou only had three thousand subjects but of one mind. For this reason they achieved success at Mu-yeh with a single effort. This is the result of employing humanity and righteousness to unify the masses.” ²⁸⁰

It should not be forgotten that men, especially those in martially oriented societies, willingly participate in group efforts and unquestioningly follow their commanders and comrades into battle because there is no alternative, only a question of fervency., Chinese military thought hhistorically encompassed the “will to fight,” whether characterized as resolve, courage, determination, morale, or fervency under the semitechnical term of *ch’i*, (氣) the army’s “spirit.”

This concept of *ch’i* —variously translated as *pneuma*, breath, or spirit, but essentially the vital psychophysical foundation or energy of life, whether metaphysical or flowing and embodied, both in man and the universe—has been an integral component of Chinese protoscientific thought for more than two millennia. ²⁸¹ Long envisioned as manifest in many forms as well as coursing through the meridians in the body that form the basis for acupuncture, according to later philosophical formulations, *ch’i* solidifies to form the myriad animate and inanimate objects that populate the world.

Prompted by the absence of zealously and commitment, the

classic military writers, especially Sun-tzu and Sun Pin, developed a sophisticated protopsychology that focused upon “martial spirit” (*ch’i*). Even though the seven extant Warring States writings were composed over a span of three centuries during which military concepts and tactics evolved significantly, they all recognize *ch’i*’s underlying role and agree upon the basic assumptions.²⁸² Moreover, commencing with *Art of War*’s realization that the army’s *ch’i* ebbs and flows, authors formulated measures not just to elicit it, but also modulate and even repress it in accord with battlefield requirements. Many of their insights can be fruitfully applied in analyzing the Chou campaign.

Warring States thinkers believed that “when courageous, people will fight; when fearful, they will flee. When [a state] is victorious in battle it is because it fought with courageous [troops]; when they flee from combat, it is because they engaged in battle with the fearful.”²⁸³ The famous strategist Sun Pin would note that a loss of *ch’i* results in defeat,²⁸⁴ and the late Warring States *Wei Liao-tzu* thereafter asserted that “the means by which the general fights is the people; the means by which the people fight is their *ch’i*. When their *ch’i* is substantial they will fight; when their *ch’i* has been snatched away they will run off.”²⁸⁵ Courage was found to be an elusive virtue, difficult to fathom and prone to evaporating at crucial moments: “Fear and courage are not constant, they come and go suddenly but no one knows their workings.”²⁸⁶ “The Three Armies are *ch’i*; their *ch’i* easily moves and is difficult to control.”²⁸⁷

Rulers, including King Wu and Emperor Hsin, were believed to have achieved success because they *understood* *ch’i*’s dynamics and were therefore able to manipulate it: “Only the sagacious can see the origins. Thus both the Shang and Chou were able to flourish, but King Chieh [of the Hsia] and King Chou [of the Shang] perished. Skill and clumsiness differ constantly in achieving courage, in increasing or snatching away the people’s *ch’i*, in being able to employ the masses to fight or being unable to employ them.”²⁸⁸

Combat being a matter of courageous *ch’i*, battlefield achievement and even the astute initiation of engagements thus depend upon “whether the troops have the spirit to be victorious or not.”²⁸⁹ The *Ssu-ma Fa*, a military classic from the early to middle Warring States Period that may preserve earlier Chou materials, similarly envisioned *ch’i* as crucial to combat: “In general, in battle one endures through strength and gains victory through *ch’i*. One can endure with a solid defense, but will achieve victory through being endangered. When the heart’s foundation is solid, a new surge of *ch’i* will bring victory.”²⁹⁰ Wu Ch’i similarly observed that *ch’i* ebbs and flourishes and that the army’s success depends upon it reaching a

zenith just at the moment of battle. ²⁹¹

An *Art of War* passage well known from the middle Warring States onward finds Sun-tzu commenting on *ch'i*'s tendency to surge and abate: ²⁹²

The *ch'i* of the Three Armies can be snatched away, the commanding general's mind can be seized. For this reason in the morning their *ch'i* is ardent; during the day their *ch'i* becomes indolent; at dusk their *ch'i* is exhausted. Thus one who excels at employing the army avoids their ardent *ch'i* and strikes when it is indolent or exhausted. This is the way to manipulate *ch'i*.

Sun-tzu's characterization of its natural enervation over the course of a day would sometimes be simplistically understood as implying that all attacks should be mounted late in the afternoon. ²⁹³ However, the key points lie in the realization that commanders should avoid animated spirits, striking instead when the enemy becomes dispirited, and that *ch'i* can be deliberately targeted or "snatched away." The *Art of War* (which always emphasizes being active, rather than passive, controlling the development of events rather than being compelled into movement by others) thus provided the conceptual impetus for later formulations intended to manipulate and thereby deplete the enemy's *ch'i*.

Despite the *Art of War*'s being the oldest military text to discuss the concept and its martial effects, a clash that unfolded in the Spring and Autumn Period at least a century and a half earlier reportedly turned on fathoming its nature: ²⁹⁴

The state of Ch'i attacked the state of Lu. Duke Chuang was about to commit Lu's army to battle when Ts'ao Kuei requested permission to join him. The duke had him ride in his chariot and went to engage Ch'i in battle at Ch'ang-shao. The duke was just about to have the drums sound the advance when Ts'ao Kuei exclaimed, "Not yet." After Ch'i had sounded their drums three times Ts'ao then said, "Now." They [beat their drums], engaged in combat, and severely defeated Ch'i's army.

After their victory, the duke inquired why Ts'ao had delayed the drums. Ts'ao replied, "Combat is a matter of courageous *ch'i*. A single drumming arouses the soldiers' *ch'i*, with a second it abates, and with a third it is exhausted. They were exhausted while we were vigorous, so we conquered them."

Although the battle dates to 683 BCE, this depiction appears in the *Tso Chuan*, a Warring States compilation whose reliability is intensely debated. Even though Ts'ao Kuei may have had an intrinsic

understanding of the possibilities, without doubt the dialogue is a later reconstruction because it reflects fully formed concepts of *ch'i* dynamics unlikely to have arisen in the middle Western Chou era.

Early thinking about the difficulty of compelling men to engage in combat also resulted in identifying a number of emotional factors that would prompt troops to fight aggressively, if not actually make them courageous, including anger and rewards. The *Ssu-ma Fa* notes that “men will die for love, out of anger, out of fear of awesomeness, for righteousness, and for profit.”²⁹⁵ Love was particularly cited as a strong motivator by Warring States political thinkers such as Han Fei-tzu, who frequently used the analogy of a mother’s love for her child causing her to take unimaginably heroic action, including battling tigers and bears, to save it.²⁹⁶

Sun-tzu attributed fervent battlefield performance to anger by asserting that “what motivates men to slay the enemy is anger.”²⁹⁷ His observation was subsequently cited to conclude the tactical discussion for the topic of “Anger” in *Hundred Unorthodox Strategies*: “Whenever you engage an enemy in battle, you must incite your officers and troops, making them angry before going into combat. A tactical principle from *Art of War* states, ‘What enables men to kill the enemy is anger.’”²⁹⁸

The problem, as the *Ssu-ma Fa* observes, is fear: “When men have minds filled with fear all they see is their fear.”²⁹⁹ Doubt and fear must therefore be expelled, replaced by anger, courage, and a commitment to victory because “when men have their minds set on victory all they see is the enemy.”³⁰⁰ Measures have to be formulated and then adroitly employed to stimulate the requisite courage and elicit death-defying performances from the troops.³⁰¹

All the military writers agreed that “men do not take pleasure in death” and fear dying; that “combat is what the people hate so that one who is able to cause the people to take pleasure in combat will become the king of the realm.”³⁰² Conversely, men who are well-trained, rested, properly fed, clothed, and equipped will fight vigorously if their spirits can be roused. “It is the Tao of warfare that when they are well instructed men will regard death lightly.”³⁰³ However, if physical or material conditions have blunted their *ch'i*, there is any imbalance in the relationship between officers and troops, or they have grown superstitious and fearful or have lost their motivation, they will be defeated. The *Ssu-ma Fa* describes an army beset by such difficulties:³⁰⁴

If they do not follow orders; do not trust (their officers); are not harmonious; are lax, doubtful, weary, afraid; avoid responsibility, cower; are troubled, unrestrained, deflated, or dilatory, it is termed a disastrous campaign. When they suffer

from extreme arrogance, abject terror, moaning and grumbling, constant fear, or regret over actions being taken, they are termed “destroyed and broken.”

Fathoming the enemy’s *ch’i* became a significant activity once the concept had been articulated. From the Warring States onward, the enemy’s *ch’i* therefore ranked among the few crucial objectives whenever commanders sought to acquire military intelligence. ³⁰⁵ Moreover, the stage of passive cognition was quickly transcended once it was realized the enemy’s *ch’i* could, and therefore should, be manipulated through aggressive measures. But, being intangible, it had to be indirectly perceived, deciphered from certain signs such as mutterings among the troops, a pronounced belief in baleful omens, general malaise, or widespread dissension in the ranks, as well as correlated with physical condition and recent battlefield behavior.

Generals were accordingly advised to structure their tactics and maneuver their armies so as to avoid enemy forces when the latter’s spirits were strong and exploit any opportunity presented by their diminishment (forced or otherwise), attacking when the enemy no longer had any inclination to fight, such as when standing down from field deployments, about to return to camp, or preparing for meals. ³⁰⁶ According to Sun-tzu, prolonged warfare can only lead to enervation; ³⁰⁷ therefore, careful planning to guarantee the swift execution of the chosen campaign strategy is paramount. The traditional military writings therefore advocated seizing the initiative ³⁰⁸ and manipulating the enemy until they become physically and emotionally exhausted, resulting in their *ch’i* or “will to fight” being so severely diminished that defeat becomes inevitable. ³⁰⁹

Certain, frequently encountered situations were seen as conducive to stimulating the soldiers’ *ch’i* and eliciting the army’s greatest efforts, but others, such as moving through the site of historical defeats, simply debilitated their *ch’i* and had to be scrupulously avoided. Cognizant of these constraints, an astute commander could focus upon stimulating the resolve of his troops as they passed through the various stages preliminary to combat, though always with an eye to avoiding over stimulating the army’s *ch’i* or causing it to fruitlessly peak too early. ³¹⁰

Despite some twenty-five hundred years of martial theorizing in China, the most systematic method for stimulating the requisite *ch’i* level just prior to engaging in combat remains Sun Pin’s chapter “Expanding Ch’i.” The first part of this recently recovered text prescribes active measures that astutely apply the period’s martial psychology: ³¹¹

When you form the army and assemble the masses,

concentrate upon stimulating their *ch'i*. 312 When you again decamp and reassemble the army, concentrate upon ordering the soldiers and sharpening their *ch'i*. When you approach the border and draw near the enemy concentrate upon honing their *ch'i*. When the day for battle has been set concentrate upon making their *ch'i* decisive. When the day for battle is at hand, concentrate upon expanding their *ch'i*.

Unfortunately, only glimpses of Sun Pin's methods remain. Rewards and punishments, the twin foundations of awesomeness, are normally the basic tools for ensuring performance and stimulating the troops. Without specifying exactly how it should be accomplished, fragments speak about stimulating the army's *ch'i* by overawing them and employing the general's orders to sharpen their *ch'i*. Even their attire, a "short coat and coarse clothes" that reportedly "encourage a warrior's determination," are viewed as "the means by which to hone their *ch'i*," perhaps just the way a whetstone sharpens a blade through slow grinding. Diplomatic communications are severed "in order to make their *ch'i* decisive," and even their food and drink are constrained "in order to expand their *ch'i*," presumably because minimal rations will compel the army to defeat the enemy or, failing that, at least aggressively wrest supplies from them.

Any lack of *ch'i* entails inimical effects, if not great danger. Sun Pin's chapter identifies several deficient forms that portend disaster:

"If their *ch'i* is not sharp they will be plodding. When they are plodding they will not reach [their objective]. When they do not reach [their objective] they will lose the advantage.

"When their *ch'i* is not honed they will be frightened. When they are frightened then they will mass together. When they mass together [they will be ineffective].

"If their *ch'i* is not decisive they will be slack. When they are slack they will not be focused and will easily disperse. If they easily disperse, when they encounter difficulty they will be defeated.

"If their *ch'i* is not...they will be lazy. 313 If they are lazy it will be difficult to employ them. If it is difficult to employ them, they will not be able to converge on their objective."

To ensure decisiveness, all vestiges of fear must be eliminated, inimical influences negated, and contrary practices banned: "Prohibit omens, eliminate doubt so that they will die without other thoughts." 314 And then, when the moment for combat has finally arrived, rather than allowing them to be swept up in hollow euphoria, the general

must “expand their *ch’i*” so their courage will be sustained throughout the day’s conflict rather than be precipitously broken.

A second stream of thought advocated extreme measures to elicit even greater effort from the troops. Cognizant of the possibilities of *ch’i* manipulation, Sun-tzu concluded that hopeless circumstances might be aggressively exploited to stimulate death-defying behavior:

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Cast them into positions from which there is nowhere to go and they will die without retreating. If there is no escape from death, the officers and soldiers will fully exhaust their strength.

When the soldiers and officers have penetrated deeply into enemy territory, they will cling together. 316 When there is no alternative, they will fight. Cast them into hopeless situations and they will be preserved; have them penetrate fatal terrain and they will live. Only after the masses have penetrated dangerous terrain will they be able to craft victory out of defeat.

For this reason, even though the soldiers are not instructed, they are prepared; without seeking it, their cooperation is obtained; without covenants they are close together; without issuing orders they are reliable. Thus it is the nature of the army to defend when encircled; to fight fervently when unavoidable; and to follow orders when compelled by circumstances.

In another dramatic passage, Sun-tzu notes that “on the day that orders are issued the tears of our soldiers sitting about will soak their sleeves, the tears of those lying around will roll down their cheeks. However, if you throw them into a hopeless situation, they will have the courage of [the famous heroes] Chu and Kuei.” 317 Later generals, including the great Han Hsin, effectively employed Sun-tzu’s insight with astonishing results, proving the concept was not the product of idle speculation. 318 However, exploiting fatal terrain was a measure of last resort, one that could not be repeated because the probable consequence of failure—total annihilation—could not be endured.

Another of the *Art of War*’s core concepts is *shih*, the “strategic configuration of power.” 319 Analogized as a torrent rushing down a mountain that carries everything before it, *shih* makes military effort independent of individual soldiers and minimizes the need to resort to extreme measures. According to the *Art of War*, “courage and fear are a question of the strategic configuration of power” and “those who excel at warfare seek victory through the strategic configuration of power, not from reliance on men.” Even the *Ssu-ma Fa* notes that “warfare is a question of the strategic balance of power, combat a matter of courage.” 320

Separately, Sun-tzu asserted that “those who employ strategic power command men in battle as if they were rolling logs and stones. The nature of wood and stone is to be quiet when stable but to move when on precipitous ground. If they are square they stop, if round they tend to move. Thus the strategic power of those who excel at employing men in warfare is comparable to rolling round boulders down a thousand-fathom mountain. Such is the strategic configuration of power.” ³²¹

Although courage was sometimes thought to be innate, a matter of human nature, an early T'ang Dynasty explication concluded otherwise: ³²²

Courage and fear result from plans, strength and weakness from strategic power. When plans are competent and strategic power complete, then the fearful become courageous. When plans are clumsy and strategic power lost, then the courageous become fearful.

When the fearful are employed through punishments they become courageous; when the courageous are employed with rewards they will die. The ability to shift human nature and change the minds of men lies in rewards and punishments. In what sense does courage or fear reside in men?

Within this context, the *Wu-tzu* dramatically imagized the resolution and determination that can engender surpassing courage: ³²³

I have heard that men have strengths and weaknesses, that their *ch'i* flourishes and ebbs. Now if there is a murderous villain hidden in the woods, even though a thousand men pursue him they all look around like owls and glance about like wolves. Why? They are afraid that violence will erupt and harm them personally. Thus one man oblivious to life and death can frighten a thousand.

In order to explain the extreme effects of death-defying commitment while debunking the prevalent concept of courage, the *Wei Liao-tzu* subsequently transplants this image to the populous marketplace: ³²⁴

If a warrior wields a sword to strike people in the marketplace, among ten thousand people there will not be anyone who doesn't avoid him. If I say it's not that only one man is courageous, but that the ten thousand are unlike him, what is the reason? Being committed to dying and being committed to

seeking life are not comparable.

The creation of elite units composed of warriors who had the courage of tigers and would be able to shatter the enemy (just as the initial Chou surge that paved the way for Shang's vanquishment) was intended to exploit this zealousness. ³²⁵

Special group measures still visible in the *Wu-tzu* and *Liu-t'ao* were accordingly formulated by the classic military writers to ensure cohesion and disciplined battlefield performance. ³²⁶ Unity does not just foster cohesive effort but also, according to insights furnished by Sun-tzu and Sun Pin's discussions of strategic power, encompasses and enfolds the men, giving them confidence while psychologically compelling their enthusiastic participation. Years of successful campaigning had obviously nurtured Chou cohesiveness, but it was belief in their mission that sustained their courage at the crucial moment. Their advance into enemy territory, far from the comfort and security of the Wei River Valley, could only have further stiffened them to the task.

The clash at Mu-yeh represented the culmination of several stages of psychological preparation ranging from assertions of righteousness and claims of having received the Mandate of Heaven through deliberately demonizing Hsin. The Mandate of Heaven's ostensible sanction gave confidence to their leaders, underpinned their sense of mission, and may have even assuaged any feelings of guilt arising from presuming to overthrow the realm's acknowledged authority. It has even been suggested that, had King Wu adopted a different course and claimed the Shang kingship because of their marriage relationships, his ascension might have been deemed well in accord with Shang succession patterns.

However, King Wu would not have been anything more than a son of Hsin's sister, and it is doubtful that anyone would have been strongly persuaded of the relevance of these relationships. ³²⁷ Although their purported cross-cultural heritage may have conferred a nebulous aura of Shang "regalness" upon the Chou monarch, one perhaps augmented by King Wu's consort's reputedly being a woman of the Shang, it probably would not have significantly legitimized his usurpation. It certainly did not lessen the opposition they faced from the Shang forces or facilitate his subsequent acceptance by Shang remnants.

Nevertheless, as already discussed, Chou assertions of legitimacy that came to be embodied in the establishment of a new kingship would certainly have been an important unifying factor. The concomitant sense of obligation, of shouldering a responsibility to relieve the realm of its suffering, may have motivated Kings Wen and

Wu, but being highly abstract this sort of mission probably had minimal appeal for the Chou's stalwart warriors or the ordinary troops. However, despite efforts to minimize this aspect in traditional historical accounts, at least two generations of Chou nobility seem to have fervently hated Hsin. His condemnation has always been portrayed as prompted solely by his perverse behavior, but the intensity of their hatred probably had its origins in the animosity felt by most subjects toward imperious overlords even before King Chi Li's murder intensified it. Chou hatred therefore had a concrete focus: an individual the people wanted to attack despite their ultimate goal's having overtly become the Shang's overthrow, though not its extinction.

Although sophisticated *ch'i* concepts had yet to be formulated, experienced commanders and other leaders in the late Shang and Early Chou certainly had a basic sense of the importance of courage and clearly implemented steps to create the necessary enthusiasm among the people at large. Early on, the *Ssu-ma Fa* would outline the fundamentals: "After you have aroused the people's *ch'i* and enacted governmental measures, encompass them with a benign countenance and lead them with your speeches. Upbraid them in accord with their fears." 328

Stirring speeches delivered at different stages of the campaign, but especially just prior to battle, have always constituted a primary measure because fear not only undermines battlefield performance, it may also totally incapacitate the soldiers. 329 Rulers therefore took pains to elucidate the cause and justify forthcoming campaigns as necessary to chastise the enemy. According to the *Ssu-ma Fa*, the offender's misdeeds had to be clearly publicized in a formal manner (rather than extemporaneous or infuriated pronouncements): 330

If any of the feudal lords had disobeyed orders; disordered the constant; turned their backs on Virtue; or contravened the seasons of Heaven, endangering meritorious rulers, then they would publicize it among all the feudal lords, making it evident that he had committed an offense. They then announced it to August Heaven, and to the sun, moon, planets, and constellations. They prayed to the Gods of Earth, the spirits of the Four Seasons, mountains, rivers, and at the Great Altar of state. Then they offered sacrifice to the Former Kings.

Only thereafter would the prime minister charge the army before the feudal lords saying, "A certain state has acted contrary to the Tao. You will participate in the rectification campaign on such a year, month, and day. On that date the army will reach the offending state and assemble with the Son of Heaven to apply the

punishment of rectification.”

Later speculation suggests the Sage Rulers employed slightly different approaches in antiquity: ³³¹

Emperor Shun made the official announcement of their mission within the state capital because he wanted the people to first embrace his orders. The rulers of the Hsia Dynasty administered their oaths amid the army for they wanted the people to first complete their thoughts. The Shang rulers swore their oaths outside the gate to the encampment for they wanted the people to first fix their intentions and await the conflict. King Wu of the Chou waited until the weapons were about to clash and then swore his oath in order to stimulate the people's will.

The army's confidence would initially be raised by prominently seeking sanctification for the campaign in the ancestral temple and then assuring the troops of the uprightness of their cause, thereby inspiring certainty and excluding doubt. (King Wu exploited this aspect by conspicuously carrying King Wen's spirit tablet on the campaign.) Thereafter, measures would have to be implemented to maintain their commitment and proclamations issued to stimulate their morale whenever new situations were confronted. If the “T'ai Shih” preserves any vestiges of King Wu's speeches in the run-up to battle, the contents should have prompted the true surge of *ch'i* needed to propel the warriors forward.

In aggregate, the two *Shang Shu* versions include three pronouncements traditionally identified with preparing to ford the Yellow River at Meng-chin, reassemble after crossing, and initiate the march to engagement. The proclamation at Mu-yeh and King Wu's retrospective articulation of his early campaign oath provide two additional examples of efforts to inspire the fighters. Viewed as a synthesized progression, the sequence comprises a relatively believable series of pronouncements designed to motivate the army's masses in the face of danger and death. Furthermore, the contents reflect the Chou's vision and grand intent insofar as they seem to have been preserved in the traditional texts and expressed in early bronze inscriptions. At critical moments, King Wu must have delivered speeches such as these; the only question is whether the gists may have been preserved through vestigial memory across generations.

How to treat these pronouncements, most of which appear in both the ancient and modern text versions, therefore remains problematic. Although much of the language is archaic and some of the passages repetitious, their assignment to the prebattle stages appears suspect, and all the speeches are unfortunately marked by

anachronistic terms that indicate an early Warring States composition date at best. Moreover, despite having real believability when read aloud with proper cadence and emphasis, they are clearly too circumspect to be real words spoken in a true military context. ³³² Nevertheless, despite almost certainly being systematically concocted retrospections, they retain great value because of their influence in shaping later historical interpretations and thus imperial court debates on military and external affairs.

In their reconstructed sequence, the focus tends to shift from charging Hsin with relatively transpersonal offenses (such as disdain for Heaven and the sacrifices) to emphasizing his perversity and offenses against the people, including the Shang's own members. While stressing the sanction granted by Heaven and encouraging the participants, King Wu still felt compelled to invoke the specter of rewards and punishments, the very foundation of command authority. Even if a majority of the Chou warriors had been motivated by righteousness, it would be unrealistic to assume that all the participants had joined voluntarily or that abstract indictments, even when buttressed with concrete charges of heinous behavior, would be sufficient to carry the day.

According to the "Wu Ch'eng," during a review of postconquest events, King Wu recalled this brutalization early in the march:

Having realized Shang's offenses, I announced to August Heaven, Lord Earth, and all the famous mountains and great rivers that we passed, that "I, Fa, inheritor of the righteous kingship of Chou, am about to impose decisive rectification upon Shang. King Chou of the Shang transgresses the Tao. He brutalizes and decimates the creatures of Heaven and injures and oppresses the populace. Instead, he rules over the realm's escapees and criminals, a dense congregation.

Inferior as I am, having already gained men of humanness, I dare to undertake Shang Ti's [behest] to suppress his chaotic schemes. The splendid descendants of the Hsia ³³³ and the [uncivilized] Man and Mo, without exception, follow my leadership. Revering Heaven, to complete its mandate and pacify their warriors and women, I am undertaking a campaign of rectification to the east. Their warriors and women, with baskets of dark and yellow [silk], glorify me, king of the Chou. Heaven has brought about a cessation of their trembling movement ³³⁴ and is employing them to sustain our great city of Chou. You that have spirit, empower me so that I may relieve the hordes of people and not do anything to your shame.

Four speeches, generally deemed “oaths” in the sense that they proclaimed his obligations, intent, and promises marked the campaign’s final stages. Three of them have been gathered under the rubric of “T’ai Shih,” the “Great Oath.” The first was delivered at Meng-chin at the crucial moment when they finally confronted the Yellow River after a lengthy but unopposed march, a barrier whose fording not only entailed formidable physical difficulties, but also marked the limits of tranquil security. Because the Shang heartland and certain opposition lay before them, to cross the frontier the king had to physically and psychologically unite them:

Listen, exalted rulers of the friendly states, my chief officials, and all my warriors, clearly heed my oath!

Heaven and Earth are the father and mother of the myriad entities and man is the [most] numinous among them. The [most] sincere, adroit, and enlightened is made the primal ruler. The primal ruler [similarly] acts as the parents of the people.

Now King Shou of the Shang, 335 in disrespecting Heaven above, has brought calamity down upon the people. Immersed in darkness and enthralled by sex, he dares to act brutally and oppressively. He condemns clans for the offenses of a member and awards offices by heredity. His palatial edifices, pleasure towers, artificial lakes, and extravagant clothes have grievously harmed you, the myriad surnames. 336 He has burned and seared the loyal and good and cut open pregnant women. Stirred to anger, August Heaven ordered the late King Wen to reverently flourish Heaven’s awesomeness, but the task has not yet been achieved.

Thus I, his minor son Fa, together with you honored rulers of the friendly states, have been observing Shang’s administrative measures. But rather than being penitent, Emperor Hsin remains a wastrel. He does not serve Shang Ti or the spirits of Heaven and Earth. He does not offer sacrifice in the ancestral temples bequeathed to him, and the sacrificial animals and millet vessels have [even] been inauspiciously stolen. Yet he still says, “I possess the people and have the mandate,” and does not correct these abuses.

To sustain the people below, Heaven created rulers and teachers for them so that they might be able to fathom Shang Ti and esteem and benefit the Four Quarters. Whether or not he has committed an offense, how would I dare transgress its intent?

When strengths are alike measure virtue, when virtue is alike measure righteousness. Emperor Hsin has tens or hundreds of thousands of subordinates, but they have ten or a hundred thousand minds. I have [just] three thousand subordinates, but of

one mind. Shang's offenses are unremitting and overflowing, Heaven has ordered that I execute him. If I do not obey Heaven, my offense will be identical.

Inferior as I am, I am fearful early and late because I received the charge from the late King Wen to bring Emperor Hsin to task. I have offered a Lei sacrifice to Shang Ti and made obeisance to mighty Earth, and with you, masses [now presume] to implement Heaven's punishment.

Heaven has compassion for the people. What the people want, Heaven must follow. 337 Support me, the one man, in permanently clearing the four seas. The time cannot be lost!

Following their difficult and no doubt somewhat chaotic crossing, they needed to be reassembled and their attention refocused onto undertaking the final advance to combat rather than being allowed to be preoccupied with their immediate travail. King Wu therefore encamped and reformed the armies before delivering his speech:

On *wu-wu* the king encamped north of the Yellow River. When the numerous feudal leaders had all assembled with their armies, the king reviewed their forces and gave an oath: "Attention, you many men from the western territory, heed my words. I have heard that in doing good the beneficent man finds his days inadequate, but in doing evil the baleful man also finds his days insufficient. Right now the king of the Shang's willful behavior knows no bounds. He has cast aside the honored and aged and associates with criminals. He is licentious, drunken, dissolute, and oppressive, and his subordinates have been transformed to be like him. Enmity prevails among their factions so they abuse their authority to exterminate each other. 338 The guiltless implore Heaven [for help] even as these fetid actions are made manifest.

"Heaven shows beneficence toward the people so we should punish King Chou to uphold Heaven. 339 When he possessed the Hsia, Chieh was not able to model on Heaven but instead poisoned the states below. Heaven then aided and mandated King T'ang [of the Shang] to negate the Hsia's mandate. King Chou's offenses far exceed Chieh's. He has skinned and slain the truly good, and turned those who would remonstrate and assist him into brigands and oppressed them. Claiming to possess the mandate of Heaven, he asserts that respect is not worth practicing, sacrifices confer no benefit, and brutality has no repercussions. His mirror is not far, it lies in that king of the Hsia. Heaven is about to have me regulate the people. My dreams

cohere with my prognostications and are therefore doubly auspicious. Our armed attack will certainly result in conquering the Shang.

“Shang [Emperor Hsin] has hundreds of thousands and millions of ordinary people all divided in mind and virtue; I have ten catalysts 340 united in mind and virtue. Even though he is surrounded by close associates, they are not as good as my men of humanity. 341 Heaven sees from the perspective of my people, Heaven hears from the perspective of my people. If the members of our nobility 342 commit transgressions, they lay with me, the one man. Today I must advance.

“Our martial forces have been mobilized and we have invaded the border to seize these baleful miscreants. The magnitude of our attack will be more illustrious than King T’ang’s.

“Exert yourselves, my warriors! [But] do not assume that there is nothing to fear, for it is better to think that we are not even an enemy for him. Their nobles are fearful and trembling, as if their points of power are about to collapse. Heed this! United in virtue and mind, you will achieve a great deed, a conquest that will persist forever.”

In the next harangue delivered prior to marching to the point of encounter the king tackles the daunting task of creating the determined spirit that enables men to confront the specter of conflict. He would eventually conclude by confidently asserting that they will exterminate their enemy: 343

On the morrow the king conducted a grand inspection of the six armies 344 and gave an enlightened address to the numerous warriors. The king said, “Listen, my stalwarts 345 of the western territory! Heaven has a manifest Tao, its principles are apparent. Today King Chou [Emperor Hsin] contumes the five constants, 346 is dissolute, a wastrel, and disrespectful. He has cut himself off from Heaven and incurred the animosity of the people.

“He severed the tendons of people fording a stream, cut out the heart of a worthy man, 347 and acted despotically, 348 slaying and exterminating. He has poisoned and polluted the four seas, reveres the licentious and trusts the perverse, dismissed instructors and exiled protectors. 349 He has rejected and abandoned the penal statutes, imprisoned the upright, and enslaved warriors. He doesn’t maintain the altars to the spirits, and the ancestral temples enjoy no sacrifices, but he creates unusual 350 artifices and licentious devices in order to please his woman. No longer being in accord with Shang Ti, Shang Ti has

cursed him with imminent doom. Boldly support me, the one man, in reverently implementing Heaven's punishment!

"The ancients had a saying: 'Whoever nurtures us is our ruler, whoever brutalizes us is our enemy.' This solitary fellow Chou, in vastly flaunting his awesomeness, is our enemy. To establish virtue one must nourish it, to eliminate evil one must concentrate upon the root. Inferior that I am, with your aid, my many warriors, we will exterminate our enemy. Be resolute and decisive, my many warriors, in order to complete his punishment. Those who achieve the most will have generous rewards; those who fail to perform will be conspicuously slain.

"Hear me! King Wen was like the radiance of the sun and moon shining down, illuminating the western land and manifest in the western lands. Thus Chou acquired the [support] of many states. If I conquer King Chou it will not be due to our martial [power] 351 but because King Wen was without offense. But if Emperor Hsin conquers me, it will not be due to King Wen's flaws but because I lack goodness."

Finally, outnumbered and far from home, about to deploy at Mu-yeh and engage in combat, King Wu had to fully raise his men's *ch'i* in order to convert their fear and desperation into effort and resolve. Perhaps not fully confident of their volitional state, in the "*Mu Shih* " ("Oath at Mu") the king then demands that they maintain discipline and stresses the price of failure:

On *chia-tzu* , in the dim first light, the king reached Mu-yeh in the outer suburbs of Shang where he gave the oath. Carrying a large yellow *yüeh* [battle-axe] in his left hand and grasping a white pennant with streamers in his right, he proclaimed, "It has been far, men of the western territory. Listen, honored rulers of the allied states, my directors of affairs, my Ssu T'u, Ssu Ma, Ssu K'ung, commanders of clan forces and of the armies, leaders of a thousand and of a hundred, together with you men of Yung, Shu, Ch'iang, Mao, Wei, Lu, P'eng, and P'u. Brandish your dagger-axes, conjoin your shields, and lift up your spears, for I will give the oath.

"The ancients said that hens do not cackle in the morning. When a hen cackles in the morning, the family is doomed. Now, employing the words of women, Emperor Hsin has confusedly abandoned the sacrifices and thus receives no response. He has obtusely cast aside his various relatives but honors and esteems criminals from the four quarters who fled there from their pursuers. 352 Trusting and employing them, he has made them *tai-*

fu and *ch'ing-shih* , 353 enabling them to be brutal and cruel to the hundred surnames and commit licentious acts in the Shang capital.

“I, Fa, am but respectfully implementing Heaven’s punishment. In today’s affair, without exceeding six or seven paces, stop and regroup. Men, exert yourselves! Without exceeding four, five, six, or seven attacks, stop and regroup. Exert yourselves, men!

“Be frightening like tigers, panthers, and bears. But here at the border of Shang do not engage those who flee [their ranks] in order to impress them as laborers in the western territory. Exert yourself, men! Those who do not exert themselves will be exterminated.”

The inclusion of strong admonitions to perform on pain of death, although highly discordant with the burnished image of a force so inspired by righteousness that they required no such behests, argues somewhat for the vestigial authenticity of the contents. Many centuries later the *Wei Liao-tzu* would observe: “People do not have two things that they fear equally. If they fear us they will despise the enemy, if they fear the enemy they will despise us. The one who is despised will be defeated, the one who establishes his awesomeness will be victorious.” 354 Theorists from Lord Shang onward would discuss the psychology of rewards and punishments, but the essentials are found in another *Wei Liao-tzu* summation: “People do not take pleasure in dying nor do they hate life, but if the commands and orders are clear, the laws and regulations carefully detailed, you can make them advance. When, before combat, rewards are made clear and afterwards punishments are made decisive, then when the troops go forth they will be able to realize an advantage and when they move they will be successful.” 355

Even though the measures implemented to nurture the Chou’s morale can only be speculatively reconstructed, the intent of the process and the dramatic results remain clear. On the other hand, if traditional claims that fatal disaffection plagued Emperor Hsin’s troops are discounted, the latter’s utter failure verges on the inexplicable. Because it was realized early on that fear causes paralysis in an enemy, rendering them easy prey, Warring States military thinkers advocated attacking whenever it might be detected. 356 For example, the *Ssu-ma Fa* observes that “when men have their minds set on victory, all they see is the enemy. When men have minds filled with fear, all they see is their fear.” 357 Being a larger, highly experienced force that had deployed on ground of their choosing, they should not have been affected by doubt or terror. Furthermore,

despite the sanitized portrait of the clash at Mu-yeh implying that they crumbled out of fear (as much as welcomed the specter of righteousness), the reconstituted casualty figures indicate that Hsin's soldiers engaged the enemy rather than simply ran off. No account has ever suggested they were fearful, lacked confidence, or deserted prior to the battle.

Historians have also advanced the idea that the Shang troops performed less than vigorously because they reviled Emperor Hsin, their ultimate commander. However, unless the imaginative assertion that slaves and conscripts were deployed at Mu-yeh should unexpectedly prove true, the majority of the defenders would have been clan troops and members of the standing regiments, men well hardened by external forays who had long fought for glory and material rewards and therefore more likely to have envied Emperor Hsin's lifestyle than have been repulsed by it. Anyone involuntarily impressed for the conflict might have envisioned some sort of salvation in surrender but certainly not experienced soldiers caught up in the era's martial ethos and well accustomed to the draconian punishments imposed for cowardice.

King Wu's frequently enunciated claim that they were acting on behalf of all the people may have resonated with his allies and motivated most of his own troops but probably had little effect upon the Shang forces, if they were even aware of it. This is not to deny that Hsin's soldiers may have doubted the viability of their cause and been perturbed by the vigor of the realm's opposition. Just a modicum of doubt would have been enough to bring about their demise because "of disasters that can befall an army none surpasses doubt." ³⁵⁸ As previously noted, attacking when the enemy is beset by doubt, when the commanding general is puzzled and befuddled, would therefore be advocated by virtually all the martial writings. ³⁵⁹ The Chou's unified zealotry may have promoted sufficient doubt to undermine their courage and determination, resulting in the debacle at Mu-yeh.

Later military science would eventually correlate the concept of "configurations of terrain" (*ti hsing*), which subsequently evolved in the Warring States Period, with the mindset of armies undertaking invasions and deployed in defensive postures. According to their insights, the Shang forces would have been fighting in their homeland, a situation that western martial thinkers have historically characterized as strongly motivating. In contrast, classic Chinese theorists believe that home terrain is inherently fraught with temptations to disperse into the anonymity of the landscape or simply return home. Moreover, insofar as Hsin's belated actions were all responsive and evinced something of a desperate character, he sacrificed the initiative. According to later thought, "those from whom

the initiative has been taken have no *ch'i* ; those who are afraid are unable to mount a defense.” ³⁶⁰

The approach to Mu-yeh traversed relatively open ground, generally termed “accessible” terrain from Sun-tzu onward because all the combatants could access and freely maneuver upon it. From the Chou’s perspective it certainly constituted “heavy terrain,” defined as where “one has penetrated deeply into enemy territory.” The depth of their isolation brings about the result that “the army will be unified and the defenders will not be able to conquer you.” ³⁶¹ Consequently, the further they advance, the greater their cohesion: “When the soldiers and officers have penetrated deeply into [enemy territory], they will cling together...When the troops have penetrated deeply they will be unified, but where only shallowly they [will be inclined] to scatter.”

For the Chou’s severely outnumbered warriors, the battlefield at Mu-yeh can also be characterized as “fatal terrain,” ground where “if they fight with intensity they will survive, but if they do not fight with intensity they will perish.” Impeded by the narrow ford at Meng-chin, thwarted by the Yellow River along the periphery, and deployed on accessible terrain where they would have been decimated by attacks from behind if they turned and fled, flight was impossible. ³⁶² Having been “cast into a position from which there is nowhere to go” and no doubt feeling the isolation of their deployment, they could not escape death and therefore had to “cling together” and fight, “fully exhaust their strength,” and die without retreating, just as Sun-tzu described.

The ford at Meng-chin not being far, the Chou armies also satisfied the conditions outlined in the *Ssu-ma Fa* : “If you advance with a heavy force somewhat into the enemy’s territory you can fight successfully.” ³⁶³ However, if they had tried to attack Anyang by directly traversing the T’ai-hang Mountains, they would have been “advancing deeply with a heavy force,” a tactic that would be predicted as availing nothing. Perhaps another of Sun-tzu’s analogies, that of a crossbow cocked and ready to fire, is equally applicable because King Wu had “advanced with them deep into enemy territory and then released the trigger.” ³⁶⁴

The extent of the casualties would have depended upon a number of factors ranging from the fervor of the combatants to their willingness to take prisoners or, if defeat seemed certain, surrender. In a few centuries total warfare would become the norm, but when the clash at Mu-yeh occurred it had not yet become established practice to slaughter massive numbers of vanquished opponents, if only because they quickly dispersed and the victorious lacked the means to mount an effective pursuit. Being severely outnumbered must have been one of the factors that prompted the Chou to adopt a conciliatory

approach that emphasized all who surrendered would not only be spared but actually allowed to resume their former lives. Although ultimately less benign than pronounced because many prominent individuals were executed and others compelled to labor for the Chou (consonant with King Wu's pronouncement of saving them for use), this prospect for survival may have undermined the resolve of fighters trapped in crumbling circumstances, inclining them to surrender. Persuading them of this possibility would prevent inadvertently forcing them onto fatal terrain where they might suddenly find the resolve to fight to the death, causing the coalition forces far more casualties than necessary and possibly reversing their surging momentum.

Except when compelled by wounds or shock, a decision to submit may result from a variety of physical and emotional factors, either singly or in combination. Although opting to surrender tends to be viewed as a question of weighed judgment, the element of conscious rationalization has probably been overemphasized. For frightened, exhausted, and often wounded soldiers, any prospect for survival, particularly one augmented by the hope of relatively benevolent treatment, would certainly simplify the decision. However, contradictory impulses such as fear of being labeled a coward, hatred for the enemy, individual resolve, hope of rescue, and loyalty to the leader or state may negate any desire to escape the carnage intact. The classic military writers would subsequently point out that men tend to fight and therefore die "for something," whether reward, glory, or victory on the battlefield, while contemporary battlefield psychology emphasizes the strength of comradeship and unit cohesiveness. Once prospects for achievement evaporate, only peer reaction remains.

Insofar as the forces involved at Mu-yeh had no heritage of enmity, the participants should not have been motivated by a fervent desire for vengeance. Neither side found themselves trapped in an attritional campaign; therefore, none of the usual issues of enervation or tendencies to impulsive slaying beyond the initial vehemence of the clash should have loomed. The Chou had also deliberately focused their hatred on the obvious scapegoat, Hsin himself, lessening the emotional ferocity of the participants (though not without putting themselves in a rather difficult situation since the soldiers still had to be fully motivated to fight effectively). Finding themselves being overwhelmed by the enemy's determined onslaught and confronted with the terror of individual combat with cold weapons, the ill-fated Shang troops apparently welcomed the prospect of escape. Fortunately for them, both sides were emotionally free to either surrender or accept prisoners rather than extemporaneously slay them, as would usually occur.

Conversely, during the lethal, internecine warfare that would mark the Spring and Autumn and especially Warring States periods, increasing the army's strength by integrating surrendered forces into the standing armies would become vital. ³⁶⁵ Depending upon how closely they identified with their own state, ruler, or commander and how intense their animosity, troops might welcome an opportunity to continue under arms and thereby gain rewards and a defined place in the world much as immigrants who fight for their adopted country, particularly those originating among the ordinary populace.

Although the factors seem clear, the psychological dynamics should not be oversimplified. In a protracted conflict, the need to divert resources to guarding, provisioning, and caring for prisoners would constitute an additional, perhaps unacceptable burden making leniency less desirable. The question would be whether the gains that might be realized from undermining the enemy's fighting spirit by encouraging and accepting their surrender would more than offset the difficulties entailed, particularly as the latter could bog the army down, even render it susceptible to defeat. ³⁶⁶ Because the Shang's troops were fighting in their homeland, the Chou avoided many of the difficulties typically encountered by acquiring large numbers of prisoners in the field. They merely needed to be disarmed and dispersed, all other issues of control being subsumed in the problem of ongoing administration and control. Even though heavy casualties were apparently inflicted, the majority of Shang fighters ultimately found themselves prisoners of the Chou, willingly or not.

Experience acquired through the Spring and Autumn Period, perhaps even prompted by the debacle at Mu-yeh, would teach that a highly trained and motivated force can defeat a much larger, uninspired one. Although unity and spirit would be the watchwords, it was recognized that the army required a more lethal spearhead, elite forces capable of leading a charge and disrupting the enemy. Thus Wu Ch'i advised that "within the army you must have soldiers with the courage of tigers, the strength to easily lift tripods, and the fleetness of barbarian horses. To attack their flags and seize their generals you must have men with such abilities." ³⁶⁷ Once identified, they should be "selected and segregated, favored and honored."

The hundred warriors personally led by the T'ai Kung at Mu-yeh were an early realization of this concept of elite units. (The "Ko Yin" section of the *Shang Shu* states that King Wu ordered the Shang-fu and Po-fu to "*chih shih*," which can mean "raise the army's spirits" but is best understood as in the translation provided earlier of a similar passage in the "Chou Pen-chi" of "lead the army forward.") ³⁶⁸ Whether they were Chiang clan fighters personally attached to him as sometimes suggested or the members of his contingent had been

selected from among the army's stalwarts remains unknown, but they seem to have constituted a force apart from the famous Tiger Guards whose name appears in the traditional battle accounts. Well known from bronze inscriptions as well, at one point the latter appear to have been the chieftain's personal bodyguard, though in later years, non-Chou peoples augmented them for functions as crucial as protecting the palace. At Mu-yeh they should have encountered their counterparts, resulting in intense fighting, but instead quickly penetrated the more ordinary Shang troops deployed before them, shattering the opposition's unity and paving the way for the army's massive advance, thereby perhaps explaining the defender's collapse.

More than half a millennium later, in essentially discussing the problem that can be said to have confronted the Chou, the great strategist Sun Pin would advise employing an elite contingent to mount a focused strike: ³⁶⁹

Query: "Suppose our army encounters the enemy and both establish encampments. The enemy is already numerous and strong and has assumed an extended horizontal deployment. We have deployed and await them but our men are few and incapable [of defeating them]. How should we strike them?"

Sun Pin: "To strike them you must segment your soldiers into three [operational groups] and select "death warriors." Two groups should be deployed in an extended array with long flanks, one should consist of talented officers and selected troops. They should assemble [and strike] at the enemy's critical point. This is the Tao for killing their general and striking horizontal deployments."

Overall, the Chou had certainly planned well, motivated the people and their numerous allies to undertake a campaign intended to rid the world of perversity, coalesced the undercurrent of hatred, defused the inimical effects of baleful omens, and created confidence in transcendental sanctions. Their measured approach conserved their physical and psychological energy and they concentrated their power in a single strike that exploited the fervency of elite warriors inspired by stimulating harangues. Their campaign can thus be considered a textbook realization of concepts that would not be formulated until a half millennium later during the Warring States Period and thereafter.

Opacity and Subversion

The decisiveness of the surprising victory at Mu-yeh prompted later claims that the Chou had employed spies and implemented subversive measures long before the battle. Although Sun-tzu's identification of the T'ai Kung and Yi Yin as secret agents in *Art of War's* infamous "Employing Spies" probably provided a major impetus, the controversial chapter "Civil Offensive" found in *Six Secret Teachings* buttressed these beliefs.³⁷⁰ However, these two historic "spies" should be distinguished: the T'ai Kung has always been portrayed as a defector who had tired of life under the Shang but in contrast Yi Yin had been dispatched to an enemy state for the sole purpose of clandestinely acquiring information.

Assertions in the "Wei-tzu" and other late texts that Wei-tzu was encouraged to depart or otherwise left the Shang have also been interpreted as indicating he went to the Chou capital, aided King Wu in planning the attack, and was eventually awarded a small fief at Ts'ao-hsien in Shandong for his contributions.³⁷¹ Although far too imaginative and discordant with the usual depiction of events, including his abject surrender, to be given credence, he too would merely have been a defector or "local guide" in Sun-tzu's terminology rather than a subversive agent.

In his earlier life, the T'ai Kung is said to have served in a sufficiently high official capacity, and then for unknown reasons (but presumably to avoid Emperor Hsin) he had been compelled to disguise himself and undertake the menial tasks inherent to being a fisherman, an inn attendant, and a butcher. Other than general tactical and strategic advice, the only concrete information he might have been able to provide would have been gained in his previous duties: some basic military information and the sort of disparate but sometimes critical details normally provided by Sun-tzu's "local guides." For example, the campaign's tract toward Chao-ko and the subsequent Yellow River crossing at Meng-chin might have been facilitated by the T'ai Kung's familiarity with the former location, but knowledge obtained from many other informants, defectors, and reconnaissance scouts would certainly have been sought out and employed.³⁷²

The controversial but still much studied “Civil Offensive,” a chapter that would cause the T'ai Kung and *Six Secret Teachings* to be excoriated in later centuries, outlines a twelve-part program intended to systematically subvert enemy rulers. Estranging capable officials, obfuscating informational access, and encouraging licentiousness and debauchery number among the critical techniques. However, later imperial thinkers vehemently rejected the possibility that these methods had been employed because they deemed them fundamentally incompatible with King Wen's character and their implementation would have besmirched the image of Virtue alone achieving domination over the realm.

Later Chinese history would frequently witness programs of this nature being attempted, including during the Warring States Period when the Ch'in adroitly exploited them to facilitate its ascension., Having already ventured far down the path of profligancy and inebriation, the Shang required little encouragement to perdition. The Chou simply needed to magnify Emperor Hsin's transgressions and conduct a sophisticated form of propaganda warfare even as they built alliances and nurtured the people's hatred. Except to the degree that they conspicuously provided for the people's welfare, neither is there an indication that any of the measures advocated in “Three Doubts,” including debauching the emperor while estranging the populace, were ever employed. ³⁷³

Conversely, the Chou did observe the basic technique of “following along” by appearing submissive until the last few years of their military adventurism. In discussing the means available for achieving the primary objectives of manipulating and mystifying the enemy, all the military writings from the *Art of War* onward would stress making leaders arrogant and then exploiting the normal effects of negligence and obliviousness. The tactical discussion for “Arrogance in Warfare” in the late Sung *Hundred Unorthodox Strategies* succinctly states, “Whenever the enemy's forces are exceedingly strong and you cannot be certain of defeating them, you must speak humbly and cultivate obsequious behavior in order to make them arrogant. Wait until there is some political pretext that can be exploited, then with a single mobilization you can destroy them. A tactical principle from the *Art of War* states: ‘Be deferential to make them arrogant.’”

These measures would have been unnecessary because Hsin suffered from hubris and his delusion of invincibility made him oblivious to the Chou threat well after it had become manifest in the ramp-up campaign and his advisors had begun issuing dire warnings. Even though the Chou's aggressive intentions should have been apparent in the years immediately prior to the conquest, there is no indication they had ever acted belligerently or were less than

obedient. Instead, up to the penultimate moment, they seem to have practiced the respectful, though not particularly fawning, behavior of subjects and continued to, for example, forward plastrons for divination and possibly even women. ³⁷⁴

Emperor Hsin thus had had little reason to suspect Chou perfidy prior to the attack on Li and the first thrust toward Chao-ko because he had been able to summarily command the Chou kings to present themselves at his court, easily imprisoned King Wen, and entangled them in marriage alliances. The Chou had even constructed temples to two or more Shang ancestors and had been actively offering sacrifices to Hsin's father, a further indication of their submissive involvement in the Shang political-religious edifice. Whether this was a well-orchestrated charade or the Chou oligarchs simply acceded to necessity even as thoughts of revolt began to ferment within their heads remains an open question, but most likely they actively sought to maintain an increasingly fictive obeisance while cultivating the means to power, thereby realizing the substance of Sun-tzu's adage that "warfare is the Tao of deception."

Oracular Evidence

Although a significant number of oracle bones have been found at Chou-yüan, less than two hundred of the estimated seventeen thousand preserve inscriptions, and their interpretation has been marred by controversy. ³⁷⁵ Their provenance has also been the subject of heated disagreement, some historians confidently attributing them to the Chou but others vociferously asserting that they were imported from the Shang, claiming they furnish incontrovertible evidence that Shang rulers performed divination while visiting the Chou, or that they date to Ken Wen's imprisonment. ³⁷⁶ However, their physical characteristics differ significantly from all known Shang oracle bones and plastrons, square rather than round holes having been bored to induce the necessary cracks under heating, and the calligraphy is distinctive in size and style. The inscriptions also employ language similar to that found on early Chou bronze vessels, utilize unique terms, and vary in their form of calendrical reference. They also seem to have been carefully preserved rather than just discarded, an auspicious layer of red earth having been deposited over one cache. ³⁷⁷ In short, all the evidence suggests they originated in a different divinatory culture, presumably at the pinnacle of predynastic Chou power.

Three enigmatic inscriptions have particularly attracted attention. The first (H11:1) indicates the querent was planning to sacrifice two women, three rams, and three pigs to King T'ang, the primal leader who overthrew the Hsia and founded the Shang. ³⁷⁸

One explanation holds that these sacrifices, while unusual in presumably having been offered by the Chou ruler, were not impossible and that the Chou progenitors were merely seeking protection from the ancestral spirits of their overlords. However, objections to this interpretation have been raised because it contravenes the idea that sacrifices can only be properly offered within the clan and to one's own ancestors. ³⁷⁹

In rebuttal it might first be noted that this is a concept first expressed in the *Tso Chuan* and otherwise articulated in the stultifying ritual texts compiled in the Warring States Period, long after the advent of Confucius and the growing ascendancy of his influence. Even though the proscription formalizes the sort of desirable practices found among the increasingly codified demands of everyday late Chou ritual, its existence in the late Shang and early Chou cannot be assumed. In fact, in direct contradiction it has been shown that so called extralineaage sacrifices are known to have occurred at that time. ³⁸⁰

The sacrificial relationship visible in these fragmentary inscriptions derives not from the political relationship that would normally prevail between an overlord and his subordinate, however intense, but from the complex marriage relationships that existed between them. Although it would be presumptuous, even unthinkable, for a mere secondary lord to offer sacrifice to the spirits of the ruling clan, sincere offerings could certainly have been expected of "outsiders" who had been integrated into the extended clan structure through marriage.

China has a lengthy heritage of systematically employing marriage relationships for political purposes. With at least fifty-two known consorts, King Wu Ting of the Shang had been especially prolific, and both he and King Wen Wu Ting took consorts from the Chou. The Chou were also symmetrically tied to the Shang through marriage relations, King Chi's consort possibly coming from Emperor Yi's extended family, sometimes even said to have been one of his daughters, though without any substantial basis. King Wen's wife, identified as coming from a minor state called Hsin, may also have been a woman of the Shang, possibly even one of Emperor Hsin's daughters. ³⁸¹ King Wen would therefore have been doubly justified in seeking the blessings of the high Shang ancestors and especially the recently deceased Emperor Yi even though it must have caused him considerable consternation because Yi had executed Wen's father, King Chi Li.

A second inscription (H11:84) that beseeches the early Shang ancestor known as T'ai Chia for protection is problematic in the way it refers to a "Chou-fang Po" or "Duke of the Chou-fang." ³⁸²

Interpretations vary dramatically, one being that it records a request to protect Chou-fang Po, presumably a deceased ancestor (such as T'ai-kung Tsu Kan), either by King Wen himself or the Shang emperor upon appointing him as Western Protector, another that it preserves a query by the emperor about sacrificing King Wen to the great Shang ancestor T'ai Chia. However, the latter would not only contravene historical practice, but would also require that the querent be Emperor Hsin rather than King Wen, clearly impossible in Chou divination materials.

The third (H11:3), asking about prospects for a forthcoming hunt, is assumed to record a Chou divinatory query undertaken prior to the Shang emperor's arrival and is therefore cited as evidence that the Shang still retained confidence in the Chou's submissiveness. In this connection the frequently voiced hypothesis that late Shang rulers avoided problematic areas and confined their hunts to their ever-dwindling, secure domain is somewhat dubious because these hunts, while certainly motivated by a quest for pleasure and aggrandizement, had a marked military character. Apart from offering a chance to personally gather intelligence and overawe people, the hunt could serve as a precursor for sudden military action and in this case may have been an attempt to assess a potential threat, accounting for the Shang's subsequently avoiding nearby terrain in their hunting expeditions.

Despite their fragmentary and as yet incompletely comprehended nature, from these inscriptions it appears that the Chou kings were not just maintaining a façade of submissiveness when they conspicuously participated in certain Shang ritual activities even though they deemed themselves kings and were seeking to augment their power. Excavations conducted in the core capital area in Shaanxi early on uncovered what have come to be regarded as "Chou-style" buildings, but more recent efforts have unearthed remnants of a palace structure at Feng-ch'u in the Mount Ch'i area that appears to be a classic Shang-style temple that must have been erected to allow proper veneration of the Shang ancestors. ³⁸³ Although doubts about its true nature might be raised, its existence seems to provide undeniable evidence that King Wen acknowledged his obligation to ritually participate in Shang clan offerings and conducted them in a separate, appropriately styled edifice for the purpose. It appears the temple was maintained postconquest, consistent with suggestions that King T'ang continued to be venerated and Ch'i-tzu was received there.

Although the temple's mere presence would have attested to the Chou's continued subservience, it is certain their ritual offerings would have been observed, either clandestinely or officially, and reported back to the Shang emperor. Assuming the Chou's warrior

leaders were essentially uncowed by numinous externalities, these ritual activities can be considered hypocritical measures designed to defuse Shang doubts about their fidelity, reassure them of their continued integration into the realm's hierarchy, and preclude the possibility of preemptive military action. With their attention focused upon the east, the late Shang rulers were probably content to avoid battlefield confrontations with the Chou as long as this fictive submissiveness persisted. Conversely, their restraint in not destroying the temple immediately postconquest, but instead maintaining it for some time, suggests that rather than merely being a key element in a well-conceived strategic deception campaign, their participation in these sacrifices was relatively sincere. It also attests to the veracity of the claim that their objective was the elimination of the chief miscreant, Emperor Hsin, rather than the Shang's complete extinction, and that their purported admiration for the early Shang founders was genuine. ³⁸⁴

Obliviousness and Response

Emperor Hsin's confidence in his invincibility would remain unshaken until the collapse at Mu-yeh. Given his reputed talent and intelligence, how he could have become so isolated from reality, so determinedly immersed in debauchery remains an enigma. ³⁸⁵ He had been forewarned of the danger by Tsui Yi; the Shang had long gathered intelligence on the world about them, not to mention their own people; ³⁸⁶ and three Shang client states had been reduced in succession, a highly provocative development as well as one that deserved, if not demanded, a vengeful response by the Shang particularly as the headstrong Hsin was an experienced military commander who had doubtlessly served as his own chief strategist for three decades. In this context, King Wen's astonishing designation as the Hsi Po (Western Duke) is inexplicable even if Hsin hoped to exploit the Chou's military power by coercing them into providing a shield to the west. Neither hubris nor constant immersion in a drunken miasma should have precluded making far more realistic assessments but history would witness similar examples, including Stalin's famous refusal to acknowledge the Nazi threat prior to Germany's massive invasion.

Art of War stresses the importance of keeping the enemy ignorant of plans and uncertain about objectives so they will be compelled to contemplate numerous possibilities and defend against multiple threats. ³⁸⁷ However, even if Shang intelligence had become totally inept, King Wu's highly visible advance toward Chao-ko in the so-called rehearsal campaign had made the ultimate objective clear. Unless the suggestion that several Shang armies were stationed at Mu-

yeh can be substantiated, it remains likely that no targets of any importance intervened between the Yellow River and Emperor Hsin's capitals.

A simple assessment based upon the *Art of War's* parameters proves informative. ³⁸⁸ Sun-tzu identified five factors that should be employed for comparative scrutiny: the Tao, Heaven, Earth, generals, and laws. Only in two of the five—the Tao and Heaven—can the Chou be said to have prevailed. However, in inquiring, “Which ruler has the Tao?” the Tao's effects need to be understood: “The Tao causes the people to be fully in accord with the ruler. Thus they will die with him, they will live with him and not fear danger.” Emperor Hsin's world was marked by well-publicized dissension, whereas repeated campaign success and the rapid formation of alliances attest to the unity achieved under Chou chieftains.

Evaluation of, “Who has gained the advantages of Heaven and Earth?” would depend solely upon the credence placed in the ephemeral Mandate of Heaven were it not for its psychological effects among the Chou elite, warriors, and allies. Although the Chou's subsequent admirers would certainly disagree, prior to Mu-yeh, the remaining three factors would have been a toss-up: The answer to, “Which general has greater ability?” is conclusively shown by the outcome to have been, “King Wu (and his commanders),” but given Hsin's successful long-range campaigns, would not have been apparent in advance. Even though punishments proliferated among the Shang and their brutality alienated the people, that would not necessarily have precluded them from effectively deterring proscribed behavior in an age characterized by perverse rulers. The responses to, “Whose laws and orders are more thoroughly implemented?” and “Whose rewards and punishments are clearer?” would therefore have been equally unclear.

The category of “laws” included the Tao of command. Hsin's forces deployed successfully, but their performance lacked, suggesting the answer to, “Whose officers and troops are better trained?” should be, “The Chou's,” but nothing is known about the methods employed by either party apart from infrequent participation in large scale hunts. Due to their more recent, highly successful campaigns, the Chou commanders should have been thoroughly experienced, their troops more disciplined and cohesive. However, when it comes to answering, “Whose forces are stronger?” the historically accepted response has always been, “The Shang's.”

The sudden appearance of the Chou coalition forces prompted, but hardly compelled, Hsin to come forth with his forces. According to the *Wei Liao-tzu*, a late Warring States synthetic martial writing, one man defending a city's walls can oppose ten. ³⁸⁹ If Hsin had remained

ensconced within the walls of Chao-ko, a large city reportedly protected by three concentric layers of fortifications, he could have forced the Chou to undertake a lengthy siege or several costly city assaults of the type Sun-tzu would adamantly condemn. ³⁹⁰

Urban attacks were in their infancy, only the earlier subjugation of Ch'ung having been the result of a siege finally punctuated by an assault. Even if the factor of "ten" represents an overestimation, the Shang would have enjoyed at least a four to one advantage and been virtually certain of withstanding the attack. Meanwhile, under the pressure of logistical shortages and mounting casualties, disaffection would have certainly grown among the Chou coalition members. Illness would have further decimated them, allowing the Shang forces to sally forth and dispatch the remnants with relative ease. Apart from any question of adequate provisions, the only issue for Emperor Hsin would probably have been the loyalty of his troops.

Classic Chinese military science has generally held that a key factor in choosing an army's operational tactics should be relative strength. Roughly six centuries later, the *Art of War* would advise, "If your strength is ten times theirs, surround them; if five, attack them; if double, you can divide your forces." ³⁹¹ Since the battle would unfold on "accessible terrain" (defined by determining that "We can go forth and the enemy can also advance.") rather than broken or constricted ground that could cause problems for large forces, the sort of terrain commanders with visible force superiority would always exploit to quickly crush their enemies, Hsin cannot be overly criticized for coming forth.

Rather than attacking while the Chou coalition forces were still deploying, according to several texts (including the *Lü-shih Ch'un-ch'iu*), he tardily chose to mount a forward defense after the Chou had deployed earlier in the morning. He can therefore be faulted for yielding the initiative and the opportunity to shape the battleground despite having, in a general sense, chosen to confront them in open battle. The *Six Secret Teachings* would assert that "when the enemy has begun to assemble they can be attacked," ³⁹² yet the Shang forces idly awaited the Chou onslaught. ³⁹³

The *Art of War* offers a number of illuminating observations on the mutually dependent nature of attack and defense:

One who cannot be victorious assumes a defensive posture; one who can be victorious attacks. In these circumstances by assuming a defensive posture strength will be more than adequate, whereas in offensive actions it would be inadequate.

One who, fully prepared, awaits the unprepared, will be victorious.

One who excels at warfare first establishes himself in a position where he cannot be defeated while not losing [any opportunity] to defeat the enemy. For this reason the victorious army first realizes the conditions for victory and then seeks to engage in battle. The vanquished army fights first and then seeks victory.

In antiquity those who excelled in warfare first made themselves unconquerable in order to await [the moment when] the enemy could be conquered. Being unconquerable lies with yourself; being conquerable lies with the enemy.

Emperor Hsin's surpassing numerical superiority, leisure to launch preemptive attacks, and ability to assume a solid defensive position at any location of his choosing outside of Chao-ko means he could have compelled the weaker Chou armies to assault his well-ensconced troops. He could also have realized all the conditions for victory early on either by defensively exploiting the configurations of terrain and making himself unconquerable or by launching fierce onslaughts that would have overwhelmed the coalition forces. Instead, rather than empowering his armies, his tactical and command measures seem to have perversely facilitated his defeat.

Sun-tzu also asserted that "whoever occupies the battleground first and awaits the enemy will be at ease; whoever occupies the battleground afterward and must race to the conflict will be fatigued. Thus one who excels at warfare compels men and is not compelled by other men." ³⁹⁴ From experience garnered in the Spring and Autumn Period, early Chinese commanders became acutely aware of the effects of overly hasty advances. The *Art of War* provides an estimate of the deleterious effects of even a day or two's rapid marching: "If you abandon your armor [and heavy equipment] to race forward day and night without encamping, covering two days normal distance at a time, marching forward a hundred *li* to contend for gain, the Three Armies' generals will be captured. The strong will be the first to arrive while the exhausted will follow. With such tactics only one in ten will reach [the objective]. If one contends for gain fifty *li* away, it will cause the general of the Upper Army to stumble, and by following such tactics half the men will reach [the objective]. If you contend for gain at thirty *li* , then two-thirds of the army will reach [the objective]." ³⁹⁵

The distance from Chao-ko to Mu-yeh being about one hundred *li* , it might be asked how rapid their advance had been. Accomplishing it in a single day would certainly have resulted in massive disorder and only a portion of the exhausted troops being available for battle as the rest straggled in, but if they took several

days, one hundred *li* would have required nothing more than a leisurely hike. Additional complexities would be their degree of preparation and the origination of the troops, those farther afield having to traverse far more debilitating distances. Given Hsin's obliviousness, haste and a degree of disorganization are likely to have characterized the Shang response, but none of the texts indicate they suffered from weakness or confusion in their final deployment.

The *Art of War* also preserves a number of tactical observations that should have been applicable to Shang's defenses. For example, "With the near await the distant; with the rested await the fatigued; with the sated await the hungry. This is the way to control strength." ³⁹⁶ In defending interior territory, the Shang forces should have been well rested in comparison with a Chou force that had to trudge more than ten times the one hundred *li*. Furthermore, in view of the vastness of their forces, they should equally have realized the condition of "not relying on [the Chou's] not coming but depending on having the means to await them" ³⁹⁷ and, because they chose the field of battle, "not having relied on [the Chou's] not attacking, but relied upon having an unassailable position." ³⁹⁸ But because the forces may have been too large to effectively command, whether they were able to "in order await the disordered and in tranquility await the clamorous" remains an open question. ³⁹⁹

King Wu's relatively swift advance probably prevented Emperor Hsin from mustering all the forces deployed anywhere but on nearby terrain. Exhaustion brought about by protracted warfare and the commitment of the bulk of its forces to external campaigns against the Eastern Yi have traditionally been cited to explain the Shang's inability to mount a vigorous response and quash the Chou. It has even been commonly claimed that one hundred thousand troops were absent in the southeast when the clash unfolded. ⁴⁰⁰ However, the only evidence ever raised for these expeditions has always been a scant two sentences preserved in the *Tso Chuan*, a compilation dating many centuries later, delivered by a moralist in an almost-offhand manner when he cites several historical examples of doomed states that had enjoyed temporary success at Heaven's will before crumbling. Both are found late in the book, among the entries for Duke Chao's fourth and eleventh years: "Chou [Emperor Hsin] of the Shang undertook the formal ordering of troops at Li and the Tung Yi rebelled against him," and "Chou [Emperor Hsin] vanquished the Tung Yi of the east and thereby lost his life."

Even assuming the spokesman accurately assesses the trends of history, these nebulous, late statements provide an insufficient basis for the tertiary conclusion that the Shang had debilitated their troops and exhausted their martial resources in achieving a pyrrhic victory.

Even if King Wu did astutely exploit a preoccupation with the Tung Yi that made Hsin somewhat oblivious to Chou developments, there is no evidence the army was still deployed in the east during the battle of Mu-yeh or that the troops opposing King Wu were merely slaves, prisoners of war, or conscripts fielded in haste. Given the ferocity of the Chou onslaught it is far more likely the Shang's troops were ill prepared, lacked motivation, or mounted a shaky defense than it is they were debilitated or the dregs of their forces. Furthermore, at this time, the Shang's remnant power was concentrated in the area between the detached capital at Chao-ko and the ritual center at Anyang because the Chou had encroached upon the west and south, whittling the Shang's domain away, and the Yi apparently continued to make incursions in the east and southeast. ⁴⁰¹

The analysis of more than one hundred fifty oracle bones pertaining to a late campaign Emperor Hsin had initiated earlier against the Jen-fang generally corroborates perceptions that their energies had been diverted eastward, but not that the Shang had suffered any debilitating effects, either short or long term. There is also no evidence he had continued to undertake similar campaigns in his final years. ⁴⁰² Although the Jen-fang campaign had lasted some ten months, was apparently commanded by the emperor himself, and required a considerable expenditure of energy, unlike the Sui Dynasty's invasions of Korea, it simply did not deplete their resources to any great degree nor exhaust the army. In fact, the campaign was completed in basically victorious fashion in slightly less than a year, relied on provisions furnished by subject states that were augmented by foraging and plundering, and was punctuated by numerous intervals of rest and feasting and therefore conducted in leisurely, well-sustained fashion.

In addition to seizing spoils and capturing prisoners, this and previously successful campaigns should have nurtured greater military cohesion, experience, and field capabilities among the Shang. The only surprising aspect is the extent to which Emperor Hsin, who probably already felt invincible and therefore remained untroubled by Chou threats, personally participated. Perhaps because their domain was eroding in the west, northwest, and south, Hsin felt compelled to stifle challenges to his authority originating in the southeast and preclude potential attacks from the eastern quarter that might be intended to exploit Shang combat entanglements with the Chou.

It has also been speculated that Emperor Hsin's main error was coming forth with a large, disorganized rabble, but no indications of disorder appear in any of the traditional accounts. However, the army's core forces might have become degraded under Hsin's examples of excess, may have still been ensconced up at Anyang (as

the need for extensive mopping up efforts in the north indicates), or had simply been disinclined to fight for any of several reasons, including dislike of the emperor, having succumbed to propaganda about his perversity, or feeling that the Chou's success was predestined. (Military action requires inspired leadership; corruption and debauchery are inimical to discipline, honor, and motivation.) Suggestions that Hsin had to employ captured Yi fighters, conscripts, and slaves at the front, all of whom were too weak or scared to fight, similarly lack substantiation.

Although unlikely, it is also possible that “*mu-yeh*,” now simply understood as a place name, originally designated a sort of pastoral zone outside Chao-ko. Some early texts even refer to it as *mu-chih-yeh*, which can be understood as the wilds (or uncultivated area) of a pastoral zone or “the wilds for pasturing,” an indication that animal herds were kept within the outskirts. Interpreted in this way it would have connoted a broad area, not a single point, somewhere to the south or southwest. ⁴⁰³, Emperor Hsin may therefore have deployed his forces across a broad front rather than concentrating them in a relatively confined location, resulting in gaps and fissures despite their massiveness that could have been exploited by a limited but concentrated force. Even though they made no known attempts to manipulate the enemy or employ the deceptive and unorthodox techniques that would soon evolve and be articulated in the *Art of War*, the Chou appear to have realized the advantages of comparative concentration that would be described by Sun-tzu: “If we are concentrated into a single force while he is fragmented into ten, then we attack him with ten times his strength. If we can attack his few with our many, then those we engage in battle will be severely constrained.” ⁴⁰⁴

Surprisingly, despite its having become common practice in martial writings to include illustrative battles for the various tactical principles and fundamental concepts being expounded, the later theoretical military works rarely cite the Chou conquest and the clash at Mu-yeh. Perhaps Mencius's comments or the pervasive effects of adopting Confucianism as the official state philosophy dissuaded subsequent discussion of any aspects of the Chou conquest other than the participants' surpassing confidence in the face of suddenly manifest baleful omens. Even the pioneering *T'ung Tien* contains but a few references, mainly the T'ai Kung giving tactical advice and an interesting version of the famous, evil portent incident.

Earlier Options

The Shang had long abandoned their early capitals at Yen-shih and Cheng-chou; retrenched in the west by removing the forward

troops necessary to conduct delaying actions; and after Ch'ung's fall no longer controlled the crucial passes to Kuan-chung. If the Chou had left a residual force on the intervening terrain after the abortive first campaign, the Shang would have been incapable of mounting even a minimal forward defense, one sufficient to conduct delaying actions, without dispatching several armies. Nevertheless, a number of highly effective tactical options continued to be available for thwarting the Chou well before their armies could have assaulted the heartland.

The Shang might have established an effective defensive perimeter by improving and heavily manning strongpoints on the intervening terrain, deploying armies along the formidable Yellow River, and erecting fortifications at Meng-chin and other potential fords. Although this sort of tactic was not actually articulated until the *Art of War*, they must have realized that attacking an enemy in the midst of crossing with a hail of arrows is highly effective and that battling them as they strive to ascend an embankment conveys an almost insurmountable positional advantage. In fact, Sun-tzu would subsequently advise attacking when half the enemy's forces have crossed, drawing them forward by not arraying any troops right at the river but instead deploying on tenable ground and occupying the heights. ⁴⁰⁵

Simply focusing on the crucial passes and fortifying the accessible choke points—the “crucial points” (*chi*) of earth—would also have expeditiously blocked the Chou's spirited troops. As Wu Ch'i, the great early Warring States commander, later expounded: “Warfare has four vital points: *ch'i*, terrain, affairs, and strength. When the road is narrow and the way perilous; when famous mountains present great obstacles; and if ten men defend a place a thousand cannot pass, it is termed a ‘vital point [*chi*] of earth.” ⁴⁰⁶ He also reportedly said, “For one to attack ten, nothing is better than a narrow defile. For ten to attack a hundred, nothing is better than a deep ravine. For one thousand to attack ten thousand, nothing is better than a dangerous pass.” ⁴⁰⁷ Although subsequently deemed particularly suitable for attacking superior enemies, striking armies hampered by confined terrain would always be deemed advantageous while the length of the Chou's journey ensured that numerous opportunities would arise. ⁴⁰⁸

Chao-ko itself was one of the Shang's secondary capitals, the final realization of a still little-understood Shang penchant for shifting its capital, both dynastically and predynastically, and erecting alternative administrative centers. Sometimes they were occupied sequentially, at others simultaneously, in which case one normally functioned as a ritual center, the other as a secondary administrative focus or seasonal residence. ⁴⁰⁹ They were often highly militarized or

offered to rulers, especially more pleasure-oriented individuals, an escape from the capital's constraints. Ancillary capitals in the late Shang included Han-tan, located to the north in a geostrategically crucial area previously occupied by predynastic Shang culture (as well as subsequently the capital of the state of Chao), ⁴¹⁰ and the ancient city of Shang-ch'iu, often said to have retained its importance throughout the dynasty as the original ritual center and site of the oldest, and therefore most important, ancestral temple.

Traditional accounts suggest that Chao-ko was located south of Yin-hsü, somewhere between the theocratic capital of Anyang and the extended boundary at Mu-yeh. Even though several sites have been proposed, one in the district of Ch'i slightly to the southwest but still north of the Yellow River appears the most likely. Local tales claim that Chao-ko was defined by an outer rectangular wall about one thousand by six hundred meters in extent and further protected by two concentric inner walls, but no definitive remains have yet been recovered. ⁴¹¹ It probably functioned as a military bastion long before Emperor Hsin transformed it into an opulent pleasure center, thereby dissipating its essentially Spartan character despite the presence of Hsin's personal bodyguard.

In contrast, Anyang lacked external protection, and even the heavily fortified former capital of Huan-pei, located just north of the Huan River, had been strangely abandoned. However, early on, a wide moat excavated along the western side of the city was connected in the northwest corner with the Huan River as it flowed from west to east before turning down on the eastern side. Since the moat rejoined the river southeast of the site, Anyang was completely encircled by a ring of water. Whether the moat was intended to define the western perimeter and provide a modicum of defense or was simply a control measure intended to relieve flood surges remains unanswered.

It continues to be argued that Anyang had originally been protected by fortified walls comparable to those still visible at Huan-pei's virtually impregnable citadel but on a much grander scale. Although these theories are all essentially variations on the idea that absence somehow proves existence, the best-constructed cite oracular inscriptions that indicate the late Shang rulers having frequently been troubled by the possibility that the Huan River (which originates in the T'ai-hang Mountains to the west) might flood as evidence that turbulent waters had often inundated the city. Any remnants that had remained after the rampaging Chou forces had destroyed the city by fire would have eroded over the centuries.

Flooding might account for the destruction of badly burnt wooden components in exposed structures such as gate towers but cannot explain how the rammed earthen walls purportedly found on

all four sides could have been completely destroyed nor the absence of wooden remnants or post holes anywhere on the periphery. ⁴¹² Although farmers would level many walls over the millennia and peasants frequently raided them for materials, unlike in the Spring and Autumn Period, Shang and Chou armies bent upon plundering rarely diverted their energies to such tasks or made dismantling an objective. The very massiveness and solidity of these walls would also have required Herculean efforts to be dismantled, explaining how portions managed to survive and even remain visible at numerous, far more ancient sites.

Proponents of extensive fortifications rather futilely cite an additional complexity in explaining the current failure to detect substantial fortifications. Anyang sprawled over a vast area that extended at least six kilometers from east to west and five from north to south. Although somewhat irregular in shape, the resulting thirty square kilometers encompassed palaces, temples, dwelling quarters, handicraft areas, and even massive bronze workshops. Whether the walls were erected just once or frequently modified, even replaced over the nearly three centuries Anyang was occupied, their exact locations remain problematic, presumably explaining the ongoing failure to detect them.

On the other hand, the T'ai-hang Mountains to the west and northwest, the Chang River to the north (which also flows downward into the southeast and joins the Yellow River), and the Yellow River itself running south of Anyang would pose obstacles to potential invaders, perhaps delaying them sufficiently for the defenders to respond in force. Insofar as the Shang had effectively carried the battle to their enemies throughout the dynastic period, generally thwarting them before severely damaging attacks could be mounted, they probably deemed the forces deployed at dispersed bastions and concentrated in the flourishing secondary capitals more than sufficient to repel invaders. ⁴¹³ However, while well situated to project power and control the trade and transport routes into Shandong and the passes through the T'ai-hang Mountains, Anyang's geostrategic advantages proved inadequate to preserve their kingdom.

Elusive Military Issues

Much like the broad political and psychological questions raised by the Chou's surprising ascension, several problematic military issues merit renewed scrutiny in the light of revitalized traditional texts, inscriptional evidence, and recently recovered archaeological materials. Some are broad in scope, others more specific, mainly related to the battle's unfolding and the combat capabilities of the two forces. Particularly focal are questions of organization, component forces, operational measures, and technological superiority.

A number of explanations other than the widely proclaimed sweeping appeal of Virtue and a highly enlightened leadership dedicated to the people's welfare have been advanced to explain the astonishing Chou victory. Often formulated in terms of material or technological advantages, they include assertions that the Chou benefited from a formidable geostrategic location, numerous allies, superior weaponry, more powerful or numerous chariots, better training and discipline, more flexible armor, greater experience in some operational aspects, comparatively more (or less) impact from external peoples, and surpassing tactics.

Despite originating in the west rather than the east, the conquest replicated the Shang's overthrow of the Hsia and essentially represented a battle for control of the civilized heartland. The unexpected nature of the victory has prompted many analysts to believe their remoteness allowed the Chou to secretly develop their material base and weapons systems, particularly their more powerful chariots, before springing them at the last moment. ⁴¹⁴ In making a single swift strike, the Chou managed to conserve their forces rather than depleting them in a series of engagements, thereby realizing Sun-tzu's conclusion that "the army values being victorious, it does not value prolonged warfare." ⁴¹⁵

The Wei River Valley in Shaanxi where the ancestral Chou terminated their migration has traditionally been known as "Kuan-chung" or "the area within the passes" because it is surrounded by difficult, mostly mountainous terrain on all sides and essentially accessible only through four strategic passes where control points

(*kuan*) would be established over the centuries, leading to the names Han-ku-kuan, Wu-kuan, San-kuan, and Hsiao-kuan, with Han-ku-kuan being the most important because it provides the major conduit to the eastern portion of the country. (Another pass, Lung-kuan, located in the southeast corner of Gansu, appears in some traditional enumerations.) Ensconcing themselves within its easily defensible yet environmentally conducive confines considerably facilitated their ascension and furnished a natural bastion for externally directed campaigns.

However, no matter how geostrategically advantageous, topography alone could not preclude incursions by peoples from the Northern Complex. Numerous pinch points existed, but the terrain still allowed predatory advances down through the Ching and upper Wei River Valleys even while providing a corridor for outwardly directed thrusts. Accordingly, it has long been claimed that the Chou's location exposed them to frequent military challenges even as it shielded them from the full brunt of Shang military prowess. Not only did they have to organize and train to undertake expeditionary campaigns, but they also had to be prepared to ward off unexpected incursions. Their martial experience over several generations, especially their victories, nurtured the cohesiveness, resilience, spirit, and unflinching commitment necessary to prevail.

Judgments of this type can only assess relative predispositions; actualizing them depends upon the will of the leadership and response of the populace. No matter how difficult the contiguous terrain, until very late in the dynasty, Shang rulers—especially King Wu Ting—had never been reticent about mounting westward expeditionary campaigns, including into the valley itself. Archaeological evidence also shows extensive cultural interaction, trade, and technological diffusion among the various peoples and protostates in the prequest century, suggesting that, rather than dwelling in some sort of splendid isolation, the Chou had been much visited and no doubt actively sought out information and techniques, including in the Shang. Because the area functioned as a transmission nexus between the outlying steppe cultures and the Shang to the interior, the Chou's location early on exposed them to western-originated metallurgical techniques and the chariot, prompting adoption of the latter if not also providing the corridor for its introduction to the Shang. ⁴¹⁶

Even though significantly higher numbers (such as thirty-two hundred clan groups) are sometimes suggested, traditional accounts claim that eight hundred participated in the Chou campaign. The nature of this "participation" is open to question and may, in many cases, have consisted of merely disavowing the Shang or simply offering encouraging words. Only eight of the Chou's supporters have

ever been named: Yung, Shu, Ch'iang, Mai, Wei, Lu, P'eng, and P'u. Perhaps they were the only ones sufficiently powerful to deserve mention, all the others being minor clan groups or individual feudal lords, many of whom may have inhabited the Chou's core domain. Their names continue to appear in later centuries, and they putatively occupied territory in the upper Han River area and eastern Sichuan. However, despite detailed discussions and the production of highly useful maps, insofar as states suddenly shifted or disappeared, fiefs changed over the centuries, and the populace was always surprisingly mobile, without the recovery of additional bronze vessels or other forms of insignia, identification of their preconquest sites remains problematic. ⁴¹⁷


Shu's location is particularly tenuous because a rather tortuous journey would have been required if its founders had already taken up residence deep in central Sichuan, just as its namesake would in the Warring States and Three Kingdoms periods. Artifacts indicating that the Shang conducted a campaign against Pa or Shu have been found in P'eng-chu-hsien in Sichuan, ⁴¹⁸ yet Pa and Shu may have been located in the near southwest, possibly in the Ch'eng-ku region of Shaanxi. ⁴¹⁹ After the Chou victory, Pa groups apparently came up the Han River and were enfeoffed as the state of Yü in Shaanxi as a reward, even though the Pa are not listed as having participated in the coalition effort. ⁴²⁰

Even more controversial, Shu is not only replaced by Su in some lists but also appears to have been the target of an earlier Chou attack. ⁴²¹ Oracular fragments recovered from the Chou heartland in fact indicate that the Chou defeated the Shu, making the latter's participation in the coalition effort highly questionable unless their presence was coerced, perhaps in the way King Wu Ting had previously compelled subjugated states to undertake military missions on behalf of the Shang. ⁴²²

Ch'u's possible participation, as well as its location, is equally problematic. Inscriptions indicate that Yü Hsiung, leader of incipient Ch'u, ventured westward to the Chou at the very end of the Shang. As a result of acknowledging Wen Wang as his "father," ⁴²³ Yü Hsiung came to be recognized as a *yang tzu*, a "nurtured son," and designated as a "*nan fu*" (southern submissive [state]), a status Ch'u reportedly had acquired under the Shang as well. Although Ch'u merely foreshadowed their future power, inscriptions such as these somewhat validate the claim that much of the realm's peoples had given their allegiances to the Chou or at least "hedged their bets" prior to the conquest, perhaps in part because the Shang remained preoccupied with the east. When the remote Chiang-Han, Ching-Ch'u, and Pa Shu regions are included, claims that the Chou enjoyed the support of two-

thirds of the known realm seem justified.

Based upon numerous studies, the Chou's major allies may be tentatively arrayed as shown on the accompanying map.



Major pre conquest sites

Given the sparseness of the population and dispersed nature of towns and villages, most of the protostates and clan groups must have been largely self-contained. Apart from a trickle of trade conducted with immediately contiguous entities, occasional onerous annoyances emanating from the dominant Shang, and whatever clan or confederation issues might impinge upon them, geographical constraints bounded their consciousnesses and their viable horizons rarely extended beyond the nearby fields.

It therefore remains puzzling why peripheral groups were willing to participate in the enterprise unless they had simply been overawed by the certainty of Chou success. Any who had chosen to subvert the Chou would certainly have been well rewarded by the Shang and probably retained a greater degree of independence than under the Chou if only because of their often greater distance from the respective centers of power. After the Chou subjugated a few key states, the lack of opposition from erstwhile Shang allies on the march to the final engagement was especially advantageous. Not being obliged to fight through numerous strong points and conquer various satellite states, the Chou were able to expeditiously proceed to the focal gathering point, ford the Yellow River, and directly strike at the secondary capital.

The assertion that superior weapons, whether in design or type, proved to be a factor in the Chou victory is not sustainable. Though obviously adequate to equip their warriors and despite probable exposure to steppe metallurgical techniques, their total productive capacity was certainly lower than the Shang's; ⁴²⁴ their weapons—primarily dagger-axes supplemented by spears, a few battle axes, and bows and arrows, though the latter are not noted as having played any

role at Mu-yeh—were essentially identical; and the purported superiority of the mounting system being employed for the dagger-axe was inconsequential, if not nonexistent.⁴²⁵ Archeologically recovered artifacts indicate that, when the Chou mounted their final campaign against the Shang, their weapons differed little apart from minor stylistic variations resulting from local preferences (perhaps conjoined with the influence of the Northern Crescent), slight variations in indigenous technological practices, and minor differences in the compositions of accessible ores.

Despite assertions to the contrary, their daggers, often mistakenly termed swords but far too short to even merit being termed dirks, were also distinguishable only stylistically, not functionally, because both sides still employed them as piercing rather than slashing weapons.⁴²⁶ Furthermore, they played no combat role because almost no one wielding a twelve-to-fifteen-inch dagger could have survived a confrontation with a warrior brandishing a three-foot-long dagger-axe (*ko*) or the short spears then common to the battlefield. Without doubt, Chou (and Shang) daggers were consigned to moments of desperate defense, resorted to only when the fighter's primary weapon had been damaged or lost.⁴²⁷

It should not be forgotten that all discussions of this sort, particularly of pre-gunpowder weapons, overlook the “good enough” principle: despite the zealous quest for battlefield advantage, weapons do not have to be perfect, just functional within a strife-filled context. Since the Shang had successfully employed these and earlier variants of the dagger-axe for two or three centuries, they must have been durable enough to withstand several dozen blows during actual combat. Furthermore, skill and training obviate all but the most significant differences, at least until radical new inventions (such as the crossbow with its extended range) suddenly convey insurmountable battlefield advantages and alter the nature of conflict.

Some historians believe Chou armor was more flexible and provided more extensive protection than its Shang counterpart, two aspects that could have had significant impact in prolonged clashes between individual fighters.⁴²⁸ However, in contrast to subsequent centuries, the archaeological evidence for any differentiation at Mu-yeh is minimal, more suggestive than conclusive, and it is unclear from contemplation alone that the armor worn by some Shang fighters, large pieces of rawhide loosely conjoined over an underlying garment with some metal pieces affixed, would have proven more cumbersome. Flexibility obviously plays a critical role if the fighters move rapidly about, bending and contorting as they battle, but becomes far less relevant if they simply stand to strike each other, all the while protected by their shields and their skill in wielding their

weapons defensively as well as offensively.

Whether Chou armor provided better protection or was simply a cultural expression is thus not only open to question but also awaits experimentation with replica armor and weapons to gain real insight. Even if their armor were fabricated by affixing small metal plates individually to a tunic, significant gaps would have remained because they were never overlaid, a problem that would not be resolved until the emergence of lamellar armor in the Warring States Period. ⁴²⁹ The critical question of how extensively either side employed body armor, whether it was confined to the officers and more prominent warriors or furnished to the lower ranks as well, similarly remains to be answered. The perishable nature of the components—leather, wood, and especially early fabrics—has significantly diminished the number of recoverable artifacts, skewing the basis for any valid assessment.

Based upon the relative paucity of artifacts, helmets appear not to have been used in large numbers even though both sides possessed them. The few Shang examples recovered so far are more substantial and often include an extension down to the neck, the most likely target of the *ko* (dagger-axe), especially the crescent *ko* increasingly being employed. (It should be remembered that being fabricated from solid bronze, battle-worn helmets would be among the first items melted down, severely diminishing their numbers except as they may have been deliberately included in grave placements.)

It has been suggested that the Chou prevailed because of their greater combat expertise on rough terrain. ⁴³⁰ However, even if the Chou or their coalition allies from the more rugged upper Han River area had been more experienced in fighting on treacherous ground than the Shang, their single battle unfolded in a generally flat area characterized as “accessible” despite the usual minor undulations and some contiguous hills in the distance. In addition, the Shang’s martial activities over the centuries had consisted of external campaigns rather than internal conflicts. Wu Ting’s efforts against the T’u-fang, Kung-fang, and other steppe peoples may have been but dim memories and therefore lacked contemporary impact, but the army would have had to traverse tortuously difficult hills and rivers to target enemies ensconced in the mountains during Hsin’s campaigns to the south, east, and southeast. Neither side would therefore have possessed any significant advantage in this regard even if it could be ascertained that the Chou’s southern and southwestern allies played a major combat role instead of merely providing ancillary forces at Mu-yeh.

Although the additional assertion that the coalition forces somehow managed to outflank their enemies coheres with prescriptive materials found in the classic theoretical writings, it lacks

substantiation and contravenes historical claims that the Shang forces greatly outnumbered the Chou. ⁴³¹ If so, their deployment would have extended far wider than the Chou's, possibly the several *li* traditionally claimed, whereas the Chou forces were highly concentrated, as would have been necessary for them to punch through the enemy even if significant gaps existed. Thus it would have been impossible to segment off contingents to conduct flanking maneuvers, especially when they were highly vulnerable to being outflanked themselves. This would well cohere with assertions in the eclectic *Lü-shih Ch'un-ch'ü* that the Chou attacked with six armies, but before they all reached the enemy, their elite forces had already conquered the Shang. ⁴³²

A commonly enunciated view holds that the Chou triumphed through skillfully employing their chariots at Mu-yeh, even that the Chou's sole advantage was their innovative employment in mounting the first concentrated chariot assault in Chinese history. ⁴³³ Although correctly discounting mythical tales of their use in the conquest of the Hsia, this view equally ignores oracle bone inscriptions that indicate the Shang had deployed as many as three hundred chariots in outwardly directed campaigns. (The Shang probably dispersed their chariots among the various field contingents rather than concentrating them for massive chariot charges; however, their actual mode of employment remains unknown and unified thrusts are not precluded.) Any assessment of surpassing chariot expertise accordingly depends upon which of several fragmentary accounts might be chosen, the tactics purportedly adopted, and the resolution of certain technological and topographical questions.

The extent to which the coalition's chariots participated in the battle, particularly at the initial stage, still numbers among Mu-yeh's unresolved issues despite recent (but as yet unpublished) reports of chariot formations having been discovered in the vicinity. The size of the individual contingents and whether they were simply deployed in a line across the field, segmented into operational groups, or set up as a single column some five or ten chariots abreast in order to penetrate the enemy's lines before fanning out all remain unknown and perhaps unknowable. According to all accounts, it was the hundred stalwarts (quickly augmented by the elite Tiger Guards) rather than hundreds or even thousands of chariots, engaged in a massive onrush that succeeded in disrupting the Shang's deployment and shattering their morale. ⁴³⁴ Only thereafter did an indeterminate number of chariots and the bulk of the coalition forces race up and engage the enemy.

None of the reports state that the T'ai Kung employed chariots in this first charge, but several assert that they were retained under the command of King Wu and quickly bought up later. It is of course

improbable that the king's chief commander, especially an aged one, would not have ridden in an awe-inspiring chariot nor that the hundred were other than chariot-mounted forces. ⁴³⁵ From the perspective of subsequent Chinese military doctrine (such as seen in the *Wu-tzu*) , they may well have constituted a sort of elite reconnaissance group designed to probe the enemy's defenses in force and exploit any opportunities that might arise. They may also have hoped to infuriate the enemy's troops and thereby provoke them into precipitously engaging in unconstrained and therefore highly disorganized battle, a technique that would be practiced in the Spring and Autumn Period. ⁴³⁶

An important collateral question is how many chariots were actually present on the battlefield and available for combat. The traditional view has always been that three hundred were employed and that they were accompanied by three thousand Tiger Warriors, a perfectly feasible, perhaps even ideal, ratio of ten to one that would allow maneuvering while providing infantry support. However, the "K'o Yin" section of the *Yi Chou-shu* (which no doubt contains reliable material but also some anachronisms) states that the Chou employed three hundred fifty chariots. Later sources, including the "Chou Pen-chi," inflate the overall figure to a highly unrealistic four thousand for the entire coalition force, a number that should probably be dismissed because even though the various allied states would be expected to field their rulers in appropriate style and supported by at least a few chariots, only the eight major coalition states presumably had the resources for contingents of more than five or ten. ⁴³⁷ (This would readily account for the difference between three hundred and three hundred fifty.) For the eight to have provided approximately four hundred chariots each when the Chou only had three hundred exceeds the bounds of probability.

However they may have been employed, it should not be forgotten that these light chariots were extremely complex physical devices that required disparate materials, numerous individual components, practical knowledge, woodworking and metallurgical skills, and significant time to construct. It has therefore been suggested that a long preparatory period had been necessary to not just nurture the material basis required for such a major campaign, but especially to construct a sufficient number of chariots and fabricate a substantial supply of weapons. The chariot's complexity imposed inescapable organizational and sequencing requirements while its fragility and the Chou's extensive campaigning constantly caused their chariot stores to dwindle. It has been estimated that only twenty or so chariots could be fabricated annually; even if this is seriously undercalculated, the construction rate could not have been

more than double. ⁴³⁸ Horses also had to be bred or acquired, the drivers and horses trained both individually and together, and maneuvering practiced, primarily in the hunt. ⁴³⁹

One sentence found in “K’o Yin” may preserve a hitherto ignored but revealing aspect of the battle: “Three hundred fifty Chou chariots were deployed at Mu-yeh and then Emperor Hsin followed onto the battlefield.” If the Chou deployed first and Emperor Hsin responded to them, King Wu was not only the aggressor but also seized the initiative, enabling him to choose terrain conducive to an open field attack where they could fully utilize their chariots and effectively maneuver their smaller numbers of infantry. Any question of topographical necessity apart, this no doubt would have contravened the era’s conventional wisdom because most experienced commanders realize badly outnumbered forces need to exploit constricted terrain to have any chance of victory.

Although never explicitly articulated until the inception of dedicated military writings, all the later theorists would in fact advocate manipulating superior enemies onto constricted spaces where they might be expeditiously attacked, as Wu Ch’i does in this brief dialogue from “Responding to Change” in the *Wu-tzu* :

Marquis Wu asked, “If the enemy is numerous while we are few, what can I do?”

Wu Ch’i replied, “Avoid them on easy terrain, attack them in narrow quarters. Thus it is said for one to attack ten nothing is better than a narrow defile. For ten to attack a hundred nothing is better than a deep ravine. For a thousand to attack ten thousand nothing is better than a dangerous pass. Thus it is said, when employing larger numbers concentrate upon easy terrain; when using small numbers concentrate upon naturally confined terrain.”

The availability of numerous chariots radically alters the preferred measures because constricted terrain thwarts mobility, the one advantage an inferior force might have in effecting the hit-and-run tactics needed to overcome the enemy.

Two parallel queries from “Ten Questions” in Sun Pin’s *Ping Fa* (*Military Methods*) discuss these complimentary situations:

“Suppose our army encounters the enemy and both establish encampments. Our men and weapons are numerous [but] our chariots and cavalry are few. If the enemy’s men are ten times ours, how should we attack them?”

“To attack them you should conceal yourselves in the ravines and take the defiles as your base, being careful to avoid broad, easy terrain. This is because easy terrain is advantageous

for chariots while ravines are advantageous to infantry. This is the Tao for striking chariots.”

“Suppose our army encounters the enemy and both establish encampments. Our chariots and cavalry are numerous, but our men and weapons are few. If the enemy’s men are ten times ours, how should we attack them?”

“To attack them carefully avoid ravines and narrows; break open [a route] and lead them, coercing them toward easy terrain. Even though the enemy is ten times [more numerous], [easy terrain] will be conducive to our chariots and cavalry, and our Three Armies can attack. This is the Tao for striking infantry.”

Theoretical considerations apart, the Chou’s open field attack at least avoided the horrendous losses certain to result from an assault on a massively fortified enemy position. Since the terrain at Mu-yeh would have been more favorable to chariot employment than almost anywhere else in China, if the Chou’s wooden chariots were capable of playing a penetrating or disruptive role anywhere, it would have been here. Although the Shang had faced formidable enemies on their distant campaigns, the inscriptions recording the capture of enemy chariots indicate that their foes had rarely, if ever, been able to muster more than a few tens. If the Shang’s front line troops were relatively inexperienced conscripts rather than veteran core forces used to employing chariots in their own military expeditions, the vehicle’s speed and relative mobility might well have surprised the defenders.

Insofar as even the Shang’s most seasoned troops had never confronted a mass chariot assault, their lack of close familiarity could have fostered fear or panic and they would have then crumbled before the onrushing horses even though history would show that this sort of onslaught might still be deflected with a solid array of spears. Prior to actually closing with the enemy, the chariots would have been used as mobile archery platforms to no doubt deadly effect because the Shang’s large numbers and high density assured virtually every Chou arrow would find a target despite the archer’s uncertain footing and the vehicle’s jerky movements across the terrain.

Even if they only provided mobility and served as command and archery platforms—a function facilitated by the large wheels that resulted in the compartment floor being about twenty-five inches above the ground—any assessment of the chariot’s role must also ponder whether the Chou versions were in some way technologically superior or more powerful. Although the dimensions would vary in subsequent centuries as the chariot continued to incrementally evolve, the numerous vehicles so far recovered from late Shang and early Chou burial pits show no difference apart from a slight increase in the

number of spokes in the Chou chariots. ⁴⁴⁰

It has often been speculated that the Chou's chariots were powered by four horses and were therefore sturdier or more threatening and effective than the Shang's two-horse version. Even though the northwest may have been the conduit for the chariot's introduction into China two or three centuries earlier and the Chou could have been exposed to further steppe improvements as well as presumably had access to more horses, excavations to date have provided only a very few examples of harnessing double pairs. Although suggestive, the fragmentary archaeological reports also indicate that the pits contained multiple chariots, making the apportioning of the horses somewhat difficult, if not controversial; their numbers are extremely small; examples of Shang burials may be similarly cited; and in all cases the chariots are virtually indistinguishable. ⁴⁴¹

At this moment, the evidence is therefore insufficient to assert that more than a handful of the early Chou's war chariots ever harnessed an additional pair, a privilege presumably reserved for the king and the highest-ranking nobility. Even though an additional pair of horses would have increased the tractive power vital to traversing difficult and distant terrain and augmented the turning ability, given the limited size of the compartment and the emphasis upon lightness in construction, the era's chariots could have easily approximated the theoretically attainable top speed on the plains at Mu-yeh with just two horses. Four horses would have merely augmented the system's bulk and provided a percentage increase in the energy actually applied. Meanwhile, whether staffed by two or three warriors, the chariot would have still suffered from all the limitations and operational issues discussed in our *Ancient Chinese Warfare* .

The Shang's defeat has also rather surprisingly been attributed to having adopted a chariot-based form of military organization that resulted in sacrificing the tactical flexibility needed to cope with the Chou's infantry units. ⁴⁴² However, only a single, highly controversial (if not dubiously grouped) series of graves even minimally suggests the Shang ever employed chariot-based squads or conjoined them with dispersed troop contingents and even if this aggregation was intended to memorialize a schematized array, the latter could only have been a prebattle order that would have quickly dissolved in the swirl of conflict rather than some sort of inviolate structure.

Because of a single Spring and Autumn example in which chariot troops dismounted in order to fight greatly superior numbers of steppe infantry it is also thought that the Shang method of chariot-based organization was inherently inflexible and therefore vulnerable to an infantry attack. ⁴⁴³ Although apparently illuminating, the commander

actually opted to fight dismounted (and thereby offended the sensitivity of the nobility) because chariots would have been unable to maneuver on the constricted terrain, not because of any inherent deficiency. Three hundred years of oracular inscriptions also shows that Shang field armies, although fundamentally infantry forces, were sometimes augmented by up to three hundred chariots. Even though they almost certainly functioned as command and archery platforms rather than the nuclei of individual chariot-based platoons or in free-wheeling operational contingents and probably suffered from numerous operational constraints, their sustained (albeit occasional) use indicates they must have been deemed useful contributors rather than a hindrance to battlefield achievement or an impediment to dynamic deployment. Furthermore, massive integrated contingents focused on the chariot's capabilities would play a fundamental role throughout the Eastern Chou.

Archaeological discoveries minimally suggest that chariots had become a status symbol among the Shang by the time of Mu-yeh, as would be expected of such an expensive conveyance. They seem to have been lavishly painted and decorated with bronze emblems, frequently employed inscribed bronze fittings on the axles and end points of the shafts, and were often buried with the powerful and wealthy, as well as in multiple vehicle pits. In marked contrast, the Chou appear to have been more parsimonious because they rarely included them in their early burials and seem to have stressed utility and perhaps sturdiness. Rather than just a difference in material wealth and therefore frugality, there seems to have been a basic reorientation in attitude.

If this had been a chariot battle, any Chou success might then be explained by function over decoration, but apart from any (and therefore puzzling) lack of mention of the Shang chariots having participated, the chariot's design precluded direct encounters. As extensively discussed in *Ancient Chinese Warfare*, even though historians continue to imagine that violent clashes occurred between the weapons bearers when they encountered each other, lethal combat would have been impossible without dismounting because the weapons' handles were simply too short.

Not only were the sides of the compartment set in two feet or more from the outer tip of the axle cap—even further when longer axles or more elaborate fittings were employed—the shafts of the dagger-axes and spears employed by both sides never exceeded three feet in length. Even if the problems posed by the momentary nature of the engagement could be overcome, neither a dagger-axe point nor the head of a thrusting spear could have been effectively employed against a moving enemy standing in a compartment more than four or

five feet away. (Assuming a fully extended arm grasping the weapon right at the butt, the maximum radius for both the thrusting spear and the dagger-axe [which had to be wielded in a semicircular arc] would be about five feet. However, strength and control rapidly diminish when the arm has to be fully extended and what might be termed the comfort point of 75 to 80 percent is exceeded, explaining why shaft length rapidly increased to as much as eighteen feet as the chariot's numbers burgeoned in the Spring and Autumn Period and the chariot's battlefield role increased, as well as why seven-foot spears were employed by Hittite fighters in the west.)

In the light of these various factors, the most reasonable conclusion is that the charge of a hundred stalwarts was accomplished on chariots and that its ferocity or unexpectedness allowed a Blitzkrieg-like penetration that disrupted the solidity of the defense. The Tiger Warriors then followed up, shattering a portion of the already wavering line and penetrating any gaps, resulting in panic apparently spreading among the defenders who had no doubt been deployed over a wide expanse. They probably crumbled under the onslaught of the bulk of the coalition forces, the main carnage then occurring as portions turned and fled, giving rise to the much-idealized depiction of Virtue so triumphant that the enemy did not even attempt to mount any defense.

Irrespective of their numbers, apart from the initial assault, the chariots fielded by the coalition forces were thus employed in the standard mode first as conveyances, then dispersed as command vehicles and archery platforms. ⁴⁴⁴ There was no coordinated charge of chariots other than by the initial hundred or any chariot-to-chariot combat, contrary to common depiction. Perhaps the only surprise is that the Shang's own chariots are never mentioned in any way, whether in terms of numbers or role.

Finally, the surprising results at Mu-yeh have also been attributed to a discrepancy in military organization and discipline, the Chou forces said to have been more thoroughly trained and prepared, but the Shang said to be deficient in both respects. The campaigns of the previous years would certainly have toughened the Chou armies, the core of the coalition forces, and nurtured a strong military machine while providing irreplaceable experience in command and control. However, little is known about their organizational structure, one that may have still been quite rudimentary and heavily clan based (as will be discussed in the concluding chapters). In contrast, even though it was still evolving at the end of the era, the Shang had a well-developed, exhaustively tested military organization that continued to benefit from a multicentury heritage of military activities.

The only question might be the degree to which Hsin's personal excesses had undermined the state's martial spirit and corrupted its military units. Since he esteemed martial values and was a noted warrior himself, even reputed to have achieved the apocryphal hundred victories, ⁴⁴⁵ it is unlikely that he would severely neglected their military forces or allowed them, especially his personal clan troops, to descend into debauchery. Other causes for the debacle at Mu-yeh—such as his obliviousness, ineptitude in evaluating the risk, or hasty forward deployment—must therefore be found, though it should again be noted that none of the accounts suggest the Shang troops were incapable of deploying or were plagued by chaos prior to engaging.

The March to Victory

Despite a spate of recent works that raise fundamental topographical issues and even a dedicated book on mud's ubiquitous powers of entanglement, terrain-imposed constraints continue to be neglected in historical studies and contemporary planning alike, not just ignored but even dismissed as irrelevant. History has shown that the ability to successfully negotiate steep passages, traverse precipitous ravines, slog through muddy fields, wend through deep forests, and penetrate dense vegetation while suffering the onslaught of insects and tirades of weather is often more important than power and tactics in determining a battle's outcome. Only the elusive factor of spirit, an ineffable combination of resilience and morale, makes men capable of courageously engaging the enemy after a difficult trek and weeks of misery.

The Chou's march toward Chao-ko would have been no different. Commencing late in the fall or early winter, it must have exposed the troops to the harshness of cold and subjected them to the dreary effects, even enervating illnesses, brought on by inescapable precipitation. Fortunately, their progress was unopposed; no preliminary engagements were required, only a focal thrust to target sustained by King Wu's stimulating pronouncements and their cohesive sense of mission. Coming shortly after the harvest, the stores of grain that might be readily seized en route would have been at maximum, reducing the logistical burden and offering prospects for more than mere sustainment.

After emanating from Kuan-chung, the royal forces advanced roughly five hundred fifty kilometers from the Chou capital of Hao to Mu-yeh along an eastward horizontal line that paralleled the Yellow River. Their progression kept them on the southern side until they hooked upward to cross at Meng-chin before proceeding northeastward to the point of confrontation. However, insofar as

campaign graphics obscure the nearly insurmountable topographical challenges that have to be tortuously overcome, they are invariably deceptive, especially those that emphasize simplicity.

Basic routes had already evolved in response to the needs of trade, travel, communications, administration, and military efforts. Systematically improved road surfaces are known as early as the Shang but at the interstice of the Shang and Chou they were neither comparable to the paved highways of the Roman empire nor the thoroughfares built by the Ch'in Dynasty, but simply walking, haulage, and possibly ox-cart tracks except in the greatest cities. ⁴⁴⁶ More extensive trade routes had also begun to evolve that exploited a combination of water and overland passage to forward crucial natural resources such as copper and salt to various ancient capitals ranging from the Hsia's last bastion at Erh-li-t'ou through Yen-shih, Cheng-chou, and Anyang. For example, two routes intended to facilitate the acquisition of copper and tin from the lower Yangtze area extended out to the Hai-tai region in the east. One of them required a complex passage through the ancient path of the Yellow River and utilized the Chi and Ssu Rivers, including appended marshy areas with sufficient depth, to reach the Chiang/Huai area. ⁴⁴⁷ A land route to the south, that Emperor Hsin followed for his major expeditions, also existed.

Despite the opacity of entangling characteristics such as fine sand or scapple, satellite imagery now provides a reasonable sense of the terrain's difficulty, hindrances, and obstacles, as well as confirms historical depictions of particularly treacherous areas. Although the march down the Wei River Valley probably encountered a few annoyances and troublesome areas of ascension and decline, nothing exceptional should have frustrated the troops until they reached the vicinity of Han-ku Pass. Nevertheless, even a minor grade quickly enervates troops marching under weight and exhausts the daft animals, particularly oxen, being employed to pull their supply vehicles. Contrary to common expectation, downgrades also impose severe leg stresses and the steepness or a loss of traction may cause uncontrollable acceleration in wagons already exerting strong forward pressure on animals under yoke.

Portions of the campaign route pass through narrow valleys hemmed in by steep rock walls where neither wagons nor chariots could possibly have advanced two abreast. The high cliffs and generally mountainous terrain to the west of Meng-chin precluded travel along the north bank, certainly the reason a crossing developed somewhat eastward at Meng-chin. After fording the Yellow River, the fairly level terrain would have allowed the Chou to advance more rapidly than Emperor Hsin might have anticipated, not that any unimproved surface in antiquity would have been overly conducive to

travel.

Despite these readily perceived obstacles and numerous other constraints unimaginable to anyone not trapped in the immediacy of the experience, throughout history contingents such as Alexander's expeditionary armies and Hannibal's famous elephants managed to survive dire conditions and extreme deprivation before reaching their objectives. ⁴⁴⁸ But the crucial military question is whether they remained sufficiently vigorous to engage the enemy in battle, whether their travails did not so sap their strength that collapse became inevitable. The *Wu-tzu*, an early to middle Warring States compilation, would list "long marching," especially under adverse conditions such as cold and wind, among the situations deemed propitious for mounting an attack without conducting the divination normally required, victory being so certain. ⁴⁴⁹

The *Art of War* preserves a number of relevant observations including, "To travel a thousand *li* without becoming fatigued, traverse unoccupied terrain," ⁴⁵⁰ and, "If one knows the field of battle and knows the day of battle, he can traverse a thousand *li* and assemble to engage in combat." ⁴⁵¹ Having cleared the route of potential enemies, the Chou certainly satisfied the first behest. However, their journey of approximately five hundred fifty kilometers amounts to about eleven hundred *li*, only slightly more than the storied thousand *li*, an almost inconceivable distance for a large campaign force in that era.

Unimpeded passage certainly facilitated reaching the objective in fighting condition but other factors remained important, particularly the need to modulate their speed of advance and thereby avoid the debilitating extremes of stagnation and exhaustion, especially if the latter resulted from unnecessary haste. The Chou's measured movement was fully in accord with King Wu's instructions to maintain order even in the heat of battle, and it also satisfied the strictures that would be outlined in the *Ssu-ma Fa*: ⁴⁵²

A campaign army takes measure as its prime concern so that the people's strength will be adequate. Then, even when the blades clash, the infantry will not run and the chariots will not gallop. When pursuing a fleeing enemy the troops will not break formation, thereby avoiding chaos. The solidarity of a campaign army derives from military discipline that maintains order in formation; does not exhaust the strength of men or horses; and whether moving slowly or rapidly does not exceed the measure of the commands.

Wu Ch'i similarly stressed the importance of a measured advance:

The Way (*Tao*) to command an army on the march is to not contravene the proper measure of advancing and stopping; not miss the appropriate times for eating and drinking; and not completely exhaust the strength of the men and horses. These three are the means by which the troops can undertake the orders of their superiors. When the orders of superiors are followed, control is produced. If advancing and resting are not measured; if drinking and eating are not timely and appropriate; and if, when the horses are tired and the men weary, they are not allowed to relax in the encampment, then they will be unable to put the commander's orders into effect. When the commander's orders are not obeyed, they will be in turmoil when encamped and defeated in battle. 453

King Wu also needed to coordinate their efforts with their numerous allies. Merely communicating the call to action would have required many days, even weeks; local mobilization would have consumed another several days; and a similar length of time would have been necessary for them to race forth and join the coalition. Any expeditious dash to Mu-yeh in the hope of catching Emperor Hsin totally unprepared would have been impossible.

The many troops provided by these coalition members must also have posed logistical problems. Although a few-days march can be undertaken with provisions carried at the outset, sustainment would have been impossible for those coming any distance (such as the vicinity of the Han River) without foraging and numerous supply wagons. Even though King Wen reportedly created a temporary pontoon bridge from watercraft to facilitate his future wife's passage to Chou, and the Shang had already been employing boats to a limited extent for transport and military campaigns, there is no evidence that King Wu employed rafts or boats to convey his forces down the Wei and Yellow Rivers. 454 In fact, the vestigial accounts only mention watercrafts' being employed to assist the army's fording the Yellow River at Meng-chin where they would have been essential for transporting the provisions and chariots.

Rather than being compelled by necessity, the army's movement seems to have been well planned and consistent without being exhaustive. Whether they alternated days of marching and resting as frequently practiced by late Shang campaign armies is unknown, but uninterrupted forward progress would have been essential because any delay would have resulted in rapidly consuming all the grain and animal stocks while polluting the water and wearing out the land.

King Wu apparently assembled his forces at Meng-chin, at the limits of Chou-dominated territory. It has frequently been suggested

that choosing a southern, indirect route rather than struggling to punch through the T'ai-hang Mountains and descend from the comparative heights at Li proved somewhat surprising, ⁴⁵⁵ but any northern trek would have been unnecessarily long. Whether the Shang expected an attack from the west, as often claimed, and therefore arrayed their static defenses accordingly also remains unknown. Strongpoints had previously been deployed against enemies originating on the northwestern steppe, including at Li, and despite their retrenchment to Anyang they probably had not been completely abandoned over many decades, given the lack of fortifications at the capital.

Whether the campaign commenced early in the fall and concluded two months later or started in the winter and ended in mid to late spring has particular relevance because the armies would have encountered significantly different environmental conditions. Although brutal for the troops, wintry conditions would have facilitated fording the Yellow River because the water levels in the central plains would have been low, and there are even reports that a drought had severely affected the land. The combination of low temperatures and minimal water flow could even have resulted in the Yellow River's freezing.

Famous historical incidents would even see commanders stretch ropes across the river to induce sufficiently thick ice to form that the troops might cross, but the employment of boats at Meng-chin contravenes any possibility that the river had been transformed into an easily traversed frozen field of ice. ⁴⁵⁶ The agricultural fields in the comparatively dry plains would have frozen to some depth, providing the additional solidity necessary for large numbers of men, wagons, and chariots to pass. In contrast, as spring emerged, the land would have turned muddy, and higher water levels from the melting snowpack far up the Yellow River's course would have roiled the river, making it impassable.

Whether because of an error in rewriting the text or the year count was restarted after the conquest, the postbattle account is too compressed without the addition of another sixty days. Additional time would also have been needed to accomplish the movement up to Mu-yeh as well as for the allies to join the coalition forces. Historically attested marches throughout the world have rarely exceeded twelve miles per day (or roughly eighteen kilometers, or thirty-six *li*), somewhat more than the thirty *li* suggested by the Han Dynasty scholar Liu Hsin. At an (impossible) uninterrupted rate of thirty *li* per day, the five hundred fifty kilometers or eleven hundred *li* from Hao to Mu-yeh would have required a minimum of thirty-seven days, only slightly longer than a leisurely royal progression from Hao to Ch'eng

Chou would soon expend. In Sun-tzu's opinion, a commander rushing forth thirty *li* in a day can be expected to suffer the loss of one third of his men, no doubt the lazy, weak, and malingerers who could not sustain the pace. ⁴⁵⁷ Whether because they proceeded at a necessarily slower rate or adopted a policy of intermittent but regular rest, alternating days on the march with brief periods of encampment, far more than thirty-seven days would have been required. ⁴⁵⁸

From another perspective, oxen have generally been deemed capable of advancing at two to three miles per hour for five hours per day or a maximum of ten to fifteen miles, a number that well coheres with the average marching speed of antique armies. More difficult terrain would adversely affect their progress, limiting the rate to less than ten miles per day or about thirty *li*, again suggesting this was the maximum feasible distance under normal conditions. ⁴⁵⁹ The campaign therefore required not just the short period indicated in the traditional records, but an additional sixty days, one full calendrical cycle, as incorporated in the account already reprised.

II

Rebellion and Its Suppression

Consolidation and the Second Conquest

Following their astonishing victory, the Chou kings were confronted with the problem of ruling an embryonic empire of disparate peoples and far-flung territories with limited military resources. Although they had enjoyed the cooperation of numerous states in the final campaign, and eight hundred reportedly gave their allegiance immediately thereafter, others had shunned and even actively opposed them.⁴⁶⁰ These enemy peoples, thousands of Shang nobility, and even their own allies had to be effectively controlled as well as smoldering rebellions quenched. As the classic military writers would repeatedly point out, even when victory is easily achieved, preserving it invariably proves difficult.⁴⁶¹ Conversely, the *Art of War* asserts that “if someone is victorious in battle and succeeds in attack but does not exploit the achievement, it will be disastrous.”⁴⁶²

Despite the many psychological explanations that might be advanced, the ability of limited numbers to dominate vast populations and control overwhelming expanses of territory, to cower people into enduring painful repression and endless shame without striking down their paltry forces, has always posed a conundrum. Furthermore, rather than being limited to the Shang, the issues integral to its conquest and occupation transcend national boundaries and specific eras. Nevertheless, it must be asked how comparatively few, albeit elite, Chou warriors could have survived in their isolated enclaves when the indigenous populace might have vanquished them if a mere ten percent had picked up rocks and vigorously struck them down.

Dwelling in an era when slaying an enemy required face-to-face combat, none of the difficulties faced by unarmed assailants confronting modern weapons would have been encountered. The bow and arrow, widely available to all parties, provided the only possibility of action at a distance. Dissident Shang fighters could have easily employed them to effect multiple assassinations and initiate guerrilla actions just as Ming patriots did during the initial stages of the Manchu occupation of China or late Ch’ing era troops could have (but did not) during the highly exposed British march inland. In the

antique era of cold weapons, men constituted a far greater threat than uncollected military equipment or dispersed arsenals.

The *Yi Chou-shu* accounts previously cited indicate that King Wu's consolidation efforts entailed significant casualties. Although numerous potential combatants were certainly eliminated, far more remained, and many previously oblivious members of the population had probably been enraged by the violence. The Chou may have come to believe in the Mandate of Heaven, but it's unlikely the conquered populace would have been uniformly persuaded of its validity, assuming they had somehow been made aware of it. Only the enticement of participatory benefits and the lure of riches, including the bronzes and jade seized in the conquest, may have motivated those who could tolerate subservience.

The Chou conquest swept away part of the ruling clique but many authoritarian structures remained and were consciously adopted and exploited. According to the *Tao Te Ching's* idealized depiction, in antiquity the sparse number of people dispersed among the small towns and villages were fundamentally oblivious to the world about them. ⁴⁶³ Forceful exactions, occasional interference by government officials, and externally imposed punishments may have still intruded upon their lives from time to time, but the ruler was incomprehensibly distant, as remote as the stars. The charges of licentiousness, drunkenness, and cruel extravagance lodged against Hsin all focused upon perversities that were being committed in luxurious settings these peripheral peoples could hardly have imagined.

In addition to the widespread but momentarily docile population, pockets of Shang loyalists, antagonistic enclaves within the central area, and numerous peripheral peoples and protostates of varying identity, loyalty, and persuasion populated the newly envisioned realm. King Wu may have obliterated several obstreperous entities immediately after Mu-yeh, lessening the immediacy of any threat, but distance and residual Shang power ensured that others on the perimeter remained beyond the ken of quick remedial action. ⁴⁶⁴ They ranged from powerful non-Shang peoples, especially the Yi and Jung, in protostates that had been nominally integrated into the Shang hierarchy and would continue to exist in the early Chou (such as Chang) ⁴⁶⁵ through Yen, P'u-ku, Hsü, and others that would become embroiled in the second conquest. Fortified towns (such as T'an-ho-li, discussed below) were also scattered about, and independent western entities such as Mei and Tse (Nieh) existed. When not simply ignored, they were powerful enough for their rulers to be awarded the honorific title of "duke" (*po*) or be referred to as "kings." ⁴⁶⁶

The Chou's expansive trajectory thus compelled the oligarchs to formulate a number of ad hoc measures intended to control the

disparate peoples they had now subjugated or otherwise attracted. The Shang conquest had been a multifaceted military event that must have consumed untold resources, both material and intellectual, and it is unlikely that King Wu or his close advisors ever enjoyed the leisure to contemplate future administrative problems. Nevertheless, it must have quickly become obvious that he could not possibly govern the empire alone, but would need some form of dispersed power, whether or not similar to the Shang's hybrid system of a core domain surrounded by external states subject to varying degrees of royal authority.

King Wu had already recognized the need for an eastern power point to control the former Hsia and Shang territories en route back to Tsung Chou. He eventually opted settled for the expedient solution of deputing three supervisors to oversee one of Hsin's sons, Wu Keng, who was entrusted with nominal authority over the residual Shang enclave, no doubt on the assumption that he would prove compliant. The king also sought to consolidate Chou rule through a number of bold political and military measures, the most important being the innovative deployment of powerful clan members and prominent warriors among both allied and dissident states, particularly in strategically critical areas. After emigrating with their family members, retainers, and at least some military forces and establishing a collateral family line, each person so "enfeoffed" would immediately assume rulership of an incipient, feudal-like Chou enclave that was essentially superimposed onto the local people. ⁴⁶⁷

The provisions and troops necessary to complete the effort were normally supplied by the central government. Once emplaced, these walled towns initially functioned as military and administrative centers but gradually assumed significant cultural and eventually economic roles. ⁴⁶⁸ In some cases, controlling the antagonistic inhabitants was the chief objective, but in others expanding the Chou domain, inserting a bastion among friendly states, or thwarting border incursions provided the motivation. Although the fiefs out at the periphery may have been defensive in intent, by their very presence they provided a base for projecting Chou power in the hinterland. Conversely, even when intended primarily for the latter, they automatically provided a defensive screen, defined the limits of the realm, and controlled interaction with external peoples, soon coming to tax trade and implement restraints.

The early Chou kings sought to impose their rule and consolidate their power through close connections with all these feudal-like lords even as they developed a sort of incipient or protobureaucracy back at the capital. ⁴⁶⁹ Their obedience was ensured by their participation in clan activities and power, including

vicariously in the tale of conquest; ⁴⁷⁰ reinforced by their military and political inferiority; encouraged by rewards and honors; and emphasized by their relative isolation, which guaranteed enthusiastic cooperation with the king's directives. The first few monarchs thus managed to control an extensive core area and impose their rule, at least temporarily and in varying degrees, in a greater arc through personal, hierarchical, and ritual connections. Although the Shang's theocratic character had been displaced by a more worldly approach, the king retained the right to sacrifice to the ancestors whose intimate involvement in state affairs initially remained necessary. He also instituted ceremonies to Heaven, no doubt because it had sanctified their revolutionary activity, further augmenting his celestial connections.

Perhaps because the Chou had emphasized that their objective was displacing the "one man" rather than annexing the realm, the architects of this solution could not have envisioned the many issues and complexities that would arise with dispersed power points. Flushed with the enthusiasm of victory, these early innovators probably never imagined they could not dominate the realm just as the Shang had managed to keep a myriad states in subservient status for centuries. Much to their consternation, many inimical factors loomed up, not all of which would be overcome.

The grand solution that emerged would gradually change over the Western Chou's several centuries and even the initial measures imposed by King Wu after the conquest were quickly altered following the suppression of the Shang rebellion. ⁴⁷¹ Because the fief lords tended to become more independent as their prosperity increased and their martial power grew, a marked shift in the original imbalance of power between the central government and the subservient protostates that had been established to control the realm in the Chou's name would also be witnessed. A few even found themselves increasingly burdened with primary responsibility for perimeter defense, a task that fiscally enervated them but simultaneously strengthened their military powers. In addition, many fiefs, sometimes estimated at twenty but probably far more, would eventually be moved almost intact when their award was rescinded or the ruling clan reassigned to other areas for political or strategic reasons.

The process of enfeoffment and consolidation continued on through the next two Chou reigns, but then regal control over the well-established states gradually weakened with each passing generation. Despite subsequent projections eastward into Shandong and northward where the state of Yen would be established after the rebellion's suppression, being centered around the capitals in the Wei River Valley and Ch'eng Chou at Luoyang, even at its apex, real Chou

authority never extended far beyond these core domains in North China. ⁴⁷²

The paucity of historical sources discussing their creation together with an almost complete lack of more than offhand references to most of the fiefs unfortunately continues to frustrate attempts to identify their locations. Even when every possible vestige has been pondered and numerous acrimonious discussions perused, the evidence proves insufficient, purported solutions remain mere guesswork, and in the absence of definitive bronze inscriptions, this situation is unlikely to change. Two laconic passages, a conversation in the *Tso Chuan* and a cursory reprise in the *Shih Chi*'s "Chou Pen-chi," provide the only listings of the early fiefs. According to the latter:

King Wu enfeoffed Lu Fu, King Chou of Shang's son, with the remnant Shang populace at Yin. To honor the earlier Sage kings he enfeoffed Shen Nung's descendants with Chiao, Huang Ti's (Yellow Emperor's) with Chu, Emperor Yao's with Chi, Emperor Shun's with Ch'en, and Great Yü's with Chi. Thereafter, when he enfeoffed the meritorious among his ministers and advisers, the Shih Shang-fu [T'ai Kung] was the first to be honored. He enfeoffed the Shang-fu with Ying-ch'iu, to be known as Ch'i; his younger brother Tan, the Duke of Chou, with Ch'ü-fu, to be known as Lu; Shi, the Duke of Shao, with Yen; his younger brother, Hsien, with Kuan; and his younger bother Tu with Ts'ai.

The "Chou Pen-chi" account, which has long served as the basic documentary source, thus explicitly asserts that King Wu enfeoffed his greatest warriors with territories that came to be named Ch'i, Lu, and Yen. It also notes that he appointed somewhat less distinguished but meritorious clan members to oversee the vanquished populace and Hsin's son, Lu Fu, to exercise some unspecified degree of authority over the remnant Yin members. Other accounts emphasize that, before he descended from his chariot, he enfeoffed the Yellow Emperor's descendants at Chi, Yao's in Chu, and Shun's at Ch'en; after descending from his chariot, he then enfeoffed the remnants of the Hsia at Ch'i and Yin in Sung, had a mound erected at Pi-kan's grave, and Ch'i-tzu released from prison. ⁴⁷³

Unfortunately, the "Chou Pen-chi" not only fails to provide any useful information about the nature of these fiefs but also appears to have compressed two stages of their bestowal into one, an initial implementation overseen by King Wu and a new surge effected after the second conquest that redeployed the critical fiefs of Ch'i, Lu, and Yen and actually established Sung as one of the final Yin enclaves. The heterogeneous nature of the initial measures is clearly visible,

supervisors being employed in the Shang heartland, fiefs being created for heritage peoples, and Chou warrior-aristocrats being appointed in other areas. A single sentence in the *Tso Chuan*, no doubt the appraisal of later ages but fundamentally correct, states that “in antiquity, being troubled that King Wu’s two younger brothers had not endured, the Duke of Chou enfeoffed family members in order to augment the [defensive] screen around Chou.” ⁴⁷⁴

The *Tso Chuan*’s list is not only more extensive but also retrospectively looks back to the reign of King Wen when the Duke of Chou is portrayed as establishing the dynasty’s foundation and initiating the Chou practice of enfeoffment: “Kuan, Ts’ai, Ch’eng, Huo, Lu, Wey, Mao, Tan, Kao, Yung, Ts’ao, T’eng, Pi, Yüan, Feng, and Hsün [were entrusted] to King Wen’s descendants. Yü, Chin, Ying, and Hann [were entrusted] to King Wu’s sons. Fan, Chiang, Hsing, Mao, Tsuo, and Chai [were held by] the Duke of Chou’s descendants.” ⁴⁷⁵

Governing the Shang remnants clearly posed complex, less-easily resolved issues. Although the highly esteemed traditional accounts claim that the people welcomed King Wu’s deposition of the tyrannical Hsin, their dismal performance at Mu-yeh might more realistically be understood as tantamount to their will having been broken. Whether the more privileged aristocrats truly felt defeated rather than just embarrassed, inconvenienced, or even relieved is another question. Coming quickly and decisively after a long preparatory period rather than through a bloody, sustained campaign of attrition that would have largely laid waste the fields and towns, the stunning victory at Mu-yeh neither vanquished nor substantially vitiated the Shang, only temporarily thwarted and suppressed their exercise of power.

No matter how strategically conceived at the outset nor operationally implemented, the assault at Mu-yeh constituted a sort of ancient decapitation strike. Although no widespread guerilla actions are recorded, twenty-first century insurgencies perhaps reflect the festering emotions that characterized that moment and the potential for sudden eruption. Assuming a realistic maximum combat loss of some 30 percent, the numerous troops that escaped unscathed or were otherwise deployed and thus uninvolved would have constituted an enormous pool of armed, disenfranchised manpower. Even though the population seems to have at least minimally acquiesced in their fate, the inevitable development of resentment, oppressive Chou behavior, or the exhortations of an indigenous leader always had the potential to rouse their latent military strength and stimulate insurgency, as their later readiness to revolt under Wu Keng attests. The absence of significant attempts to radically change the nature of Shang society or annex the remnant Shang populace provides evidence that the Chou

made a highly realistic assessment of their vanquished enemy's residual strength.

This cognizance of their lethality would subsequently be reflected in an anecdote that purportedly pitted the T'ai Kung's martial outlook against the more benign views of the Duke of Shao and Duke of Chou. Although almost certainly a product of the middle Warring States or later (because the Duke of Chou is lauded for his humanistic approach and the T'ai Kung comparatively deprecated), it still encapsulates essential issues: ⁴⁷⁶

After King Wu had conquered Yin, he summoned the T'ai Kung and inquired, "What shall we do with their *chung* (masses)?" ⁴⁷⁷

The T'ai Kung replied, "I have heard that love for someone extends even to the birds on their roof. But when you hate someone, you even hate his minions. What about executing your enemies so that none remain?"

The king said, "We cannot."

The T'ai Kung exited and the Duke of Shao entered. When the king asked what should be done, the Duke of Shao replied, "Why not slay the those who have committed offenses and let the innocent live?"

The king demurred so the Duke of Shao went out and Duke of Chou entered. When the king asked what should be done, he replied, "Have them each live in their dwellings and farm their fields. Don't change the old for the new. Approach them with *jen* (humaneness) and if the common people commit offenses then (the fault) will lie with one man." ⁴⁷⁸

King Wu initially sought to defuse their volatility by imposing minimal constraints, disavowing interference in internal affairs, and allowing the Shang to retain most of their officials and administrative structure, with the result that even the major landholding clans suffered little displacement. Despite many of the chief "evildoers" having been summarily executed, merciful and beneficent pronouncements of the type reprised below were also made to reiterate that Emperor Hsin bore sole responsibility for the Shang's downfall. (Having consciously made Virtue a banner essentially demanded this sort of conciliatory policy.)

Whether immediately after the conquest or, more probably, the ceremonies and celebrations back at the capital, King Wu is said to have ordered the emigration of an unknown but presumably small portion of the Shang inhabitants to the Tsung Chou area, most likely craft specialists and others with critical talents who could serve in a support capacity and transfer handicraft and technological skills. A far

more general redeployment of the populace, including the forced emigration of thousands of noble families, would be imposed after the coming rebellion was suppressed.

Marxist-oriented Chinese scholars have always insisted that the Shang were enslaved, much as the Chiang under the Shang and in accord with King Wu's mandate before the clash at Mu-yeh to "spare the people for use," but substantiation is lacking despite scattered inscriptional evidence showing that early kings granted as many as a thousand slaves to members of the nobility.⁴⁷⁹ The Chou was not a slave society, and despite a dual farming-warrior orientation, never seem to have employed slaves for agricultural work in the ancient Greek manner. Accordingly, apart from some portion that perhaps came to be employed in domestic tasks, many of the displaced were apparently chosen for their productive and especially administrative skills, including their literacy and previous performances as scribes or historians.

Whatever their conceptions of rulership, the Shang had always been a highly heterogeneous political entity. Apart from the subjugated peoples, satellite states, and remote groups that they believed were encompassed within the greater Shang domain, pockets of non-Shang groups including the Yi and descendants of archaic groups tenuously identified with the Hsia and earlier legendary rulers were interspersed throughout their core territory.⁴⁸⁰ Few were completely extinguished during the Chou's emergence or in the violence of the postconquest measures, but instead continued to exist in various guises and forms under the veneer of Chou authority, some even flourishing and being assigned key defensive roles.

Hsün, located near Chi-nan in Shandong, numbered among the Shang states that submitted to the Chou. Initially subordinated to Ch'i, it managed to survive through the Western Chou Period but was finally annexed by its nearby overlord late in the Spring and Autumn Period.⁴⁸¹ Among non-Shang entities, the ancient people known as the Su Shen dwelling in the northeast immediately acknowledged King Wu's victory and are even noted as having participated in the victory ceremonies that followed the second conquest. They were accorded a place of honor, and the highly specialized arrows that they presented in symbolic tribute were reportedly preserved throughout the dynasty.⁴⁸² In contrast, the ruler of the strong Shang state of Eh located at Yang-tzu-shan in the Sui-chou area of Hubei initially submitted and came to be entrusted with essentially defending the Chou's newly defined southern perimeter, but subsequently revolted and was crushed.⁴⁸³ The nearby state of Tseng similarly was accorded royal recognition and not only managed to survive Eh's demise but burgeoned.

Several of the Shang clans that capitulated early on managed to maintain their identities and cohesiveness for a century or two despite being subjected to disruptive emigration measures. The Chü, a particularly powerful one that had enjoyed close relations with several Shang emperors and had been prominent participants in King Wu Ting's expeditionary actions against the Kung-fang and again later in the dynasty against the Jen-fang, retained their strength until the middle Western Chou Period. Before gradually amalgamating with the Chou, they came to inhabit a broad area in central China ranging from Shaanxi and Gansu to the general environs of Luoyang and Beijing. Although less evident, the Ch'uo clan, which had originally been centered around Luoyang and quickly gave their allegiance to the Chou remained loyal, and rather than participating in the revolt, aided in its suppression. ⁴⁸⁴

Despite having been forced to emigrate as a group to Tsung Chou and other centers many members of those states that had willingly capitulated soon began to participate in the nascent administrative structure and contribute to the kingdom's economic activity. ⁴⁸⁵ Those who could provide important services were especially welcomed despite any lingering animosity, though some of them were no doubt compelled to accept their roles in the new order. Just as with the Chü, they often retained their cohesiveness under minimal Chou control. The relatively recent discovery of an inscribed bronze vessel known as the *Shih Ch'iang P'an* provides evidence that the Wei clan's surpassing expertise as scribes was fully utilized by the Chou for several generations.

In addition to serving as scribes and local officials (especially over their own people), some of the displaced were assigned military roles, several eventually commanded contingents as large as armies, and a few, such as Nan Kung, distinguished themselves. ⁴⁸⁶ For example, as attested by bronze vessels memorializing their rewards, members of the Chü were assigned responsibilities as diverse as serving as dog officers and as middle level commanders. ⁴⁸⁷ Members of the Wei-shih, an offshoot of the royal clan closely identified with Wei-tzu, also intermittently fulfilled martial roles for several generations after King Wu initially granted them fifty *sung* of (inferior) land in the Chou-yüan area in order that they might assist in the government. According to the *Shih Ch'iang P'an*, as early as the second generation, Ta-tsu Tsu-hsin (Tso-ts'e Che) participated in the military expedition to the south that King K'ang undertook in his nineteenth year. ⁴⁸⁸

Inscriptions from another horde of vessels recovered near the ancient Chou capital provide evidence that members of the Lu Tung clan were similarly assigned military responsibilities even though their

ancestors apparently numbered among the postconquest rebels. For example, the *Lu Po Tung Kuei* indicates that representatives from the fourth and fifth generations distinguished themselves in “conducting campaigns in the four quarters and opening the borderlands.”⁴⁸⁹ As might be expected in a fundamentally warrior culture, noteworthy martial accomplishments naturally foster the development of similar skills in succeeding generations, resulting in family specialization and military professionalization, however unintended.

Without doubt, the most prominent examples of Shang participation (and refusal thereof) are furnished by Wei-tzu and Ch’i-tzu, two disaffected members of the royal clan. Arguments and confusion persist over their exact identities, and the historical writings often intertwine the two, but Wei-tzu K’ai was apparently the eldest of Emperor Yi’s sons and therefore Hsin’s older brother while Ch’i-tzu reportedly was one of Yi’s brothers and therefore Emperor Hsin’s uncle.⁴⁹⁰ As already noted, Wei-tzu was sorely troubled by the Shang’s descent into debauchery and, realizing the impossibility of altering Hsin’s behavior, finally fled (or feigned insanity), but Ch’i-tzu ended up being imprisoned despite also having feigned madness and trying to pass himself off as a slave.

Following the initial conquest, Wei-tzu reportedly went forth in an abject posture and contritely presented King Wu with the state’s sacrificial vessels. However, despite his traitorous (from the Shang’s perspective) actions, Wei-tzu’s supposedly praiseworthy acknowledgement of the Shang’s errors and the Chou’s Virtue did not result in his being appointed caretaker over the Shang remnants. Instead, Wu Keng, one of Emperor Hsin’s own sons, was entrusted with ruling the core area that would be thereafter known as Yin-hsü.

Rather unexpectedly, their paths soon diverged dramatically, and the complexities do not end there. Although King Wu ordered Ch’i-tzu’s release from prison, Ch’i-tzu adamantly refused to consider serving another state and therefore fled to the northeast, an area that had already seen a significant influx of refugees and otherwise disgruntled people.⁴⁹¹ cursory textual statements have prompted the conclusion that King Wu (or possibly King Ch’eng after the second conquest) appointed him to oversee the indigenous population and disaffected former Shang members throughout the region. Although this may have happened before he traveled to the Chou capital to visit King Wu, an event now minimally attested by Chou oracular inscriptions, it more likely postdates the visit and therefore constitutes a sort of de facto sanction.

Tradition holds that when Ch’i-tzu had his audience with King Wu, he was queried on the causes of the Shang’s downfall but in accord with his concept of loyalty, demurred. Instead of elucidating

the Shang's errors and transgressions, he pontificated upon the essence of good government and his disquisition became the text found in the *Shang Shu* known as the "Great Plan." Unfortunately, contrary to assertions of truly antique origin, the "*Hung Fan* " ("Great Plan") is a product of a much later age, presumably the early Warring States or thereafter. The chapter bearing Ch'i-tzu's name in the *Yi Chou-shu* has also been lost and only the "Wei-tzu chih Ming" ("Appointment of Wei-tzu"), found in the *Shang Shu* , reportedly a late Spring and Autumn or early Warring States concoction that purportedly records King Ch'eng's admonitions to Wei-tzu upon conferring Sung's rulership upon him, remains. ⁴⁹² Nevertheless, evidence appears to exist for Ch'i-tzu's appointment to oversee the dispersed Shang in the area around ancient Ch'ao-hsien out on the current Korean peninsula, in which case both he and Wei-tzu essentially ended their years in the service of the Chou, contrary to protestations otherwise. ⁴⁹³

The Three Ignominious Supervisors

Despite retaining many members of the nobility and reaffirming the Chou's authority over broad areas, thereby symbolically perpetuating the Shang and ameliorating residual animosity, King Wu still minimally segmented the people to lessen the possibility of concerted action and imposed, active supervision to thwart untoward developments. Thereafter, apparently satisfied that these measures, especially when augmented by a second administrative center at Luoyang, would prove sufficient to control what he probably hoped or expected would be an increasingly docile Shang populace, he spent his last two years in the capital of Tsung Chou.

It has traditionally been believed that the greater Anyang/Chao-ko region was divided into the three administrative areas known as Pei, Yung, and Wei. Wu Keng (Lu Fu), the nominal Shang ruler, was in addition responsible for overseeing a fourth portion sometimes said to be in Chao-ko but more likely centered in Anyang, the ritual capital, which was still known as Yin. ⁴⁹⁴ According to the "Tso Luo" in the *Yi Chou-shu* , "after King Wu had conquered Yin he established the king's son Lu Fu to enable him to preserve the Shang offerings. He established Kuan-shu in the east, and Ts'ai-shu and Huo-shu at Yin, to enable them to supervise (*chien*) the Yin officials." Allowing him to continue their ritual sacrifices and act like a miniature king instead of exterminating the royal house well accorded with Chou assertions that they had not sought to destroy the Shang or seize the mandate, the Shang having lost it themselves. King Wu's three brothers—Hsien, Tu, and Ch'u—meanwhile came to be known from their fiefs as Kuan-shu, Ts'ai-shu, and Huo-shu respectively.

As all things ancient, simplicity is often a harbinger of

complexity, and four major questions have arisen over the centuries. First, whether only two or all three brothers were deputed to serve; second, the locations of their fiefs and their possible correlation with the three core areas; third, whether Kuan-shu and Ts'ai-shu exercised their supervisory functions from the comfort of their fiefs or were posted to the former Yin region; and finally—in part because the detailed meaning of *chien* is variously argued even though it clearly entails the concept of observing, advising, supervising, and controlling—the nature of their responsibilities over the nominal king and the diverse population segments.

The simplest unresolved issues revolve about Huo-shu's role and his fate. The early texts differ, but according to the *Yi Chou-shu*, all three brothers were dispatched to supervise Wu Keng. Others believe he merely played an auxiliary role, if any, because he was never awarded a specific district and no early textual evidence exists for his having participated in any way. In this view, early Han writers must have added Huo-shu's name to resolve certain puzzles, and his lack of active responsibility explains how he managed to escape with his life. ⁴⁹⁵ Alternatively, the three *chien* are seen as Kuan-shu, Ts'ai-shu, and Wu Keng himself, the latter therefore entrusted with real authority for governing his domain.

The Shang's final centuries had been marked by retrenchment and the shift of their focus eastward, resulting in both the ordinary people and nobility being concentrated above the Yellow River in the greater Anyang/Chao-ko area. Irrespective of how responsibility might have been assigned, the intent to impose a tripart division on the core domain in order to simplify supervision and preclude the remnant inhabitants from being able to undertake unified action seems incontestable. Despite the exact boundaries and even the location of the resulting "occupation zones" being uncertain, it appears the newly apportioned fiefs basically encircled Wu Keng and his territory.

One variant of their assignment envisions these Chou strongpoints on the north, east, and south effectively cutting off Wu Keng's communication with the Tung Yi to the east and the Ti in the north. However, the natural barrier posed by the largely impenetrable T'ai-hang Mountains in the west obviated any need for a major Chou deployment while yet constraining his access to other, albeit distant, northwestern peoples. In this view, Kuan is correlated with Yung, Ts'ai with Wei, and Huo with Pei, Wei being the most closely associated with Chao-ko itself. ⁴⁹⁶ Another reasonable alternative locates Kuan near the long-abandoned Shang capital of Cheng-chou, in which case it would have interceded between Tsung Chou in the west and concentrated Shang enclaves in the east. ⁴⁹⁷ After assessing and melding these and other projections, it appears Lu Fu was probably

enfeoffed at Pei or P'i to the north in the area between Chao-ko and Anyang, Kuan-shu governed Yung to the east, and Ts'ai-shu was entrusted with the crucial area of Wei. ⁴⁹⁸

It is sometimes argued that the three brothers were merely supervisors, never fief holders, and that Wu Keng continued to be the titular head; otherwise the populace would have proven intractable. Similarly, claims are occasionally made that the supervisors never left their fiefs, never even ventured into Wu Keng's domain, but (mysteriously) exercised their influence from afar. ⁴⁹⁹ The effects of this sort of laxity would of course depend upon where the fiefs were located. It would have been absurd to allocate them in the Wei River Valley area, as rarely but surprisingly claimed. But even if they were situated in former Shang territory, the travel distance would have limited the time available to investigate, not to mention intercede, in Wu Keng's diminished realm. ⁵⁰⁰

Ultimately the questions of "how" and "where" remain irresolvable, limiting analysis to articulating the possibilities and assessing probabilities. Even though the task of establishing a new government and King Wu's increasingly severe illness prevented the era's three great figures—the Duke of Chou, Duke of Shao, and the T'ai Kung—from ever dwelling in their fiefs, the three brothers had a more immediate task. ⁵⁰¹ In the context of military conquest, however decisive and surprising, it would be unimaginable for them not to have assumed authority in their assigned realms. However, no matter how their authority was constituted and exercised, the problems that subsequently arose did not stem from their laxity.

An Independent Enclave

The brief postconquest campaign period would not have been sufficient to overcome towns that were minimally fortified even if the entire week could have been devoted to aggressive actions rather than largely expended in traveling to and from their objectives. It should not be surprising that traces of formidable cities marked by highly independent cultural traits dating to the early Western Chou Period have been discovered in the noncore realm. To take but a single example, although T'an-ho-li in Hunan's Ning-hsiang district displays strong Shang and Western Chou cultural influences and integrates some Hubei traits, local factors predominate. Occupied from the late Shang through the end of Western Chou, it was neither a Shang nor Chou fief, not even an Yi enclave, but simply another distinctive, comparatively wealthy community with its own bronze-production facilities that had evolved in the shadow of powerful but distant central authority.

Being marked by unusually strong defensive measures that

display considerable engineering and construction skills, T'an-ho-li provides evidence that dedicated effort and enormous amounts of time were required to survive in the turbulent southeast. ⁵⁰² The roughly circular walls originally protected some 145,000 square meters and now encompass the junction of two minor rivers, perhaps because their courses have shifted over the intervening millennia. Being situated in a valley with surrounding hills marked by comparatively low, two-hundred-fifty-foot peaks, from inception, the city exploited the rivers for both water and defense.

The walls currently have a remnant height of one to two meters but originally rose at least three meters. Tumulus shaped, their width varies between twelve and fifteen meters, and they seem to have been laid down in four unusually thick layers that show evidence of a rather odd construction technique. A foundation layer of about one meter was capped with a fifteen- to twenty-centimeter-thick, tamped-earth layer, after which another two meters was added on top. Even though the top two layers uniformly extend across the entire width and down the slopes, in the outer third, the two lower layers were separately laid down into a U-shaped depression. Systematic differences in layer composition are also visible as the second layer down (which overspreads the entire wall) consists of an intermixture of sand and river pebbles. The third layer down in the main core is identical but, in the U-shaped dip, consists of a clay-like material. The intent and impact of these distinctive characteristics remain unknown.

The town's defenses were further strengthened by three concentric moats, one excavated outside the city and two within it. Although a few southwestern precursors employed multiple moats for protection, it was a method rarely adopted. Erecting a wall in this fashion between two moats considerably increased the defensive complexity because potential aggressors were compelled to confront two radically different obstacles—the wall's height and solidity and the ditch's watery depths—doubling the burden in equipment and effort. Archers stationed atop the wall could easily decimate enemy troops floundering in the moat or attempting to cross the killing zone with arrows while others in the town's interior might easily slay any soldiers that managed to ascend the wall and struggle across the intervening areas and subsequent twin moats.

The outer moat, which had a width of about six meters, was excavated about twelve meters from the base of the city wall, some of the soil being employed to erect the fortifications. It had an average depth of about one meter, steep sides, and a flat bottom. Within the town, the moat closest to the wall averaged two to three meters to the interior, reached fourteen and a half meters wide, and in a reversal of the usual tactical approach, was a surprisingly deep but highly

functional two and a half meters in depth. (In multiple moat defenses, greater depth was normally employed on the town's exterior to ensure maximum difficulty and drastically reduce the attacking force before they could reach the walls, whereas the intent of T'an-ho-li's tacticians seems to have been stopping any stalwarts that managed to overcome the outer defenses.) The second interior moat, obviously designed to impede anyone who eluded all previous countermeasures, was located some thirty meters from the base of the wall but had a virtually identical profile, being fourteen and two-tenths meters in width and two and a half meters in depth.

Collapse and Repression

King Wu died roughly two years after attaining hegemony over the realm but without implementing all the measures necessary to preserve the Chou's glorious new empire.⁵⁰³ As would frequently happen throughout Chinese history, he left an heir old enough to ascend the throne but too young to rule, a boy generally thought to have reached thirteen but who may have been anywhere from six to seventeen.⁵⁰⁴ In response to the precariousness of the situation, the Duke of Chou directed the government in an uneasy partnership with the Duke of Shao whom bronze inscriptions indicate played a far more important role than traditional texts suggest.

The "Chou Pen-chi" has long provided the basic account of the events: "As King Ch'eng was (still) young and the Chou had just settled the realm, the Duke of Chou feared that the feudal lords would rebel against the Chou and therefore took the reins of government. Because they were suspicious of the Duke of Chou, Kuan-shu and Ts'ai-shu, together with their younger brothers and Wu Keng, fomented chaos and rebelled against the Chou." The *Shang Shu's* "Chin T'eng" similarly states that "after the mourning rites had already been performed for King Wu, Kuan-shu and his younger brothers had words circulated about the kingdom to the effect that the duke was acting inimically toward the young child." Whether the Duke of Chou intended to indefinitely retain power or displace King Ch'eng, as often suggested (and discussed below), cannot be known, but even after discounting extensive Confucian exaggeration of his virtuous nature it would seem completely out of his character.⁵⁰⁵

The turmoil that accompanied King Wu's death spawned not only general uncertainty but also outright opposition to forcefully suppressing the rebels just as King T'ang, founder of the Shang, had reportedly experienced when he sought to initiate martial action against the Hsia's tyrannical last ruler.⁵⁰⁶ Much has been made of the "Ta Kao," a masterpiece of coercive persuasion purportedly delivered by King Ch'eng but almost certainly composed, if not uttered, by the Duke of Chou to cajole recalcitrant clan members who may have questioned the latter's actions, didn't want the dynasty to embark on

such a turbulent course so early in its life—simply sought to avoid the inconvenience of military service—or feared defeat. ⁵⁰⁷

The “Ta Kao” provides evidence that, despite being the chief architect of their political and military policies, the Duke of Chou could not initiate the campaign solely on his own authority. Even though the intriguing contents exploit the great credibility still ascribed to divination, they betray a surprising willingness to ignore prognosticatory indications when the parties are otherwise motivated. It might well be questioned how extensively divinatory results were manipulated in Chinese antiquity, yet the strength of Shang and Chou belief in their reliability has never been disputed. If it does not indicate the opposition’s strength, although unlikely in the context of the *Yi Ching*’s evolution, the “Great Announcement” (“Ta Kao”) may thus preserve an interesting contradictory strain symptomatic of divination’s increasingly perfunctory nature.

The proclamation begins by referring to “great distress in the western lands,” clearly a reference to King Wu’s death and the visible discontent of his brothers. ⁵⁰⁸ However, before reporting the findings from his oracular inquiry, the speaker carefully establishes the source’s incontrovertible numinousness. Rather than some recently acquired plastron, it was the “great treasured tortoise” itself, a sacrosanct heirloom from their years of travail. He then asserts that the indications are all positive, thereby confirming the undertaking’s validity and the certainty of successfully suppressing their resurgent enemies.

Cognizant of apparently widespread opposition, the speaker then directly assails the weakness and hesitation of recalcitrant members of the nobility who claim to be troubled by the conflict having arisen with the royal clan and cite the difficulties of undertaking a concerted military campaign that will inevitably impose great hardship on the people. (Astonishingly, they had even advocated contravening the prognosticatory indications, a misstep that allowed the speaker to cite their previous implementation of Heavenly mandated actions and advise them to be wary of transgressing Heaven’s will.) Astutely avoiding any mention of the T’ai Kung’s previous counsel to ignore plastrons and stalks at a crucial moment in the first campaign, he then closes his persuasive harangue by reiterating his belief in the power of prognostication, appealing to their heritage, and condemning their ignorance.

Although dramatically contrary to claims that the Chou was responsible for continuing the Heavenly mandate, the “Ta Kao” actually begins by attributing the Chou’s difficulties to celestial inflictions and reiterates it again later. The speaker then immediately redirects his audience’s attention by accusing the present ruler over

the Shang's remnants (Wu Keng) with seeking to exploit internal Chou dissension to not only recover their independence but also heinously subjugate the Chou itself. However, amid this swirl of negative developments the "king" also notes that ten worthy men had come to assist the Chou in their efforts as soon as their troubles began, certainly an indication of the righteousness of their path. ⁵⁰⁹

The opposition seems to have crumbled in the face of these well-crafted persuasive techniques, which is not to deny that the author may have believed in them, particularly as divination and warfare would always be closely entwined in Chinese history. With its repeated appeal to all the Chou held sacred, especially their obligation to continue the great ambition of Kings Wen and Wu, ⁵¹⁰ obey the will of Heaven, perpetuate the heritage of the ancestors, and never forget their great achievements, whenever it may have been composed, the "Ta Kao's" admonitory content provides a surpassing historical example of psychological perceptiveness.

Stalwart but Controversial Leadership

Without doubt the Duke of Chou is the most intriguing and difficult to fathom of all the participants in the rebellion and its suppression. Whatever his original intent, once he assumed power he immediately came under a cloud of suspicion in the capital and was increasingly vilified in the countryside. According to several sources, the Duke of Shao and even the T'ai Kung had doubts, the former being particularly suspicious of the Duke's motives and disagreeing with his perspective. ⁵¹¹ The Duke of Chou's explication in the "Ta Kao" apparently satisfied them both, allowing the work of government to proceed, though perhaps after a hiatus of up to two years during which he labored to suppress the rebels, following an episode in which the king learned of the Duke's earlier willingness to sacrifice himself if only King Wu would be spared.

A much debated historical question has been whether, after "seizing power," the Duke of Chou ruled as king or always maintained the fiction of acting as regent for King Wu's son who was, at most, in his early teens. A single short sentence in the previously cited passage—"As King Ch'eng was (still) young and the Chou had just settled the realm, the Duke of Chou feared that the feudal lords would rebel against the Chou and therefore took the reins of government."—has long provided the basis for this speculation. Adding to the complexity, the term *she*, which broadly means "to grasp" or "to take control of," often in addition to other responsibilities (although in later ages), may well be a concept of the Warring States Period despite appearing in such comparatively early texts as the *Yi Chou-shu*'s "Ming T'ang," which states, "*Chou Kung sheh cheng*," ("The Duke of Chou took

control of the government.”).

Some historians claim that the Duke of Chou styled himself king and planned to continue; others that he merely acted in the name of king or made announcements as king; and a few that he assumed monarchical power but then relinquished authority after seven years.

⁵¹² Despite their often-detailed natures, because none of the arguments have produced a definitive answer and the institution, even the concept of “regency,” had no prehistory at that time, the exigencies of the moment must be pondered.

To avoid the absurdities and abuses that would frequently characterize later eras when mere children would be named emperors, bringing chaos to the land and ruin to the people as the realm became enmeshed in factional struggles, a powerful tribal chief or “strongman” had to seize authority and implement policies that would ensure the nascent dynasty’s survival. Fortunately for the Chou, the finesse of ritual, concerns of lineage, and trepidation induced by propriety that would predominate in later times had not yet emerged or were ruthlessly brushed aside to cope with the all encompassing demands of necessity.

Rather than one-dimensional figures haltingly moving about in some shadow play, this drama was enacted by “big men” entangled in difficulties of their own making. Dwelling in a warrior culture in which the chieftainship had been acquiring despotic powers, the Duke of Chou undoubtedly felt compelled to remedy the power vacuum created by the king’s death and deflect the potentially fatal effects of the moment’s uncertainties. Perhaps because of the incipient conflict over the allocation of power between rulers and ministers in the imperial age and the Duke of Chou’s subsequent lionization, he has historically been deemed the architect of the Chou’s preservation. ⁵¹³

Contemporary materials rarely mention him despite his apparently crucial role in the second conquest. In contrast, even though history essentially degraded the Duke of Shao by virtually ignoring him, he is now known to have commanded forces throughout the regency and for many years thereafter. Perhaps because he was the son of a consort rather than the primary wife of the king and had no expectation of inheriting the rulership and simply wanted to deny it to his half brother, the Duke of Chou, he turned out to be a staunch supporter of regal power and the importance of primogeniture.

Based upon the “Tu Yi” section of the *Yi Chou-shu*, it has been suggested that when King Wu realized his death was near he felt that the kingship should be transferred to the Duke of Chou and divined about its appropriateness. ⁵¹⁴ Terrified at the prospect, the Duke of Chou merely shed tears and folded his hands in salute. Ironically, because King Wu interpreted—or claimed to interpret—the

prognosticatory response as auspicious, had it not been for the turmoil noted in the “Ta Kao” that probably compelled the Duke of Chou to vociferously assert he was merely holding the reigns of power in order to forge a viable clan coalition, he might well have become the next king.

For whatever reason, including recurrent animosity, the Duke of Chou’s efforts have long been portrayed as having provoked Kuan-shu and Ts’ai-shu, invariably identified as the chief instigators, to condemn his actions and eventually rise up against him in conjunction with Wu Keng, the nominal Shang ruler. Dwelling in the heart of Shang culture, the brothers may have been piqued at having been consigned to the hinterland, become annoyed at not being able to participate in central government decisions at a crucial moment, or simply were jealous of the Duke of Chou’s rapid consolidation of power. Kuan-shu, being the Duke of Chou’s elder brother and no doubt cognizant of the Shang practice of brotherly succession, may have harbored kingly aspirations despite the precedent of King Wen having designated his son Fa as heir or perhaps felt that he should have been chosen as King Ch’eng’s caretaker. ⁵¹⁵ (He may even have realized and therefore been troubled that King Wu had intended that the Duke of Chou become king following his own demise.)

Even though dissension, usurpation, and fratricide frequently recur throughout human history, this sudden disaffection when belief in the Mandate and the excitement of conquest should have been vibrantly reverberating remains puzzling and suggests a lack of unanimity may have existed among the chief participants even earlier. (This readiness to sacrifice hard won gains in violent internal squabbles, while astonishing, often recurs in Chinese history.) Vestiges in the *Yi Chou-shu*’s “Ta K’uang” and “Wen Cheng” and their appointment to key posts show that, at the outset, King Wu must have regarded Kuan-shu and Ts’ai-shu as capable men rather than villains best shunted off to some remote location in order to preclude internal strife. ⁵¹⁶ It is difficult to believe they would have preferred King Wu’s underage son to “King Chou,” even more incomprehensible that they were willing to see power perversely returned to the reviled Shang.

The lack of historical explication has long stimulated extensive speculation about their motivation and that of all the parties involved in the era’s events. Even though several individuals and a number of groups are depicted as having rebelled against Chou authority, without doubt their perspectives and interests differed considerably. As chronicled by the *Bamboo Annals*, in the autumn of King Ch’eng’s first year, “Wu Keng rebelled with the Yin.” Thus encapsulated, the initiative falls solely to Wu Keng as his supervisors go completely unmentioned.

In accord with the Duke of Chou's accusation in the "Tao Kao," Wu Keng has traditionally been understood as having even wanted to extinguish the Chou and restore the Shang. Although unknown, he may have always been arrogant and headstrong but certainly would have had to act humbly and contritely to have been awarded rulership over the shattered Shang. Moreover, notwithstanding his being a member of the Shang's highly privileged warrior aristocracy, having long cowered in his palace and concealed his resentment he is unlikely to have conceived any plans to rebel or dared to instigate overt military action by himself despite his animosity.

On the other hand Wu Keng probably required little coercion and no doubt responded enthusiastically, if unintelligently, when the opportunity arose to restore the Shang and once again dominate a portion of the realm. Visible agitation among the Shang populace and the specter of Chou oligarchic disquiet, however tempting, would probably have been insufficient if the brothers had not lured Wu Keng into participating. A disputant in the *Tso Chuan* would subsequently speak about how Kuan-shu enticed the Shang to revolt, thereby implying that Wu Keng was some sort of dupe, and adds that the effort received support from Yen and P'u-ku.⁵¹⁷ In this regard, the *Shang Shu Ta-chuan* mentions that "the lords of Yen and P'u-ku said to Lu Fu, 'King Wu has already died, the king is still young, and the Duke of Chou has come under suspicion. This is a singular moment in a hundred generations. You should initiate the [great] affair!'" Their *Shih Chi* biography states that they "pinched" (coerced) Wu Keng into fomenting rebellion.

How this actually might have occurred remains puzzling. Unless the two had been physically exercising a close supervisory role at Chao-ko rather than imposing some sort of abstract constraints from afar, it is difficult to imagine how the familiarity and trust necessary to even broach the subject could have developed. Communications at this time were also difficult and time consuming, making the sort of coalition action that brought the Shang down nearly unattainable. Ambitious, life-defining efforts such as these were not the result of three stalwart warriors convivially sitting about eating and drinking, bemoaning events and hashing out plans.

Their participation in this conspiracy strikingly belies Kuan-shu and Ts'ai-shu's ostensible concern with King Ch'eng's future, as does their willingness to risk the Chou's demise in an armed revolt. Throughout history people have not just obliviously, but willingly chosen the path of destruction by gambling the fate of what they value most rather than fall short of their objectives, even preferring to see everything destroyed if they fail. Having only recently assumed control of their newly established fiefs, the brothers probably lacked

the power required to challenge the royal forces and therefore saw no alternative to luring others into participating in some sort of massive revolt even if it precluded limiting the collateral damage.

The claim that Kuan-shu encouraged numerous Yi states to rebel when he initiated his own efforts appears justified. Texts such as the “Lu Chou Kung Shih-chia” mention that Kuan-shu and Ts’ai-shu led the Huai Yi and Hsü Yi in revolt, thereby implying that if the brothers had not enticed or led them, they would never have been entangled in the ensuing chaos. Several responded enthusiastically, but their vehemence should not be allowed to obscure the vital fact that many had never submitted to the Chou and may have only been indirectly aware of its presence despite having been deemed subjects. Claims that any of them, even the former Shang client states of Yen and P’u-ku, were interested in reestablishing the Shang Dynasty, a longtime Yi nemesis, make little sense.

In this context, Yen and P’u-ku must have perceived a windfall opportunity to profit from the forthcoming disorder and expand their domains but because the Chou now claimed authority over the known realm by virtue of Heaven’s sanction, much to their consternation they became priority targets. Meanwhile, apart from the profits that might be garnered, Hsü, Feng, and the smaller states probably did not want to remain inactive and risk being overwhelmed by momentous events or possibly subjugated by some newly risen state and therefore felt compelled to join the alliance.

The extensive conflict marking the second conquest may have resulted simply from bickering that somehow exploded, the “rebels” never having formulated any far-reaching plans or decided upon focal objectives. Although the actual events and their sequence remain murky, Wu Keng initially was probably nothing more than a pawn in the brothers’ plans, but he soon decided to exploit the growing chaos in order to shed the yoke of constraint and revive the Shang. He may have in turn then cajoled the increasingly disaffected brothers into openly revolting instead of contenting themselves with verbal protests. Rather than any one party exploiting another, it appears the three distinct groups—the disenchanting brothers, rebellious Yin elements, and the Yi states—loosely conspired to participate in a conjoined effort that would benefit each of them in accord with their own aspirations. If so, fate held a surprise because the Chou oligarchs evinced remarkable resolve, and the rebels perished for their audacity.

Absence and Retirement

A long-unresolved issue is whether, having come under suspicion, the Duke of Chou was compelled to ignominiously vacate the capital for two years following King Wu’s demise. Despite having

attracted scholarly attention for hundreds of years, hagiographic influences and the lack of definitive sources have probably consigned the matter to the catch bin of irresolvable questions. The *Bamboo Annals* and other early texts contain statements to the effect that “the Duke of Chou went and dwelt in the east,” but interpretations vary from two years of studied reclusiveness in his fief in Lu to three months in the south around Tan-yang in the nascent state of Ch’u. ⁵¹⁸ The *Bamboo Annals* add, “In autumn, amid great thunder, lightening, and wind, King Ch’eng went to meet the Duke of Chou in the suburbs,” indicating his exile ended in less than a year.

Disputants who believe that he deliberately absented himself for a full two years focus on the section in the *Shang Shu* known as the “Chin T’eng” or “Bronze Container.” ⁵¹⁹ As recounted in its somewhat dubious passages, when King Wu fell seriously ill not long after the conquest, the Duke of Chou prayed he might die in the king’s stead and had his prayer and the response to his divination stored away in a container sealed with metal straps. Thereafter, in response to the rebellion, the Duke of Chou campaigned and otherwise attempted to thwart the rebellious elements in the east for two years (rather than retiring), but doubts continued to linger in the young king’s mind, presumably prompted by ongoing slander and disaffection in the court. Not until numerous baleful omens including thunder, lightening, and wind that severely damaged the crops and trees plagued them that autumn did the king fortuitously have the coffer opened and, no doubt chagrined by his discovery, contritely acknowledged the Duke of Chou’s surpassing Virtue and sagacity. This sudden realization of his loyalty produced an immediate cessation in the perversities besetting them, confirming that the latter had been visible indications of Heaven’s displeasure. ⁵²⁰

Both the *Bamboo Annals* and “Chin T’eng ” portrayals verge well into the melodramatic because widespread doubts about the Duke of Chou’s loyalty prompted scenes of darkness punctured by flashes of lightening and bolts of thunder. These energetic manifestations would have been highly appropriate because the Duke of Chou was a tested commander and experienced infighter rather than the pussyfooted, virtuous persona he would become in later depictions. Being a charismatic leader, he would never have abandoned a political contest vital to the Chou’s future and simply retired to a fief in the east with his tail between his legs. No matter how frequently or fervently espoused by imperial age literati, the Chou court was never some idyllic parlor club of Virtue obsessed with ritual performance and deferential correctness but instead a turbulent arena seething with jealousy and suspicion. No warrior would have ignominiously shrunk from the fight and expected fate to exonerate him.

If his absence from Tsung Chou for a period of time is to be deemed factual (primarily because of statements in the *Bamboo Annals*), a realistic military explanation should be sought. The simplest turns upon the crucial, theoretical concept of manipulation and its corollary, deception, that would be articulated late in the Spring and Autumn and early Warring States periods. Rather than indulging in self-pity, the Duke of Chou may have exploited the dissension pervading the court to make a visible pretense of retirement. With one stroke he would have brilliantly defused the immediate threat of armed dissidence, thereby protecting the underage king and the state, and gained the freedom to venture eastward where he might actively conduct reconnaissance and strengthen their eastern defenses, especially in his own fief of Lu, then located in Henan. The presence of his son, Po Ch'in, who became an accomplished commander in the second conquest, attests to the emplacement of clan forces there, and some texts claim that Po Ch'in's assumption of authority prompted the actual revolt of the brothers, Huai Yi, and Hsü Jung. ⁵²¹

Given the precariousness of the situation and the king's youth, it is highly unlikely that his activities in the east would have consumed more than the year indicated in the *Bamboo Annals*, possibly far less even allowing for the thirty days required to travel out and back. Although the most reasonable sequence of events, it should be noted that the passage referring to dwelling in the east for two years has also been construed as referring to the two years of campaigning required to defeat his brothers and Wu Keng and thereby redeem his reputation. ⁵²² Despite this being less likely, it equally avoids the riddle posed by a voluntary "retirement" at the moment of crisis.

By traveling eastward, the Duke of Chou preemptively consolidated the state's military power and stabilized the political situation near the heart of rebel territory in preparation for quashing the looming rebellion. It certainly was not his only option for resolving court dissidence because he could have easily assassinated the king and claimed the chieftainship, forcing the Duke of Shao to the side, or allied himself with the T'ai Kung. Instead, he deferentially continued to claim he was simply acting for the king who presumably, albeit nominally, sanctioned his actions despite subsequently being portrayed as miffed by the experience.

Following the suppression's conclusion and Ch'eng Chou's completion, the Duke of Chou appears to have finally retired to Lu, now relocated to Shandong, whether voluntarily or under duress. It may well be that the clash between the Duke of Chou and King Ch'eng's virtual alter ego, the Duke of Shao, came to be distorted over the centuries and that his only absence from the capital (apart from when on actual military campaigns) occurred during the last two

years of his life. ⁵²³ As he grew older and became persuaded of his rights as king, the youthful Ch'eng no doubt became impatient and wished to be free not just of ministerial constraints but also the specter of an authoritarian figure whose very presence incessantly challenged him.

Nevertheless, it remains puzzling why, even after reverting authority back to King Ch'eng, the undoubtedly still powerful Duke of Chou would have so weakly chosen to vacate the capital. Unsubstantiated vestiges suggest that he may have assumed derivative responsibility for governing the eastern portion of the realm anchored by Ch'eng Chou, with the Duke of Shao exercising similar responsibility in the west. However, an ode in the *Shih Ching*, "Ch'ih Hsiao," while almost certainly not by the Duke of Chou despite its authorship traditionally being attributed to him, expresses true dismay in three powerful verses at his being unappreciated and may well reflect his dejection after a lifetime of arduous service to the incipient state. ⁵²⁴

The political question of whether the Mandate of Heaven devolved solely upon the Chou kings' commencing with King Wen or more broadly upon the Chou, construed as the body of leaders in a chieftainship structure, may have furnished philosophical grounds for debate, but the true clash was clearly over power and personality. Although this partisan conflict with the Duke of Shao marks a vital stage in the evolution of the Chou government and would become the subject of heated political and philosophical debate in later centuries between those emphasizing the role of ministers (who cite the Duke of Chou as their paragon) and those defending the absolute right and power of kings, it has little further import for Chou military history.

The Suppressive Campaign

Although no contemporary accounts now survive and arguments continue over the roles of the chief participants, enemies targeted, and sequence and length of the campaigns, without question the Chou became embroiled in a multiyear conflict to quash the rebellion mounted by King Wu's own brothers and the nominal Yin ruler Wu Keng. ⁵²⁵ Having achieved success, they redirected their suppressive campaign toward the contiguous peoples and protostates that had sought to shed the yoke of suzerainty, whether independently or in conjunction with the chief rebels. Well in accord with the concept of exploiting victory, the Chou then struck farther afield, ranging widely into Shandong and down into the southeast, defeating well-recognized, powerful states together with numerous minor peoples loosely classified as Tung Yi and Huai Yi, two groups whose members had never been reluctant to oppose the Shang and would subsequently

prove deadly enemies to the Chou.

Previously unknown campaigns were finally mounted into the south under King Ch'eng's nominal leadership, including by the Duke of Shao and Duke of Chou.

Following the apportionment of crucial new fiefs, this "second conquest" resulted in imposing a significant degree of authority over the still highly heterogeneous realm and manifesting a new awesomeness that ensured several decades of relative tranquility, just as traditionally asserted. It was not Virtue but military power that implemented the Chou vision and even the pusillanimous Mencius conceded that fifty states had been extinguished. ⁵²⁶

Indications about how the command responsibilities were apportioned still exist. Although the Chou's minor enemies were probably incapable of fielding more than a few hundred to perhaps a thousand fighters, nothing is actually known about the forces, number of battles, or casualties incurred. Nor, despite claims that Ch'u and certain others contributed to the effort, do the historical records indicate any participation by the many allies who had advanced with King Wu to Mu-yeh. This suggests the suppression effort was either an internal matter or that they had become resentful over their new, subservient status, however nominal, and lacked enthusiasm for the fight.

The next few years witnessed highly melodramatic tales of human conflict and tortuous military campaigns that extinguished states and subjugated peoples. Entangled and virtually inseparable, these two must be understood on their own terms, the former not being allowed to distort assessments of the latter. The "Chou Pen-chi" has traditionally been thought to provide the unquestioned "facts":

Kuan-shu and Ts'ai-shu, together with their younger brothers and Wu Keng, fomented chaos and rebelled against the Chou. Upholding King Ch'eng's mandate, the Duke of Chou attacked and executed Wu Keng and Kuan-shu and displaced Ts'ai-shu. From the beginning when Kuan and Ts'ai rebelled against the Chou and the Duke of Chou extirpated (*t'ao*) them required three years to be fully settled.

This virtually sacrosanct version unfortunately preserves little information other than the rebels' identities and the vital fact that three years were required to completely exterminate the miscreants. Even the scope of the chaos and the acts entailed by the rebellion lack elaboration and the suppression's initiation and all the achievements credited solely to the Duke of Chou, creating the foundation for the esteem that would be accorded to him in the imperial age. No matter how laconic, Confucius's admiration subsequently provided crucial

impetus to his lionization and Mencius similarly extolled his accomplishments by saying, "In assisting King Wu, the Duke of Chou executed Chou [Emperor Hsin] and attacked Yin. He conducted a punitive campaign against its ruler for three years and caused Fei Lien to flee to an inlet of the sea where he was slain. Fifty states were extinguished and he drove off the tigers, leopards, rhinoceroses, and elephants. All under Heaven were greatly pleased." (The threatening creatures that he dispersed should probably be understood as totems associated with the various peoples dwelling in the east and southeast, not actual beasts despite a subsequent reference to these "fierce animals.") ⁵²⁷

Mencius adds that the Duke of Chou embraced the Yi and Ti, a somewhat nebulous phrase that may mean anything from he "extended the Chou's beneficence to them" to he "forcefully subjugated them." Several other early texts also assert that members of the Yi, including several relatively powerful peripheral states that had nominally tended their allegiance, rebelled at this moment. However, there is no indication whether they actually supported the rebels or simply exploited the opportunity to gain renewed freedom from Chou strictures, the ostensible motivation for later uprisings.

Both versions of the *Bamboo Annals* agree on the sequence of events. In the autumn of King Ch'eng's first year, "Wu Keng rebelled with the Yin." The enigmatic entry that has caused considerable discussion over the centuries, already pondered above, states that, at this time, "the Duke of Chou went and dwelt in the east." In his second year, "Men of Yen and men of Hsü together with the Huai Yi entered Pei in order to revolt. In autumn, amid great thunder, lightening, and wind, King Ch'eng went to meet the Duke of Chou in the suburbs. Subsequently they attacked Yin." "In the third year the royal army extinguished Yin, killed Wu Keng Lu Fu, and shifted the populace of Yin to Wei. Subsequently, they attacked Yen and extinguished P'u-ku." ⁵²⁸ "In the fourth year, spring, first month, they first held court in the temple. In the summer the royal armies attacked the Huai Yi and subsequently invaded Yen." "In the fifth year, first month of spring, while at Yen, the king moved the ruler to P'u-ku. In the summer, fifth month, the king returned from Yen and shifted the populace of Yin to Luo-yi" and, according to the *Current Bamboo Annals*, "encamped at Ch'eng Chou."

Apart from permitting the reconstruction of a basic timeline for the rebellion's unfolding, this chronicle raises the important issue of peripheral participation. Rather than just the three supervisors and Wu Keng's having risen in revolt (as indicated by the "Ta Kao"), the important states of Yen and Hsü seem to have joined nearly from the outset. They are also said to have had the backing of an indefinite

number of peripheral clans or groups among the Huai Yi and various protostates. Vestiges of varying reliability in other early writings seem to confirm that the scope of the conflict was not limited to the Chou rebels and Wu Keng, but eventually encompassed these peripheral peoples, whether because their actions had instigated Chou reprisals or they were subsequently deemed targets for preemptive, strategic subjugation.

In another paragraph the important “Chou Pen-chi” succinctly asserts, “The Duke of Shao served as the [*T'ai*] *Pao* and the Duke of Chou as the *Shih* [strategist/commander] when they went east to attack the Huai Yi, destroyed Yen, and moved the ruler to P'u-ku.” These events unfolded after they moved (some of the) Yin inhabitants, presumably to the area of Luo-yi because Yen and P'u-ku had not yet been subjugated. The *Yi Chou-shu's* “Tso Luo” expands the list of enemies even further by stating that “the three younger brothers together with the Yin, Tung Hsü, Yen, Hsiung, and Ying revolted” and adds the much-cited information, “seventeen states and nine cities among the Hsiung and Ying clans were rectified.” 529

The Yi peoples that obstreperously confronted the Chou were probably far more individualized than extant records suggest, each of them having adopted agricultural and pastoral lifestyles in varying degrees in response to their environments and formed localized confederations in accord with their general interests. Their conflict with the Chou reputedly involved seventeen statelets and anywhere from eight or nine to twenty-six tribal groups, the former being the Tung Yi, said to be from the Hsiung and Ying clans, some of them possibly the ancestors of the Ch'u royal house and the Ch'in or those otherwise related to them, to which should be added the Yi peoples found in the Huai River Valley region. 530

Although these may only be nominal figures, especially the number “nine,” which often stands for an indefinite many, Yen and P'u-ku were powerful states, as were Hsü (said to be a Jung state, but Jung is probably a general rubric here) and, to a lesser extent, Feng. The state of Yen was located at Ch'ü-fu in Shandong, the site of a former Shang capital, just south of T'ai-shan mountain while P'u-ku, probably located slightly northwest of Lin-tzu and north of T'ai-shan mountain, would eventually emerge as one of Ch'i's capitals. Hsü, said to be an Ying clan state and probably located in southeast Shandong or in the border region of Shandong and Jiangsu rather than their final southern site in the Huai River region, would reappear as a Chou enemy and leader of nearby peoples. Feng, although largely unknown, probably developed somewhat southeast of Yen. The Hsiung, Ch'u's chief progenitors, apparently dwelt in northern Jiangsu at this time and the Ying occupied the Huai's middle to lower reaches.

Assuming the *Bamboo Annals* preserve a reasonable, albeit imperfect, account, even in the absence of battle reports and conflict descriptions, the basic sequence of events can be summarized as follows: King Wu's death, far too premature in turns of consolidating the Chou's achievements but apparently anticipated because of his illness, opened the way first for consternation and then bickering and jealousy among the brothers and other important members of the ruling clan. Seeking to quell this dissension before it tore the nascent empire apart, the Duke of Chou seized power and then formulated plans for a punitive campaign in conjunction with the Duke of Shao and other experienced warriors including the T'ai Kung.

Kuan-shu's identification as the prime instigator prompted the oligarchs to target him first, no doubt out of anger as much as the assumption that destroying the chief miscreant would cause the rebellion to crumble. If, as suggested, his fief lay southwest of the former Yin capital in the Cheng-chou area, below the Yellow River and in close proximity to Meng-chin, geography would have dictated that they attack him first when they proceeded along the very path that King Wu's campaign had followed just two years earlier. He must have been defeated late in the first year and perished, though whether through being slain, execution, or committing suicide remains uncertain. ⁵³¹

On the other hand, if his fief were in Yung and he had been exercising supervision from there, a far more tortuous route would have had to be negotiated and a river crossing completed before he could be brought under attack. After vanquishing Kuan-shu and occupying his city, the Chou armies then defeated Ts'ai-shu and either executed, exiled, or imprisoned him, thereby achieving dominance over the area about Yin. (One tradition claims Ts'ai-shu was imprisoned at Kuo-ling where he was sustained with ten chariots and seventy warriors, a rather odd chariot to fighter ratio.) ⁵³² Surprisingly, Ts'ai-shu's son was not only appointed as a high-ranking central court official (*ch'ing shih*), but also later enfeoffed at Ts'ai upon his father's death. ⁵³³ Huo-shu's fate is far less certain but he either fled, surrendered and was exiled for three years, or was vanquished. ⁵³⁴ However, if he suffered the inexplicably lenient treatment of being reduced to the status of a commoner and exiled, it may have been because he failed in his supervisory duties rather than because he rebelled.

Irrespective of his treatment, Huo-shu's elimination concluded the initial phase of the suppressive campaign and set the stage for a concerted strike on Wu Keng. As might have been expected because of their hasty reassembly, Wu Keng's forces collapsed and he fled to the north. (According to the *Yi Chou-shu*, "they again formed the army

(*shih lü*) and approached Wei to rectify Yin. Greatly shaken, Yin crumbled. Wang-tzu Lu Fu fled to the north.”) He apparently remained there until another campaign mounted under the Duke of Shao eventually ferreted him out and executed him, his only possible fate. ⁵³⁵

Had the rebellion been mounted solely by disaffected Chou clan members and aggressive Yin remnants, it would have constituted a civil war and the rebels’ defeat would have concluded the subjugation efforts. But, as already noted, several identifiable Yi states rose up in unison: “The three brothers and Yin, as well as Hsü, Yen, Hsiung, and Ying to the east then rebelled.” ⁵³⁶ More importantly, “Men of Yen and men of Hsü together with the Huai Yi entered Pei in order to revolt,” an assertion that indicates that instead of simply standing off and awaiting developments they actually contributed at least some warriors to the clash and otherwise actively participated.

Various campaign scenarios have been proposed, the most likely being the strategists followed an operational suggestion that the smaller, less powerful statelets be attacked first in order to isolate the largest one, Yen, for a concerted final strike. According to the late Warring States *Han Fei-tzu* , “When King Tan of the Chou had already conquered the Shang and was about to attack the Shang state of Kai [Yen], Duke Chia of Hsin said, ‘The great are hard to attack, the small are easy to bring to submission. It would be better to subjugate the numerous small [entities] in order to coerce the large [state of Kai].’ Thereupon he attacked the Nine Yi and Shang Kai submitted.” ⁵³⁷ Of interest here, the Duke of Chou is referred to as “king,” and the state of Kai, clearly identified as a Shang state, voluntarily submitted (even though the text can also be read as “was subjugated”), contrary to all assertions that the conflict with Kai (Yen) constituted more of a war than a simple battle.

This approach, probably the only feasible one given that distant thrusts would have to be made by independent armies that inevitably risked being cut off and overwhelmed, mirrored the incremental strategy previously employed against the Shang. ⁵³⁸ Although the early historical writings are not particularly transparent regarding the exact sequence, it seems the lesser Tung Yi statelets were initially targeted for what the “Chou Pen-chi” notes were “sudden strikes.” However, the *Bamboo Annals* states, “In the third year...they attacked Yen and extinguished P’u-ku. In the fourth year, spring, first month, they first held court in the temple. In the summer, the royal armies attacked the Huai Yi and subsequently invaded Yen. In the fifth year, first month of spring, while at Yen the king moved the ruler to P’u-ku. In the summer, fifth month, the king returned from Yen and shifted the populace of Yin to Luo-yi.”

As chronicled, Yen was attacked and probably besieged to prevent interference or counterattacks, allowing the main thrust to be directed against the Tung Yi and Huai Yi, including the state of P'u-ku. Because the *Bamboo Annals* emphatically asserts that P'u-ku was extinguished, a fact confirmed by the *Jan Fang Ting* (JC 2739), while the "Chou Pen-chi" notes Yen's ruler was subsequently moved there, only the ruler's fate remains in question. Essentially identical texts on the *Pao Yu* (JC 5415) and *Pao Tsun* (JC 6003) indicate that the *Pao* , more generally known as the *T'ai Pao* and assuredly the Duke of Shao, had been ordered to apprehend five lords (*hou*) in Yin's eastern region. Although unspecified, they are generally thought to have been Hsü, Yen, Hsiung, Ying, and P'u-ku. ⁵³⁹

In apparent confirmation the *Lü Ting* (JC 2728) records that when Kung T'ai Pao came back from attacking the "rebellious" (*fan*) Yi he received his reward at a military garrison known as Chou. Command must have been shared with the Duke of Chou, whether over an aggregate force or, more likely, separate thrusts since the *Jan Fang Ting* begins by stating, "When Chou Kung [the Duke of Chou] mounted his punitive campaign his attacks resulted in the Tung Shih [Yi], Feng Po, and P'u-ku all being destroyed." ⁵⁴⁰

Based upon these and other bronze inscriptions, these campaigns must have been largely independent and primarily conducted under the overall command of the Duke of Chou and the Duke of Shao in his role as *T'ai Pao* , apparently without any battlefield participation by King Ch'eng even though the *K'ang Hou Kuei* (JC 4059) states that after the king came back from attacking Shang-yi, he ordered K'ang-hou to begin planning at Wei. (This inscription is sometimes understood as actually referring to the Duke of Chou in his role as de facto king, but may simply refer to King Ch'eng's nominal presence.) ⁵⁴¹

The *T'ai Pao Kuei* (JC 4140) states that when the king attacked Lu-tzu Sheng and extirpated the rebels, the order for the punitive campaign had been given to the *T'ai Pao* who performed outstandingly, indicating the northern thrust against Wu Keng was conducted (at least in part) by the Duke of Shao. ⁵⁴² The *Ch'in Kuei* (JC 4041) further indicates that when the king attacked the lord of Kai (Yen), Chou Kung did the planning, suggesting he was more of a strategist than actual battlefield commander despite the references in the ode "P'o Fu" (reprised below) to his command of the victorious forces. ⁵⁴³ The king's presence in the campaign against Kai is also confirmed by the *Kang Chieh Tsun* (JC 5383), which refers to his making an award after conducting a punitive expedition against Kai.

The lesser, but still relatively significant, state of Feng also somehow became embroiled in the rebellion, resulting in its being

targeted by Chou forces. (The *Jan Fang Ting* provides the only evidence that Feng had become an objective.) Because he was termed a *po* (duke), presumably a Shang title that may have been recognized by the Chou, the ruler may have been expected to provide some sort of local leadership. Being located south or southeast of P'u-ku (Ch'ü-fu) and Yen, its defeat no doubt cleared the way for strikes on the Huai Yi.

Several texts, including the *Shu Hsü's* comments on the "Ta Kao" and the "Fei Shih," mention the Huai Yi rebellion; the former asserts that "when King Wu died, the three supervisors and the Huai Yi rebelled." These independent statelets and tribal groups located in the northern parts of Anhui and Jiangsu derived their names from inhabiting the area around the Huai River, which at that time flowed from T'ung-po-shan in Henan eastward into Anhui, then into Hung-che-hu (Hung Marsh Lake) on the border between Jiangsu and Anhui, and finally through Lien-shui-hsien in Jiangsu down into the sea. Frequently troublesome during the Shang's retrenchment, the Yi and their aggressive resurgence in the previous century may have indirectly facilitated the Chou's rise by drawing the Shang's attention eastward but certainly had little direct impact on predynastic Chou policies.

According to the *Shih Chi*, rather than the Duke of Shao or Duke of Chou, the venerable T'ai Kung was called upon to play a major role in subduing the rebels in what the "Chou Pen-chi" separately notes was a sudden strike or surprise attack (*hsi*): [544](#)

When King Ch'eng of the Chou was young, Kuan-shu and Ts'ai-shu revolted and the Yi people of the Huai River Valley turned against the Chou. So (King Ch'eng) had Duke Shao K'ang issue a mandate to the T'ai Kung: "To the east as far as the sea, the west to the Yellow River, south to Mu-ling, and north to Wu-ti, completely rectify and put in order the five marquises and nine earls." From this Ch'i was able to conduct a campaign of rectification and attack (the rebellious) and become a great state. Its capital was Ying-ch'iu.

The *Shih Chi's* appraisal no doubt exaggerates the T'ai Kung's role, expanding it from participating in the Tung Yi suppression and directing the campaigns in the southeast to include assaults on the primary rebels themselves. However, because his fief seems to have originally been in Henan rather than the area centered on P'u-ku, he would have been well positioned to initiate this campaign in the southeast.

Although unstated, from the sequence of fixing and then temporizing, it appears that Yen, rather than King Wu's brothers or

the Shang remnants, provided the most formidable opposition. Yen had been the storied site of Nan Keng's fief before he designated it as the capital upon ascending the Shang throne. Tsu Chia, who succeeded him, also dwelt there but for much-debated reasons, P'an Keng felt compelled to abandon it and move the capital elsewhere, presumably Huan-pei rather than Anyang, but the details are uncertain. ⁵⁴⁵

This prehistory of course raises almost as many questions as it resolves, including whether the Shang retained the fortified city, deputing a portion of the inhabitants or a military contingent to occupy it, or completely abandoned it as traditional writings insist. In either case normal economic growth and the refurbishment of the walls can be expected to have occurred. Furthermore, although Ch'ü-fu in Shandong, long identified as Yen's site and the locus of the subsequent state of Lu, has been relatively well studied archaeologically, no attributable ruins have been found that would help resolve the issue.

The Shang's virtually seminomadic activity remains puzzling, particularly when great effort would have been required to erect the fortifications appropriate to an intermediate capital. Tradition holds that the Tung Yi had begun encroaching upon the Shang's domain from Wu Yi's reign onward and it is likely Yen had long become an Yi bastion, the population no doubt availing themselves of whatever improvements the Shang had effected before perhaps augmenting them over the intervening centuries. ⁵⁴⁶ Whether Yen's reduction required a citadel assault remains unknown, but the need to undertake a siege would certainly explain Chou prudence in avoiding an immediate and therefore potentially entangling confrontation that could have made them vulnerable to Huai Yi attacks. Conversely, as Sun-tzu would note, leaving untouched fortresses behind while making an advance poses its own risks, reasoning that no doubt accounted for a first thrust to temporarily confine them. ⁵⁴⁷

The ferocity employed against Yen suggests the Chou leaders had been enraged by their participation in the revolt and incensed by the leadership role it had played for the Tung Yi in the east, as well as the likelihood that Yen's support had encouraged the rebels. The term most commonly used to describe their fate, *chien*, which basically means "to tread upon" or "to trample down," was early on explicated as "slaying [the ruler's] body, seizing his family, and turning his palace into a pool." Subsequent Han Dynasty efforts to minimize the brutality associated with Chou campaigns resulted in the common (but highly dubious) view that rather than being slain, the ruler was not only spared but even transferred to the ancient site of P'u-ku where he would have been kept under close supervision by the Chiang

clan that would soon be ensconced in Ch'i.

In asserting that "they went east to attack the Huai Yi, destroyed (ts'an) Yen, and moved the ruler to P'u-ku," the "Chou Pen-chi" basically coheres with the *Bamboo Annals* statement that "in the summer the royal armies attacked the Huai Yi and subsequently attacked Yen. In the fifth year, first month of spring, while at Yen the king moved the ruler to P'u-ku." However, the well-known *Shu Hsiü* claims that "after King Ch'eng attacked the Huai Yi in the east he trampled Yen and composed 'Ch'eng Wang Cheng' ("King Ch'eng's Administration"). After King Ch'eng had trod on Yen and was about to shift its ruler to P'u-ku, the Duke of Chou made an announcement to the Duke of Shao, the "Chiang P'u-ku." The Duke of Chou is therefore assumed to have composed an admonitory document, the (now lost) "Chiang P'u-ku," but may well have opposed this transfer and written it in opposition.

Several possibilities thus exist, including that the original ruler was slain and one of his sons, as in the previous case of Wu Keng, transferred to a secure site where he would be able to continue their ancestral offerings or provide the bodies that were needed to supply Ch'i's needs. Perhaps, instead of being crushed, Yen simply surrendered after having been besieged while the Chou armies conducted their far-reaching external sweeps. However, assuming that Yen's members belonged to a peripheral warrior culture, severity should not be unexpected. The capable apparently fled southward where they eventually reestablished a small but strong enclave protected by a formidable citadel, but most of the survivors were compelled to dwell under close Chou supervision in the state of Lu. ⁵⁴⁸ Assessment of their status ranges from farmers through slaves, with the most extreme (and highly speculative) concluding that the strong males were castrated and forced to serve the Chou nobility. ⁵⁴⁹ Most likely, the ruler and his family were simply exterminated but some remnants of the nobility, perhaps with a nominal chief, were transferred to Ch'i to help erect the fortifications and provide a segment of the populace.

Lengthiness and Grumbling

The chronicle preserved in the *Bamboo Annals*, statements in the *Shih Chi*, and brief comments in other early writings all concur in asserting that roughly three years, however calculated and apportioned, were required to extirpate the rebels and subdue the newly obstreperous states. For example, the *Shang-shu Ta-chuan*, written in the early Han, asserts, "Once the Duke of Chou took the reins of government, in the first year he rescued the chaos, in the second he conquered Yin, and in the third he trampled Yen." The *Pan*

Kuei (JC 4341) also mentions it took three years to suppress the revolt. However, this has not prevented claims based upon various fragments “the Duke of Chou brought peace to the land of the Huai Yi in two years,” or that the three years were expended solely on thwarting the brothers and defeating the remnant Yin forces. ⁵⁵⁰ According to the *Bamboo Annals*, a similar period reportedly had to be expended on the eastern, southeastern, and even southern expeditions, turning the initial suppressive campaign into something of an extended world war. ⁵⁵¹

Support for the shorter period is found in the dates for Ch’eng Chou’s commencement and completion. It is impossible that they could have devoted the manpower, military and otherwise, to supervising the compulsory emigration of a large portion of the Yin populace to the new site or erected the city while attempting to mount continuous suppressive campaigns in the east and south. Three years in the field, even if marked by infrequent clashes with the enemy, would have been more than enough to debilitate any army, particularly one operating under primitive logistical conditions.

Several odes have traditionally been associated with these campaigns, including “Che Hao” (*Mao* 155), “Tung Shan” (*Mao* 156), “P’o Fu” (*Mao* 157), and presumably “Lang Po” (*Mao* 158) even though the latter merely praises the Duke of Chou’s surpassing Virtue. The ode “Tung Shan” (“Eastern Mountains”) gives voice to the troops’ enervation:

We advanced into the eastern mountains
And long toiled there without returning.
When I came back from the east,
The mist fell persistently.
When in the east we were told our return was imminent,
My heart was agitated about the west.
She was making clothes for me,
For a time free of onerous military service.
A solitary caterpillar
Crawled about the mulberry leaves.
In loneliness I passed the night
Under my chariot.

We advanced into the eastern mountains
And long toiled there without returning.
When I came back from the east,

The mist fell persistently.
The fruit of the spreading gourds
May be hanging below the roof,
Sow bugs might be in the bedroom,
Long-legged spiders around the door,
Deer prints fill the stockade,
And lightning bugs flicker as they flit about.
We should not fear this,
But embrace that.

We advanced into the eastern mountains
And long toiled there without returning.
When I came back from the east,
The mist fell persistently.
Cranes cried in the foothills,
[Prompting] my wife to sigh in her chamber.
Just when she was sprinkling and sweeping our empty house,
Our campaign forces arrived!
Bitter melon had spread about,
And hung interspersed among the chestnut's branches.
A sight unseen
For these three years.

We advanced into the eastern mountains
And long toiled there without returning.
When I came back from the east,
The mist fell persistently.
A yellow hawk flew about,
Its feathers flashing.
When my wife came to be married,
In a carriage drawn by gloriously variegated steeds,
Wearing a sash bestowed by her mother,
Presents and accoutrements in great array,
The newness was blissful.
How will the maturation now be? [552](#)

The effects of long campaigning are also visible in “P’o Fu”

("Broken Axes"), in which the destruction of their weapons and tools provides a concrete image of their cumulative travail. The first verse states: [553](#)

We had destroyed our axes
And worn out our hatchets.
The Duke of Chou had punitively struck in the east,
And brought the four states under imperial sway.

Subsequent stanzas begin essentially the same but substitute "chisels" and then "clubs" (which splinter) for "hatchets." The "four states" are generally understood as the remnant Shang enclave and three supervised areas, with the Duke of Chou's objective having been to bring them into submission, a task he is portrayed as performing with great sorrow and thus compassion. [554](#)

Although certainly not definitive, given the enervation expressed in these poems and the reticence, even outright refusal, of exhausted armies, even successful ones (such as Alexander's) to proceed beyond a certain point, it seems likely that any additional efforts were separately mounted after the construction of Ch'eng Chou, probably under King Ch'eng's aegis. Certainly the missions to the south (described below), subsequently conducted by the Duke of Shao and Duke of Chou as separate efforts, were never integral to the immediate task of rebel suppression.

Postsuppression Measures

The historical vestiges that depict the second conquest convey a sense that rather than simply resolving internal strife or engaging in a civil war, a “world war” had been fought over a major portion of the contiguous terrain. Chou military forces did not just suppress recalcitrant elements but also succeeded in imposing a greater degree of control over the realm, enabling the government to embark on a vigorous program of consolidation despite the continued existence of heterogeneous elements and unsubmissive pockets. Even if not yet fully actualized, their dream of dominance had now become achievable. Radiating out from Shaanxi, Chou control stretched into southern Hebei in the northeast, out to Shandong and Po-hai in the east, across Henan, and down to northern Hubei, Anhui, and Jiangsu in the southeast. Despite unsubstantiated claims of southern campaigns having been mounted, ⁵⁵⁵ the south remained hostile territory, but Shanxi fell well within their purview. Not counting any coalition forces, the Chou may have fielded as many as five independent armies in order to realize these results.

Insofar as the Chou had certainly been unable to impose many taxes, labor obligations, or ritual constraints during King Wu’s short, two-year reign, the so-called rebellions of the Tung Yi and Huai Yi probably amounted to the more powerful groups and protostates refusing to acknowledge Chou authority. Despite not having deployed any forces in this area nor having established any peripheral fiefs that had come under attack, Chou leaders were sufficiently inflamed by what they perceived as the Tung Yi and Huai Yi’s presumptuousness to target them for military action. So immersed in their quest for domination, so enraged that others had failed to accept Heaven’s mandate, the oligarchs were willing to wage battle far afield, contrary to their long-avowed policy of accommodation.

Whether the Shang revolt had been mostly verbal, centered on the person of Wu Keng but with little armed support, or had involved numerous members of the warrior nobility and whatever military forces had been reconstituted to ensure tranquility after the first conquest, remains uncertain. King Wu’s brothers must have mobilized

their troops but apparently waited to be attacked instead of seizing the initiative and forcefully acting. Wu Keng similarly remained passive, suggesting he had become saddled with groundless claims that he was seeking to restore the Shang and displace the Chou when he had merely been voicing his displeasure and rejecting continued Chou dominance. As no egregious or aggressive actions are recorded—and it is hard to imagine they would not occupy a prominent place in the historical records, given their contravention of the newly sacred order—Wu Keng's ambitions must have greatly exceeded his strategic competence.

Assertions that the subsequently well-known Eight Yin Armies had already been created from remnants of the Shang forces and therefore participated in the revolt, perhaps furnishing the key forces under Kuan-shu and Ts'ai-shu, are highly questionable. The leniency of postconquest Chou measures and the large number of people shifted to other enclaves also suggest a limited scope to the rebellion rather than a widespread uprising that would have entailed the complete destruction of Shang society and its infrastructure.

Chou mastery was eventually reimposed, but the second conquest had once again failed to preclude future threats because the root cause, the residual power of the Shang nobility, had merely suffered further erosion and not been annihilated. Although the Chou may well have been able to decimate their enemies, the Yin were spared severe penalties because the Chou lacked the military might to thoroughly repress or enslave them without precipitating a death struggle. Yet several *Shang Shu* documents, especially admonitions directed to the Yin populace, condemn their continued rebelliousness and defiance. Without doubt, a combination of assertive solutions was required, no single measure being adequate.

In addition to removing a number of surviving Shang leaders from office and transferring authority to Chou officials, a dual, reward-and-punishment approach was implemented, verbal emphasis falling upon the former and severity marking the latter. They were threatened with draconian punishments if they failed to reform and comply, but guaranteed relative freedom, the preservation of their lands, maintenance of their positions, participation in the government, and opportunities for prosperity and advancement if they cooperated. Despite their heinous actions, instead of their being enslaved or exterminated, much of the Shang population was redistributed across the land, including several thousand important families who were forced to emigrate to the new capital near Luoyang, thereafter termed Ch'eng Chou, where they could be adequately supervised and controlled. ⁵⁵⁶ Rather than built by Chou conscripts, Ch'eng Chou was constructed by the Shang populace as a deliberate form of punishment

as much as a necessary labor measure. Once completed, the Duke of Chou gave an address known as the “Tuo Shih” that emphasized Chou’s leniency in allowing them to retain numerous privileges despite their odious behavior, decried the performance of their former officials, and again adjured them to adhere to the strictures being imposed. The “Tuo Shih” commences by reiterating that the Chou had a Heaven-mandated obligation to conquer the Shang: 557

You many remaining officers from Yin, do not mourn for it. August Heaven has visited great destruction upon Yi. We of the Chou were tasked with assisting [the implementation of] the mandate, to clearly manifest Heaven’s awesomeness and impose royal punishment, bringing about that Yin’s mandate concluded with Emperor [Hsin]. You many officers from Yin, [know that] it was not that our small state dared aspire to Yin’s mandate, only that Heaven would not succor the lost nor solidify the chaotic but assisted us. How would we have dared seek the throne ourselves? It is only that Ti did not sustain you, that our people below acted conduively in fear of Heaven’s illustriousness.

The next section, here omitted, revisits the tale of the Shang conquest of the Hsia, itself made possible because the last ruler of the Hsia refused to reform and Heaven had charged King T’ang, the Shang’s founder, with extirpating the primary source of perversity. The duke then goes on to strongly justify the Chou’s usurpation of the mandate in similar terms:

You many officers of Yin, our king of Chou now possesses the great numinosity to continue Ti’s affairs. The mandate said “Sever Yin” and we proclaimed Ti’s charge. Our intent was singular, directed solely against the Yin royal family. I say to you that it is only that you have acted beyond all constraint. We did not instigate these affairs, they arose from within your city. I also recognize that Heaven has already inflicted great calamity upon Yin so we are not taking further punitive measures.

I tell you, you many officers, I accordingly transferred you to the west. This was not because I, the solitary man, presumed it to be virtuous to not remain tranquil and peaceful but only because Heaven mandated it. Be without transgressions! I did not dare neglect anything, do not be angry with us. Well knowing that your ancestors had bamboo strip records and compilations about how the Yin changed Hsia’s mandate you have now been saying that members of the Hsia were selected for positions in the king’s court and served among the hundred officials. I, the solitary man, only heed and employ the virtuous. Accordingly, I ventured to

seek them out in the “Heavenly city of Shang” 558 and have continued by having compassion on you. I am without offense. It is simply the mandate of Heaven.

You many officers, earlier when I came from Yen I broadly proclaimed my edicts among the people of your four states. I then conspicuously applied Heaven’s punishment and moved you to distant places. Here you may act as officials for our clan if you are submissive.

I proclaim to you, you many officers of Yin, I am not going to slay you but instead again announce my edicts. We have now raised a great city here at Luo because there are places within the four quarters that remain unsubmissive. Therefore you many officers should be submissive and hasten to act as subjects with the greatest sincerity. Then you will retain your lands, be able to dwell in tranquility, and able to pursue your affairs. If you can be respectful Heaven will sustain your affairs and have compassion on you but if you are not capable of being respectful, you will not only not possess your lands, I will impose Heaven’s punishment of your persons. Now you can continue to reside in the towns in which you now dwell, and your children as well, all arising from your being shifted here.

Well in accord with the Chou’s historically depicted concept of Virtue, the Duke of Chou’s pronouncement encapsulates their dual policy of constrained containment and soothing pacification. Intended to justify and persuade, yet fraught with implications for their own people, it sought to convince the Shang survivors of the inescapable necessity of submitting to the manifest will of Heaven. The formulation and delivery of this message well recognized that battlefield victory alone, however dramatic and severe, may lack the psychological impact necessary to ensure docility, particularly when the vanquished attribute the defeat to poor leadership and blithely deny the severity of the repercussions. It thus stands as evidence that the concept of subjugating the enemy’s intent had already emerged.

The same basic contents are found in several other pronouncements including the “Tuo Fang” delivered by King Ch’eng at Hao after the rebellious Tung Yi had been suppressed, the “K’ang Kao” intended to instruct King Wu’s younger brother Feng before his enfeoffment at Wei and thus ostensibly intended for internal consumption, and even the “Chiu Kao.” Supposedly a relatively authentic document, the “Tuo Fang” again stresses the importance of Heaven’s will, the latter having previously been revealed when the last Hsia ruler failed to heed Heaven’s transcendent indications and continued his perverse ways until chastised by King T’ang, paving the

way for the Shang's ascendancy. The speaker similarly asserts that despite having received lenient treatment, the Yin have not appreciated Chou beneficence, responded with sincere obedience, or given their allegiance. Upbraiding their officers for their remissiveness and the people for lacking harmony, he further warns that Chou tolerance is nearly ended, but not without again extending the promise of prosperity if they are willing to cooperate, thereby somewhat ameliorating the harangue's severity.

The "K'ang Kao," dated to the period of Ch'eng Chou's completion and widely believed to be one of the more authentic early documents, reiterates that Heaven had responded positively to King Wen's administration and therefore "given King Wen a mandate to slay the majestic Yin." ⁵⁵⁹ Although certainly a highly assertive pronouncement, it still contains an essential behest to cooperate formulated in terms of their heritage by extolling the excellence and efficacy of the former Shang kings. However, despite their not having suffered a wrenching imposition of Chou law and instead being allowed to retain Shang laws and customs, the people are accused of being "unsettled" ("*pu ching* "), a situation deemed highly unacceptable.

Even though the actual measures and restrictions remain unknown, the "K'ang Kao" reflects the Chou's conciliatory policy and multifaceted approach, one that studiously refrained from imposing disagreeable foreign practices and values that could cause further consternation. Certainly the Shang's laws, long the object of the people's hatred and a proclaimed cause of Heaven's displeasure, would have been strict enough to ensure a docile populace and if the grumblings arising in the peripheral southeast serve as an indication, their labor burdens may have been extensive and the other impositions severe. ⁵⁶⁰

Finally, the "Chiu Kao" or "Proclamation on Liquor" previously mentioned and ostensibly directed against excess is actually a strong propaganda piece. ⁵⁶¹ Intended to deflect rampant antagonism away from Chou administrators onto Hsin and his coterie, it not only demonized the late emperor but also asserted that his indulgence and brutality stemmed from immersion in drunkenness. Liquor is said to have distorted his judgment, causing the dynasty to lose the mandate. Accordingly, the Shang perished not because of the Chou's revolutionary activity (which would have otherwise contravened Heaven), but because of this collapse, because the Shang dropped or let the mandate (*ming*) fall. ⁵⁶² The Chou were therefore compelled to take severe action, to extinguish the Shang, though they allowed them to retain the social and aristocratic structure that had prevailed prior to the conquest. ⁵⁶³

Chou suppressive efforts were not limited to admonitory pronouncements and the forced emigration of a portion of the people to Ch'eng Chou. Artifacts recovered from the capital region attest that many more families with specialized skills (rather than the common people or farmers) were again moved to the Hao/Feng capital region, some of whom then provided important services to the Chou court, including acting as scribes and eventually even military commanders. 564 Much as Sun-tzu would subsequently advise, the remaining populace was segmented and dispersed in what might be termed a second round of enfeoffments, resulting in heterogeneous enclaves consisting of Shang remnants of varying backgrounds, indigenous people, and a Chou overlay, often concentrated in localized distributions. Many came to fully embody classic Chou culture, but others, especially the more widely dispersed and isolated, were heavily influenced by indigenous expressions, resulting in unique identities that persisted well into the Spring and Autumn Period, when strife began to foster further diversity. 565

It has traditionally been claimed that the Chou adopted many Shang rituals and administrative institutions, including in the military sphere. Although these assertions are as much, if not more, assumption than attested facts, without doubt the Chou early on imitated the Shang's sacrifices to their ancestors, including by slaying many important prisoners seized in the first conquest. Whether they employed the same form of military organization or simply evolved their own component elements and hierarchy over their centuries of strife with contiguous peoples continues to be debated and requires separate discussion. However, insofar as warrior cultures invariably have to confront similar challenges and situations when undertaking campaigns and engaging in battle, many of their practices, whether imitative or derived from common human experience, inevitably exhibit extensive commonality. 566

Continuity is especially visible in religiously tinged rites such as announcing military expeditions before the ancestors, divining a mission's auspiciousness, assessing its prospects for success in the temple, appointing commanders and charging them with their duties, reporting victory to the ancestors, presenting prisoners and plunder, rewarding successful efforts, training the troops through hunting activities and holding other forms of review, formally standing down after the effort, establishing camps, and possibly carrying spirit tablets for numinous effect. (The massive hunt held after the victory over the Shang played a prominent role in the Chou's postcampaign rituals.) Even though the fiefs would eventually be ordered to contribute forces or undertake military missions, the Chou no longer practiced the Shang method of levying forces for external campaigns. 567

Influenced by stimuli from several sources including their own historical heritage, the Chou soon evolved new cultural practices and King Ch'eng's era saw many Shang values and predispositions neglected or consciously abandoned. Although the institutional and ritual practices recorded in the late Warring States compilation known as the *Chou Li (Rites of Chou)* cannot be attributed to the Duke of Chou, claims by Confucius and later thinkers that he was instrumental in transforming past practices appear to have considerable basis. ⁵⁶⁸ Of particular import, the Chou quickly reduced the number of sacrificial animals used in various rituals, abandoned the use of human victims and the practice of interring people with the deceased (though it persisted to some extent in the Shang enclaves), and rejected the possibility of offering sacrifice to anyone other than one's direct ancestors. ⁵⁶⁹

The Fiefs and Their Function

Although a number of former Shang protostates and subject peoples, many of whom had acknowledged the Chou as the realm's legitimate rulers and remained loyal throughout the rebellion (such as Su Shen), were left essentially undisturbed, the eastern terrain was significantly revamped both authoritatively and administratively. Several major states were created, others reconstituted, and a number of minor entities established that would be increasingly differentiated over time because of their internal dynamics despite having been highly similar in intent and in the number of forces allocated at their emplacement. Some had vigorous founders, others simply clung to life for a brief period before being subverted from within, withering away, or being absorbed, violently or not, by more vigorous polities. Whether due to an impetus at inception or the ongoing stimulus of local factors, several would assume crucial military roles in the forthcoming centuries.

In brief, major reforms saw K'ang-shu Feng enfeoffed in the former Chao-ko/ Anyang region, which was thereafter called Wey; the T'ai Kung's fief of Ch'i was shifted to the old P'u-ku area; ⁵⁷⁰ Po Ch'in was formally invested with the reconstituted state of Lu; the Duke of Shao's son assumed residence in the newly established northeastern state of Yen; and Sung was created as an enclave for Shang remnants and the royal family. ⁵⁷¹ In addition to their fundamental role in controlling the remnant Yin population and other groups in the region, these new fiefs defined the still indistinct perimeter and seem to have been generally expected to repel incursions as well as provide troops for external campaigns. The so-called Eight Yin armies were probably also organized about this time and stationed in Wei, which had been cobbled together from the three rebellious fiefs of Kuan,

Ts'ai, and Wei.

Shang clans that had not been deported to the capital region or shifted to Ch'eng Chou were apportioned among the three incipient states of Sung, Wei, and Lu. Nominal successor to Wu Keng's fief of Yin, Sung essentially became a much-vitiated Shang state under Weitzu, one of Emperor Yi's sons. ⁵⁷² Whether out of expediency, superstition (synonymous with being afraid of ending the Shang sacrifices, a psycho-emotional factor rendered even more complex by the Chou royal house's close relationship with the Shang emperors), or a desire to once again show their intent had been benign, a miniature Shang kingdom continued to be preserved. For centuries, this heritage would be widely recognized, sometimes disparagingly because they represented the fragments of a failed dynasty, but sometimes positively when the virtues of earlier ages were extolled and preeminence claimed at conclaves and assemblies.

Thirteen major clans were dispersed between Lu and Wei, two states that would enjoy great longevity but digress significantly in character over the succeeding centuries. ⁵⁷³ The "Chou Pen-chi" succinctly states, "He widely gathered the remnant Yin populace and enfeoffed King Wen's youngest brother Feng (with them) as K'ang-shu at Wei." The old capital region of Emperors Yi and Hsin, Wei became home for seven Shang clans: the T'ao, Shih, Fan, Ch'i, Fann, Chi, and Chung-k'uei. As already noted, the "K'ang Kao," supposedly composed just prior to Kang-shu's enfeoffment, shows that the Chou conspicuously pursued an ameliorative policy. Given the disproportionate population figures, it doubtlessly stemmed from the need to minimize friction and preclude the sort of guerilla actions zealously pursued by defeated peoples in recent decades worldwide. Contrary to persistent (Marxist) claims that the Shang were enslaved, the pronouncements are also consistent with a conscious policy to integrate the remaining inhabitants into the Chou's new world order rather than oppress and exploit them.

Lu, originally awarded to the Duke of Chou who apparently never had the leisure to dwell there—even his son Po Ch'in did not venture there until King Ch'eng began to exert authority—had originally been located in Henan but was now reconstituted in Shandong and formally assigned to Po Ch'in because he had distinguished himself in the repression campaign. Two early Han texts contain a story that purportedly illuminates the Duke of Chou's attitude toward the incipient state's future: "When the Duke of Chou performed divination about inhabiting Ch'ü-fu, his charge to the turtle stated, 'If we establish the city on the southern side of the mountain, if they are worthy it will flourish; if not, they will quickly perish.'" ⁵⁷⁴

A total of six clans with their chiefs and subordinate families,

perhaps totaling somewhat more than the estimated twenty-five hundred Chou members, were allocated to Lu: the T'iao, Hsü, Hsiao, Suo, Ch'ang-chuo, and Wei-chuo. Remnants from Yen continued to inhabit the area from the outset so the population consisted of three distinctive groups—Chou, Shang, and Yen—each with their own rituals. ⁵⁷⁵ Being situated in an ancient, pre-Anyang Shang capital seems to have been especially conducive terrain to preserving old Shang customs, even their original altars, perhaps explaining Confucius's empathy with the Shang since he was reputedly a man of Lu. ⁵⁷⁶

Several of the major postconquest fiefs were established at significant geostrategic locations including the confluence of rivers, intersections of incipient transport and travel routes, access paths to mountain passes, and other points that might control vital resources. Much as Shen and Han late in the Western Chou era, Lu appears to have been tasked with responsibility for actively defending the perimeter against external peoples, primarily the Huai Yi and Hsü Jung, rather than just exercising control over the subjugated. The ruler had comparatively exalted status, and the nearby small states of Ts'ao, T'eng, Chi, and Chu continued to pay homage to it into the Spring and Autumn Period.

The *Shih Chi* succinctly states that Yen was created when “When King Wu of the Chou exterminated Chou [Emperor Hsin] and enfeoffed the Duke of Shao at Yen.” ⁵⁷⁷ His appointment seems to be confirmed by at least three bronze inscriptions that either state or indicate that Yen was established to honor the *T'ai Pao*, the *Hsiao Ch'en X Ting* (JC 2556), *K'o Lei*, and *K'o Ho*. Plastron fragments the *T'ai Pao* had employed to divine about Ch'eng Chou's auspiciousness have also been found at Liu-li-ho, providing further evidence of the Duke of Shao's inherent connection with Yen. ⁵⁷⁸

The political situation at the time suggests Yen's occupation would probably not have been feasible until King Ch'eng (or the Duke of Chou) began the next wave of consolidation measures after the second conquest. (Any forces deployed to Yen prior to the rebellion could have easily mounted a pincer attack on the brothers.) Tradition holds that the *T'ai Pao* remained in the capital throughout his life while the inscription found on the *K'o Lei* can be interpreted as an unknown king making K'o, one of the duke's sons, the first *hou* or lord, in which case he would have assumed the actual rulership. ⁵⁷⁹

The original site is now thought to have been slightly southwest of Beijing in Pei Tung-chia-lin Village, in the town of Liu-li-ho, in the modern district of Fang-shan, out on the northern Hebei plains north of the Yellow River's present exit to the sea and thus well above the core cultural area. ⁵⁸⁰ Destined to survive for another eight hundred

years until Ch'in extinguished it in 222 BCE, Yen is said to have been essentially a miniature replica of Ch'eng Chou but, having apparently been erected by the late Shang as a northern bastion, actually preexisted the Chou conquest.

Even after its reestablishment, Yen continued to encompass a highly disparate populace. The *K'o Lei* indicates ten distinct groups, including the Shih, Ch'iang, Ma, and Yü, were allocated to Yen's domain but members of other groups that inhabited the contiguous northern and southeastern areas (including Po-hai) continued to have a minor presence. A few important Shang clans were also intermixed, many of whom apparently managed to retain their identities for several generations. ⁵⁸¹

Their being located on the fringe of the steppe in a semi-arid area, the inhabitants had long intermixed agriculture and pastoral practices. Horses were being bred there, ensuring a ready supply of tractive power for Yen's increasingly important chariots. Situated near the Ta-shih (Liu-li) River, the capital itself occupied a strategically advantageous position and could easily derive the water needed for the moat that protected the remaining three sides.

Recently uncovered wall remnants reveal that the fortified city employed a conjoined wall-and-moat system for its defense and had the character of a military citadel. ⁵⁸² The walls were a relatively narrow eleven meters in width, but the moat spanned a significant expanse of twenty-five meters. The northern wall seems to have had a length of about 830 meters (compared with Ch'ü-fu's thirty-five hundred and Ch'eng Chou's twenty-nine hundred) but the true extent of the eastern and western walls has yet to be determined beyond an apparent three hundred meters each. However, based upon common shapes and normal proportions, they should have been a minimum of six hundred meters, possibly even eight hundred to a thousand. The earliest parts are said to date to King Ch'eng's reign.

Built from layers of tamped earth—some board marks are still clearly visible—the northern wall now displays a remnant height of seven-tenths of a meter but was certainly at least double that originally. Reports indicate all the fortifications were constructed without digging and layering any foundation trenches. In the context of many centuries of highly specific engineering practice and the almost universal use of tamped earth foundations, the trenches' absence suggests comparative haste in the wall's erection, just as might be expected when a military outpost is established in a troubled area. Nevertheless, they were still substantial enough to deploy significant defensive forces atop them.

Positioned about three and a half meters from the wall's outer perimeter, the moat is marked by a fiendish configuration that would

have surprised aggressors. After wading an initial ten to eleven meters in water just one meter deep, anyone still proceeding inward would have unexpectedly encountered a 2.8-meter-deep pit with a width of about 3.2 meters. Thereafter, the moat suddenly became shallower, the ledge looming beneath, returning to a two-meter depth, after which the bottom gradually sloped upward over the last eight meters until measuring about one meter at the interior edge. Even the relatively shallow portions thus posed a significant obstacle to warriors who managed to avoid drowning in the slightly more than nine-foot-deep pitfall, and the contour indicates it was designed by an experienced military mind.

Finally, King Ch'eng conspicuously enfeoffed the T'ai Kung in the east, ostensibly to reward his unsurpassed contributions but more likely to provide a strong bulwark against the Tung Yi; thwart incursions by hostile peripheral peoples who might threaten the newly established, still tenuous Chou state; and perhaps remove a powerful nonclan member from the ruling councils. As the *Three Strategies* would advise, ⁵⁸³

When the soaring birds have all been slain good bows are stored away. When enemy states have been extinguished ministers in charge of planning are "lost." Here "lost" does not mean that they lose their lives but that [the ruler] has taken away their awesomeness and removed their authority. He enfeoffs them in court at the highest ranks of his subordinates in order to manifest their merit. He presents them with excellent states in the central region in order to enrich their families and bestows beautiful women and valuable treasures on them in order to please their hearts. ⁵⁸⁴

Now once the masses have been brought together they cannot be hastily separated. Once the awesomeness of authority has been granted it cannot suddenly be shifted. Returning the forces and disbanding the armies are critical stages in preservation and loss. Thus weakening [commanding generals] through appointment to new positions, taking [their authority] by granting them states, is referred to as a hegemon's strategy. Thus the hegemon's actions incorporate a mixed approach [of Virtue and power].

Located in the northeast where they had to dominate a strong but fairly late Shang presence, confront hostile peoples, and deflect numerous threats originating on the steppe, Ch'i soon waxed powerful under the stimulus of unremitting stress coupled with governmental measures designed to enhance the people's welfare. ⁵⁸⁵ Their rapid

ascendancy prompted Ssu-ma Ch'ien to comment:

The Grand Historian says: "I went to Ch'i. From Lang-yeh which belongs to Mount T'ai north to where it fronts the sea [it covers] two thousand *li* of fertile land. Its people are expansive and many conceal their knowledge. It's their Heaven-given nature. Taking the T'ai Kung's sagacity in establishing his state, isn't it appropriate that Duke Huan flourished and cultivated good government and was thereby able to assemble the feudal lords in a covenant. Vast, vast, truly the style of a great state!"

Evidence for Ch'i's existence has recently surfaced with the discovery of an ancient fortified town at Ch'eng-chuang in Shandong. 586 The earliest known Shandong site of this type yet investigated, its square shape and relatively small size of roughly 180 to two hundred meters per side, give it all the characteristics of a military bastion. Although not as wide as many early manifestations at just 5.2 to seven meters along the top and nine to ten meters at the base, the walls would still have presented a strong defensive profile to aggressors. Remnant heights of 0.4 to 1.28 meters suggest they were probably at least one and a half to two meters high and could only be accessed by negotiating a conjoined moat of some 3.3 meters with an adequate depth of 1.2 meters, and whose sides were somewhat laddered though the bottom was simply rounded. The city's initial manifestation had but a single moat but two others were added over the course of its existence to create an even more formidable defensive system.

Even though there is no disagreement over its identification as an extremely early Ch'i site, the usual controversy marks efforts to further pinpoint it. 587 Possibilities that present themselves include a Ch'i fief town, the first capital of Ying-ch'iu, and the second capital of P'u-ku, which apparently was occupied only briefly before the ruler moved to Lin-tzu. Erected very early in the Western Chou Period and inhabited until being abandoned for unknown reasons around the middle or slightly later, its conspicuous martial character and limited size suggest it must have served as a military bastion just after the second conquest campaign. Given the hostility of the indigenous people, it would be unreasonable to expect that an initial site, whether a simple strongpoint or first capital, would attain the dimensions marking the great Shang cities or even Ch'eng Chou.

Accordingly, arguments that such paltry beginnings could not possibly have marked Ch'i's establishment and that Ch'en-chuang must therefore have been some sort of early fief town are unfounded. Conversely, because Ying-ch'iu was established in the aftermath of widespread eastern conflict and the T'ai Kung continued to experience opposition from the Lai (who were generally located further

eastward), a bastion of this size would not only have been feasible but actually essential to protect a small clan force and begin imposing administrative control over the immediate area. However, P'u-ku continues to have proponents because of its limited size and one of the inscribed vessels indicating the central government had appointed the military commander, perhaps consonant with the reassertion of royal control, after executing Duke Ai. ⁵⁸⁸

Bronze vessels recovered from the site that include references to "Ch'i Kung," the Duke of Ch'i, and an (unfortunately undated) chariot pit with three chariots, two of which harnessed the four horses appropriated only to the highest-ranking figures, attest to the T'ai Kung's appointment as ruler of Ch'i and its establishment as a military colony immediately after the second conquest. These discoveries and references in early bronze inscriptions clearly disprove assertions that the T'ai Kung never existed except as a literary trope and show the hollowness of Confucian disparagement over the centuries.

Ch'eng Chou's Establishment

The literary records portray King Wu as a foresighted leader who was immediately troubled by the trend of historical events rather than just caught up in the euphoria of victory, even one achieved after many arduous decades. ⁵⁸⁹ Shortly after the conquest he reportedly ascended a nearby hill or low mountain variously said to be on the perimeter of the devastated Shang capital (as would be most likely) or back at the old Chou capital of Pin (in which case his contemplation would have had to be purely abstract) to exploit the vantage point. Thereafter, continuing to be troubled by the Shang's abandonment by Heaven despite its highly auspicious beginnings and numerous sagacious leaders, he was unable to sleep even in the comfortable bastion of Tsung Chou.

Pondering the precariousness of the Chou's newly won superiority, he concluded that Virtue and leadership by exemplary men were insufficient and that the Chou would need an eastern bastion in the center of the world, the very crux of culture, that could dominate the realm as well as restrain the troublesome peoples. Various extemporaneous measures were quickly instituted to ensure the Shang remnants remained submissive, but lacking extensive resources, the nascent dynasty had to emphasize government by expedience. Even though they had already constructed several capitals, the eastern project could not be initiated before King Wu's precipitously declining health ended in his death.

Apart from the fundamental operational military issues posed by Feng and Hao's geographic isolation, the violent revolt and its aftermath redirected attention to the difficulty of administering their

widely expanded but still tenuously held domain from within Kuan-chung's confines. The youthful King Ch'eng has traditionally been credited with reviving King Wu's strategic intent, but the impetus must have come from the era's real leaders and subsequently the chief directors of Ch'eng Chou's erection near Luoyang, the Duke of Shao and Duke of Chou. The inscription on the *Ho Tsun* (JC 6014), a bronze vessel attributed to King Ch'eng's fifth year, confirms that King Wu formulated the initial vision, and the texts indicate that he even planned the city's layout on site, but the exact contributions of the other two figures are less obvious.

A number of discrepancies exist in the various accounts of the divining, planning, and construction of the city that would be known as Ch'eng Chou, the "Completion of Chou." Because oracle bone fragments discovered at the former capital of his fief, Yen, indicate that he confirmed the auspiciousness of the location by performing divination, the Duke of Shao must have been dispatched to conduct a survey and actually lay out the main aspects.⁵⁹⁰ The Duke of Chou then seems to have been entrusted with overseeing the actual construction in which capacity he similarly sought to affirm the appropriateness of this crucial undertaking: through divinatory means.

Eventually growing to occupy both sides of the Ch'an River, a tributary of the Luo,

Ch'eng Chou's location was well suited to control the east and immediate southeast, including the middle and lower reaches of the Yellow River,⁵⁹¹ project power into Shandong, the Huai River area, middle and lower Yangtze, and eventually even the Chiang/ Han basin where the Man Yi would become troublesome, all regions that lacked Chou military presence at the outset. Located at a transportation and communication crossroads between east and west, north and south, on well-watered, comparatively level terrain, the Luoyang area provided the ideal site for a dedicated, effective military command that could be staffed at a sufficient level to maintain effective control of the local inhabitants and initiate widely ranging expeditionary campaigns.

Despite its necessity, it was not merely military power that was to be centered at Ch'eng Chou but instead administrative control of the realm itself. Ironically, the Shang had abandoned the pivotal Luoyang area when they reoriented their focus eastward and surprisingly deserted Yen-shih and Cheng-chou, their initial administrative bastions located slightly to Ch'eng Chou's east, and opted for other intermediate capitals before ultimately transferring their focus to Anyang. After centuries of retrenchment, the remoteness of their last site must have intensified the effects of their otherwise voluntary displacement from the west and the ensuing power vacuum facilitated the Chou's ascendancy.

The “Chou Pen-chi” includes a fairly sophisticated rendering of King Wu’s rapture, which has been embedded within a reconstructed meditation on the means of governing well. As it was cobbled together from passages in the two *Yi Chou-shu* chapters, it seems preferable to ponder his original pronouncement upon the geostrategic appropriateness of an eastern capital. Unfortunately, the somewhat enigmatic sentences can be understood in several ways depending upon how the geographical references are interpreted and the meaning chosen for crucial terms. A basic working rendering might be as follows:

From the junction of the Luo River [with the Yellow River] to the conjunction of the Yi [with the Luo] one dwells in the brightness without any impediments. Isn’t this an expansive area for habitation! To the south I looked out as far as Sant’u, to the north looked as far as the mountain peaks, vigorously turned to gaze out beyond the Yellow River, and twisted about to gaze at the Yi and Luo. This [area] would not be far from Heaven’s Mansion. 592

After the second conquest, the geostrategic situation changed dramatically. The territory under at least nominal Chou authority expanded greatly and the measures already described for segmenting the Shang populace and controlling most of the realm were quickly underway. Insurmountable difficulties existed in King Wu’s time, whereas the elimination of local opposition, reduction in political instability, and the deployment of military forces in conjunction with the establishment of the new military colonies, creating a bulwark against externally originated, potentially lethal strikes, made Ch’eng Chou’s undertaking conceivable. 593

The virtually contemporary inscription found on the *Ho Tsun* preserves King Wu’s exclamation to Heaven when he returned to Feng/Hao that, without doubt, he should dwell in the middle region and govern the people from there. 594 Incontrovertible evidence of his inclination, even dramatic realization of authoritarian necessity, it remains far too laconic to impute any underlying reasoning. Although the sequence of historical events remains unchanged, it has been suggested that recourse still must be made to the traditionally received texts, particularly the passage just translated, for insights into King Wu’s strategic thought processes. 595

Ch’eng Chou’s erection at Luoyang between the former Shang capital and the Chou’s isolated Wei River bastions has traditionally been interpreted as the true fulfillment of his intention, at exactly the location he intended. However, in the light of the ongoing instability characterizing the moment and the Chou’s limited postconquest

power, it has recently been asserted that King Wu's pronouncement should be interpreted as indicating that he realized the site was unsuitable because of its unimpeded accessibility and was instead describing another location in the heart of ancient Hsia territory. Furthermore, the *Yi Chou-shu's* "Luo Kao," which is taken as a comparatively authentic document, terms it a *shih* or military outpost, suggesting that rather than an opulent manifestation, King Wu envisioned a citadel that would have played a primarily martial role.

This new view is based upon the belief that conflation of the *Ho Tsun's* pronouncements with the subsequent location of Ch'eng Chou at Luoyang, while natural, is fundamentally incorrect ⁵⁹⁶ and that a key passage in the "Tu Yi" should be interpreted as meaning, "From the bend of the Luo River to the bend of the Yin River one dwells in the easy ⁵⁹⁷ without any solidity [*ku*]. [But] what about the dwelling [place] of the Hsia?" The crux of this interpretation is that King Wu had realized the general area where Ch'eng Chou would eventually be erected was surrounded by easily accessed terrain and therefore lacked the substantiality necessary to be solidly entrenched and defended, the term *ku* being emphasized in its meaning of solidity, as in defensible strong points such as mountain passes.

In contrast, these analysts believe the Hsia's old core area around Yang-ti was not only centrally located but also highly defensible. Based upon the features noted in King Wu's description, they conclude he must have been looking out from the ancient Hsia focal point of Mount Sung in Henan, a location that turns out to be astronomically central. ⁵⁹⁸ King Wu's deliberate awarding of fiefs in the immediate vicinity to create a sustainable forward defense is therefore seen as primary evidence for the correctness of this interpretation, but minor confirmation is also thought to be provided by recently discovered bronzes, as well as the imposition of Chou enclaves throughout the entire central area and farther afield after the second conquest. If so, the Chou oligarchs made a fundamental error in erecting their secondary capital of Ch'eng Chou at Luoyang.

Irrespective of the precise geographic location, the thrust of King Wu's vision remains unmistakable: establishing a powerful military and administrative bastion in the very center of the realm to govern their newly conquered domain and be in harmony with Heaven. The strategic concept is obvious but the topographical factors that would empower it far less so, as well as very much a function of breadth and extent, of how far outward one must look before finding advantageous features of terrain that can be exploited for defensive purposes.

Because of its pivotal location, Luoyang would always be a key target for forces advancing from every direction. Just as with Anyang, historians have (futilely) tended to perceive numerous natural

defensive features in the general area, but in actuality Ch'eng Chou was built on "easy" or "accessible" terrain, land without natural fortifications or other immediate protection. This is not to deny that several smaller rivers flow in the region or that the Luo River flows to the south while the Yellow River intercedes to the north, impeding invaders from that quarter, though often no more successfully than when it thwarted the Chou's advancing forces before Mu-yeh. But the significant mountain ranges and named passes are distant while the nearby hills offer little shelter from southern aggressors advancing along the river basins. However, rather than arraying a plethora of names such as Hu-lao or even T'ung-kuan Pass that have no meaning or relevance for those without firsthand experience of the area, recourse may simply be had to the full color topographical maps and satellite views readily available on the Internet, which will immediately reveal the character of the terrain and location of nearby rivers, hills, and mountains.

Heritage and Transition

Charisma and heroes rather than pusillanimous bureaucrats and political fiddling marked the turbulent century that witnessed the Shang's dramatic collapse and the rebellion's repression. Internal clan bickering, disparate desires, external threats, and other crushing impulses demanded dynamic leadership and great figures. Apart from Kings Wen and Wu, who framed the vision and provided the impetus, a few royal clan members and disaffected individuals monopolized power and directed the quest for domination. The Duke of Shao and Duke of Chou, both of whom served in advisory and command capacities in the period leading up to the conquest and distinguished themselves in quashing the rebellion that prompted the second conquest, as well as in collateral campaigns and no doubt other unrecorded actions, proved to be the most important of the royal relatives. Together with the somewhat infamous T'ai Kung they charted and forged the Chou's ascension.

Having been attracted by the conducive environment and the ruler's conspicuous Virtue, a number of worthies, music masters, and various recluses from about the countryside all sought refuge with the Chou, where they apparently made substantial but unknown contributions to its protobureaucracy. (The defection of the Shang's music masters had more than merely symbolic significance because ritual and the expert performance of music and the odes were increasingly important to maintaining authority and fostering a sense of participatory identity.) The *Yi Chou-shu* also preserves the names of a few important generals and subcommanders, albeit without any details, while the Duke of Chou's son and other members of the next generation also participated in the second conquest.

Despite the current historical tendency to disregard powerful figures in favor of impersonal forces and broader political and economic factors, it was the strength, ruthlessness, and cunning of these men that allowed the Chou to gain the allegiance of partisans and prevail over their enemies. They were catalysts whose actions effected epic changes within the context of a martially oriented, essentially tribal society and would rescue the nascent state from the

peril of rebellion. Unfortunately, apart from the T'ai Kung, whose personal history, however accurate or inaccurate, can be glimpsed in vestiges preserved in the *Shih Chi* chapter devoted to the state of Ch'i, hardly enough information has been transmitted to construct even minimal vignettes of the others. Nevertheless, indications of a heated postconquest conflict between the much-lionized Duke of Chou and the myopic loyalist, the Duke of Shao, have been discerned. Rather than just a disagreement over the Duke of Chou's exercise (or usurpation) of rulership, the clash seems to have evolved into a political disagreement over who had received and who possessed the mandate of Heaven—the monarch alone or the Chou leadership in aggregate—and whether the chief clan members should not be equal participants in the Chou's numinously sanctified power. ⁵⁹⁹

Little is known about King Wen apart from the developments already reprised. Despite his being posthumously titled the Cultural (or Civil) King, *wen* encompassing both these meanings, he was clearly a man of action and determination, as well as the essential progenitor of the Chou move to usurpation. Centuries of (deliberate) historical emphasis upon his intellectual and literary achievements, especially his purported (but unsubstantiated and almost certainly specious) role in developing the core of the *Yi Ching* while held in captivity have all but obscured his martial vigor and tactical contributions. Even the late, comprehensive *Six Secret Teachings* (*Liu-t'ao*), despite being a thoroughgoing military work that begins by envisioning the T'ai Kung replying to strategic queries from Kings Wen and Wu, portrays King Wen in a highly benign light, concerned with the people's welfare rather than simply preserving the Chou and conquering the enemy.

Despite his having directed the Chou in the final conquest and being responsible for the founding of the new regime, King Wu has been comparatively ignored, even disdained, by Chinese historians over the centuries. Viewed simply as a man of action, the embodiment of the martial (*wu*), he tended to be grudgingly acknowledged and his contributions appraised simply as the accomplishments of a hatchet man, not the enlightened work of a dynastic progenitor. However early bronze inscriptions and the "Shih Fu" chapter show that he was not just a great combat leader but also a strategist who thought profoundly about essential questions of administration and strategic deployment. Unfortunately, no records remain that might suggest who first conceived of employing the feudal-like, dispersed-power-center system initially implemented under his rule.

Apart from Kings Wen and Wu, the most important figure in the drive to conquest was probably Lü Shang, best known as the T'ai Kung. Subsequently esteemed as the first general and the true progenitor of Chinese strategic thought, he was even honored with

temples and proclaimed the state's martial protector in the T'ang before the deprecations of Confucian-influenced literati managed to have that distinction rescinded. ⁶⁰⁰ Authorship of the comprehensive theoretical compilation known as the *Six Secret Teachings*, a work compiled in the Warring States Period but featuring him as the interlocutor throughout, would also be subsequently attributed to him. ⁶⁰¹ One of the *Seven Military Classics*, it purportedly contains the T'ai Kung's political and tactical advice, including his measures for achieving effective state control, attaining national prosperity, waging psychological warfare, and overthrowing the Shang. Being devoted to analyzing tactical situations and suggesting appropriate concrete measures, much of the work remains important for the study of Warring States formulations.

Despite his skeleton biography in the *Shih Chi*, references in the other chapters concerned with the conquest, and mention in the *Yi Chou-shu* and the well-known *Shih Ching* ode "Ta Ming" (in which he is compared to an eagle and referred to as the Shang-fu) as well as numerous pre-Han writings, over the millennia, Confucian skeptics even denied his very existence. ⁶⁰² Others, perturbed by the confusing traditions regarding his origin, simply consigned him to a minor role despite his conspicuous enfeoffment as ruler of Ch'i. King Wu's Herculean efforts over the many years prior to the conquest and his achievements in imposing rudimentary Chou control over the vast Shang domain also tend to be slighted. Consequently, the two figures historically associated with sagacity, Virtue, and the civil—King Wen and the Duke of Chou—are revered while the strategist (the T'ai Kung) and final commander (King Wu), the embodiments of the martial, are ignored if not derisively dismissed.

Even though the last half century has witnessed continued efforts to construe the T'ai Kung as a trope or insubstantial figure, ⁶⁰³ his name has been increasingly found in recently discovered early bronze inscriptions, the *Yi Chou-shu* strongly affirms his existence, and the city remnants previously mentioned reinforce both of them. ⁶⁰⁴ He can also be seen as emblematic of the Chiang clan, with which the Chou royal clan extensively intermarried and partially derived their culture even though it is claimed that the T'ai Kung was never accorded the same esteem and participatory power as the king's brothers. ⁶⁰⁵ Nevertheless, traditional sources indicate that King Wu not only married one of the T'ai Kung's daughters but also that she became one of the ten great ministers of his reign. ⁶⁰⁶

According to the *Shih Chi*, after meeting King Wen in an apparently predestined encounter, the T'ai Kung was appointed as a *shih*, which generally means "commander" but can also include didactic functions, as in "preceptor" or "teacher." ("*Shih*," in "*Shih*

Shang-fu,” perhaps refers to his command position, “*T’ai Shih*,” rather than his role as preceptor to Kings Wen and Wu. “Shang-fu,” or “Father Shang,” may have been an honorific mode of reference employed by the two kings toward their commander-in-chief or strategist-adviser.)⁶⁰⁷ Thereafter, he reportedly served as advisor, teacher, confidant, Sage, and combined strategist for Kings Wen and Wu over the twenty years that preceded the final victory.

Although commonly portrayed as having led the initial charge that shattered the resolve of the Shang troops at the battle of Mu-yeh, his responsibilities seem to have been more related to strategy than command. The first general entrusted with consolidating the Chou conquest, he equally fulfilled an expeditionary role in the second conquest but is not otherwise noted as having directed forces in any of the early conflicts, a military task that King Wu should have personally assumed.

This purported combat role is somewhat surprising because Warring States materials tend to stress his advanced age and the reputed years of hardship he previously suffered. One account claims that he was a *shih* (lowest rank of noble) of the Eastern Yi people,⁶⁰⁸ another employs his late, meteoric rise to power after an undistinguished life to illustrate that talent and merit alone are inadequate unless one meets the proper moment: “When Lü Wang was fifty he sold food in Chi-chin and when he was seventy he butchered cows in Chao-ko. So, if he commanded the army for the Son of Heaven when he was ninety, it was because he met King Wen.”⁶⁰⁹ It’s also said that “his lands were inadequate to repay the cost of the seeds, his fishing inadequate to repay the cost of the nets, but for governing All under Heaven he had more than enough wisdom.”⁶¹⁰ He was even thought to have been “an old fellow whose wife had put him out, who had worked as a butcher’s assistant in Chao-ko and as an inn employee in Chi-chin who welcomed guests.”⁶¹¹

No doubt these tales were concocted to emphasize King Wen’s perspicacity—his ability to “know men,” an important skill in the tumultuous Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods—and burnish the T’ai Kung with the patina of sagacity.⁶¹² However, life expectancy was short in antiquity, and the Chou’s was a highly martial society whose lifestyle must have imposed severe physical demands, suggesting his surpassing longevity is a chimera.⁶¹³ Even imputing a much lower but comparatively advanced age of forty to him when he first encountered King Wen, requiring that he engage in physical combat at sixty or more, might already be excessive.

Ssu-ma Ch’ien’s characterization of the T’ai Kung’s contributions came to define him and his career:

After the Hsi Po [King Wen] had been extricated from Yu-li

and returned to Chou, he secretly planned with Lü Shang (the T'ai Kung) and cultivated his Virtue in order to overturn Shang's government. The T'ai Kung's affairs were mostly concerned with military authority and unorthodox stratagems, so when later generations speak about armies and the Chou's secret balance of power, they all honor the T'ai Kung for making the fundamental plans.

His succinct appraisal of the preconquest situation would be widely quoted thereafter: "If All under Heaven were divided into thirds, two-thirds had already given their allegiance to the Chou. The T'ai Kung's plans and schemes occupied the major part." ⁶¹⁴ Apologists for the position that Virtue, rather than martial techniques and military might, conquered the Shang would repeatedly cite the first part—that King Wen secretly cultivated his Virtue—and completely ignore the second.

Finally, although the T'ai Kung seems to have been a significant historical figure, the legends surrounding his origins and the convoluted appraisal of his role obscure another important representational aspect. As already discussed, the Chiang (of the T'ai Kung's more formal name, Chiang T'ai Kung) had long been critical allies and integral marriage partners, an interrelationship that no doubt facilitated the T'ai Kung's assumption of widely ranging advisory and command roles. In addition, the extended Chiang clan and the Ch'iang in general were bitter enemies of the Shang (who previously employed great numbers of the latter in sacrifices) and would presumably have been predisposed to support anyone opposing the Shang theocracy.

In contrast, although the Duke of Chou played an extended role in the founding of the Western Chou, his fame in imperial Chinese history has derived largely from Confucius's near idolization of him as expressed in traditionally received *Analects*, particularly when Confucius lamented his languishing career by exclaiming that he had long failed to dream about the Duke of Chou. ⁶¹⁵ Despite his achievements in preserving Chou domination, controversy over whether the duke usurped power and intended to become, or even proclaimed himself, "king" following King Wu's death has long marked distaff depictions that apply standards of judgment based upon a concept of primogeniture that simply did not exist in the interstice of the Shang and Chou. Furthermore, in imitation of Shang kingship practices and concord with the idea of yielding (transmitting) it to the most virtuous (just as King Wen had received the throne) at a precarious moment when his son was a mere child, King Wu may have intended that the kingship actually be conferred upon him following

his death, particularly as he was the eldest of the remaining brothers, as already discussed.

His other accomplishments certainly include being a major participant in the final preconquest years, exercising command of some battlefield forces at Mu-yeh, directing the second conquest campaign (albeit in conjunction with the Duke of Shao and the T'ai Kung) and sometimes exercising battlefield command, ⁶¹⁶ further developing the dual nature of the fiefs as administrative centers and defensive shields, and participating in the design and construction of Ch'eng Chou, the Eastern capital at Luoyang. Although history has tended to ignore his martial achievements, it has emphasized his sagacity in reforming the outmoded Shang institutions that they inherited and (as befits his image as a cultural icon) creating many of the administrative and ritual practices visible in the *Chou Li* and generally fostering the evolution of Chou culture. ⁶¹⁷ Following his retirement as regent and removal, voluntary or otherwise, to the east, he reportedly split power with the Duke of Shao who then reportedly continued to exercise military authority in the west, even though King Ch'eng had now reached maturity. ⁶¹⁸

His nemesis, the Duke of Shao, also known as the *T'ai Pao* or "Grand Protector," seems to have acted out of personal enmity as much as philosophical conviction in vehemently opposing, even condemning the Duke of Chou. ⁶¹⁹ One of the triumvirate that controlled Chou power during King Ch'eng's early years (with the Ta'i Kung and Duke of Chou), he reportedly was responsible for administering the western portion of the kingdom, Duke Chou the eastern. ⁶²⁰ Whether their conflict stemmed from the sort of animosity that often characterizes relationships between brothers, developed as a simple struggle for power, or derived from his umbrage at the perceived inferiority of his position as a mere half brother of King Wu, remains uncertain. However, in the context of severe martial uncertainty, his much-ballyhooed suspicion of the Duke of Chou's power grab seems specious at best and may well have contributed to the vigor and rapidity with which the other rebellious brothers voiced similar charges, if not prompted them to do so.

Although they were apparently reconciled when the Duke of Shao was persuaded of (or at least temporarily accepted) his sincerity, he remained an outspoken proponent of primogeniture, a practice that would entail untold misery for the Chinese people in succeeding millennia. As previously mentioned, he also insisted the Mandate of Heaven had been conferred on the king alone, not the Chou leadership *in toto*, no doubt primarily to buttress claims for direct succession and constrain other points of authority.

Bronze inscriptions and textual materials indicate the Duke of

Shao was an accomplished warrior who directed campaign forces in all the early conflicts and continued to play an active field role at least through King Ch'eng's era. ⁶²¹ In addition, he was early on awarded the fief of Yen in the crucial area of northern Hebei, no doubt with the expectation that their forces would thwart intruders emanating in the north and control Shang remnants that continued to inhabit the area. Although he never ventured there, these functions were successfully undertaken by his son. The *Shih Chi* also somewhat surprisingly praises him for the equity of his administration and the harmony he managed to create among the various peoples inhabiting the western portion of the realm.

King Ch'eng's Achievements

King Ch'eng eventually assumed authority, but the incipient Chou's great accomplishments were achieved early in his reign, during the years required to complete the second conquest. Despite traditional claims to the contrary, peace remained elusive, and the Chou continued to become embroiled in conflict, though on a much more localized basis. Evidence for three clashes remains, but many more have probably disappeared from historical memory or simply went unrecorded. Ironically, two of them seem to have resulted when enclaves intending to ensure tranquility and secure the eastern perimeter provoked local opposition.

According to his biography in the *Shih Chi*, when the T'ai Kung's fief was shifted to the Ying-ch'iu area, he was immediately compelled to subjugate local members of the Lai Yi who had apparently expected the Chou to be too preoccupied with their many enemies to mount a credible local threat. ⁶²² Although certainly embellished by late Warring States editors, the account retains interest:

King Wu, having already pacified the Shang and become King of All under Heaven, enfeoffed the T'ai Kung at Ying-ch'iu in Ch'i. The T'ai Kung went east to go to his state, staying overnight on the road and traveling slowly. The innkeeper said, "I have heard it said that time is hard to get but easy to lose. Our guest sleeps extremely peacefully. Probably he isn't going to return to his state." Overhearing it, the T'ai Kung got dressed that night and set out, reaching his state just before first light. The Marquis of Lai came out to attack and fought with him for Ying-ch'iu, which bordered Lai. The people of Lai were Yi, who, taking advantage of the chaos under King Chou [Emperor Hsin] and the new settlement of the Chou Dynasty, assumed Chou would not be able to assemble the distant quarters. For this reason they battled with the T'ai Kung for his state.

When the T'ai Kung reached his state he rectified the government in accord with their customs; simplified the Chou's forms of propriety [*li*]; opened up the occupations of the merchants and artisans; and facilitated the realization of profits from fishing and salt. People turned their allegiance to Ch'i in large numbers and Ch'i became a great state.

Presumably accompanied by a strong Chiang clan force, the T'ai Kung seems to have quickly vanquished them and tenuously established control over the region. Accordingly, the T'ai Kung's thrust into this area clearly continued King Ch'eng's policy of eastern pacification.⁶²³ Although clashes would continue and Ch'i would often be disparaged for its martial or brutish nature, it gradually grew powerful, no doubt in part through the stimulus of conflict and conquest.

Despite certainly not being unaware that the Chou had quashed the rebellion and summarily subjugated numerous hostile and nearby southern states, the protostate of Hsü similarly sought to contest the imposition of Chou power on nearby terrain. A name that would reappear in a rebellious leadership role in later conflict history, Hsü was reportedly joined by several other Huai Yi groups because the "Lu Chou Kung Shih-chia" and the "Fei Shih" preface both note that the Huai Yi and Hsü revolted together.⁶²⁴ Po Ch'in, the Duke of Chou's son who had distinguished himself in the just-concluded reconquest, commanded the successful response, one presumably mounted with clan troops attached to the recently established fief.⁶²⁵

Finally, perhaps opportunistically prompted by the chaos in the early Chou, an uprising of unknown nature developed in the Shang Dynasty heritage state of T'ang, whose existence must have been tolerated into the early Chou Period. According to the *Shih Chi's* "Chin Shih-chia," the Duke of Chou did not just pacify the old Hsiahsü area but "executed and extinguished" them. Thereafter, no doubt because this strategically critical area controlled the northern approach to Ch'eng Chou, King Ch'eng appointed Shu-yü to govern the remnants. Shu-yü's son was subsequently called the earl of Chin, and from these troubled beginnings the state of Chin, which would play a crucial role in late Western Chou and early Spring and Autumn history, emerged.⁶²⁶

The early writings chronicling King Wu's postconquest military operations make no mention of any enemies having been targeted in the south, yet tradition and more than a few historians have enthusiastically held that he forcefully imposed the incontestable virtues of Chou culture in what was regarded as a virtual wilderness. A passage in the *Li Chi's* exposition on music, the "Yüeh Chi," which

was long believed to preserve Confucius's thoughts on the subject's essence, has been cited to claim that after he vanquished the Shang, King Wu proceeded to subjugate the south.⁶²⁷ However, the assertion appears in a highly idealized explication that contrasts the T'ai Kung's overly martial spirit (which is essentially condemned as having been responsible for the ferocity of both the campaigns and dance) with King Wu's purportedly constrained employment of military force and can neither be considered historical evidence nor attributed to Confucius.

A statement in the "Kingly Administration" ("Wang Chih") section of the *Hsün-tzu* that asserts that the people in the south were resentful when the Duke of Chou campaigned in the north (and in the west when he struck in the east) is similarly cited as evidence of southern efforts. Insofar as it echoes the praise bestowed on King T'ang's similarly idealized strike against the tyrannical last king of the Hsia and requires acceptance of the implication that the Duke of Chou went on to complete his rectification in the south and east, its value is equally negligible.

In contrast, nearly contemporary references indicate that projective efforts into the south were indeed undertaken during King Ch'eng's reign. Although the actual dates are unknown, the campaigns could not have been initiated until after the Tung Yi and Huai Yi had been pacified and Ch'eng Chou occupied. Bronze inscriptions note that the Duke of Chou and the Duke of Shao were individually deputed on missions into the south, and the king's name also begins to appear in them, suggesting that he was now taking the field, though probably still in a nominal capacity rather than as the actual battlefield commander.⁶²⁸ The *Tso Po Ting*, although not contemporaneous, records Kuo Chung's retrospective statement to Tso Po: "Formerly, when your illustrious ancestor the Duke of Chou performed great services for the state of Chou, his efforts were unparalleled. He extensively campaigned in the southern region."⁶²⁹ Although the Duke of Chou's southern efforts have otherwise faded into the mists but must have been completed within a year to two, before he completely withdrew from governmental affairs.

The Duke of Shao's southern responsibilities seem to have been more directed to reconnaissance and manifesting the Chou's newly acquired awesomeness than mounting strikes and subjugating people. According to an inscribed jade *ko* (dagger-axe) known as the *Li Hou Yu Ko* or the *T'ai Pao Yu Ko*, which might well be from his tomb, while out at Feng the king ordered the T'ai Pao to proceed down along the Han River and *sheng* the southern states and also assemble them, no doubt in an attempt to determine their strength and attitude.⁶³⁰ (The term *sheng* encompasses both military and political aspects, and

could include military action to rectify instead of just undertaking reconnaissance or even reviewing the troops.) The limited nature of his mission is perhaps best indicated by the forces chosen to augment whatever forces he may have been commanding, just a hundred infantrymen under the Lord of Li from some indecipherable location. (Despite presumably still being the Chou's commander-in-chief, he may have proceeded outward with just his clan forces or a single royal army [*shih*] rather than two or three major contingents.)

An astute rearrangement of strips found in the *Bamboo Annals* indicates that additional martial activity was undertaken in King Ch'eng's later years. ⁶³¹ In his thirteenth year, a coalition force consisting of the king's army and forces from Ch'i and Lu, each commanded by their respective lords, attacked a segment of otherwise unspecified Jung. Thereafter, the incipient but highly martial state of Ch'i again manifested its armed might in the king's fourteenth year when their army besieged the fortified town of Ch'ü and conquered it. In his fifteenth year, King Ch'eng then directed a large hunt, presumably an exercise intended to improve the army's readiness and discipline, because in the autumn of the following year the royal forces finally extinguished the (remnants of) the minor state of P'u-ku. ⁶³²

In this context the question of identifiable targets looms large, with Ch'u not unexpectedly being the most-often-suggested objective. ⁶³³ However, they had sought and received recognition from King Wen prior to the strike against Shang and had supposedly been counted among the allies participating in it. Ch'u had also been accorded formal recognition by King Ch'eng, presumably in order to at least nominally integrate it into the Chou's envisioned domain of subservient entities. Whatever their political nature or organizational composition, at this time the proto-Ch'u were probably located somewhere around Tan-yang, south of the Chou core domain, rather than in the east around lower Shandong where their ancestors, the Hsiung clan, are said to have originated.

Based upon the transcription of the character generally read as Kai (and taken as Yen) being Ch'u, it has been suggested that the bronze inscriptions previously cited indicate that a state by this name, situated in Shandong, rather than Yen, was in fact targeted. Although this interpretation has generally been rejected, others have suggested that the Hsiung, the ancestral Ch'u people, had participated in the brothers' revolt after King Wu died and were suppressed. In consequence, they emigrated westward from the upper Huai River area to the Han, Tan, and Che River areas, one of their many flourishing sites being Tan-yang, and became a southern Chou fief. ⁶³⁴

In view of the earlier evidence, this reconstruction must be

considered somewhat dubious despite the early presence of Hsiung clans in the east and, at some point in earlier antiquity, their possibly ancestral relationship with groups that suddenly burgeoned in the upper Han River area. Furthermore, literary vestiges indicate they were at least temporarily integrated into the Chou hierarchy during King Ch'eng's reign, albeit with somewhat inferior status, and (given their military inferiority) are therefore unlikely to have yet been openly aggressive, whatever their inclinations, at this time. ⁶³⁵

III

Domination and Challenge

Tranquility and Disaster

Based upon Ssu-ma Ch'ien's characterization of King Ch'eng's and King K'ang's reigns as eras marked by tranquility, the latter's years (1005–978 BCE) have astonishingly been seen as a period in which punishments were never imposed. Even the *Bamboo Annals* records nothing more than a single southern tour of inspection that proceeded as far as Mount Lu in Chiu-chiang, Jiangxi, during his sixteenth year. However, inscriptional evidence from bronze vessels that commemorate major campaigns against two archaic enemies, the Kuei-fang and the Tung Yi, strikingly contravene this idyllic picture and suggest that, at most, the *Shih Chi's* description applies solely to the state's internal affairs.

Despite the comparative consolidation achieved during King Ch'eng's reign, the Chou continued to be occasionally troubled by peoples they viewed as disrespectful, antagonistic, or even rebellious. Affronts in three of the four quarters—the west, north, and east—so perturbed King K'ang that he felt compelled to respond with aggressive, externally directed efforts. Assessments of their frequency and intensity vary, but most analysts tend to see significantly proliferating activity synonymous with somewhat diminishing Chou prestige and authority. Although the number of clashes would gradually increase over the forthcoming decades and Chou invincibility would soon be punctured by the devastating loss of their western forces, the bronze inscriptions associated with his reign mention only four or five conflicts, hardly a monumental figure for a rulership that spanned twenty-six years.

The Huai Yi and the incipient state of Ch'u quickly became focuses of concern, explaining the king's interest in initiating a southern progression undoubtedly intended to manifest the Chou's majestic power. However, all the other campaigns were undertaken under the king's mandate rather than K'ang's personal leadership. Therefore, even though the Chou remained an essentially martial society and continued to actively promote military values and vicarious participation in its vaunted conquest history through various ritual means, congruent with a greater emphasis on expanding the

civil administrative structure and perhaps immersing himself in the pleasures accruing to authority, the ruler seems to have begun shedding his command responsibilities.

An important bronze vessel known as the *Hsiao Yü Ting* commemorates the awarding of numerous symbolic gifts to Yü, the commander-in-chief of a glorious strike mounted against the Kuei-fang in the king's twenty-fifth year. ⁶³⁶ An old enemy making its last appearance on the historical stage, the Kuei-fang had previously been crushed after a lengthy campaign by Shang forces during King Wu Ting's era ⁶³⁷ and then again vanquished by Chi Li at the Shang's behest during their years of ascension. Following their final suppression, peace would again prevail along the western border for decades.

Another vessel associated with the commander but generally dated two years earlier, the *Ta Yü Ting*, records that the king awarded him a considerable number of inhabitants for his fief, including members of the indigenous Chou populace (detailed as four leaders plus 659 ordinary folks) and foreign residents amounting to thirteen leaders and 1,050 others. ⁶³⁸ Insofar as he was a descendant of the prominent Nan-kung clan whose members would attain prominence as both military and civil officials, the inscriptions equally attest to the role several powerful Shang clans played in the Chou's early decades. The *Ta Yü Ting* also includes a preamble that accuses the Shang of profligacy and drunkenness, of dropping the mandate, showing that their excesses were increasingly deemed historical fact.

The *Hsiao Yü Ting* reveals an unexpected scope to the era's military efforts. The expeditionary forces seized three enemy chiefs, killed at least 4,812 men, and captured an astonishing 13,081, the largest number that would ever be recorded in the Western Chou Period. The inscription also indicates they confiscated an unspecified number of horses together with thirty chariots, thirty-eight sheep, and 355 oxen. Although the illegibility of a few characters renders the details somewhat uncertain, 237 scalps, 104 horses, and (possibly) a hundred war chariots were apparently taken by the commander's personal forces rather than the army at large. ⁶³⁹

The exactness of these figures and the awesome nature of the court presentation imply, but do not guarantee, that they are true counts rather than guesstimates or inflated claims. Even if they represent cumulative rather than single encounter results, insofar as a portion of the enemy's troops probably escaped annihilation, the total Kuei-fang force must have exceeded twenty thousand men and may well have reached thirty thousand. Assuming comparable fighting capabilities and the likelihood that the Chou armies confronted dispersed Kuei-fang contingents that they defeated in detail, the Chou

would have needed a minimal operational force of ten thousand troops. Accordingly, their total military strength at the turn of the millennium could not have been fewer than twenty-five thousand to thirty thousand, as would be expected for a state maintaining six armies in the west and eight in the east.

Although mounted riders were still unused, the numerous horses and chariots captured in these encounters show that Northern Complex peoples had begun employing chariots in significant numbers, though almost certainly as command and archery platforms, just as the Shang and Chou. Nevertheless, despite their having probably been the conduit for the chariot's transmission to China, the steppe people's having begun fielding completely chariot-based forces at this time is continually claimed but contradicted, in comparison with the infantry's massiveness, by these and other much smaller figures. ⁶⁴⁰

Even allowing for an increasingly seminomadic lifestyle, there are important logistical implications in the number of cattle and sheep captured. Unless the Chou expeditionary force attacked the Kuei-fang in one or more of their semipermanent settlements, these animals were probably part of the mobile supplies intended to sustain marauding campaigns. The numbers fairly well match the needs of a force of twenty thousand operating away from their primary base for a month or two, particularly when gains from foraging are factored in. ⁶⁴¹

The capture of such extensive provisions coincidentally shows how victories can augment an army's supplies and allow it to remain in the field after they have exhausted their initial provisions. As Sun-tzu would say, "One who excels in employing the military does not transport provisions a third time. If you rely on seizing provisions from the enemy, then the army's foodstuffs will be sufficient. One bushel of the enemy's foodstuffs is worth twenty of ours; one picul of fodder is worth twenty of ours." ⁶⁴² It's unlikely all these cattle and sheep were ever presented to the king, some being instead consumed on the homeward march but for these achievements Yü was still awarded the usual array of commemorative items, including a bow with a hundred arrows and a few additional, symbolic arrows.

According to the *Hsiao Ch'en Lai Kuei* and other inscriptions, a far more extensive punitive (*cheng*) campaign was launched against "rebellious" Tung Yi groups in the Shandong area under the direction of the highly able commander Po Mao-fu. ⁶⁴³ (The Chou's presumptuousness in assuming that the Tung Yi owed obeisance is evident from the preamble stating, "The Tung Yi greatly rebelled.") Apparently infuriated, the king not only dispatched most of their eastern strength, the Eight Yin Armies, in response but also performed

a major ritual sacrifice before the campaign's initiation. ⁶⁴⁴

The expedition proceeded along the eastern slope of T'ai-shan (Mount Ta'i) from Mu (of Mu-yeh fame), where the state of Wei was engaged in building its capital and the so-called Eight Yin Armies were presumably still quartered. ⁶⁴⁵ As lord of Wei and their normative commander-in-chief, Po Mao-fu led them in a wide suppressive sweep against various targets in a campaign that proceeded as far as the seacoast and achieved several victories even though the inscription does not indicate the number captured or slain.

One plausible reconstruction has suggested the campaign consisted of a two-pronged attack, the second thrust going forth under the duke of Lien, then one of the so-called Three Dukes. He personally commanded the *Shih Shih* and other officers, as well as some minor allied states, in a coalition strike on Yüan. ⁶⁴⁶ Finally, a vessel variously known as the *Ming Kung Kuei* (JC 4029) and *Lu Ho Tsun/Kuei* clearly states, "The king ordered Ming Kung to attack the Eastern States with three *tsu* (clan forces)." The brief inscription concludes by noting that Lu *hou*, the lord or ruler of Lu who had the vessel cast, achieved merit in this correlated campaign, presumably a sort of mop-up effort, implying it had been successful. ⁶⁴⁷

Although there is little doubt that Ming Kung was one of the Duke of Chou's sons, considerable disagreement persists over his exact identity. A *Ming Pao*, presumably the same person with a different honorific title, appears in two lengthy award inscriptions in which he is not only appointed by the king to control the administrative officials and govern the four regions but is also identified as the Duke of Chou's son. ⁶⁴⁸ However, this information is too nebulous to resolve speculation, and the best candidate continues to be Chün Ch'en, who was known for controlling the Ch'eng Chou region. Apart from providing evidence that clan troops continued to exist and played an important role in peripheral conflicts, the inscription thus suggests that two of the Duke of Chou's sons—Ming Kung and Po Ch'in, the latter presumably still serving as ruler in Lu—participated in the campaign. Although the identity of the third *tsu* is unknown, the other two must have led their own clan troops, with Ming Kung serving as overall commander. If so, he was accorded authority over his much more famous, battle-hardened brother.

It has been claimed, albeit erroneously, that this sudden, concentrated military activity thoroughly vanquished the Eastern Yi and suppressed their aggressiveness. More realistically, their vigor diminished drastically, many groups emigrated away (including southward), and some remnants were integrated into the populations of Ch'i and Lu. ⁶⁴⁹ Assertions that these campaigns were made possible and necessarily postdated the Kuei-fang's vanquishment, an

event that allowed attention to be directed eastward without fear of invasion, similarly overlook the effort's fundamentally responsive nature and the deputation of troops stationed in the east rather than the employment of any of the western standing forces.

From the various inscriptions dating to King K'ang's reign, Po Mao-fu seems to have been the chief royal clan member entrusted with commanding operational military forces, further evidence of growing military specialization, particularly in the border area. His power, even though derivative, must have been considerable because he was able to personally reward exemplary performance with gifts valuable enough to be commemorated with bronze vessels. ⁶⁵⁰ King K'ang's era thus not only witnessed considerable military activity, but also the rise of experienced commanders who directed long-range campaigns that brought success and were thought to stabilize the borders. Nevertheless, there is no evidence that the Chou constructed or retained postconflict strong points in these areas even though some additional fiefs intended for the defense of the realm such as Hsing continued to be created.

Chou claims of "rebellion" may have been tinged with arrogance, yet they are not entirely fallacious because many peoples and states had hastened to acknowledge Chou supremacy shortly after the conquest, whether voluntarily or otherwise. No doubt their protestations of fealty were variously motivated, marked by different degrees of sincerity, and probably resulted as much from astonishment at the rapidity of the Shang's collapse as having been converted by Chou proclamations of Virtue and manifestations of awesomeness. The passage of decades, early revolt of the Shang and Eastern Yi, and some combination of umbrage at Chou hubris coupled with remoteness from visible authority doubtlessly encouraged the more adventurous to not just ignore Chou demands for tribute and reject other impositions, but also mount incursions to raid and plunder.

The Ch'ao's behavior provides an early example of this sort of attitude reversal. Despite their being a *tzu* clan entity that numbered among the Shang's satellite or client states, they are said to have voluntarily come forth during the euphoria marking King Wu's conquest of the realm. ⁶⁵¹ Nevertheless, according to the *Ku Mei* (?) *Kuei* just a few decades later, they sallied forth from their location at Ch'ao-hsien, Anhui to invade the Chou perimeter, thereby infuriating King K'ang who swiftly dispatched six armies under Tung Kung to pursue them. According to another inscription, the Lord of Eh eventually "captured Ch'ao," a clause interpreted as meaning he took their leader prisoner. ⁶⁵² An oracle bone fragment recovered from Chou Yüan presently identified as H11:10 apparently refers to this event because the two characters "*cheng* Ch'ao" (meaning "rectify" or

“conduct a punitive campaign against” Ch’ao) appear.

Bronze inscriptions indicate that King K’ang initiated additional military expeditions against peripheral peoples that must have been intended to manifest Chou awesomeness and solidify their sphere of dominance. Although the *Ch’en Chien Kuei* (JC 4237) is illegible at a couple of important junctures, it begins by clearly noting that the “Jung had come forth in great force at Ti.” This incursion in the north prompted a response under the Lord of Hsing, another of the Duke of Chou’s sons, who forcefully assaulted them and then successfully occupied Ti. The attack and response thus unfolded somewhat north of Hsing-t’ai in Hebei, along the crucial northern perimeter where numerous threats to sedentary China would materialize over the subsequent millennia and where the Jung Ti had reportedly been chastised during King Ch’eng’s reign for not submitting the proper tribute. ⁶⁵³

A short inscription on the *Lü Hsing Hu* (JC 9689) records an otherwise unknown punitive campaign probably conducted during the latter part of King K’ang’s era rather than in King Chao’s. Again mounted under Po Mao-fu’s leadership, it targeted an area just north of the new state of Yen and is thought to have been part of the ongoing effort to repress still troublesome Shang remnants who had fled northward and northeastward during the rebellion. Although no other details are provided, the effort apparently resulted in at least reasonable success. It has been further speculated that the Su Shen, a minority people located slightly further northwest and known for very early on having acknowledged the Chou, may have cooperated in some unknown manner in the suppression effort. ⁶⁵⁴ Another vessel among the several that refer to Po Mao-fu, the *Shih Lü Ting* (also transcribed as the *Shih Ch’i Ting*), provides evidence that a punitive campaign (that may have been intrinsically related to this other effort) was undertaken under the king’s leadership in the third month of an unknown year, though without any details.

King Chao’s Reign

A number of vessels indicate several campaigns were mounted under King Chao’s nineteen-year aegis (977–957 BCE) but the *Bamboo Annals* only document two, both targeting Ch’u. The first was not initiated until the king’s sixteenth year when armies under his personal command crossed the Han River and he auspiciously encountered what may have been a rhinoceros or, more probably, an overly large water buffalo. Apparently dissatisfied with a singular display of Chou might, he then mobilized the six western armies for a major but ill-fated thrust in his nineteenth year, probably intended to preemptively neutralize or even extinguish the protostate of Ch’u

rather than simply show the flag or chastise the rebels.

Although little is known about the nature of the first campaign, considerable inscriptional evidence for its existence can be gleaned from vessels now generally attributed to his reign. Based upon the name Ching/Ch'u, the attack's focus was probably a fortified city or enclave located in the vicinity of Ching Mountain in northeastern Hubei, possibly even the eventual capital of Tan-yang. ⁶⁵⁵ The *Yi Yü Kuei* (JC 3976) records that Yi Yü , yü presumably being an indication of his command responsibilities, accompanied the king in a southern punitive expedition; the *Kuo Po Ting* (JC 3907) speaks about Kuo Po (Duke or Baron of Kuo) accompanying the king in an attack on rebellious Ching and seizing "metal"—more likely actual bronze vessels than either copper or bronze—that he utilized to cast the vessel; and the *Ts'ai Kuei* (JC 3732) was similarly cast from metal seized by another participant who had accompanied the king.

Just as in the *Bamboo Annals* , the *Ching Shih Chün Tsun* notes that the king crossed the Han to attack Ch'u; the *Hung Shu Kuei* (also known as the *Hui Kuei* , JC 3950), states that in the ninth month Hung Shu followed the king in a punitive campaign against Ch'u/Ching; and the now famous *Shih Ch'iang P'an* (JC 10175) praises King Chao for having successfully opened up the area. (Having been cast much later, it may simply be an example of groundless praise being employed to exhort contemporary performance.) The campaign's success is thus clearly attested and the probable motivation, chastising Ch'u's purported rebelliousness, its visible provocation even though assuring transport and communication access to the mineral-rich southeast seems to have been the actual motivation. Since the inscriptions assert that the casters accompanied the king rather than acted in accord with his mandate, King Chao must have personally led the initial expedition.

Equally little is known about the second Ch'u expeditionary action. Several vessels that can perhaps be dated to the king's eighteenth year, especially those from the thirteenth month, apparently refer to preparatory steps, but their lack of visible relationship with the campaign makes their interpretation highly conjectural. These include the *Shao Huan Ch'i* (JC 10360); the *Ch'ien Yu* (JC 5402), which notes the king as being in An on the twenty-seventh; and the *Chung Fang Ting* (JC 2785), which places the king in Han-shu on the twenty-eighth. The *Huan Yu* (JC 5407) also mentions that the king was in An in the nineteenth year and others contain references that cannot be specifically tied to either campaign. ⁶⁵⁶

Prior to enigmatically noting the campaign's tragic conclusion, the *Bamboo Annals* prefaces its account with a somewhat melodramatic array of inauspicious portents: "In the spring of the

king's nineteenth year, a comet appeared in Tzu-wei.⁶⁵⁷ The Duke of Ts'ai (Ts'ai Kung) and Baron of Hsin (Hsin Po) joined with the king in an assault on Ch'u. The sky darkened greatly, pheasants and rabbits trembled. They lost their six armies at the Han River and the king ascended [to Heaven]." Rather than elaborating upon this monumental event, the *Shih Chi* merely asserts that the king did not return from a "southern tour of inspection and hunting."⁶⁵⁸ There are no references to this astonishing defeat, the first suffered by the powerful Chou, in the era's documents and, as commentators have noted, its true nature seems to have been quickly purged from collective memory.

Apart from brief mentions in two Warring States works, the *Ch'u Ts'u* and *Tso Chuan*, only the *Lü-shih Ch'un-ch'iu* preserves any useful information: "King Chao of Chou personally commanded the punitive expedition against Ching. Hsin Yü-mi, tall and of great strength, acted on the king's right. On the return back the crossbeams collapsed when they were crossing the Han River, casting the king and Ts'ai Kung into the midst of the Han River. Hsin Yü-mi supported the king onto the northern [bank] and then returned again to support Ts'ai Kung."⁶⁵⁹

One explication holds that the six armies also perished when the bridge collapsed. However, even if each army (*shih*) consisted of approximately two thousand men, a nominal but certainly realizable portion of the probable unit strength of three thousand at this time, the Chou component alone would have totaled twelve thousand troops. Their chariots, horses, and possibly another four thousand men from Ts'ai and Hsin must be added if each commander contributed a similarly sized contingent in order to create a coalition army sufficiently powerful to overwhelm Ch'u. No Chou era span would have been large enough to encompass even a small portion of them, not to mention their baggage train and support personnel, at one time.

More realistically, it might be speculated that the bridge's collapse cut off their line of retreat or severed their unity, after which the river's width and depth prevented the suddenly isolated contingents from mounting a concerted defense. Developments of this sort would have allowed Ch'u's forces, operating on familiar terrain, to easily defeat a massive army that had become highly disorganized when the bridge collapsed, saw their communications disrupted, and perhaps had their commander-in-chief, the king, disabled. As Sun-tzu would say, "In antiquity, those who were referred to as excelling in the army's employment were able to keep the enemy's forward and rear forces from connecting, their troops to be separated, unable to reassemble."⁶⁶⁰

Suggestions have also been made that the bridge consisted of wooden planking laid over small wooden boats that had temporarily

been lashed together but somehow broke apart. ⁶⁶¹ (Although remarkably early for such extemporaneous construction, King Wen had reportedly employed just this sort of pontoon bridge to facilitate his future wife's crossing a century earlier.) This possibility immediately suggests another highly plausible scenario: that Ch'u forces managed to sabotage it undetected, thereby accounting for the king's presence on the bridge. Their efforts might well have been undertaken prior to a surprise attack, or an assault may have been made on the bridge itself to cut the lashings during the heat of a protracted battle. Yet a third possibility is simply that a disorganized crossing, perhaps one made under duress, may have resulted in an overload or imbalance that sank the pontoons or even caused them to fatally spread.

Despite the overwhelming likelihood of a major engagement's having occurred and accusations subsequently being lodged against Ch'u for having slain the king, no contemporary records confirm it. ⁶⁶² Certainly the disaster would have had a major impact on the Chou elite, possibly even the people at large, one that would have been all the greater for being unexpected. However, the Chou had been born in strife and emerged from the chaos of revolution substantially strengthened. Being a warrior culture, the king's death is more likely to have enraged than depressed them, but the loss of the six armies substantially diminished their military strength and must have caused grief for thousands of families. Nevertheless, they may well have responded with determination and resolve rather than the despair often envisioned, especially as the six armies had to be reconstituted to thwart potential invaders from three quarters.

Three vessels indicate that, in his eighteenth year, before the second Ch'u campaign materialized, King Chao had also ordered Nan Kung to undertake an apparently successful, punitive campaign against the Hu-fang. A name visible in earlier Shang forays but presumably a different foe than challenged them, this incarnation of the Tiger (*hu*) Quarter (*fang*) apparently dwelled in Anhui (or perhaps along the Han River) before finally being conquered by Ch'u. ⁶⁶³ According to the *Chung Fang Ting*, ⁶⁶⁴ King Chao targeted the Hu-fang because of their "rebelliousness" (*fan*), a term whose scope is again unspecified but presumably synonymous with an insufficiently respectful attitude or a failure to forward the tribute deemed appropriate rather than any known aggressive acts. More punitive than preemptive, it apparently unfolded during the king's eighteenth year before preparations for the ill-fated second campaign against Ch'u commenced late in the year, suggesting its success contributed to King Chao's confidence.

Apart from essentially chronicling the king's exercise of overall

supervision in this little-known strike under Nan Kung's field command, the *Chung Fang* inscriptions provide evidence that these campaigns were not impulsively undertaken but instead mounted on a systematic basis to ensure their success and probably the king's comfort as well. In accord with the king's mandate, ⁶⁶⁵ reconnaissance efforts for their expeditionary route through the southern area were undertaken and forward bases completed and provisioned by local allies. According to the *Chung Yen*, these preliminary efforts covered an extensive area that stretched from Fang and Teng to the state of Eh, at that time still a valued border protector. In addition, Po Mai-fu was deputed to provide flank protection, no doubt to preclude a surprise attack by Ch'u clans or other restive southern groups emanating from the vicinity of the Han River.

Significant preparatory activity seems to have marked the second Ch'u campaign as well. Despite several illegible characters, a recently discovered inscription from a vessel cast in the incipient state of Chin records the regal gifts bestowed upon Hsieh Fu, the lord of Chin, for having undertaken a mission to Fan at the start of the same year as the Hu-fang campaign. If Fan's identification with Fan-yang at Hsin-ts'ai-hsien in the northern part of Henan is valid, a location proximate to targets in Ching/ Ch'u, it would suggest his task was ensuring the cooperation of a crucial border ally in the upcoming campaign. ⁶⁶⁶ The Hu-fang's neutralization may well have been another aspect of these efforts, one intended to prevent them from mounting a flank attack on the Chou expeditionary forces or moving to exploit the vacuum created by the absence of the six armies from the west, highly possible if they employed a southern route that circumvented the power of the Eight Yin Armies.

Other inscriptional evidence indicates at least two other campaigns were mounted under King Chao's reign, presumably before the Hu-fang effort and subsequent to the first Ch'u strike, making it a period of relatively intense military activity. The Scribe Yü, who seems to have been honored with a gift of fields by Wang Chiang (who was either the king's consort or mother, depending upon attribution), ⁶⁶⁷ also acted as commander-in-chief in another thrust directed at Hsien. Despite frequent assertions that the earliest Chou monarchs always commanded in person, King Chao did not personally participate in either of these actions, but instead deputed this scribe to act as his alter ego, thereby illustrating the growing military importance of scribes and their participation in military command, just as previously witnessed in the Shang. Both efforts were apparently successful because commemorative bronze vessels were cast.

Finally, a brief inscription found on the *Yüan Yu* (JC 5387) summarily indicates that the individual who had it cast, surname of

Yüan, was a member of another campaign of uncertain date under this same Scribe Yü against a protostate known as Hui, known to have been a Yün clan state. He therefore participated in an assault upon a fortified town called Hui (or perhaps K'uei), clear evidence that city assaults were already being mounted, contrary to claims they did not occur until the Spring and Autumn Period. The first to penetrate the town, Yüan seized—literally “made captive”—an unspecified quantity of bronze he then employed to create the vessel. No motive for undertaking this punitive expedition is noted, but rather than extinguishing them, the Chou seem to have been satisfied with simply chastising them. [668](#)

King Mu's Peregrinations

Famous for his journeys about the realm and his mythical encounter with the Queen Mother of the West, King Mu has traditionally been thought to have ruled for fifty-five or fifty-nine years but probably only held power from 956 to 918. ⁶⁶⁹ After suddenly inheriting the throne upon his father's unexpected demise, he obviously (and thus somewhat oddly) seems to have set about constructing new palatial edifices rather than concentrating on the military measures that would have allowed him to pursue a campaign of vengeance. ⁶⁷⁰ Even the *Shih Chi* merely preserves a long remonstrance and some additional material on the promulgation of new laws and recently imposed punishments for which he would subsequently be condemned. ⁶⁷¹

King Mu is often praised for adopting a conservative approach and refraining from foolishly wasting additional forces in futile southern strikes. However, the lack of early military activity and even accusatory diatribe in the extant, sparse accounts is perhaps best explained by early trepidation or possibly a penchant for pleasure. Nevertheless, a few contemporary historians believe that from the outset King Mu dedicated himself to reinvigorating the Chou, revitalizing the military, and asserting monarchical authority. Moreover, they view his reign as marked not just by major expeditionary endeavors but also the deliberate nurturing of military talent and a concomitant martial spirit through archery competitions, feasting, and similar events. ⁶⁷²

The initial decade of recuperation saw the six armies reconstituted ⁶⁷³ and the fief of Lü shifted to the west of Nan-yang in Henan where a member of the Chiang rather than someone from the extended Chou clan was named ruler. ⁶⁷⁴ Although intended to function similarly to the western states that screened the capital, Lü was probably expected to act more as a bulwark against incipient Ch'u than any other southern group because the Huai Yi had not yet become restive. A surge of military activity then marked his twelfth and fourteenth years, after which King Mu reportedly embarked on a lengthy period of wandering about the western region variously said

to have lasted from three to seventeen years. Finally, according to vestiges in the *Bamboo Annals* and Han Dynasty writings, he mounted a major campaign in his thirty-ninth year that targeted Yüeh in the southeast. However, depending upon how they are sequenced and dated, several inscriptions indicate that two major campaigns targeting the southeast punctuated this apparently tranquil interlude.

The expedition initiated in the king's twelfth year struck an ancient Chou nemesis, the Ch'üan Jung. According to the *Bamboo Annals*, locally furnished troops augmented the royal forces: "Duke Pan of Mao, Duke Li of Kung, and Duke Ku of Feng led their armies (*shih*) in conjunction with the king to attack the Ch'üan Jung. In the tenth month of winter, the king went north on a tour of inspection and subsequently conducted a punitive action against the Ch'üan Jung." Then, in his thirteenth year, "in the spring, the Duke of Ts'ai, leading his army (*shih*), accompanied the king in a campaign of rectification to the west whose final encampment was Yang-yü."

As already discussed, King Ch'ang had long ago attacked the Ch'üan Yi in his role as *Hsi Po*. In its introductory paragraphs on the Hsiung-nu, the *Han Shu* notes that a little more than ten years after King Wu conquered the Shang, the Jung Yi north of the Luo and Chin Rivers sent tribute on a timely basis. According to concepts prevailing in the Han Dynasty, they could therefore be viewed as "*huang-fu*," (nominally) submissive states or peoples who, inhabiting the wilds, were saddled with minimal ceremonial obligations but expected to forward symbolic tribute for which they presumably received gifts in return. (The importance of such tribute would vary over the decades, being considered highly significant when it consisted of horses or rare indigenous items but something akin to a nuisance when conveying items of little or no value.)

In chronicling this incident, the *Han Shu* notes that "some two hundred years later the Chou *Tao* declined and King Mu attacked the Ch'üan Jung, capturing four white wolves and four white deer that he brought back to the capital. After this, [emissaries from] the *huang-fu* no longer came to court." ⁶⁷⁵ Commentators have suggested these white wolves and deer, both said to be extremely rare, were tribal totems, sacred animals, or possibly even symbolic references to the eight Ch'üan Jung clan groups. However, the *Po T'ang-fu Ting* attributed to King Mu's era coincidentally describes an elaborate archery party mounted as part of a feast during which the king floated about on a lake and shot at a variety of exotic animals including white deer and white wolves, contravening more symbolic interpretations. ⁶⁷⁶ Yet, instead of solidifying his hold upon the steppe people and compelling their ceremonial obedience, King Mu's aggressive policies have traditionally been viewed as having provoked them into

discontinuing their acknowledgement of “subservient” status.

Roughly half of the “Chou Pen-chi’s” account for King Mu’s reign consists of a remonstrance directed against undertaking this campaign to the west, a martial effort apparently intended to cower the “recalcitrant” and “disrespectful” into submission rather than forcefully subdue them. ⁶⁷⁷ Mou-fu, the Duke of Chai, a direct descendant of the Duke of Chou whose name appears in a number of inscriptions that attest to his military expertise, protested against it in a lengthy argument. His objections apparently were based upon the idea that the vaunted former kings (such as King T’ang and King Wu) had subdued their enemies by practicing and displaying Virtue and thereby garnered their willing obeisance. Moreover, much in anticipation of Warring States beliefs, he viewed the essence of true rule as lying in efforts to eliminate harm rather than add to the peoples’ misfortune by flourishing arms and compelling them to serve in distant campaigns.

Doubtlessly a late reconstruction replete with ideas common to Mencius’s era, the opening argument—one that would frequently be repeated in imperial court discussions—is particularly interesting: “The former kings illustriously displayed their Virtue but did not cause the people to perceive their arms. Now the army should be secreted away but move when timely; then, when it moves, it will be awesome. If [arms] are displayed, then they will be treated as an object of play. If they are regarded as an object of play, they will lack the ability to terrify.” ⁶⁷⁸ The Duke of Chai buttressed his criticism by advancing a theory about concentric circles of submission, much as would be subsequently attributed to the Hsia and Shang, and stressed that military force would be justified only when Virtue had been “nourished complete.” But because he recognized the existence of problematic circumstances that could not be resolved except through military action, he never suggested the army be eliminated or assaults be completely foregone. ⁶⁷⁹

Rather than heeding his remonstrance, the king went forth on the campaign of rectification described in the *Han Shu*. Upon an unknown basis, the *Hou Han-shu* adds the explication that when he conducted his westward campaign against the Ch’üan Jung, the king not only captured five kings (thereby implying the animals in fact represented tribes), but also compelled the Ch’üan Jung to move further out to T’ai-yüan, a location that would figure significantly in later clashes with the Hsien-yün. ⁶⁸⁰ If this late account has any validity, their departure for Gansu signifies a major victory over a seminomadic people. According to the *Bamboo Annals*, in the eighth month of his seventeenth year the king then shifted other, unspecified members of the Jung (but presumably the remnants of previously

defeated groups) to T'ai-yüan, thereby further reducing the immediacy of any threat, albeit only minimally.

The *Bamboo Annals* continue by noting that in his thirteenth year, "in the seventh month, autumn, the Hsi Jung came [to court] as honored guests." Unless the Hsi Jung were simply hypocrites or were implementing the sort of deceptive treaty measures witnessed from Sun-tzu's time onward, being tantamount to an acknowledgment of submissiveness, their visit should have marked the end of threats originating in the northwestern steppe. However, even as the western perimeter began to enjoy momentary tranquility, other peripheral peoples initiated aggressive actions, and the year ended unhappily: "The Hsü Jung invaded Luo. In the tenth month, winter, Tsao Fu drove the king's chariot as they entered Tsung Chou."

Whether the Hsü Jung had learned of extended Chou military actions and believed the king's western preoccupation had created a power vacuum or not, they mounted the first attack that succeeded in penetrating the Chou's eastern core. According to contemporary inscriptions and literary remnants, under King Yen, the peripheral state of Hsü cobbled together an alliance of some thirty-six minor groups, presumably mostly from the southeast but possibly including some members of the Tung Yi as well, particularly groups that inhabited the lower Shandong area.⁶⁸¹ How many of them actually contributed to the coalition force remains unknown, but whatever its nature and size, the leaders must have imposed a high degree of discipline and realized great cohesiveness to achieve such startling success. The depth of their advance and strength of their forces compelled the king to race back to Tsung Chou by supposedly by covering a thousand *li* per day, a totally impossible feat said to have been realized by employing the legendary Tsao Fu as his chariot driver.

Whether the Hsü Jung alliance had hoped to emulate the Shang and Chou in overthrowing their dominant overlords or simply sought to strike and plunder Ch'eng Chou cannot be determined. Insofar as they failed to gain their objective during the lengthy time that would have been required for the king to be notified and return to heart of the realm, the Hsü Jung campaign must have encountered determined opposition at the perimeter that significantly retarded their advance. A major bronze vessel, the *Pan Kuei*, is generally thought to commemorate victorious actions by Mao Pan, one of the chief participants.⁶⁸² The highly interesting inscription records the issuing of a mandate to command that clearly allocated the duties among three operational forces. As overall commander, the Duke of Mao directed the center army:

During *ch'u-chi* [first auspiciousness] in the eighth month, on *chia-hsü* [the eleventh] at Tsung Chou, the king ordered the Duke 683 of Mao to replace the Duke Ch'eng of Kuo, assume responsibility for screening the king's position, be a beacon to the four quarters, and take control of Fan, Shu, and Ch'ao. The king then had him presented with a bit and bridle.

The king ordered the Duke of Mao together with the distinguished rulers from the states and infantry, charioteers, and *chi* halberdiers to attack the Yüan 684 Jung in the eastern states.

The king ordered Wu Po, saying, "Deploy your armies close on the left of Father Mao." The king ordered the Earl of Lü, "Deploy your armies close on the right of Father Mao." He dispatched an order that said, "With your clan troops follow your father on this punitive campaign. When you go forth from the city, protect his person." 685 In three years we made the Easter region tranquil, not one of the states failed to submit to Heaven's awesomeness. 686

Mao Pan obviously was a highly experienced, much-favored official entrusted with frequent military command. Not only is he noted in the *Bamboo Annals* as having commanded an earlier, victorious campaign mounted against Ching and for participating in the action against the Ch'üan Jung, he would subsequently accompany King Mu on his fabled journey to the West. According to the *Mu T'ien-tzu Chuan* he was sent back in advance of the king, presumably having been entrusted with treasures garnered en route. Under his leadership, the Chou royal forces, although considerably augmented by troops from Wu and the recently created state of Lü, vanquished their disparate enemies. Whether this was accomplished with one or two dramatic victories or by simply by displaying sufficient imperial might to cower them into nominal submission remains unknown.

Mao Pan began by formally assuming the Duke Ch'eng of Kuo's responsibility for governing the region's pivotal states and providing a defensive screen for the royal city. Succeeding in this endeavor, he was able to operate further afield and conduct a campaign of repression against the recalcitrant, including the pivotal southeastern An-hui states of Fan, Shu, and Ch'ao. 687 Although less reliable due to its late composition date, vestiges in the *Hou Han Shu* imply that perhaps because of the strength of his attack and the general restiveness marking the southeast, King Yen of Hsü was subsequently accorded a sort of grudging recognition and accommodated in the Chou hierarchy of nominally submissive states.

The uncertainty marking even tentative reconstructions of this campaign is unfortunately compounded by an entry in the *Bamboo*

Annals that states that, in his fourteenth year “the king led the prince of Ch’u in an attack upon the Hsü Jung and conquered them.” Given the lingering enmity between the Chou and Ch’u, the latter’s astonishing participation in this eastwardly directed expedition can only prompt questions about the nature of their diplomatic relations, as well as the Ch’u’s motive, which was presumably reducing the power of potential eastern enemies rather than actually supporting the Chou. It might also be construed as indicating that the king eliminated the Hsü Jung challenge within a year and that the inscriptions found on the *Pan Kuei* and other vessels pertain to an entirely different suppressive expedition mounted later in his era. ⁶⁸⁸

Military activities around the perimeter seem to have been generally increasing in the fourteenth year because, “in the ninth month, the Ti invaded Pi.” The king also traveled about extensively and hunted in several remote locations, actively “showing the flag” and possibly overtaxing his troops, behavior glaringly inconsistent with an ongoing effort to eject eastern invaders. Reportedly prompted in part by a desire to neutralize the Chüan Jung but probably more because he was bemused by the prospects of exotic travel and possibly a desire to acquire superlative horses, ⁶⁸⁹ King Mu undertook, in his seventeenth year, the legendary (and no doubt largely mythical) expedition that reached the K’un-lun Mountains.

Tradition holds that he had an audience with the Queen Mother of the West (as she is conventionally titled) and that she later came to court and stayed as an honored guest in the Chao Palace, whether this same year or much later, as recorded in the *Bamboo Annals*. Whether in chariots, on foot, or presumably both, they would have had to traverse enormous distances and tortuous, highly arid terrain, estimates of which range from 14,000 to an unimaginable 190,000 *li*. Logistical sustainment as they passed through often hostile peoples must have been impossible, and the king’s reported three-year absence an administrative nightmare, if not an opportunity for usurpation.

Whatever the underlying reality, these events stirred the imagination early on, resulting in many stories about the king’s adventures and the Queen Mother’s powers eventually being assembled into the early novel known as *Mu T’ien-tzu Chuan*. Although there is no information on the actual campaign or any depiction of military clashes, the topographical descriptions and basic facts recorded about the places visited during the king’s meandering, all information with potential intelligence value (similar to that acquired during Chang Chien’s eighteen-year, external mission during the Former Han), has prompted suggestions that the *Mu T’ien-tzu Chuan* is similar in nature to the classic geographical compendium known as the *Shan-hai Ching* (*Classic of Mountains and Seas*). Although

its authenticity continues to be debated, it is at best a semimythical synthesis based upon a variety of magical tales and occasional exotic artifacts. Probably compiled sometime during the Warring States Period, it was lost until recovered in a Wei Dynasty tomb together with the *Bamboo Annals*. ⁶⁹⁰

Considerable inscriptional evidence indicates another major conflict unfolded sometime during the two decades between the earlier coalition attack under Hsü's leadership and a spate of activity near the end of King Mu's era. Unlike the previous challenge, this invasion was mounted by more southerly peoples and constitutes the first known aggression from this quarter. The origin of these groups and the nature of their most prominent member, the Huai Yi, continue to be debated, but the coalition seems to have encompassed disparate entities ranging from indigenous peoples including the descendants of the great Neolithic cultures such as the Miao Yi, remnant Shang enclaves, and more recent immigrants such as Tung Yi clans that had been compelled to move southward under Shang and then Chou military pressures. ⁶⁹¹ Their realm extended from northern Jiangsu and northern Anhui to southeastern Henan (especially the Hsin-yang area), southwestern Henan (around Nan-yang), and northern Hubei and thus encompassed the Huai River region, Nan-yang basin, and plains between the Han and Huai Rivers. However, although their members included groups identifiable with Ch'u's ancestral clan, they not only never identified with or included Ch'u, but would soon be targeted by the latter as it expanded eastward.

King Mu's response attests to the attack's penetrating nature: "The king ordered Tung, saying, 'Damn, the Huai Yi have dared to attack an inner state. You, with the army commanders from Ch'eng-Chou, are to race and repulse them at Ku-shih.'" ⁶⁹² As generally understood, the encampment (*shih*/ army) at Ku was entrusted with forward perimeter defense and appears to have been one of several military strongpoints that the Chou established but somehow never came to be recorded in traditional historical materials. Command of its defenses had already been entrusted to Po Yung-fu, otherwise known as Shih Yung-fu, whose role is confirmed by at least three other bronze inscriptions including the *Yü Yen* and *Chien Tsun*. ⁶⁹³

Although the *Tung Fang Ting II* celebrates Tung's success in personally leading the elite Tiger Guards that resisted the Huai Jung, another vessel, the *Tung Kuei*, provides the most extensive record of his actions. In the sixth month, he directed the officials and officers in a race to intercept Jung contingents that had continued to advance even though they must have learned of the Chou response. Tung's forces first encountered them at Yü-lin, then fully engaged them at Hu, a nominally subservient Chou protostate that found itself caught

between the Huai Yi and the Chou border. ⁶⁹⁴ The Chou eventually repulsed them and achieved a significant victory because the *Tung Kuei* states that Tung's forces slew a hundred enemy troops, captured two officers, repatriated 114 prisoners previously seized by the Huai Yi, and confiscated 135 military implements including shields, spears, halberds, bows, arrows, jackets, and helmets. ⁶⁹⁵ Po Yang-fu then apparently secured a truce, though it would fail to preclude further incursions in future reigns.

Scholarly evaluations of the Huai Yi invasion tend to emphasize their audaciousness in targeting Ch'eng Chou, the depth of the penetration, and the *newly* defensive nature of Chou military activities. ⁶⁹⁶ Much like King Yen's coalition, the Huai Yi were no longer cowered by the specter of Chou might or its assertions of Heavenly sanctioned awesomeness. But it must be pondered whether they had refrained from initiating predatory activities out of fear during the Chou's first century of self-proclaimed rule or had simply lacked powerful chieftains who could motivate contiguous peoples and gather a sufficient number of warriors to mount an armed challenge. Perhaps the tribute demanded by the Chou had simply become too annoying or onerous, stimulating them to not just refuse but instead attempt to plunder the warehouses in distant Ch'eng Chou where precious metals and other indigenous products had been accumulating. Whatever the Chou's delusions, quiescence in these regions cannot invariably be deemed submission. Conversely, distant vibrancy did not necessarily result from, nor should it be equated with, internal Chou weakness or military decline.

The seriousness of this new threat is incontrovertible. Being located about a hundred miles from Ch'eng Chou near Yeh-hsien in central Henan, Yü-lin was squarely positioned to thwart incursions proceeding up the river valleys from the south and southeast. Moreover, the existence of defensive features apart from the military encampment at Ku is attested by Shih Yung-fu's having been deputed to examine the area between Tao and Ku. Because the Chou had not initiated the conflict, it can only be characterized as "responsive" in nature, being the second such military action required under King Mu's aegis. However, despite the earlier loss of the six armies, given the king's activist martial policies these incursions should perhaps be understood more as evidence of increasingly restive nature of peripheral peoples than some sort of inherent Chou decline.

Toward the very end of his reign, between his thirty-fifth and thirty-seventh years, King Mu initiated an extended campaign or connected series of actions directed against troublesome eastern/southeastern enemies. ⁶⁹⁷ Although minor discrepancies prevent complete confidence in the correlation, they are generally supported

by inscriptional evidence. According to the *Bamboo Annals*, in the king's thirty-fifth year, "men from Ching invaded Hsü so Baron Ch'ien of Mao led his regiments (in a counterattack) and defeated Ching's forces at Chi." In his thirty-seventh year, "the king greatly mobilized nine armies (*shih*) and proceeded eastward to Chiu-chiang where they made a bridge out of a framework of tortoises and iguanas. Thereafter, he attacked Yüeh, ending up at Yü. The people of Ching came with tribute." ⁶⁹⁸

From these two entries the main provocation originated in Ching, later part of Ch'u. The first thrust defeated them directly while the second, although not specifically targeting them, apparently overawed them into becoming temporarily submissive. The king then personally led the final campaign that rectified the southeast, ranging widely in the region and striking Yüeh. According to the *Lai P'an*, Chung Li-fu, one of the caster's ancestors who apparently excelled in governmental measures and military tactics, also supported kings Chao and Mu in all quarters, including in an otherwise unknown attack in this era on Ching/Ch'u that probably occurred earlier than the one recorded in the *Bamboo Annals*. ⁶⁹⁹ King Mu's reign thus ended with their defensive focus directed toward the south and southeast rather than the traditionally troublesome northwest region.

King Kung

Despite the existence of several well-dated bronze vessels attributable to his era, King Kung has the distinction of being virtually unknown. ⁷⁰⁰ Only four entries appear in the *Bamboo Annals*, but a single incident in the "Chou Pen-chi" notes, "In his fourth year the king's armies extinguished Mi." Even the length of his reign and its starting date remain nebulous, but recent analysis indicates he probably ruled from 917 (or 915) to 900 BCE. ⁷⁰¹

Ssu-ma Ch'ien devoted most of his portrayal to recounting a contextual tale about Mi's annihilation that had undeveloped implications:

Duke K'ang of Mi accompanied King Kung when he ventured to the upper reaches of the Ching River. When three women sought to become Duke K'ang's concubines his mother said: "You should present them to the king. Among animals three are considered a pack (herd), among people three are termed a "mass," but three women create licentiousness. When the king hunts he does not take (the whole) pack, when the king campaigns he doesn't have the masses bow, and when the king takes concubines he does not take three women from one clan.

Now female beauty is the most surpassing of things. Even if such beautiful things are granted to you, how will you have the

virtue to sustain them? If the king cannot sustain [such licentiousness], how much less someone as insignificant and deficient as you? An inferior who fully possesses all things will, in the end, perish.” He did not present them to the king and a year later King Kung extinguished Mi. 702

As juxtaposed, it appears that Mi was targeted for a punitive attack, one designed to chastise the perverse and rectify the inimical, just the sort discussed in the *Ssu-ma Fa*. However, the *Ssu-ma Fa* is a product of the middle Warring States Period and a work whose author strongly embraced a highly moralistic view unlikely to have emerged in the early Chou. Mi’s ruler presumably offended the king in some unknown way—presumably not merely by keeping these beauties for himself and thereby making the king jealous—prompting the draconian response that resulted in the state’s being vanquished. Even though the fate of the population remains unknown, having previously been a target of early Chou expansion, they once again suffered for the ruler’s misdeeds. Yet Mi’s removal from the imperial map appears to have had the unintended consequence of weakening the northern defenses, allowing steppe marauders easier, possibly unopposed passage across the ill-defined border into the upper Wei River Valley.

The *Bamboo Annals* entries for King Kung’s reign conclude by noting that in his ninth year, he awarded a military command to Lord Ch’ien of Mao, though the purpose is otherwise unspecified. The *Shih Ch’iang P’an* indicates that he preserved his father’s legacy, presumably meaning his efforts to expand the realm and secure the borders.

Later Middle Conflict

The *Bamboo Annals* records only three military incidents during King Yih's reign (899–873 BCE), but two of them, being strikes by peripheral peoples into the Chou's ancestral center, confirm the existence of continued steppe threats and King Yih's ongoing inability to thwart them.⁷⁰³ Mobile raiding parties would always prove difficult to defeat without extensive static defenses and massive standing forces; nevertheless, these incidents are generally interpreted as implications that the Chou's majesty had eroded to the point that its diminished awesomeness could no longer deter potential aggressors. Chronologically summarized, in the king's seventh year a Hsi Jung incursion reached Hao; in his thirteenth year the Ti invaded Ch'i; and in his thirty-first year the Duke of Kuo was unexpectedly defeated, and his troops fled after he led them northward to attack an old nemesis, the Ch'üan Jung.

The virtually silent "Chou Pen-chi" simply notes that during King Yih's reign "the royal house declined and poets wrote satirical [odes]" but the chapter devoted to the Hsiung-nu in the *Hou Han-shu* observes that "during King Yih's reign the Jung and Ti communicated with each other and mounted incursions so that China suffered from harm and its poets felt pained and chanted because of it." Moreover, as his reign has often been characterized as pervaded by both political and moral decay, administrative weakness may have prevented the Chou from nurturing the strength necessary to cope with these highly motivated raiders. Traditional views and even the laconic *Bamboo Annals* entries for his era emphasize the king's abandonment of Virtue, his lack of personal and administrative constraint, and finally his apparently desperate movement to Huai-li in his fifteenth year. Whether he felt vulnerable because steppe invaders had penetrated to the ancestral center at Mount Ch'i and nearly reached the capital at Hao or was forcibly displaced, resulting in King Hsiao then imitating the Duke of Chou in taking up the reins of government, remains uncertain.

Inscriptional questions and differences over the attribution of bronze vessels complicate attempts to chart his martial activities. For

example, the *Miao Sheng Hsü*, *E-hou Yü-fang Ting*, and *Wu Chi Kuei* indicate that campaigns were mounted against the Huai Yi and Southern Yi. Given King Yih's reported self-indulgence, his preoccupation with western threats, and the distraction of punitive strikes that targeted the northwest, these aggressive actions were more likely undertaken in King Yi's era. ⁷⁰⁴ Nevertheless, an important vessel known as the *Shih Mi Kuei* indicates that at least one significant expedition was directed against the Southern Yi in response to attacks on Chou states located in the east. ⁷⁰⁵

The *Shih Mi Kuei* inscription also provides the important but surprising information that rather than dispatching any of its core armies to quell the evolving disorder, in the eleventh month of an unspecified year the king ordered troops from Ch'i and several minor eastern states to go forth in response. ⁷⁰⁶ Furthermore, instead of commanding in person, he deputed a scribe surnamed Mi and a *shih* (army commander) named Su to take charge of these locally raised contingents. Not only are Chou troops never even mentioned, but the degree of mobilization is also somewhat surprising since virtually all of Ch'i's component forces—its standing armies; clan infantry; and *sui-jen*, the troops mobilized from the outer area—were called out, leaving the state bereft of men. ⁷⁰⁷

Although some analysts believe the conflict was limited in scope, the Southern Yi apparently posed a major challenge because they had been ranging widely in their attacks on Chou satellite states in the eastern region, and their coalition similarly included troops from several other states, including Chi and Chow, under the leadership of Lu and Hu, who had assembled the forces. ⁷⁰⁸ The suppressive campaign therefore had to adopt the relatively sophisticated tactic of dividing into two columns that then advanced independently until converging to mount a two-pronged attack on the enemy's encampment at Ch'ang-mi. It thus exemplifies Sun-tzu's tactical principle of "segmenting and reuniting," a technique adopted in order to concentrate previously dispersed forces at a proper moment.

Ch'i's core army (the *tsu jen*) and its reserves (*sui jen*) under the *Shih* Su proceeded from the right while the attacking force—composed of Ch'i's clan forces and contingents from three other minor Chou states, including Ts'ai—were led by the Scribe Mi on the left. Although the final impact of this otherwise unrecorded outward thrust remains unknown, the assault must have been somewhat successful because one hundred prisoners were captured, a somewhat paltry number in view of the engagement's supposed scope. More importantly, this encounter provides further evidence that the Chou were being increasingly compelled to turn the defensive focus away from the Tung Yi to the Southern Yi and Huai Yi in order to blunt

bolder, more frequent challenges.

Interpretations of this campaign, especially the lack of central government troops, and its significance vary greatly. The absence of any mention that the Duke of Kuo had assumed command of Chou royal forces implies he directed contingents furnished by his own state. It would have been logical to employ troops stationed in closer proximity to the enemy, rather than incur the far-higher expense and inconvenience of dispatching them from Tsung Chou, perhaps thereby fatally weakening the capital's defenses.⁷⁰⁹ Ch'i's lengthy heritage of deputed martial activities, and particularly its role in quelling early dynastic disturbances, made the choice even more appropriate. However, because contingents from the Eight Yin Armies around Ch'eng Chou would have been better prepared and positioned than those from Ch'i to mount a quick response, their nonparticipation suggests this decision was consciously made for undeclared reasons. Possibilities include a fundamental lack of preparedness, weakness or depletion in the Chou armies, or a desire to assert and thereby reinforce royal authority in recalcitrant fiefs.

Ch'i's willingness to obey the king's mandate at the risk of their entire strength shows they still respected central government authority. However, indications of growing disaffection within the Ch'i and corresponding royal dissatisfaction, which would become highly visible early in King Yi's reign, suggest the king may have seized upon the opportunity to enervate a potentially rebellious power, one initially expected to anchor the perimeter's defense. If so, he clearly forgot that military success can breed strength, just as was taught by the Chou's own ascension during the years they fulfilled the role of Hsi Po.

Some analysts believe the conflict was highly limited in scope and the imposition of central government commanders should be interpreted as symptomatic of a decline or disorder in the Ch'i's military forces.⁷¹⁰ However, the charge's terminology indicates the invasion was mounted by a southern coalition that had been making inroads across a broad area and therefore must have presented a significant, as well as infuriating, challenge even though neither Ch'eng Chou nor the antique core had been targeted. Because several of the peripheral states had been established to protect the border and state-based contingents, rather than central government forces (such as from Kuo), which had previously been employed for border clashes, Ch'i's deputation was hardly anomalous.

The king may also have found these distractions impinged upon his royal pleasure and therefore somewhat impetuously delegated responsibility for quashing the effrontery to royal representatives and the closest states. Mobilizing forces near the point of conflict spared

central government expenses, ensured the ongoing defense of the capital region against western threats, and prevented (or rather transferred) the losses normally suffered by any campaign army, however victorious, from the ever-diminishing regal coffers of the hapless state. His motivation need not have been singular, nor should these objectives be construed as mutually exclusive. In addition to representing a strategically sound choice, entrusting the Ch'i with combat responsibility may have been intended to simultaneously reassert the king's authority and enervate an obstreperous state.

King Hsiao

King Hsiao's reign (872–866 BCE) is not only shadowy and uncertain, he may have even wielded power during some of the years traditionally allotted to King Yih. The *Shih Chi* simply ignores him and his successor, King Yi, perhaps because Ssu-ma Ch'ien lacked reliable data on which to base an account. However, the *Bamboo Annals* notes that “in his first year he ordered the Earl of Shen to attack the Hsi Jung,” the earliest conjoined mention of the two powers that would eventually be responsible for the Western Chou's collapse. Confronted by ever-increasing peripheral threats, King Hsiao apparently felt compelled to reassert Chou authority and therefore initiated his rule by ordering this preemptive strike. Although the final results remain unknown, two years later representatives from the Hsi Jung presented some horses during a court visit, an important conciliatory gesture tantamount to at least nominally acknowledging Chou authority.

The final entry for his brief reign also involves horses: “In the eighth year, for the first time they pastured [between] the Ch'ien and Wei Rivers.” According to the *Shih Chi* this laconic statement is generally understood as referring to the time when one of the Ch'in's early ancestors was appointed to supervise the raising of horses in this area, an activity that proved so successful the clan was eventually enfeoffed, initiating their rise from obscurity. The horse's growing importance in transportation and warfare obviously prompted the king to attempt to increase their numbers by allocating them a dedicated space and calling upon someone with recognized expertise in horse breeding. ⁷¹¹

King Yi

Although King Yi ruled just shy of eight years, from 865 to 858 BCE, the *Bamboo Annals* and several bronze vessels depict an aggressive, outwardly oriented ruler willing to employ military force to staunch the erosion of Chou power. An enigmatic entry for his third year states that he “assembled the feudal lords and boiled Duke Ai of Ch'i in a *ting* [square bronze cauldron].” The *Shih Chi* adds that the

marquis of Ch'i vilified Duke Ai, prompting the king (who presumably accepted the accusation's validity) to exploit a conclave to publicly execute Duke Ai in this particularly heinous fashion and appoint another ruler for Ch'i, no doubt to augment his own awesomeness and assert Chou authority. ⁷¹² A bronze vessel known as the *Shih Shih Kuei* (JC 4216), although generally dated to the king's fifth year, commemorates Shih's receipt of a mandate to attack Ch'i, confirming the king's ongoing displeasure with the ruler and indirectly attesting to the earlier incident's veracity. ⁷¹³ Unfortunately, no results are appended, only a list of his appointment rewards, but whenever the vessel was cast—presumably upon Shih's return rather than in the haste of departure—there was no indication in any of the traditional records that Ch'i had aggressively rebelled at the time, despite their displeasure with the king, their own geostrategic advantages, and their possession of well-proven military forces.

A successful campaign ordered in King Yi's seventh year once again vanquished an ancient enemy, members of the Ch'üan Jung that King Mu had shifted to T'ai-yüan: "The Duke of Kuo led the armies to attack the Jung in T'ai-yüan. They proceeded as far as Yü-ch'uan and captured a thousand horses." The state of Kuo had previously undertaken military expeditions on the Chou's behalf, including the ill-fated effort that dates to the end of King Yih's era; however, the king's continued absence from command should still be noted. The entry's listing of a thousand horses—an exceedingly large number—rather than any prisoners or other plunder, reemphasizes the animal's growing importance even though the cavalry had yet to appear.

Much in contrast with the Duke of Kuo's glorious achievements, the same year also witnessed predatory activity by Ch'u forces along the perimeter: "The prince of Ch'u, Hsiung Ch'ü, attacked Yung and proceeded as far as Eh." ⁷¹⁴ A *Shih Chi* entry explicates the events: "During King Yi's reign the royal house was weak. Some of the feudal lords did not come to court but attacked each other. After widely achieving harmony among the peoples between the Han and Yangtze Rivers, Hsiung Ch'ü mobilized his troops to attack Yung and Yang-yüeh and then proceeded as far as Eh." ⁷¹⁵ Ch'u's thrust thus carried them far northward into purportedly Chou terrain and therefore was seen as threatening to both the western and eastern capitals, but especially to Ch'eng Chou.

However, rather than core Chou terrain, it was territory east and northeast of incipient Ch'u that was targeted, presumably to gain access to mineral resources as well as reduce nearby threats and expand their own realm. More importantly, no doubt cognizant of possible Chou reprisals, rather than intrepidly acting alone, Hsiung Ch'ü forged a large coalition of peoples from the south and southeast

before launching his assault. Since their forces did not directly strike at Ch'eng Chou, he must have still respected the Chou's power and thus never intended to challenge it with an eastern attack that would, in any event, have created a power vacuum and left his westward flank exposed to a fatal assault by the six Tsung Chou armies.

The *Eh-hou Yü-fang Ting* (JC 2810), named for the core information preserved in its inscription about the Lord of Eh, commemorates his designation as an *yü-fang* or Defender of the Quarter, also commonly translated as Border Defender, a very uncommon honor otherwise accorded only to the famous Pu Ch'i.⁷¹⁶ Whether this was a mere gesture intended to placate a potentially dangerous peripheral ruler or the king actually expected him to replicate the defensive activities associated with the earlier *Hsi Po* remains unknown, but the naivety of this gesture would soon be proven. Irrespective of whether the king felt the Chou's prestige was sufficient to entice, or cower, him into cooperating, in the context of ongoing border strife the Lord of Eh's appointment was essentially vacuous.

Nevertheless, it has generally been thought that he had been entrusted with extensive responsibility for defending the Chou and speculated that Eh had been deliberately established as a strategic protectorate similar to other fiefs such as Shen, particularly as the ruler's clan reputedly originated in the heartland itself. A vessel known as the *Eh Hou Kuei* (JC 3939) indicates that one of the Lord of Eh's daughters married the king, an arrangement that probably contributed to Chou confidence in his fidelity while prefiguring the political exploitation of marriage alliances with "barbarian" peoples in subsequent ages, but therefore is perhaps equally an indication of the clan's foreign origin. Given the lord's ability to co-opt numerous Yi statelets into an alliance, it seems more likely that they had emerged from among the Yi than not.

Eh's actual location, traditionally said to be slightly northwest of Nan-yang in the middle Yangtze basin area, has been a matter of debate even though historical continuity in place names had long argued for Eh-huo-shih in Hubei until recent archaeological discoveries proved almost conclusively that it was centered on Yang-shia-shan in Hubei's Sui-chou area.⁷¹⁷ The preface to the lord's appointment in the *Eh-hou Yü-fang Ting* notes that the king had conducted a punitive expedition into the south where he had attacked two places known as Chiao and Yü before meeting with the Lord of Eh en route back at a place called P'ei, showing the somewhat offhand nature of their encounter. There is no record of the Lord of Eh having participated in this strike so his enfeoffment must have been motivated by broad geostrategic concerns rather than intended as a

reward for exemplary military accomplishment.

Although this punitive campaign was never chronicled by the traditional written texts, an inscription found on the *Miao Sheng Hsü* (JC 4459 and 4460) stating that the king campaigned against the southern Huai Yi and attacked Chiao-huai and T'ung-yü corroborates it. Miao Sheng's significant battlefield accomplishments included capturing prisoners (for interrogation), slaying an unspecified number of the enemy, seizing various implements of war (*jung-ch'i*), and confiscating "metal." Unfortunately, the date of this effort remains uncertain, but in view of the Lord of Eh's appointment it probably preceded the invasion out of Ch'u that the Chou suffered in King Yi's eighth year.

King Li

Any summary of King Li's reign (857-828) cannot avoid noting that he was repressive and self-willed, lost the support of the royal clans, and was eventually forced into exile. His absence resulted in the famous Kung Ho reign traditionally thought to have been jointly overseen by descendants of Shao Kung and Chou Kung but now known from bronze inscriptions to have been administered by one person, Kung Ho Po.⁷¹⁸ As recorded in the *Bamboo Annals* it commenced in 842 BCE, the first widely recognized date in Chinese history, and continued until rulership finally reverted to King Hsüan upon King Li's death fourteen years later.⁷¹⁹

The nature of his displacement, traditionally said to have stemmed from his excesses, was violent and King Hsüan, the heir apparent, was saved from the mob that reportedly attacked the palace only when the Duke of Shao sacrificed his own son in a successful ruse. Numerous questions remain other than why a mere child would have been targeted even as the king was managing to escape unscathed. Interpretations of the incident range from it being the simple culmination of factional clashes within the warrior nobility through anger at the corruption of key authorities, as well as that it was the first populist revolt in Chinese history.

Although the participants were numerous and evidently violent, they probably originated among the artisans and other important inhabitants in the capital, especially the nobility, rather than the peasants and "workers" who would have lacked political consciousness and the power to mount any sort of aggregate action. Kung Ho Po's immediate assumption of authority suggests that he may have been among the dissident faction's leaders and that the ongoing sanction of the important clans remained necessary.⁷²⁰ Irrespective of its nature the clash does not seem to have had an adverse impact on the Chou's already enervated military forces, but does appear to have

encouraged incursions and rebelliousness in virtually every quarter.

Several heavily critical odes found in the *Shih Ching* decrying the people's distress are traditionally identified with King Li's reign, mostly without any apparent justification. However, in aggregate the more likely among them paint a dire picture of a willful and repressive ruler who was nevertheless manipulated by slanderers and sycophants ⁷²¹ as well as a world in which destitution, depravity, and robbery had become rampant. The ruler also sought to retake land from the nobles while the people were severely tasked. For example, "Min Lao" speaks of the burdens of the people and expresses the hope that the deceitful will not prevail in government while "Pan" proclaims that the people are being worked to death, that the good are not only shunted aside but are afraid to act because they have become like the impersonators of the deceased at sacrificial offerings. ⁷²² One ode, "Tang," employs the artifice of King Wen criticizing Emperor Hsin for his violent and oppressive officials and claims that the anger that had been accumulating in the Chou extends as far out as the Kuei-fang !

Another ode titled "Yi," supposedly a self-admonishment penned by Duke Wu but thought to reproach King Li for being confused, drunken, and bent on the pursuit of pleasure, preserves some interesting verses on warfare. Instead of emphasizing the power of virtue it asserts an ongoing need to be prepared, presumably because they were not:

Put in order your chariots and horses,
Bows and arrows and martial weapons,
To be employed to constrain Jung risings,
To be used to repel the Man-fang. ⁷²³

"Sang Jou" similarly begins by speaking about the distress being suffered by the populace but then turns to paint a realistic picture of the desolation brought on by external strife: ⁷²⁴

[Everywhere] teams of steeds, impatient and bold,
With [tortoise and serpent] flags and [falcon] banners flapping
boldly.
Chaos spawned without cessation,
No state escapes destruction.
None with back hair remain among the populace,
Everywhere disaster and ashes.
Immersed in grief,
The state marches toward crisis.

The conspicuous absence of anyone with “black hair,” the youthful members of the populace, paints a bleak image of a city whose stalwart males had either been co-opted for military service or had already perished out at the border even as their female counterparts fled or were caught up in the conflicts. Their invisibility suggests that the Chou’s armies were being overused despite the burden of border defense having been increasingly shifted to the states (whose populace suffered similar fates) and the relative infrequency of external conflict. The fourth stanza adds that “from west to east, There is nowhere that one can settle.” Finally, the seventh bewails Heaven’s infliction of death and disorder, pestilence and drought.

King Li’s reign had started auspiciously because Ch’u “presented turtle and other shells” in his initial year, a gesture suggesting that the southern state’s leadership was willing to acknowledge Chou suzerainty, albeit nominally and temporarily. Thereafter, according to both versions of the *Bamboo Annals* the Chou suffered four barbarian invasions during his rule and the Kung Ho era, the first two of which proved highly successful for the aggressors. The Chou also mounted two defensive responses, one unsuccessful, the other ending in a sort of indeterminate pursuit. As chronicled, “in his third year the Huai Yi invaded Luo. The king ordered Ch’ang-fu, Duke of Kuo, to attack them but he didn’t succeed in conquering them.” Whether out of compulsion or choice, the Chou thus once again called upon the formidable state of Kuo to undertake a police action. Unfortunately, either their tactics were poorly chosen or their strength was inadequate to wrest victory.

Reportedly due to the repressive measures that he instituted from his eighth year onward the king’s administration began collapsing about him. Although not necessarily a direct result, “In his 11th year, the Hsi Jung entered Ch’üan-ch’iu.” Since he fled into exile in Chih during his twelfth year, the next incursion by the Hsien-yün into the western suburbs of Tsung Chou during his fourteenth year readily exploited the precarious situation brought about by caretaker rule. ⁷²⁵

A well-known bronze vessel, the *Tuo Yu Ting* (JC 2835), describes an outwardly directed effort that dates to the tenth month of the king’s twelfth year. ⁷²⁶ A highly mobile Hsien-yün force that knifed through the Chou’s perimeter defenses and proceeded down to the north bank of the Ching River mounted a successful attack on the garrison at Ching and threatened the capital region. The king therefore directed Wu Kung to dispatch his *yüan shih* (robust warriors) and drive them out of Ching. In compliance, Wu Kung in turn ordered his subordinate Tuo Yu to lead the duke’s own chariots (rather than any of the contingents from the royal armies) ⁷²⁷ and undertake the

mission. Meanwhile, on the 20th the enemy attacked Hsün and took prisoners.

After striking out westward Tuo Yu launched a successful counterattack on the 21st at Mai slightly northwest of Hsün, slaying (perhaps) 205, taking 23 prisoners, seizing 117 chariots, and liberating Chou soldiers who had been captured earlier. In a subsequent attack his forces slew 36 of the enemy, captured 2, and seized 10 chariots at Kung, prompting (or compelling) the Hsien-yün to flee westward. ⁷²⁸ After a brief pursuit a third clash unfolded at Shih and then the final one out at Yang-chung when their rapid advance again brought them into contact with the enemy. Although there is no indication of the number of casualties inflicted at Shih (nor even any report of Chou losses in any of the encounters), their final attack resulted in another 115 dead and 3 prisoners, but for some reason they burned the enemy's chariots, taking only the horses.

Overall Tuo Yu's effort can be characterized as a straightforward campaign that proceeded across relatively open terrain. It exploited speed and determination to catch the enemy unprepared, if not initially surprise them with the quickness of the response. The ratio of enemy deaths to the number of chariots captured, at least at Mai and Kung, is suggestive of a purely chariot force that employed speed and mobility to mount swift incursions. However, the enemy's resilience, the expense and complexity of chariot construction, and the generally large infantry component normally found at this time, coupled with the likelihood that the casualties at each encounter only represent a limited percentage of the contingents present on the battlefield - certainly 20% or less, a level at which most units historically break and flee -- somewhat argues against this conclusion. Nevertheless, the number of chariots remains surprising even though their limitations and deficiencies would have limited them to command and archery platform roles. ⁷²⁹

Conjoined with the *Bamboo Annals* entry for the eleventh year is a line that states "Duke Mu of Shao led the army in pursuit of a Ching Man [invasion force] down as far as Luo." Commentators have understood this as indicating that Ching's forces advanced far north of the Luo River but then Duke Mu drove them back to its banks. It has been speculated that the Ching Man attack may have deliberately sought to exploit the turmoil consequent to the Hsien-yün invasion, not impossible since even the peripheral peoples had to be at least somewhat conscious of distant developments in order to survive. (However, the Hsien-yün may equally have exploited the aftermath of a Ching Man invasion if the bamboo strips were inadvertently or deliberately inverted during the reconstruction of the *Bamboo Annals*.) ⁷³⁰ Thereafter, no further military actions are recorded for the

twenty-six years nominally encompassed by King Li's life and even the *Shih Chi* focuses on the king's "moral failures" without noting any battles.

However, several vessels commonly (but of course not universally) attributed to his reign indicate that various Yi groups not only continued to threaten the southern perimeter, but also succeeded in penetrating the heartland in both the west and east. Whether their inscriptions depict two enemy major enemy thrusts or multiple aspects of a single invasion remains uncertain, but in view of the specificity of the aggressor's names they might best be construed as evidence for the former. Moreover, whenever the battles unfolded, they provide vital insights into the ongoing conflict between the Chou and the peripheral peoples or proto-states in the south and are therefore discussed here with the caveat that the dates of the campaigns may be inaccurate. ⁷³¹

According to the *Yü Kuei*, the Chou managed to thwart a Southern Huai Yi incursion only after the latter's forces had penetrated well up both banks of the Luo River by successfully attacking towns identified as Chiu-mao, Ts'an-ch'üan, and Su-min. The royal armies under a commander known only as Yü (who cast the commemorative vessel) mounted their initial response at Hsi-ku on the Luo's upper reaches after he was ordered to pursue and repel them. Yü evidently garnered a victory of some sort because his forces seized forty prisoners and slew a hundred of the enemy, comparatively low numbers for a confrontation with a major enemy unless achieved solely by his own troops. He also succeeded in liberating some four hundred prisoners, evidence that the southern invaders had not only been victorious in earlier battles, but had also been deliberately carrying off captives, presumably to employ as slaves.

An inscription on the *Hu Chung* cast by the king himself that speaks about the "southern states and *fu-tzu*" -- perhaps "submissive earls" or some similar lower rank of the nobility -- "having dared to penetrate and occupy [or brutalize] our land" may well refer to this invasion and the additional measures taken in its aftermath. ⁷³² The inscription begins by noting that in order to continue the accomplishments wrought by Kings Wen and Wu in the border area he conducted an inspection -- actually a sort of reconnaissance in force -- of the area and continues by noting that the king powerfully attacked the aggressor's thrusts and their capitals. This resulted in twenty-six members of the Southern Yi and Eastern Yi coming in to an audience, synonymous with (nominally) submitting.

The cover of the *Kuo Chung Hsü* asserts that Kuo Chung joined the king in a southern campaign of rectification in which they attacked the southern Huai Yi. It therefore seems to provide further evidence that an otherwise unknown thrust was highly successful,

much in contrast to the results of the campaign noted by the *Bamboo Annals* as having occurred in the king's third year. ⁷³³ The *Wu Chi Kuei* notes that Wu Chi was awarded four horses for his achievements in a punitive expedition led by the king against the southern Yi. Although possibly stemming from this campaign, the year recorded in the preface, a notation not commonly seen in this period, dates it to an unknown reign's 13th year which would put it shortly after King Li was forced into exile, suggesting either that the vessel refers to King Yi's southern campaign or that Kung Ho Po was the actual commander. ⁷³⁴

Based upon the lengthy inscription found on the *Yü Ting* (JC 2834) the Lord of Eh, only recently sanctified as an esteemed ally, not only failed to act in the Chou's defense but actually led a powerful invasion that from the Chou perspective could only be deemed a rebellion. ⁷³⁵ Following the dedicatory preface the inscription preserves several important historical points: "When Heaven inflicted severe losses on our state below and the Marquis of Eh, Defender of the Quarter, led the Southern Huai Yi and Eastern Yi in a widely ranging attack on our southern states and eastern states up to Li-han, the king issued an edict to the six armies in the West and eight in the Yin territory, 'Cleave and attack the Defender of the Border, the Marquis of Eh. Spare neither the old nor young.'"

From this limited portion of the inscription it is immediately apparent that a new villain had appeared on the scene, the Marquis of Eh, so recently honored as a Defender of the Quarter. Ruling a state pivotally situated with convenient access to both the Tung Yi and Huai Yi, he would have had little trouble transforming himself from a strategic Chou ally into the troublesome leader of the very parties he had been expected to thwart, if not suppress. His earlier recognition may have been prompted by Chou fears of disloyalty and concern that he might exploit his powerful geostrategic position to spearhead incursive activities. Whether he was enamored of Chou wealth, opportunistically sought to consolidate power during a moment of imperial turmoil, or hoped to initiate a quest that would result in overthrowing the Chou itself and usurping their position is unclear. However, Ch'u's repeated success in invading the Chou heartland and the memory of its recent penetration up to Eh's very borders may have prompted an optimistic assessment. ⁷³⁶

The severity of the king's demand that no one be spared, while consonant with his basically brutal nature, no doubt reflects his anger at the enemy's effrontery and his frustration with the Chou's growing impotence. However, his rage was probably augmented by the Lord of Eh's betrayal, especially his violation of the sacrosanct family ties created by his daughter's marriage to King Yi. Whatever the actual

instigation, the inscription provides dramatic evidence that contradicts naïve but frequently voiced assertions that warfare in the Western Chou and Spring and Autumn period was essentially ritualistic and highly constrained. ⁷³⁷ Except when spared for enslavement, the slaying of all persons that crossed an aggressor's path -- whether warriors, women, or children -- was more common than not. Moreover, conflict with the peripheral peoples who came to be disparaged as barbarians would never have been bound by the ceremonial constraints (erroneously) claimed to have characterized clashes between Spring and Autumn states.

The scope of the mobilization is somewhat surprising, some fourteen armies (*shih*) having been dispatched against an obviously formidable coalition of peripheral peoples. However, despite their massive numbers -- probably 28,000 troops again computed as a realistic 2,000 men per *shih* rather than the idealized 3,000 -- a stalemate apparently resulted. Wu Kung (Duke Wu) therefore resorted to dispatching Yü, one of his lieutenants, with one hundred chariots manned by double charioteers and a thousand men under the same injunction to "not spare the old or young" in order to tilt the balance and extricate the Chou forces.

Perhaps because they constituted an elite contingent capable of penetrating the enemy's formations, this small reserve force succeeded where the vast Chou deployment had failed. History shows that suddenly throwing limited but well trained forces into the fray during moments of stalemate often proves disproportionately effective. Probably because the chariots were employed as an operational contingent and either penetrated or circumvented the enemy's formations, they managed to capture the rebel leader, the Lord of Eh, and defeat his forces.

Unfortunately, no casualty figures were recorded despite the apparently firm numbers that can be attributed to this battle. The critical ratio of ten men per chariot may be coincidental, merely the result of chariot companies of a hundred and regiments of a thousand being common rather than evidence that squads of ten were being operationally assigned to each chariot, as sometimes claimed. Given that this must have been the most extensive Western Chou mobilization undertaken since the well-known second conquest, the dismal performance of the core forces provides telling evidence of a lack of combat worthiness. Even though they ultimately wrested victory, episodes such as these must have lured peripheral enemies into thinking that the Chou's vaunted dominance had truly ended.

Futile Revival

King Hsüan's reign (827–782 BCE) is the first for which the claim that contemporary written records other than bronze inscriptions exist in what might be termed “the people's voice,” potentially has some basis. Although few of the odes found in the famous Confucian classic known as the *Book of Odes* (*Shih Ching*) date to their purported eras, some verses seem to provide comparatively reliable historical data and others add color and emotion to otherwise sterile accounts and laudatory commemorations. A few also poignantly depict the hardships and sorrows of military service in a way that would be unmatched until the great T'ang poets.

Several campaigns and a number of significant victories recorded in the chronicles suggest King Hsüan initially sought to restore Chou prestige through an aggressive, outwardly directed policy. Toward the end of his era these efforts lost momentum, central government power eroded considerably, and the king's authority over the feudal lords and the so-called barbarian peoples diminished greatly. Whether he had become overconfident or the people simply overburdened, the army seems to have become exhausted, reduced to a shadow of its former potency.

Over the centuries, King Hsüan's rule has been both praised and condemned. Critics tend to focus on the perceptible decline that followed the army's successful campaign against the Hsien-yün, their second, in his twelfth year and bemoan his somewhat puzzling personal intervention in the succession battles that arose in at least two feudal states, Lu and Ch'i, even though it may have been intended to stabilize them so they could shoulder key defensive roles.⁷³⁸ The king is particularly excoriated for having refused to perform the ritual plowing (in his twentieth-nine year) that symbolically emphasized the basis of life and thus ceremonially initiated the agricultural season, an act deemed equally essential to ensuring a good harvest and securing the blessings of the gods. Since the court's increasingly numerous ceremonies were fundamental to maintaining the participatory respect of the feudal lords, not to mention the august power of the king himself, Hsüan's obliviousness can be construed as symptomatic of

having misperceived the nature of Chou royal power and the critical measures required to preserve it. This might explain why he needed to revitalize old *tsung-fa* connections and dispatch Chüeh Fu to the incipient state of Han in order to coerce the marquis to appear in court. ⁷³⁹

Both the *Bamboo Annals* and *Shih Chi* speak of King Hsüan deliberately cultivating the government of his ancestors and being assisted from the outset of his reign by Duke Ting of Chou and the Duke of Shao, the latter justly famous for deliberately choosing to save the future king's life at the expense of his own son's death. A policy of partial economic liberalization was also initiated that reportedly returned many local privileges previously monopolized by the throne to the aristocracy and the feudal lords, some of whom had supported King Hsüan's ascension, once again began coming to court. However, no doubt in an attempt to revitalize the Chou's military heritage, in his very first year, "he restored the military tax on the fields and built war chariots." ⁷⁴⁰ Subsequently, he generally emphasized martial (*wu*) policies over civil measures in order to counter the ongoing erosion of Chou power and restore its tarnished majesty.

The initial decade of his lengthy reign witnessed a succession of major expeditions against external aggressors but questions about projected intent coupled with varying assessments of the carnage suffered make characterizing their nature highly problematic. Despite having been prompted by actual incursions rather than mere threats and therefore defensive in appearance, most of them were essentially retaliatory in nature and punitive in objective. King Hsüan clearly sought not just to castigate the aggressors, but also to subjugate and even annihilate them, the most effective method available for precluding future invasions. Campaigns were also mounted to chastise recalcitrant peripheral states that failed to display a properly submissive attitude or render the tribute "expected," whether acknowledged or not.

The first entry of military interest in the *Current Bamboo Annals* simply states that "in his third year, the king ordered Ta-fu Chung [of Ch'in] to attack the Western Jung." Although no outcome is recorded, the chronicle asserts that in his sixth year "the Western Jung slew Ch'in Chung," thereby implying that the effort, however intermittent or tardy in commencement, extended over three years. The so-called *Ku-pen* (ancient text) version of the reconstructed *Bamboo Annals* more reasonably states: "After King Hsüan was established, in his fourth year he had Ch'in Chung attack the Jung but Chung was killed by the Jung. The king summoned Ch'in Chung's son Duke Chuang and provided him with seven thousand men who then attacked and smashed the Jung. In consequence, they withdrew somewhat."

Although the “Chou Pen-chi” fails to record the conflict, a fuller account appears in Ch’in’s “Basic Annals”:

Three years after Ch’in Chung ascended his throne, because King Li of the Chou failed to adhere to the Tao, some of the feudal lords rebelled against him. The Hsi Jung turned against the king’s house and extinguished the Ta-luo clan at Ch’üan-ch’iu. When King Hsüan of the Chou was established, he appointed Ch’in Chung as a Chou *ta-fu* with responsibility for executing the Hsi Jung. However, the Hsi Jung slew Ch’in Chung. Thus, Ch’in Chung ruled for twenty-three years before dying among the Jung.

Ch’in Chung had five sons, the eldest of whom was called Duke Chuang. King Hsüan of the Chou summoned Duke Chuang and his four brothers, provided them with an army of seven thousand men, and dispatched them to attack the Hsi Jung. They smashed the Hsi Jung, whereupon King Hsüan confirmed their possession of Ch’in Chung’s ancestral lands, added those of the Ta-luo in Ch’üan-ch’iu, and appointed Duke Chuang as the Western Shielding *Ta-fu* . 741

This historically important incident would have fundamental geostrategic implications for Chinese history that would far exceed the simple recognition of an incipient state. Their investment with extensive western lands in order to employ them as a protective shield against incursions from beyond the upper Wei River Valley, much as the Shang had utilized the Chou, would prove particularly significant. Moreover, during the turmoil that embroiled the Western Chou and despite their probably being descendants of the Hsi Jung, it would be Ch’in troops that preserved the dissolute state and facilitated King P’ing’s establishment in the east.

Although not the only western group that might have been called upon to mount this campaign nor the best established, the Ch’in already had a lengthy history of inter-relationship with the Chou, and their ancestors apparently inhabited the Wei River Valley before the Chou’s appearance. 742 The somewhat fictional “Ch’in Pen-chi” that provides the long accepted traditional account of the Ch’in’s brief history indicates that in the Shang Period, their forefathers had already been acting as a western bulwark in deflecting, even dominating the Western Jung. In addition, as early as King T’ang’s era, the clan had been noted for their chariot skills and excellence in horse breeding, a talent that brought them to the attention of the Chou. The Hsi Jung attack that massacred one segment of their extended clan provided strong motivation for striking out in revenge, an aspect that King Hsüan doubtlessly exploited.

The king undertook the first of several campaigns that would target the Hsien-yün, then occupying territory northwest of the Chou heartland, in his fifth year. ⁷⁴³ According to the *Bamboo Annals*, “In the sixth month, summer, Yin Chi-fu led his armies in an attack on the Hsien-yün and reached as far as T’ai-yüan.” Both their final destination, T’ai-yüan and the commander Yin Chi-fu (apparently also known as Hsi Chia) figure prominently in the period’s events, and Yin even has authorship of two laudatory *Shih Ching* odes—“Sung Kao” and “Ch’eng Min”—attributed to him. Another ode appropriately entitled “Liu Yüeh” (“The Sixth Month”), in praising his role, coincidentally preserves several important facts about this campaign, said by some to be the first real clash with the Hsien-yün: ⁷⁴⁴

The sixth month was filled with anxiety,
Our war chariots had been fitted out,
The four stallions were robust and vigorous.
Already loaded was our garb of war.
The Hsien-yün were fiercely vigorous,
So we were hastening.
The king then went forth on a punitive expedition,
In order to rescue the state.

Well matched the four surpassing horses,
Thoroughly trained and responsive.
So in this sixth month,
We had already donned our uniforms.
Our uniforms already donned.
We [daily marched] thirty *li*.
The king thus went forth on a punitive campaign,
To sustain the son of Heaven.

The four steeds were large and broad,
And great were their heads.
We relentlessly attacked the Hsien-yün,
And thereby garnered great achievements. ⁷⁴⁵
Severely and exceptionally,
We shouldered our martial tasks,
We shouldered our martial tasks,
And pacified the king’s land.

The Hsien-yün had badly calculated
When they thoughtlessly occupied Chiao-huo,
And made an incursion into Hao and Feng,
Reaching the northern bank of the Ching River.
With our bird emblazoned flags
And white pennants brilliantly streaming,
Ten great martial chariots
Proceeded at the fore.
The war chariots were already arrayed,
Ordered in ranks and files.
The four stallions were bold,
Bold yet well trained.
We relentlessly attacked the Hsien-yün,
Proceeding out to T'ai-yüan.
The cultured and martial Chi-fu,
Is an exemplar for the myriad states.

This multiverse paean confirms that mighty Chou were not simply reacting to some amorphous seminomadic border challenge when they initiated their campaign. Rather, they had once again been compelled to respond to a significant invasion, one mounted by the suddenly powerful Hsien-yün. From the fourth stanza it is clear the Hsien-yün force must have initially proceeded as far as Chiao-huo, about fifty miles slightly northwest of Hao on the northern bank of the Ching River, where they temporarily encamped before conducting a raiding campaign into the lower reaches of the Wei River Valley. The intriguing, perhaps irresolvable, question is how far their forces penetrated before being thwarted.

According to the ode, Hao and Fang were targeted. Fang's identity may be uncertain, but without doubt Hao should refer to the capital city constructed on the eastern side of the minor Ch'an River, twinned with Feng, on the opposite side of it, slightly to the southwest. If, as suggested, Fang refers to the earlier capital of P'ang, located somewhat further north, rather than Feng, there is little doubt it could have been overrun.⁷⁴⁶ However, there is no mention in the traditional historical accounts of Hao's being crushed before the debacle that would mark the end of the Western Chou and its location south of the Wei River would have compelled marauders to cross both the Ching and Wei Rivers to gain access to the fortified city. This would have been an enormously difficult task even in the absence of Chou defenses such as the archers that would certainly have been

deployed on the far banks because of the need to port their limited number of chariots across the waters' expanse.

Although the crucial line indicates the invaders "made an incursion" into Hao and Fang, the next line notes that they actually penetrated only as far as Ching-yang. Ching-yang can either be understood as the north side (*yang*) of the Ching River or as a place name referring to a specific location, still on the north bank, about twenty-five miles north of Hao, far short of their intended target. It therefore appears the intercession of centuries and poetic license resulted in terming the invasion an incursion into Fang and Hao, meaning simply the royal domain inhabited by the aristocracy rather than the actual city of Hao. ⁷⁴⁷

The Chou campaign under Yin Chi-fu (who is praised in the last two verses by Ch'ang Chung, the ode's likely author) employed a very limited chariot vanguard against tribal warriors who appear to have lacked them despite their commonality on the steppe for centuries. Yin Chi-fu succeeded in repelling the invaders and then pushing them back to T'ai-yüan, where, if they did not totally capitulate, they acknowledged Chou supremacy, thereby temporarily ending the fighting. Since T'ai-yüan's location has been identified as present day Ku-yüan in southern Ningxia, assuming the Chou's forces were assembled and dispatched from Ch'eng-chou (as indicated in the poem by their "return from Hao") the distance covered over the entire campaign would have been extensive. ⁷⁴⁸ Of particular note is the ode's report of their daily march being roughly thirty *li* or about thirteen miles (twenty kilometers), virtually identical with western experience over the centuries and well in accord with traditional Chinese estimates of feasible rates.

The inscription on the cover of a commemorative bronze vessel known as the *Hsi Chia P'an* fortuitously provides additional information about the campaign. ⁷⁴⁹ It states that in the third (rather than sixth) month of the king's fifth year (823 BCE), Hsi Chia (Yin Chi-fu) accompanied the king in an attack on the Hsien-yün at T'u-yü. Although this discrepancy can be reconciled in more than one way, if the date provided by the inscription is taken as fundamental (as it should be), it appears most likely that preparations for the campaign were initiated in the third month but extended over several months, with Yin Chi-fu's components not actually clashing with the enemy until after the sixth month.

The inscription also notes that this marked the first time the king went forth himself, somewhat complicating the otherwise straightforward depiction provided by the *Bamboo Annals*. Whether he proceeded all the way to the final target or simply exercised some sort of nominal leadership while leaving the actual battle command to

Yin Chi-fu cannot yet be determined. However, the inscription indirectly suggests that Yin garnered a significant victory because he was immediately appointed to regulate the tax collections in the four regions of Ch'eng Chou, a responsibility that encompassed the Southern Huai Yi, who had not been forwarding the expected tribute.

Two other *Shih Ching* odes that describe crucial aspects of Hsien-yün campaigns apparently refer to this expedition rather than an earlier one or another that extended across the king's eleventh and twelfth years. Apart from their preserving information valuable to the study of military history, they also movingly portray the misery and hardships suffered by ordinary soldiers and thus represent the first-known Chinese expressions of the discontent caused by the burdens of border service. "Ts'ai Wei" (Mao #167), generally translated as "Picking" or "Gathering Ferns," relies on vegetative imagery to allude to the painful passing of time:

Gathering ferns, gathering ferns,
Just as they sprout.
Over and over we speak about returning,
The year is nearly ended. 750
We have neither houses nor dwellings,
Because of the Hsien-yün,
We have no leisure to sit or remain.
Because of the Hsien-yün,

Gathering ferns, gathering ferns,
The ferns now tender.
Over and over we speak about returning,
Our hearts are mournful,
Our mournful hearts are sorely stressed.
We hunger and thirst,
Our border duty remains uncertain,
No one is dispatched with tidings home.

Gathering ferns, gathering ferns,
The ferns now tough.
Over and over we speak about returning,
The year turns to *yang* . 751
The king's affairs are unceasing,
We have no leisure to sit or remain

Our mournful hearts are severely distressed.
We venture forth but do not return.

What is now burgeoning?
The flowers of the cherry tree.
What is that upon the road?
The chariot of our commander. 752
His martial chariot already yoked
With four steeds spirited and robust,
Dare we settle or remain?
Three victories in a single month! 753
Well yoked are the four robust steeds,
Four steeds impatient and bold,
What our commander relies on,
What we menials protect. 754

Four steeds galloping in flight,
[Carrying] ivory tipped bows and seal skin bowcases,
Are they not ever martial?
The Hsien-yün are extremely troublesome.

Long ago when we commenced
The willow trees were vibrant and luxurious,
Now as we think of returning,
Rain and snow swirl about.
Tedious and slow our movement,
Bearing hunger, suffering thirst,
Our hearts ache with sorrow,
None know our grief.

Irrespective of who composed it and subsequent didactic misinterpretations, this ode provides a human face for the campaign and evidence that these early border expeditions were lengthy—at least nine months in this case—and onerous. The second ode associated with this effort is titled “Ch’u Ch’e” (Mao #168), “Sending forth our Chariots”:

We sent forth our chariots
Out to the pasture lands.

From the Son of Heaven,
The edict to come.
The quartermasters were summoned,
And ordered to load the chariots.
The king's affairs entail numerous difficulties,
Burdensome trouble lies ahead!

We sent forth our chariots
Out through the suburbs.
Here the [tortoise and snake] flags were set out,
And the ox-tails attached atop.
Didn't they and the [falcon] pennants
Flap vigorously!
Our mournful hearts are filled with anxiety,
The quartermasters are extremely haggard.

The king ordered Nan Chung
To go forth and wall this quarter.
The chariots rolled forth, *p'eng p'eng*
The [dragon, tortoise, and serpent] flags were resplendent.
The Son of Heaven has ordered us
To wall that northern quarter.
Nan Chung, terrifyingly awesome,
The Hsien-yün will be eliminated.

Long ago when we set out,
The sweet and ordinary millets had just flowered.
Now that we are coming back,
Rain and snow enmire the roads.
The king's affairs entailed numerous difficulties,
We had no leisure to sit or remain.
Didn't we long to return,
But feared the bamboo records. ⁷⁵⁵

Yao yao resound the grass borne insects,
While the grasshoppers jump about.
"Before we see our husbands, ⁷⁵⁶
Our mournful hearts palpitate,

Once we see our husbands
Our hearts will be quieted.”
Terrifyingly awesome was Nan Chung,
In intercepting and attacking the western Jung,

The spring days gradually lengthen,
Grass and trees fully awaken.
Orioles sing melodiously,
And groups gather Artemisia.
We took prisoners for interrogation and captured leaders,
Noisily we shout about returning.
Terrifyingly awesome was Nan Chung,
The Hsien-yün have been decimated!

Clearly the product of sorrow and hardship, the verses yet grudgingly acknowledge the need to actively vanquish peripheral enemies and thereby achieve the overarching purpose of protecting the state and the lengthy campaign is therefore once again described with an admixture of resignation and praise. Apart from Nan Chung's victory, the attempt to impede these incursions with a wall merits note. Whether an actual "wall" or simply an extended palisade, it would have been both physically and conceptually a precursor to similar imperial efforts undertaken against the steppe peoples and even by other states in the Warring States Period and thereafter. However, despite China's long tradition of massive wall building, no evidence has yet been discovered for such an early realization of the tactical practice of segmenting off external terrain.

One last ode, "Ti Tu" or "The Solitary Pear Tree" (Mao #169), thought to be related to the previous ones and the campaign against the Hsien-yün, gives voice to the lamentation of a soldier's wife:

The solitary pear tree
Has come to fruition.
The king's affairs are unceasing,
Ever entangling our days.
The sun and moon have entered *yang* ,
My female heart suffers,
[Hoping] that my warrior will have leave.

The solitary pear tree
Its leaves fully burgeon.

The king's affairs are unceasing,
My heart aches with sorrow.
The grass and trees flourish,
[But] my heart grieves,
[Hoping] that my warrior will return.

I climbed the northern hills
To pick the willows.
The king's affairs are unceasing,
I trouble over our parents.
His sandalwood chariot battered and worn,
His four steeds badly fatigued,
My warrior is not distant.

He hasn't appeared in his chariot,
My mournful heart is severely distressed.
The time has passed without his arrival,
Intensifying my anxiety.
Prognostication by the tortoise and stalks concur,
Concur in saying that he is near.
My warrior is near!

Because her husband had a chariot, the speaker must have been married to a man of noticeable rank. Assuming more than mere poetic license, she also had to be highly educated or have enjoyed access to prognosticators because she could consult both the tortoise shell and milfoil stalks.

According to the *Ancient Bamboo Annals*, King Hsüan's fifth year was marked by additional military activity: "In the eighth month of autumn, Fang Shu led the regiments in an attack on the Ching Man."⁷⁵⁷ In this case their target was the Man tribal people residing near Mount Ching in an area that would eventually become a vital northern part of the incipient state of Ch'u. The concluding line of "Gathering Millet" ("Ts'ai Ch'i," Mao #178) indicates its verses describe this campaign:

They were harvesting the millet
In the new fields
When Fang Shu approached
With three thousand chariots

And armies well experienced in weaponry.
Fang Shu led,
Driving his team of four variegated steeds,
Four variegated steeds galloping in flight.
In his great chariot of red,
With its bamboo compartment and seal skin bowcase,
And bronze-trimmed harness and reins.

They were harvesting the millet
In those new fields,
Around the central hamlets,
When Fang Shu approached.
His chariots were three thousand,
With banners of [dragons, tortoises, and serpents] resplendent,
And Fang Shu leading.
The naves were strengthened with leather, the cross piece studded
with bronze.
Clink clink went the metal links on the bits.
Garbed in his robe of appointment,
His red greaves [gleamed] majestic,
And the pale green jade pendants jangling.

Swiftly soars the hawk
As it flies about the sky
And then alights.
Fang Shu led
His chariots of three thousand
And armies well experienced in weaponry.
Fang Shu led,
The drummers beat out the cadence.
He deployed the armies and exhorted them.
Illustrious and dedicated Fang Shu.
His drums boomed heavily,
Stirring the armies with their rumbling.

Foolhardy the Ching Man
Antagonizing our great state.

Venerable and aged Fang Shu,
How capable and robust!
With Fang Shu leading,
We took prisoners for interrogation and captured leaders.
The war chariots pounded noisily forward,
Noisily pounded in their massiveness,
Like rolling thunder.
Illustrious and dedicated, Fang Shu,
Conducted a punitive expedition against the Hsien-yün.
Overawed, the Ching Man submitted.

Two aspects stand out in this lengthy, somewhat-repetitive but highly laudatory ode: the large number of chariots reportedly employed and the fact that rather than initiating a campaign of conquest as part of a strategic vision the Chou had again been compelled to respond to a foreign incursion. Because he was a well-proven commander, Fang Shu's deputation confirms that specialization had become well established, that certain officials and clan members respected for their martial expertise were being repeatedly chosen for field command even though many other candidates, including close royal relatives, might be available.

Although the details are irrecoverable, the Man must have been both formidable and troubling; otherwise, three thousand chariots, an astonishing and no doubt highly exaggerated number both logistically and fiscally, would never have been dispatched. ⁷⁵⁸ (In comparison, in the subsequent Spring and Autumn Period, the powerful state of Chin only employed seven hundred and eight hundred chariots at the famous battles of Ch'eng-p'u and An respectively. Eight hundred have also been credited to Duke Huan of Ch'i, China's first hegemon, and several hundred chariots to King Hsüan at the hunting exercise in which he perished.) ⁷⁵⁹ It might therefore be speculated that one or another of the figures comprising "three thousand" is in error. Either the number "three" should be "two" or "one," or the Chinese character for "thousand" should be a "hundred," producing the very reasonable and highly probable number of three hundred chariots. However, because the characters for "hundred" and "thousand" do not resemble each other, any such error would have to be conceptual or mnemonic rather than transcriptional.

The king's sixth year was similarly marked by aggressive external campaigns: "Duke Mu of Shao led the regiments to attack the Huai Yi." A *Shih Ching* ode whose title combines the names of two great Chinese rivers, "Chiang Han" (Mao #262), celebrates his

battlefield achievements:

The Chiang and Han coursed vigorously,
Our warriors surged massively forth.
Without rest or diversion,
We had come to seek the Huai Yi.
Once we sent forth our chariots
And set out our falcon pennants,
We neither rested nor relaxed,
As we deployed against the Huai Yi.

The Chiang and Han roiled and swirled,
The warriors' spirit fervently bristled.
We tramped and encamped through the four quarters
And reported our achievement to the king.
The four quarters being already pacified,
The royal state was nearly settled.
For now free from conflict,
The king's mind was at peace.

Additional verses, here omitted, record the subsequent conferring of honors and the duke's salubrious response, all properly decorous as well as evidence of how investiture ceremonies emphasized the honoree's participation in the Chou's heritage, validating and reconnecting him with the early martial events that founded and shaped the dynasty. Because Duke Mu was a direct descendent of the famous Duke of Shao, these ties were readily made and loyalties easily reinforced.

Embedded in the first part of the third stanza are several lines of particular interest: "At the confluence of the Chiang and Han, / The king charged Shao Hu, /

'Open the four quarters, / Demark the borders of our terrain, / Neither inflicting misery nor affliction.'" The idea of beneficent though authoritarian government, of avoiding interference in the people's lives and livelihood, found throughout the classic military writings of later centuries as well as in Confucian doctrine, is thus voiced here, as well as in the ode "Ch'ang Wu" translated below. A retrospective musing, it yet encapsulates the early Chou thrust to emphasizing the welfare of the people in claiming the mandate.

The *Shih Yüan Kuei* (JC4313), ⁷⁶⁰ a vessel cast by an army commander (*shih*) surnamed Yüan who was rewarded for his efforts

in the campaign, indicates the Chou reacted to a combination of incursions and perceived threats. Apart from their effrontery in attacking core Chou domain, the Huai Yi are again said to have been insufficiently respectful and submissive. This prompted the king to order Shih Yüan to lead contingents from Ch'i and several minor eastern states located in Shandong, including Chi and Lai, in conjunction with elite warriors from the Tiger Guard to conduct a punitive campaign and neutralize certain designated chiefs. ⁷⁶¹ (The appointment of a central government official to command locally raised clan forces provides evidence these states still respected the king's authority in military matters.)

Shih Yüan's efforts must have been successful because the vessel commemorates the capture of male warriors, women, cattle, and sheep; the seizure of a quantity of "auspicious metal" (bronze); and of course the slaying of the enemy. Despite his being only a subordinate commander, Shih Yüan thus personally directed a large coalition force. Even though many of the Chou's core forces were about to be diverted for a royal campaign against the Hsü Jung, the employment of these disparate contingents implies that whether due to internal issues or exhaustion from extensive campaigning, the central government's military power was waning. However, irrespective of the participation of the Tiger Guards (probably to act as a spirited core or spearhead the attack), simplistic conclusions should be avoided because the king may have simply co-opted forces from among better positioned feudal forces to quash the threat. At the same time, just as in Ch'i's earlier effort, the absence of the advantageously em-placed Eight Yin Armies is somewhat inexplicable unless they had already been earmarked for the Hsü Jung effort.

A *Bamboo Annals* entry for King Hsüan's sixth year indicates that royal forces, under the king's personal direction, did in fact become otherwise engaged in the east: "The king led his armies to attack the Hsü Jung. Huang Fu and Hsiu Fu accompanied the king in his attack on the Hsü Jung and they encamped on the Huai River. When he returned from attacking the Hsü, the king gave a testamentary mandate to Duke Mu." ⁷⁶² "Ch'ang Wu," the "Constant Martial," one of two *Shih Ching* odes attributed to the formidable Duke Mu, glowingly describes their efforts: ⁷⁶³

In awesome and glorious fashion,
The king ordered his *ch'ing-shih* [minister],
Nan Chung's descendant,
The *T'ai-shih* Huang Fu,
"Order my six armies

And prepare our martial implements.
Be respectful and wary,
Bespread our beneficence among the southern states.”

The king addressed Yin Shih,
Instructing him to order Hsiu Fu, the duke of Ch'eng,
“Advance the forces in left and right flanks
And admonish the contingents.
Lead them along the banks of the Huai,
Conduct a punitive reconnaissance of the Hsü-fang.”
Neither delaying nor tarrying,
The three affairs proceeded apace.

Awesome and severe,
How formidable the Son of Heaven!
Constrained and composed the king arose,
Neither disordered nor distracted,
The Hsü-fang were successively perturbed.
He shook and terrified the Hsü-fang,
Just like thunder's shock or long rumbling.
The Hsü-fang were shaken and terrified.

The king roused our martial power,
His anger like the trembling of earth.
The Tiger Warriors advanced at the fore,
As fierce as roaring tigers.
We deployed heavily along the Huai's banks,
And seized the enemy chiefs.
Ensconced on the shores of the Huai,
Encamped did the royal armies.

The royal troops thundered noisily along,
As if flying and soaring.
Like the Chiang and Han,
Like the mountains' solidity.
A stream flowing
Unbroken and unmeasured,
Unfathomable and invincible,

Punitively sweeping through the Hsü-fang.

The king's intent brought to fruition,

The Hsü-fang submitted.

The Hsü-fang being brought into the fold,

An achievement of the Son of Heaven.

The four quarters now pacified,

The Hsü-fang came to court,

They would not again vacillate.

The king told [us] to return.

Whether Duke Mu would have had the leisure or information to compose this poem might be doubted since he was presumably directing the southern campaign against the Huai Yi at this time. Self-glorification always a strong motive, perhaps another of the named participants, possibly Yin Chih-fu (who is known to have been a writer from two other poems) penned the verses. Irrespective of the authorship it is immediately apparent this campaign against the southeast coalition under the state of Hsü (referred to in the old Shang style of Hsü-fang) was conceived and mounted as a major military enterprise because six armies and several important commanders participated.

The concept of restrained movement, of not campaigning to seize territory and avoiding burdening the people by interfering with the agricultural seasons, is prominent, as is the importance of maintaining proper formation, ideas subsequently seen in the classic Warring States military writing known as the *Ssu-ma Fa*, though not necessarily observed in practice. The ode informatively indicates the army was neither massed together, which would have made movement and foraging difficult, nor deployed in disordered lines. They therefore must have moved in segmented but well-ordered groups, under the discipline attested by China's lengthy military heritage.

The factor of awesomeness, of inspiring fear and trembling in the enemy, coupled with the elite Tiger Guards' much feared ferocity shows the psychological impact achieved by the king's armies in the hinterlands and at least partially explains their ability to compel, though not without extensive armed clashes, the submission of coalition leaders. ⁷⁶⁴ Nevertheless, the campaign's ostensible purpose seems to have been "giving comfort to the states of the South" rather than simply conquering distant regions. Because the *Chü Fu Hsü Kai* (JC 4464) indicates that peaceful relations had been reestablished and a mission to collect tribute returned successfully, it must have had a

major impact.

Although both the *Bamboo Annals* and *Shih Chi* are bereft of entries until the king's thirty-third year, the *Kuo Chi Tzu Po P'an* (JC 10173) and *Pu Ch'i Kuei Kai* (JC 4328) describe a multistage concerted effort that was undertaken against the Hsien-yün after a six-year hiatus. ⁷⁶⁵ In a campaign that apparently extended from one year to the next, late in the king's eleventh year, Kuo Po was entrusted with overall command of a strike intended to stem Hsien-yün incursions upon the Western Yü. His initial thrust proved so successful he returned to the capital to personally present the plunder and captives to the king and no doubt garner whatever honors and glory might accrue before the auspicious moment had passed.

According to the *Kuo Chi Tzu Po P'an*, having been ordered to pursue the Hsien-yün westward, Tzu Po penetrated the steppe and ranged widely in four border areas where he was generally victorious. In addition, his forces attacked them north of the Luo River, killed five hundred and took fifty prisoners, obviously imprecise figures that nevertheless reflect the usual, low-prisoner ratio. His rewards from the king are noted as having included horses, a bow with decorated arrows, and a *yüeh* axe, which symbolized his authority over the "barbarian" lands. Before returning he apparently ordered his nephew Pu Ch'i to control the forward strongpoint and employ his own chariot forces to press the attack in the highlands. Pu Ch'i is recorded as having been similarly successful, "slaying the enemy and seizing prisoners for interrogation" in the usual formulaic phrase, despite suffering an attack.

The *Pu Ch'i Kuei* provides further information that indicates Pu Ch'i's success was not easily won nor without reversals. Although (according to the *Kuo Chi Tzu Po P'an*) he did not lose any chariots, in the ninth month of the succeeding year Pu Ch'i who had been securing the area around Luo, went forth to mount a sweeping attack against the Hsien-yün at Kao-t'ao and wrested a significant victory. Although the vigor of his attack apparently resulted in his lines being overextended, Pu Ch'i still managed to emerge victorious after a fierce engagement in which the enemy's intense counterattack had nearly overwhelmed them. His personal rewards included the usual bow and a quiver of arrows, as well as some servants and fields.

In addition to interceding in matters of succession in the increasingly independent feudal states, ⁷⁶⁶ in his thirty-third year (795 BCE) King Hsüan suffered the first of what would prove to be an extended series of military setbacks: "The king's regiments attacked the Jung at T'ai-yüan but didn't conquer them." A set of sixteen bells with continuous inscriptions amounting to over three hundred characters recently recovered from a tomb at T'ien-ma Ch'ü-ts'un in

Shanxi in the former Chou state of Chao provides evidence that a major, successful campaign was also mounted. ⁷⁶⁷ Commencing late in the year and extending over seven months, it was ostensibly prompted by the king's desire to *sheng*—conduct a reconnaissance in force and impose military solutions—in the eastern region, ⁷⁶⁸ a somewhat surprising area of interest given its comparative quiescence. Although conducted under his nominal command, most of the actual fighting was undertaken by forces from Chin led by Su, the Lord (*hou*) or Marquis of Chin, otherwise identified as Earl Hsien.

Emanating from Tsung Chou, the core imperial armies initially proceeded eastward on foot to Ch'eng Chou where they were joined by Chin's forces. Immediately thereafter they continued their easterly advance to a place called Han where the king ordered Earl Hsien to turn left and proceed northward with his segmented forces to attack the first objective, the state of Su, reportedly of the surname of Feng but members of the Tung Yi. ⁷⁶⁹ Following an engagement in which they apparently vanquished the enemy, slaying 120 and capturing twenty-three, Hsien was ordered to proceed from the northwest to the vicinity of Hsün-ch'eng where the king was already exercising a supervisory role and then proceed to “destructively attack” the city.

In compliance, Earl Hsien led selected units from his command in an assault on Hsün that ultimately resulted in another hundred Yi casualties and eleven prisoners. (The ratio of slain to captured suggests that either the Chou forces sought to annihilate the enemy and were therefore disinterested in capturing burdensome prisoners or that the enemy was fighting to the death.) The strike's vehemence apparently caused the Yi to flee, prompting the king to try to exploit the victory by providing Earl Hsien with imperial chariot troops to pursue and seize them, an unusual delegation of command over royal troops to a fief lord. ⁷⁷⁰ Hsien's own forces slew another 110 and captured twenty. Perhaps because chariot contingents excel at pursuit, the imperial contingents performed even better, killing one hundred fifty and capturing sixty, bringing the total for the campaign to 480 slain and 114 captured.

Han has generally been identified with Fan-hsien, which is located in the western part of Shandong province some three hundred fifty kilometers east of Luoyang, while Hsün is believed have been sited at modern Yün-ch'eng, about 410 kilometers out. ⁷⁷¹ The 430-kilometer trek from Tsung Chou to Ch'eng Chou apparently required thirty-nine or forty days—possibly only thirty depending upon inscriptional errors—and the actual campaigns and engagements on site consumed about twenty days, with thirty-seven days probably being required to reach Han. The campaign thus extended across seven months, a rather long time considering the limited scope of

battle and low casualty-per-clash ratio, evidence that the opposition numbered in the hundreds rather than thousands and thus were more likely local Yi components instead of larger contingents ensconced in a regional center or a coalition force fielded by an alliance.

The inscription raises questions about the king's intent and objectives. The sparse account basically suggests that, until being suborned to the Earl of Chin, the royal troops basically stood off and let the forces from the subordinate states take all the risk, perhaps evidence that it might have been a test of loyalty, a manifestation of the king's desire to display his authority, an attempt to reduce Chin's power, simply a show of force to convince the eastern Yi to remain subservient, or possibly a combination of any—or even all—of these. Since Hsün-ch'eng must have been a fortified town, it would have required an early form of urban assault to reduce, an expensive undertaking certain to result in heavy casualties. Chin's unhesitant response to this summons has generally been interpreted as evidence that the fief lords remained obedient, but Chin's effectiveness in its assigned role clearly shows that its military power had been growing.

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Although Su (Earl Hsien) would twice receive imperial rewards, somewhat surprisingly they were mostly symbolic, consisting of eight horses, a bow with a hundred arrows, and some wine. Not having received any bronze with which to create a new vessel but wanting to commemorate the event, he apparently decided to integrate three different sets of bells into an ad hoc group, explaining why the continuous inscription was actually "inscribed" onto the finished vessels rather than cast in. It might also be noted that no forces were requisitioned from the state of Ch'i despite its martial heritage and relative proximity to the target area. Perhaps King Hsüan feared lingering enmity because King Yi had boiled their ruler, felt they were too independent to respond, or deemed them too dangerous to employ.

In his thirty-eighth year, "the king's regiments, in alliance with Duke Mu of Chin, attacked the T'iao Jung and Pen Jung. The king's regiments were defeated and fled." In this case the Chou carried the battle to two Jung groups and inauspiciously mounted an attack at T'iao, generally believed to be Ming-t'iao in the northwest part of Shanxi around Chung-t'iao Mountain where legend holds that the Shang defeated the Hsia centuries earlier.

The very next year, "the king's regiments attacked the Chiang Jung and engaged them in battle at Ch'ien-mou. The king's regiments fled in defeat." This encounter with the Chiang Jung, in itself puzzling because the Chiang had been so closely identified with the very founding of the Chou Dynasty, appears in both the *Shih Chi* and *Kuo-*

yü . In fact, the *Shih Chi* , which strangely fails to include any other battle accounts for King Hsüan's reign, summarizes the clash thusly: "They engaged in battle at Ch'ien-mou where the king's regiments were severely defeated by the Chiang tribe of the Jung." ⁷⁷³ Coincidentally, Ch'ien-mou was the site where the Chou kings normally undertook the ritual plowing that symbolized their connection with the land and initiated the agricultural year, the very ceremony that King Hsüan had, for unknown reasons, adamantly refused to perform.

According to at least one authority, Fang Shu's campaign against the Man, conventionally dated to the king's fifth year, actually unfolded in the thirty-ninth. ⁷⁷⁴ The inscription on the *Ni Pien Chung* memorializes Duke Ni of Ch'u (often identified as the early Ch'u king known as Hsiung Eh) offering sacrifice to the four quarters and then ordering the casting of bells that reportedly employed ninety thousand *chün* of bronze. (Calculated as equivalent to about five to six hundred metric tons, even if exaggerated, the quantity is still astonishing, not the least because Ch'u reportedly had few copper mines at the time.) The bell has been ascribed to the first decade of the eighth century since Duke Ni only reigned from 799 to 791, with 799, 797, and 793 being suggested as possible dates. After apparently being captured by Chou forces campaigning in Ch'u in King Hsüan's thirty-ninth year, it was awarded to Duke Mu of Chin for his success in having attacked the Pei Jung at Feng-hsi in the preceding year. ⁷⁷⁵

Whether this is the campaign traditionally but perhaps erroneously dated to the fifth year or, as seems more likely, an additional one undertaken in the thirty-ninth, a strike into the south at this late date well coheres with known developments. This same year, the Chou had used armies from the southern limits of its domain to attack the Jung in the northwest where "they fought at Ch'ien-mu and the king's armies were badly defeated by the Chiang Jung." This dire result left a gap in the southern defenses that enticed Ch'u, which had been quiescent since King Li's era, to "rebel," prompting an expedition to quash them. ⁷⁷⁶

The king's fortieth year was noteworthy not because of the additional defeats that were suffered but for the king's "numbering the people in T'ai-yüan." Apparently the first such enumeration, it must have classified the people at the northern perimeter according to their potential for service as soldiers and labor conscripts. ⁷⁷⁷ Imposed over the objections of high officials such as Chung-shan Fu in what was essentially a barbarian region that had again, if tenuously, come under Chou control, this measure is said to have been necessitated by the major Chou defeat in which the king lost his southern regiments. ⁷⁷⁸ It can only be concluded that the bedraggled state of the Chou's armies

made levying minority peoples essential, whatever the potential problems of controlling them.

The fortieth year concluded with the dismal news that “the Chiang people 779 had extinguished the city of (the Earl of) Chiang” but also heartening reports of Chin victory over the Northern Jung at Fen-hsi, the Marshes of Fen. (This victory provides further evidence of Chin’s escalating military capability.) The forty-first year 780 continued in similar disheartening fashion with the king’s regiments being defeated in Shen, but the *Ku-pen Bamboo Annals* asserts that “the next year, the king conducted a punitive expedition against the Shen Jung and smashed them.” 781

A horde of vessels recently recovered from Yang-chia-ts’un in Mei-hsien, Shaanxi that probably date to the end of King Hsüan’s reign includes four with lengthy, highly informative inscriptions that record further martial activity in the final years of his era: the *Lai P’an* and two *ting* named for their dates, the 42nd Year (*Ssu-shih-erh-nien*) *Lai Ting* and 43rd Year (*Ssu-shih-san-nien*) *Lai Ting*. 782 (The *Lai P’an* inscription contains an astounding 372 characters; the 42nd Year 280 characters; and the 43rd Year slightly more at 316.) Through a summary retelling of ancestral contributions the *Lai P’an* essentially confirms the validity of the *Shih Chi*’s sequence of Chou kings and provides evidence that, beginning with Tan Kung at the dynasty’s inception, the clan’s members held high rank and performed otherwise unrecorded important functions including undertaking military responsibility under a total of twelve kings. (Tan Kung had the surname Chi, the Chou clan name, so they must have been part of the extended clan system rather than members of the Chiang or other non-Chou group.) In aggregate, the inscriptions show they participated in the conquest of the Shang, were ordered to attack the Jung Ti in the north and the Hsien-yün, were active in a southern expedition against Ch’u Ching, and were deputed to govern the Chou *pang* (states).

Despite traditional assertions that the Hsien-yün were no longer considered a menace in King Hsüan’s reign, the 42nd Year *Lai Ting* indicates the caster participated in an external campaign against them that resulted in victories at Ching-a and Li-ch’üeh. He then supported Chang Fu in exploiting these victories and showed considerable zeal in thoroughly defeating the Hsien-yün at Kung-ku (Bow Valley), where in the usual praiseworthy fashion, they slew the enemy, captured prisoners, and seized vessels, chariots, and horses. Not only does this campaign, dated to 786 BCE, not appear in any of the normally employed historical sources, but the range of Hsien-yün activity, previously confined to the Ching River and Northern Luo basins, seems to have expanded greatly since they crossed the Yellow River into Chin-nan. 783

There are no further entries of martial interest in the *Bamboo Annals* for King Hsüan's reign, and the final one simply notes his death in his forty-sixth year. Later tradition holds that he ignominiously perished, having been assassinated during a hunting expedition by the ghost of Tu Po, a righteous man he imperiously executed three years earlier. ⁷⁸⁴ If the story holds any truth at all, the assassin must have been Tu Po's son or some disgruntled Chou clan member appropriately garbed as a ghost.

Several other *Shih Ching* odes have traditionally been viewed as descriptive of King Hsüan's actions and conditions in his era. Two already reprised, "Liu Yüeh" and "Ts'ai Ch'i," ⁷⁸⁵ pertain to attacks on the Hsien-yün, while two others ("Ch'e Kung" and "Chi Jih") ⁷⁸⁶ respectively describe the glories of massive hunts performed at Ch'eng Chou and back in the vicinity of the capital at Hao. Among the remaining few that praise or criticize him, most lack any innate connection with his rule. However, "Yün Han" ⁷⁸⁷ speaks of the misery inflicted by a severe drought and three others decry the hardship associated with unremitting military service.

The three short verses of "Chien-chien chih Shih" basically bemoan the difficulty of traversing inhospitable terrain during a punitive expedition to the east. ⁷⁸⁸ More interestingly, "Chi Fu," Mao #185, addressed to the high military officer of that title, was supposedly written late in Hsüan's ever-deteriorating reign, perhaps after the thirty-ninth year, by a member of the elite guards who had become unhappy at being dispatched on some campaign. If so, it would contravene normal expectation because privileged warriors might grumble among themselves, but the soldier's macho ethos normally prevents expressions of hopelessness and despair.

Chi Fu! We are the king's claws and teeth,
Why have you cast us into this pitiful state,
With nowhere to stop or dwell?

Chi Fu! We are clawed warriors,
Why have you cast us into this pitiful state?
With nowhere to halt?

Chi Fu! You are truly opaque!
Why have you cast us into this pitiful state?
So that we cannot nurture our mothers?

Far more poignantly "Ho Ts'ao Pu Huang" or "What Grass Hasn't Yellowed?" plaintively bemoans the constant toil that had to be endured during King Hsüan's unremitting military expeditions to the

What grass hasn't yellowed?
What day do we not proceed?
What man isn't under command,
Campaigning in the four quarters?

What grass hasn't blackened,
What man not solitary? 790
Grievous the lot of we warriors on punitive expeditions,
Are we alone not men?

Neither rhinoceroses nor tigers,
Yet we are led to these desolate expanses.
Grievous the lot of we warriors on punitive expeditions
And rest neither morning nor night.

Hardship being an expected aspect of military service, the surprising vehemence of their discontent presumably stemmed from unusually inimical conditions.

Geostrategic Initiatives

As part of his strategy to strengthen the state against perceived threats, King Hsüan shifted or reinstituted at least three fiefs—Shen, Han, and Cheng—as well as perhaps Lü whose claimed realignment in King Mu's reign is dubious. In addition, it has traditionally, though probably incorrectly, been thought that Kuo, a state with dual origins and several archaeologically attested locations, also migrated eastward as well as southward during King Hsüan's reign rather than King Yu's or King P'ing's. Just as at the dynasty's inception, experienced commanders rather than high-ranking civil officials were chosen to bear responsibility for militarily and administratively securing the new area. Whether formally titled *Po* or not, they were essentially military governors with comparatively august authority over subordinate entities as well as briefs to culturally transform the supposedly benighted peoples about them. Some were even referred to as kings within their own realms even though this title would never be formally awarded to any Chou clan member during the Western Chou Period, only usurped by Ch'u.

Despite the extensive labor and material commitment entailed in establishing these fiefs, three odes in the *Shih Ching* provided the only indication of the radical changes for two millennia. Two of them are attributed to the famous commander Yin Chi-fu, but they are unlikely

to be contemporary compositions. Nevertheless, they seem to preserve important historical vestiges and give a sense of the effort involved, especially “Sung Kao” (Mao #259), which depicts the founding of the fortified enclave of Shen that probably followed the victory achieved in Hsüan’s forty-first year. It would be located at Nan-yang, just above Tan-yang, out on the periphery at the transition point to the south where Chou forces could directly confront potential invaders as well as control east-west movement:

Mount Sung, high and lofty,
Its peak soars to Heaven.
From those heights a spirit descended,
And gave birth to Fu and Shen.
Shen and Fu,
The pillars of Chou.
Defensive hedges for the states,
And bastions against the four quarters.

Unwearying, the Duke of Shen.
The king continued his responsibility,
In the fortified city in Hsieh
Where he was a pattern for the southern states.
The king charged the Duke of Shao, ⁷⁹¹
To establish the Duke of Shen’s dwellings
So that he could proceed to the southern region
And for generations take hold of the task.

The king issued a mandate to the Duke of Shen,
“Be a pattern to the southern region
And employ the men of Hsieh
To raise your bastion.”
The king issued a mandate to the Duke of Shao,
To plot the land into fields for the Duke of Shen.
And issued a mandate to [Shen’s] chief steward
To move the family there.

The king dispatched the Duke of Shen
A great chariot and team of horses.
“I have planned your location,

Nowhere would be better than southern terrain.
I bestow a great jade scepter upon you
To augment your majesty.
Go forth royal uncle,
And preserve our southern lands.”

After the Duke of Shen set the date for venturing forth,
The king feasted him at Mei.
The Duke of Shen then turned to the south,
To Hsieh he indeed returned.
The king had ordered the Duke of Shao
To demark the plots for the Duke of Shen
In order to begin accumulating provisions
And his travel expedited.

The Duke of Shen, in martial splendor,
Entered Hsieh.
His infantry and charioteers pounded forward,
And all the states throughout the Chou were pleased.
“Our defense has a strong pillar,”
Isn’t the Duke of Shen illustrious?
The king’s great uncle,
An exemplar of culture and the martial.

The Duke of Shen’s Virtue,
Is pliant, gracious, and straightforward.
He will subdue the myriad states
And be known throughout the kingdom.

Even though the verses clearly show that both defensive and transformative responsibilities were assigned to the Lord of Shen, the most noteworthy aspect is the delegation of the city’s engineering and construction to the Duke (earl) of Shao. “Shu Miao,” Mao #227, another ode generally—but without any basis—considered to be a veiled criticism of the Western Chou’s last king and purportedly written in the voice of one of the ordinary participants, actually describes the Duke of Shao’s deputation to oversee the town’s construction:

Lushly sprouts the millet

Nurtured by the seasonal rain.

Anxious and troubled about our southward progression.

The Duke of Shao was encouraging and solicitous.

We shouldered [our loads] and advanced the carts,

Drove our chariots and ox wagons.

When our mission is finished,

We can speak about return.

We marched and rode,

Our armies and clan forces.

When our mission is finished,

We can speak about return.

Solemn and strict our efforts at Hsieh.

The Duke of Shao supervised the work.

Vigorous and energetic our expeditionary force.

The Duke of Shao brought it to completion.

The plains and marshes were cultivated,

Springs and streams were cleared.

Merit accrued to the Duke of Shao,

And the king's mind was at peace.

The verses indicate that the fundamental effort was entrusted to the army. The earl's troops (and whatever other skilled and support personnel accompanied the expedition) transported the essential materials in a variety of ways ranging from simply carrying them to conveying them in ox-powered wagons. Once on site, they leveled the land and cleared and channeled the waterways. Moreover, the verses confirm that the Duke of Shao arranged for the workers and provisions and supervised the construction itself. In conjunction with information preserved in "Sung Kao," it becomes clear that the Lord of Shen, subsequently termed a Duke (Po), did not actually take up residence until the fortifications and other crucial aspects were complete. ⁷⁹²

This process thus markedly differed from the early practice of simply granting someone a fief out in the hinterland and ordering them to establish a Chou strong-point with their dependents and personal forces. Creating new colonies required strategic foresight, tactical and logistical planning, and a determination to overcome significant obstacles, including those hindering the transportation of

goods and provisions. Somewhat warmer temperatures had to be endured in the south and the area's more luxuriant vegetation, a major impediment to travel in the relatively undeveloped countryside and an annoying obstacle when clearing fields for agriculture, laboriously battled.

Many scholars believe that the process of granting and revising of fiefs was more oriented to allocating people than apportioning land but the ode "Sung Kao" indicates a significant degree of precision in employing maps and exploiting the terrain. It also provides evidence of continuity in military responsibility because the Lord of Shen was required to thwart southern incursions and oversee the defense of the perimeter much as he had in the west. ⁷⁹³ (The fifth stanza notes that he was charged to be a "*nan-t'u shih pao* " or a "protector of the southern terrain.") In addition, he was expected to impose order on the contiguous minor states. Although later advocates of the efficacy of Virtue might believe that the duke should have been some sort of moral exemplar and attracted the recalcitrant through the radiance of his Virtue alone, he clearly was authorized to subjugate them by force if civil measures should fail. Whether Shen had been provided with adequate power to impose Chou sovereignty or their paltry forces were merely sufficient to annoy nearby entities is another question.

No doubt the king's faith in the duke of Shen's loyalty and his confidence in the latter's ability were bolstered by their familial relationship, the duke being an "uncle" of the king because the Shen clan had furnished a consort either to King Hsüan or his father, as they would to King Yu. Clearly he would not have wanted to create another Lord of Eh by empowering a potentially dangerous enemy on the porous periphery. Similar expectations no doubt applied to Fu, a name taken as referring to Lü, a state that had long furnished prominent military commanders whose names remain visible on several imposing bronze vessels. Unfortunately, no similar ode exists in praise of Lü's transfer.

The most important stanza in "Han Yi," an ode reputedly prompted by Han's establishment, describes a scene reminiscent of the "Sung Kao" but set in the colder country of the north: ⁷⁹⁴

Expansive the walls at Han,
Erected by the regiments of Yen,
Because his ancestor had received a mandate
To oversee the hundred Man.
The king [now] bestowed on the lord of Han,
The Chui and Muo.
Thereafter he was to hold the northern states

And act as their duke.

He solidified his walls and deepened the moat,

Delineated farmland and confirmed the registers.

Commentators have been somewhat divided on Han's location, claims being made that it fell into the interstice between Ch'in and Chin or even Tsung Chou and Ch'eng Chou, but it almost certainly was established more or less northwest of Yen. The mandate to bring order to the disordered peoples, the *pai Man* or hundred Man of the rugged northern region in the manner of his distinguished ancestors, is but one similarity with the Lord of Shen's appointment. Once again forces from the formidable state of Yen were ordered to undertake the physical task of erecting a suitable bastion. Perhaps because of their stalwart performance over the centuries in anchoring the northeast and the heritage of the Duke of Shao in fulfilling the role of *T'ai Pao*, Yen clearly played a pivotal role in King Hsüan's strategic conception. Whether they regarded the imposition of these responsibilities as a cause for jubilation or simply an expensive burden is another question.

Although Shen and Han were thus established in peripheral, even somewhat contested territory, neither was an entirely new creation. As a result dual states with identical designations came to exist simultaneously. Han, which would eventually be assimilated by increasingly powerful Chin, seems to have been the reconfirmation of the lord of Han at a splinter site. Clearly a man of some significance, he is praised in the ode for possessing a hundred chariots, a clan force strong enough to comprise an effective operational contingent as already seen in clashes with the Huai Yi, and is otherwise described in glowing terms.

Shen and Lü have somewhat more complex histories. Analysts have proposed diametrically opposed points of origination for Lü: Shandong in the east and the upper Wei / Ching River Valley amid the mountains in southern Ningxia where their presence in a frontier zone marked by frequent conflict would have compelled them to battle to survive. Although their shift is rather puzzling because the clan had been prominent in military affairs, their final location near Nan-yang, essentially in a cluster with Shen and probably the transposed state of Kuo where they would have well positioned to act as a bulwark against southern incursions, has been confirmed by numerous archaeological discoveries.

In contrast, most of the controversy over Shen's origination stems from whether it was located slightly west of Tsung Chou within the greater Wei River Valley or in the mountains of the upper Ching River area, as with Lü. Somewhat more complicated is the question of

what portion of the populace remained in Western Shen after the Lord of Shen, presumably with most of his extended family and the clan's forces, moved to their new location near Nan-yang. Given his pivotal role in the debacle that would end the Western Chou, the nature of this segmentation and Shen's "second creation" remain important questions that will be discussed again in the context of King Yu's reign.

King Hsüan also revitalized the area known as Cheng, previously an important Chou political and cultural center, for strategic reasons and appointed his younger brother Yu to rule over it as Duke Huan in his twenty-second year.⁷⁹⁵ Although the fief would be centered near Hua-hsien in Shaanxi, it stretched across the northern and northeastern parts of Ch'ien-yang, northern part of Feng-hsiang, northeast Lin-yu, westward to Lung-hsien, and southern part of Ling-t'ai in Gansu.⁷⁹⁶ As shown by the *Tuo Yu Ting*, Cheng effectively blocked one possible Hsien-yün approach and could screen as well as sustain the Tsung Chou area. However, unlike the case of Shen, Duke Huan assumed authority over an extant city and a comparatively strong indigenous group known as the Cheng whose clans had preexisted the Chou conquest and were found in disparate locations across Shaanxi.

Despite its importance to the Chou's forward defenses, the polity only remained at the western end of the Wei River Valley for a mere three decades before migrating eastward. Most of the Chou nobility inhabiting the Wei River Valley would eventually seek (or be compelled) to escape the confines of Kuan-chung and follow King P'ing after Tsung Chou's destruction and King Yu's demise, yet Cheng's history is unique. Rather than being transplanted at imperial behest, the state was essentially reconstituted through Duke Huan's own initiative when he became troubled by the precarious political situation and formulated a farsighted plan to ensconce the populace population in a suitable refuge. A lengthy Warring States story found in the *Kuo Yü* describes these developments but its validity remains uncertain even though it well coheres with subsequent historical developments and reflects the sort of subversive thinking that emerged in the Spring and Autumn Period.⁷⁹⁷

Ssu-ma Ch'ien provided a briefer retelling (here further abridged) of the tale right at the beginning of his chapter on Cheng:

Duke Huan of Cheng, named Yu, was the youngest son of King Li of the Chou and King Hsüan's half brother. When King Hsüan had been established for twenty-two years, Yu was initially enfeoffed at Cheng. He was thirty-three when he was enfeoffed and the hundred surnames all came to love him. King Yu appointed him

as *Ssu T'u* (Minster of the People). He harmonized and assembled the Chou people and they were all pleased. Between the Yellow and Luo Rivers everyone began to embrace him.

When he had been the *Ssu T'u* for a year the royal palace suffered frequent perversions because of King Yu's [infatuation with] Pao Ssu. Many of the nobles rebelled against him. At this point Duke Huan inquired of the *Grand Scribe* Po: "As there are many problems in the royal palace, where can I avoid death?"

The *Grand Scribe* replied: "You can only settle in territory east of the Luo [River] and south of the Yellow and Chi Rivers."

When the duke then asked why, he responded, "That land is near Kuo and K'uai. 798 The rulers of Kuo and K'uai are greedy and love profit so the hundred surnames are not submissive. Right now you are the *Ssu T'u* and the hundred surnames all love you. If you were to sincerely request [permission] to live there, seeing your upright management of affairs the rulers of Kuo and K'uai would easily segment off some terrain and give it to you. If you sincerely inhabit it the people of Kuo and K'uai will become your people."

The duke went on to inquire about other areas including the south above the Chiang (Yangtze) River and the west, none of which proved suitable. In the case of the south *Shih* Po expected the state of Ch'u, which had a heritage of accomplishment, to rise with the Chou's decline whereas in the west "the people are greedy and love profit so it would be difficult to dwell there for long." (Although an identical malady, in the rulers of Kuo and K'uai greed became an exploitable chink, but in the populace at large portended nothing but unruliness.) Even the minor state of T'ang was expected to flourish because its terrain imposed stimulating constraints.

The *Shih Chi* concludes its account by noting that the Duke then "persuaded the king to let him move the inhabitants of his fief east of the Luo. Kuo and K'uai did indeed present him with ten cities that he made into a state." Although unstated, the assumption must be that Duke Huan had generously bribed the two opaque leaders. Nevertheless, most of the portrait is couched in terms of Duke Huan's Virtue and as retold by *Ssu-ma Ch'ien* the tale focuses on someone just seeking to preserve his people by gaining the willing permission of others and then attracting the local support essential to survival.

In contrast, Po's analysis of the area bounded by the Chi, Luo, Yellow, and Ying Rivers in the *Kuo Yü* depicts a fundamentally sinister methodology and far darker purpose: "Among the states of the princes there Kuo and K'uai are the largest. Kuo-shu relies upon strategic power, K'uai-chung relies upon their constricted terrain. They both

have arrogant, extravagant, and insolent hearts to which is added excessive greed. If because of the [impending] difficulties in Chou you send your wives and riches there, they will certainly not dare reject them. When chaos comes to the Chou and it perishes, they will certainly rebel against you because of their arrogance and greed. If you lead the troops from Ch'eng Chou on the pretext of punishing the guilty, they will all be defeated."

Although reported neither by the *Shih Chi* nor *Kuo Yü*, Duke Huan's plan did indeed come to fruition even though he perished in the conflicts that would see King Yu slain. Other texts indicate that his son quickly vanquished K'uai and Kuo in the second and fourth years of King P'ing's reign, thereby securing the core of their new state, and the eight other contiguous minor entities that had similarly been entrusted with Cheng's wealth quickly fell in turn. ⁷⁹⁹

This is subversion at its best, based on a detailed and extensive analysis typical of the Warring States Period (as would be particularly exemplified by Tzu Ch'an, a native of the state). ⁸⁰⁰ It was a multistage, long term effort premised upon taking advantage of character flaws and manipulating others into untoward actions that might be forcefully exploited within the bounds of Virtue. Just as Tsui Yi had previously feared in warning Emperor Hsin about the Chou, it proves that Virtue can be an effective weapon in attracting people and a highly viable pretext for developing a base for action, particularly when combined with a willingness to act subversively.

Separately, "Cheng Min," traditionally but probably not even nominally attributed to Yin Chi-fu, praises Chung Shan-fu who appears to have been King Hsüan's chief minister. ⁸⁰¹ Somewhat puzzlingly, the ode asserts that he was deputed to fortify the capital of Ch'i that would then have been located at Lin-tzu because the ruler moved there in King Li's 20th year. Ch'i's own forces should have already erected fortifications to encircle the town; therefore, their absence implies that they lacked the funds, will, or organization for the task and were no longer as powerful as formerly or would again become in the Spring and Autumn Period.

King Hsüan was apparently so troubled by this deficiency and the consequent diminishment in their defensive and power projection capabilities that he ordered that the walls be augmented in his seventh year, some four years after the death of Duke Wu of Ch'i. This would not be the only time he chose to interfere in Ch'i's affairs. His employment of central government resources indicates that the purported economic imbalance between Tsung Chou and the nascent but increasingly powerful states may not have always been as dire as presently claimed; otherwise, there would not have been any need for the central government to intercede in order to ensure their defensive

tenacity.

The conflicts sequentially experienced in his fifth and sixth years—the Hsien-yün at T'ai-yüan, Ching Man in the south, Huai Yi in the south southeast, and the Hsü Jung in the east, as well as the earlier revolts of Hsü and Eh—must have made the king acutely aware of the numerousness, vigor, and lethality of these “disrespectful” peoples. Strategically he had little choice but to cement relationships with existing perimeter powers, even aid in strengthening their martial capabilities, and establish new bulwarks to the south and north. From this perspective Shen's shift from west of Tsung Chou and Cheng's movement from Hua-hsien both weakened the first line of defense and would be puzzling, if not inexplicable, had the capital's own military forces not been undergoing revitalization. King Hsüan must have felt confident in their improved character as well as perhaps felt that the distant, still evolving protostate of Ch'in could be manipulated into thwarting incursions emanating in the west.

Final Debacle

King Yu's infamy largely derives from his much excoriated stupidity in fatally antagonizing the feudal lords and wantonly employing the border warning system to amuse his favorite concubine, Pao Ssu, thereby bringing about the capital's destruction and the Western Chou's termination. Besotted with her charms, he foolishly displaced his own consort and her son, the heir-apparent, two acts that enraged her father, the marquis of Shen, a crucial ally who had been expected to withstand barbarian onslaughts virtually alone. In response, the marquis solicited the cooperation of a longtime Chou enemy, the Ch'üan Jung, and other peripheral states, mounted an attack upon the capital, and destroyed his protagonist, simultaneously both his king and son-in-law.

Irrespective of its moralistic simplicity, this redaction enjoyed widespread credulity for two millennia and became the basis for variant accounts and highly embellished stories. However, the Western Chou's final moments obviously consist of more than this semifictional episode, developments that are best understood within the context of other factors and the military events that unfolded during King Yu's abbreviated reign from 781 to 771 BCE. The *Bamboo Annals* balefully commence their chronicle by noting a terrible omen: in the king's second year three rivers vital to the state's well-being, the Wei, Ching, and Luo, all dried up. Mount Ch'i, the storied site in every Chou tale of origin, even suffered a landslide which is reported simply as "Mount Ch'i crumbled."

The significance of these events so struck Ssu-ma Ch'ien that he began his *Shih Chi* account of Yu's reign with a supposedly contemporary evaluation of their prophetic implications: ⁸⁰²

In King Yu's second year, the three rivers in Western Chou all experienced an earthquake. Po Yang-fu said: "The Chou will soon perish. The *ch'i* of Heaven and Earth do not [normally] lose their order. However, if they do transgress their order, the people have brought turbulence to them. *Yang* is submerged and cannot get out, *yin* presses upon it so it cannot be vaporized, ⁸⁰³ thus there

was an earthquake. Just now the three rivers have greatly trembled, this is *yang* having lost its position and being repressed by *yin*. When *yang* loses its position and is beneath *yin*, the Source [of things] will certainly be blocked. When the Source is blocked, the state will certainly perish.

Now water and earth interact and people employ them. When earth lacks the means to prosper, the people will lack materials for use, so how can it be expected that they won't perish? Previously when the Yin and Luo Rivers dried up, the Hsia perished; when the Yellow River dried up, the Shang perished. At present, Chou's Virtue resembles that of those two dynasties in their last years. The source of these rivers is again blocked, and what is blocked must dry up.

Now states must rely upon their mountains and rivers, so mountains crumbling and rivers drying up are signs of a lost state. After the rivers dry up, the mountains will invariably crumble. If a state is destined to perish, the interval will not exceed ten years because this is the cycle of Heavenly numbers. 804 What Heaven abandons will not survive past one decade." In this year the three rivers dried up and Mount Ch'i crumbled.

Although marked by late Warring States correlative thought, this interpretation is a particularly good example of its type. While certainly not uttered in the eighth century BCE, the pronouncement at least reflects what indubitably was a long standing orientation to deciphering dire events within the context of political trends.

The *Bamboo Annals* entry coincidentally provides a glimpse of the ongoing but otherwise unrecorded military developments swirling about the Chou: Tuo Fu, one of King Hsüan's younger brothers, attacked Cheng in alliance with Duke Wen of Chin. Remarkably, despite these manifestations of disintegration, ongoing drought, and other perverse indications, that very year King Yu actually increased the *fu* (military impositions), presumably with the intention of augmenting the state's martial power. His obliviousness to the people's misery can hardly have been construed as benevolent or auspicious, particularly in the face of Heaven's abandonment.

The fourth year provides evidence that Ch'in continued to be actively involved in conflicts with external peoples because "Ch'in forces attacked the Hsi Jung." Two years later "the king commanded Po Shih to lead the army in an attack on the Jung at Liu-chi but the king's army was defeated and fled and Po Shih perished." 805 Shortly thereafter, "the Hsi Jung extinguished the state of Kai," a precursor of future developments as well as an indication of the Hsi Jung's power. Finally, in his seventh year, "forces from the state of Kuo extinguished

Chiao,” further evidence that the Chou imperial order was crumbling since the subordinate states were beginning to mount predatory assaults upon each other.

Apparently a simple archetypical tale of disaster wrought by romantic (or sexual) obsession, Pao Ssu’s melodramatic story verges well into the semimythical. Contradictory versions of her origins and introduction to King Yu abound while uncertainty plagues any recounting of her age. Her first mention in the *Bamboo Annals* is simply a note that “in his third year [the king] made Pao Ssu his favorite.” According to the *Shih Chi*, this fateful step resulted when he encountered her in the inner palaces where she had been dwelling after having been presented to the Chou in compensation for remitting an offense supposedly committed by the state of Pao.

Somewhat differently, the “Chin-yü” section in the *Kuo Yü* notes that Pao Ssu had been captured when the king attacked the Yu-Pao and the Pao clan presented her as a concubine but never suggests that they had intended to exploit the mesmerizing power of a beautiful woman to hasten the Chou’s demise, as had been witnessed with the Hsia. ⁸⁰⁶ Ironically, the *Shih Chi* (rather unusually) includes a mythical tale attributing Pao Ssu’s birth to a young palace girl who had encountered a form of black dragon, the latter a descendant of the twin dragons that had supposedly appeared near just prior to the Hsia’s demise. Pao Ssu’s elevation to queen accordingly prompted the T’ai-shih to remark that the Chou was doomed. ⁸⁰⁷

By the fifth year Yi Chiu, the designated heir to the throne, apparently realized his situation had grown precarious because he fled (or was exiled) to his mother’s state of Shen. His flight set the stage for the involvement of external “barbarian” forces in the dynastic succession, creating an unfortunate precedent that would oft be repeated in China over the centuries. ⁸⁰⁸ It was not until his eighth year that the king finally confirmed Pao Ssu’s son as heir apparent, an act that so angered the already estranged marquis of Shen that the next year he initiated plans to rebel by “sending emissaries to the Hsi Jung and to the K’uai” with the intent of forming an alliance despite his many years of stalwart service and the relatively recent creation of (southern) Shen as a bulwark against external forces.

Perhaps because he soon learned of these developments and hoped to ensure the continued allegiance of the important feudal lords located in the east, King Yu in turn convened an official summit in the spring of his tenth year at T’ai-shih. (Insofar as he reportedly came down from the royal platform to covenant with them, his awesomeness seems to have already been seriously comprised.) ⁸⁰⁹ Subsequently, during an unseasonable and therefore portentous flowering of peach and almond trees in the ninth month, the king

sought to eliminate the former heir apparent and end the latent threat by striking Shen, though the attack failed to vanquish them. ⁸¹⁰

The marquis of Shen remained undeterred because in the very first month of the next year, the king's eleventh, amid further inauspicious signs that included a halo around the sun, "forces from Shen, Tseng, and the Ch'üan Jung penetrated Ts'ung Chou and slew the king and Duke Huan of Cheng. ⁸¹¹ The Ch'üan Jung killed Heir Apparent Po Fu, seized Pao Ssu, and took her back with them. The marquis of Shen, marquis of Tseng, ⁸¹² baron of Hsü, and the prince of Cheng established Yi Ch'iu as king of Chou in Shen. However, Duke Han of Kuo established the king's son Yü Ch'en at Hsi. " ⁸¹³ This temporarily resulted in the anomalous existence of two kings until Duke Wu of Chin murdered Yü Ch'en. Meanwhile, the Hsi Jung or Ch'üan Jung not only carried off Pao Ssu, but also apparently all the capital's wealth, presumably their objective from the outset, leaving it impoverished. ⁸¹⁴

Nothing is recorded in the *Bamboo Annals* or *Shih Chi* about the course of the final clash, but one recent reconstruction holds that when Hao came under attack and no aid was forthcoming, Kuo Shih-fu led a hundred chariots in a breakout attempt. ⁸¹⁵ His forces quickly collapsed under enemy pressure, opening the way for the aggressors who then penetrated the city and proceeded to plunder and burn it, hardly the result the marquis of Shen may have hoped for!

Cheng Po-yu, who then occupied the position of *Ssu-t'u*, managed to extricate the king by exiting through the north gate but they were quickly caught by the enemy's forces, quashed, and slain. Finally troops responded from the state of Cheng in a quest to avenge Po-yu's death but they, under the command of Po-yu's son, were repulsed. Forces from Wey, Chin, and Ch'in soon began to assemble to the east and Duke Wu of Wey apparently decided to employ a multipronged night attack that would strike the city on three sides but leave the west open in order to entice them to abandon the city and stumble into the ambushes that would be set up along their escape route. (Nearly two centuries later this tactic would be articulated by the *Art of War* in stating that "If you besiege an army you must leave an outlet.") ⁸¹⁶

How long the Ch'üan Jung and other groups occupied the capital and what length of time might have been required to mobilize, advance, and assemble this response remains unknown but certainly it would have been counted in days rather than hours. Once the attack commenced, perhaps because of their experience in fighting other barbarians, the forces under Duke Hsiang of Ch'in achieved the best results. Even though significant numbers of the Jung reportedly still managed to escape the ambushes because Cheng only deployed a

limited number of forces, Chin and Ch'in thereby established themselves as two of the three major powers that would soon eclipse the Chou and dramatically affect the course of Spring and Autumn events.

In view of the devastation King P'ing felt compelled to abandon the twin capitals of Feng and Hao and formally designate Luo-yi (Ch'eng Chou) as the new royal center, thereby concluding what came to be termed the Western Chou Period. In epithet Ssu-ma Ch'ien sadly wrote: "When King P'ing ascended to power, he moved (the capital) eastward to Luo-yi in order to avoid incursions by the Jung. During King P'ing's reign the royal house of Chou declined to insignificance and the more powerful feudal lords annexed the weak. From this time Ch'i, Ch'u, Ch'in, and Chin began to be great and governance (of the realm) proceeded from the regional dukes." ⁸¹⁷ The Jung, in their various incarnations as the Hsi Jung or Ch'üan Jung, soon came to occupy much of the territory between the Ching and Wei Rivers and were thereafter well poised to invade and brutalize central China. ⁸¹⁸

However inaccurate, even this simple recounting derived from the *Bamboo Annals* and *Shih Chi* show that this debacle was not of a moment's making but had festered for nearly a decade. Once the displaced heir apparent sought refuge in Shen, Shen and Chou were transformed from close allies into deadly enemies. The marquis still did not move precipitously but instead forged a powerful alliance by exploiting extant steppe-sedentary animosity and no doubt enticing the Ch'üan Jung with prospects for revenge and plunder.

Nevertheless, from the *Shih Chi* onward King Yu's flagrant misuse of the beacons intended to summon aid whenever the capital might be confronted by invading forces, one of his many attempts to amuse Pao Ssu, would dominate assessments of the Chou's collapse. Although the story, clearly a variant of "the boy who cried wolf," did not originate with the Grand Historian, as retold in the *Shih Chi* the king had the fires that had been designed to be employed solely under severe duress repeatedly lit and the great drums beaten because Pao Ssu reportedly only smiled when she saw the feudal lords hurriedly assembling. After a few pointless exertions the beacons inevitably lost their credibility and the feudal lords apparently ceased attending court.

Not unexpectedly, when the king found himself confronted by a real aggressor no one bothered to respond and the isolated capital quickly succumbed. The numerous late Western Chou vessels that continue to be discovered in earthen pits around Feng and Hao, obviously buried in an attempt to prevent their loss during the enemy's onslaught, provide evidence either of considerable perspicaciousness or a degree of forewarning. Failing to recover them

prior to making the eastward trek to Ch'eng Chou suggests that the migration was undertaken in great haste, just as evidence of sudden cultural disruption indicates irrecoverable devastation.

Over the centuries the story's veracity has been doubted and many modern scholars blatantly deny that any sort of warning system existed before Hsiung-nu incursions compelled the Former Han to create one. ⁸¹⁹ Nevertheless, the tale's widespread early dissemination suggests it might yet reflect actual events, albeit magnified and distorted. Furthermore, the Shang had established a basic system that relied on fire beacons to warn of invaders approaching while they were still beyond the perimeter, one that the Chou could have easily imitated. ⁸²⁰ The more important question is whether they had developed and maintained signaling measures that might have been employed to summon members of the nearby warrior nobility dwelling within the Wei River Valley and perhaps fifty *li* of the capital itself.

The cadence of the largest drums would not have carried far without numerous relay points and thus been primarily useful for alerting the standing forces assigned to the capital, mainly members of the well-known "six armies." (According to the tale's earliest known form, drums alone were employed.) ⁸²¹ But during the day a dense black column of smoke would have been visible for several kilometers, just as large bonfires atop a tower or hillock within the city at night, much as known from *Biblical* accounts and other historical events. In view of the Shang measures the lack of any pre Warring States archaeological evidence for fire towers should not be construed as definitive. Apart from not yet having been discovered, the flammable materials would have all been immediately consumed and any beacons within the city destroyed in the latter's broad devastation.

The rebel's coalition forces must have been formidable because they included not only experienced steppe warriors, but also Shen's own forces, fighters well known to number among the few capable of withstanding barbarian fierceness. Even assuming a somewhat more extensive signaling system, the capital was doomed long before contingents maintained by the contiguous states would have been able to react. However, the apparent refusal of the nearby nobles to defend the realm, not to mention the absence of the six armies (or their abysmal performance), should not be viewed simply as a manifestation of their disgust over previously wasted efforts, but instead interpreted as symptomatic of more general malaise and disaffection. The king's authority must have become severely eroded far earlier; otherwise, no matter how numerous the false alarms, the feudal lords would still have felt (and been) compelled to respond. In the final analysis the story paints a marvelously dramatic picture of

turmoil and chaos, lust and obsession, depicting a king who threw away his rulership and destroyed his kingdom. No wonder it retained its appeal as the debacle's sole explanation and became a much cited parable in subsequent centuries.

Despite King Yu's vilification over the centuries for idiosyncrasy, incompetence, malfeasance, and licentiousness, the *Shih Chi* never offers any real characterization of his personality or rule. Chief among the charges leveled against him are that he arbitrarily seized land from the nobility, dismissed all the loyal ministers (resulting in no one being willing to serve or utter criticism), imposed heavy exactions upon the eastern states, turned the country into a wasteland, and made the people destitute. Perversity and decay are not just signs of imminent and thus exploitable collapse, but also conditions to be fostered and objectives to be achieved through systematic covert programs such as would be outlined in three chapters of the text nominally attributed to the T'ai Kung, the *Liu T'ao* (*Six Secret Teachings*): "Honoring the Worthy," "Civil Offensive," and "Three Doubts." ⁸²² Deliberately employing beautiful women to bemuse officials and befuddle rulers, a method that would successfully cause Confucius's estrangement in the state of Lu, would be particularly stressed.

In trying to explain how the mighty Chou collapsed several early sources complain that the king had blindly entrusted the state's affairs to his exceedingly corrupt sycophantic prime minister, Kuo Shih-fu, who in turn was much reviled by the "*kuo-jen* " or state's significant people. An intense factional battle that pitted Kuo Shih-fu, Pao Ssu, various blind loyalists, and possibly the king against Yi Chiu's sympathizers and other disaffected powerful nobles must have precipitated the final clash that destroyed the king and Western Chou court. ⁸²³

More than forty odes in the *Shih Ching* have traditionally been said to reflect conditions under King Yu's reign, allude to his misbehavior, indirectly criticize him, or condemn aspects of his policies. Apart from a few that definitely target the king and depict the misery being inflicted, most are actually highly general, nebulous in origin and uncertain in attribution, and several even totally irrelevant. ⁸²⁴ Composed at least one or two centuries after the events, their validity depends upon the extent to which they preserve the views of earlier times rather than simply being imaginative interpretations of an indistinct historical episode.

In aggregate they depict a state enmired in misery, one whose populace continued to suffer despite crying out and seeking relief by fleeing but lacked any sustainable refuge. The military was clearly depleted and any consciousness of enemy threats had apparently

dissipated. History may not be solely the acts of important men, but certainly the great ones inspire the people and implement their vision while the evil and corrupt pursue self-interested courses and profit their friends at the expense of the greater good, even the state's destruction.

Among the more effective in creating this portrait of despair, "Chan Ang" (Mao #264) employs the image of a whetstone (*li*) to portray the harshness being inflicted:

We look up to august Heaven,
But it is not beneficent.
While we are occluded and disturbed,
It sends down grinding travail. 825
The state lacks stability,
The officers and people suffer misery.
These insects thief and burrow ravenously,
Without rectification or cessation.
Offenders are not enmeshed,
There is no rectification or amelioration.

The claim that the king was seizing land (and thereby antagonizing the nobles) appears in the second stanza:

Once the people had land and fields,
Instead you now possess them.
Once the people had dependents and tenants,
Now you have snatched them away.

Not only were the guilty going free, the innocent were also entangled. Following further complaints about the licentious influence of women, perversities of the inner palace staff, and the blatant corruption of high officials, the fifth stanza asserts that the king had been neglecting matters pertaining to "his powerful barbarian [foes]." (Although unstated, a direct consequence of which would be a loss of spirit and readiness within the military itself.) Finally, the sixth stanza bemoans the loss of "good men," a development that should be interpreted not just as an undeniable sign of decay, but also as an indication that the formerly powerful clans had become powerless in the face of despotism and corruption.

"Shao Min" decries the afflictions imposed not by Yu but by Heaven itself, as if it were punishing the people for his misrule:

The forbidding sky extremely awesome,

Heaven besets us with woeful calamity
And afflicts us with dire famine.
The people have all fled away,
And our towns are completely desolate. 826

Although it mentions drought and the parasites plaguing the government, the most famous lines, including two that would repeatedly be quoted throughout history, appear at the end of the following stanza:

Anciently, when the former kings received the mandate,
There were such as the Duke of Shao
Who daily enlarged the kingdom a hundred *li* .
But now they daily contract it a hundred *li* .

The ode titled “Chieh Nan Shan,” one of the very few with an attributed author, is even more outspoken in its decrying the perversities and abuses of government. According to Chia Fu, the people are so terrified they will not speak out even in jest. Death and disorder are increasing, the kingdom is on the brink of extinction, and there is no place of refuge. 827

The *Shih Ching* also preserves a few odes that focus upon Pao Ssu or bemoan the perniciousness of her power. “Cheng Yüeh, ” an unusually lengthy, thirteen-stanza lament of a virtuous official essentially crying in the darkness, concludes by asserting that Pao Ssu’s actions were destroying Tsung Chou. 828 “Shih Yüeh chih Chiao” starts by noting the highly baleful omen of a solar eclipse had been witnessed and similarly includes a condemnation of Pao Ssu’s expanding influence. 829 Two odes are even attributed to King Yu’s queen and Yi Chiu, “Pai Hua” and “Hsiao Ch’i” respectively. 830 Both purportedly depict the sorrows they experienced in having been displaced, and the former concludes by condemning the king’s licentious behavior.

Even the eastern states reputedly complained about their being reduced to desperation by various impositions, suggesting the ruler had far more power to levy taxes than previously assumed. 831 (It would also imply the central government’s treasury should not have become depleted through far -anging military campaigns, as currently understood. Whether Ch’i and the other powerful states actually submitted to these demands is questionable, just as is the widespread economic ruin depicted in the ode.) The author also complains they suffered from western snobbery or prejudice because their contributions were being belittled.

Traditional commentators note that, while the histories remain silent about the era's military affairs, a few poems apparently depict ongoing military activity intended to subjugate the four quarters, much in contradiction to poetic criticism of the king's neglect of frontier defense. (While at first glance, glaringly contradictory, it might be understood in terms of the government's constantly deputing armies on nonspecific or ill-conceived military missions that simply debilitated the troops without contributing to the state's readiness or protection.) "Hsiao Ming" is the lament of an officer who participated in a year-long westward campaign of rectification that brought him to Chiu-yeh. He longed to return home but was deterred from deserting out of fear of anger, reproof, and other legal consequences, and so could only complain: "I have endured cold and heat. My heart is troubled, the poison [of our plight] extremely bitter." ⁸³² Even more surprising is "Ku Chung," an ode understood as being a criticism of King Yu for overly indulging in pleasure during an otherwise unknown campaign into the south against the Huai Yi. ⁸³³

Issues and Probabilities

Even with the addition of these insights from the *Book of Odes*, the brevity of the traditional records and discrepancies among accounts has spawned considerable speculation about the crucial factors and actual events that doomed the Western Chou. Depending upon the analyst, the search for historical explanation may favor simplicity or complexity, neither necessarily being inherently appropriate. Despite the Chou's collapse normally being attributed to ineffectual, if not abysmal, leadership and the erosion of its economic and ritual authority, the ever-changing dynamics of steppe-sedentary conflict and local power struggles certainly played a crucial role in virtually extinguishing the realm's ruling power. Multiple parties with inimical objectives complicated the collapse, leading to shifting alliances, tangled interests, and a decade of turmoil.

Several key issues affect any interpretation of the events and their historical impact: the probable sequence of crucial actions by King Yu and the Marquis (or lord) of Shen; the site and nature of the definitive battle; Shen's location; Ch'in's participation; the identification and activities of Jung parties; role of other allies and partisans; the geostrategic situation at the conclusion; and the most puzzling and debated of all, what compelled King P'ing to shift the seat of authority from their ancient homeland to the alternative capital of Ch'eng Chou. Accordingly, the integrated but tentative account presented above, although derived from the most commonly accepted sources, requires further examination. A troubling complexity throughout is the degree to which the historical portrait

may have been shaped, deliberately or otherwise, by Ch'in historians and affected by the destruction of more critical views when the Ch'in sought to systematically eliminate inimical works through measures such as their infamous book burning.

Prompted by the thought that it would have been difficult, if not odd, for the Marquis of Shen situated in the vicinity of Nan-yang in Henan to arrange an alliance with "barbarian" groups in the west, whether the Hsi Jung or Ch'üan Jung (who were presumably active slightly north of Feng-hsiang), Shen's location during the conflict has been questioned. (This sort of alliance building between previous foes actually had a highly visible precedent in the lord of Eh's having reached out to widely dispersed eastern and southern Yi groups.) Despite marriage relations and the apparent designation of the lord of Shen as a Po, a rank which implied an external leadership role and sanctioned military capability, just as with King Wen's earlier designation as Hsi Po, the exact nature of their relationship has also been doubted because both editions of the *Bamboo Annals* assert that the royal armies suffered a defeat at Shen in King Hsüan's forty-first year.⁸³⁴

A little contemplation suggests a number of probable explanations, the two most relevant being that the lord of Shen could not have been the campaign's target because he had already emigrated to the south and that Shen was not necessarily the enemy but perhaps a Jung group located in the area of Shen's original site in the west. (The late *Hou Han-shu* adds that the next year the king conducted a campaign of rectification that defeated Shen.) For Yi Chiu to have been more than a mere child during the ensuing turmoil, King Yu's marriage with the Duke of Shen's daughter must have occurred prior to Hsüan's death, well before Yu became king.⁸³⁵ Although not members of the founding clan, their being a Chiang state, the Shen had presumably been long and closely entangled with the Chou, while the important Chou minister Cheng Wu Kung (Duke Wu of Cheng) had also married a woman from Shen.

As already discussed, early in the Western Chou Period fiefs were often changed for strategic reasons, though far less frequently thereafter. The dominant clans and the entire populace seem to have been shifted en masse in many cases, resulting in the old location's simply being abandoned or allocated to new groups. In some instances only the important families or a portion of the inhabitants were transferred, resulting in two states with the same designation that are distinguishable only when the historical texts add a relative geographic indicator such as "south" or "west." Just as a number of well-known cities, a few of these important states apparently straddled major rivers, complicating the distinction.

The ducal family's transfer to assume command and center the fief at Nan-yang need not have encompassed the entire population or even the entire Shen royal clan. Certainly the odes attributed to King Hsüan's reign depict a significant progression toward the south and a clear intent to emplace a citadel capable of thwarting incursions by southern groups targeting the capital. (The state of Lü, suggested by some analysts as having been a participant in the revolt, had been similarly established.) A significant ruling structure probably remained behind in "old" Shen because King Hsüan seems to have co-opted and deputed members of the populace dwelling in the Chou heartland to fill out the forces and augment the dominant population.

The conundrum of Shen's location tends to be resolved in terms of a new southern location coupled with the existence of a remnant state (whose identity would soon be largely forgotten) around Meih-sien in Shaanxi, west of Tsung Chou. With the appearance of "southern" Shen, the original state somehow came to be informally called Western Shen instead of the spinoff being denominated "Southern Shen." Archaeological evidence certainly substantiates the latter's establishment, much as minimally portrayed in the *Shih Ching*.

Insofar as no choke points or other readily defended features interceded on the terrain between Ch'eng Chou and Nan-yang, positioning an experienced military leader capable of mounting a defense against growing southern incursions must have appeared geostrategically astute. However, redeploying this powerful force had the detrimental effect of weakening the western defenses, removing an acknowledged leader who reportedly commanded the respect of dissident Jung groups, and exposing the capital to potential threats, including from Ch'in's latently coercive power. Suggestions that the shift was intended to reduce threats from Shen itself (which may have loomed large in the king's consciousness because of its proximity) seem dubious, given the crucial need for outwardly directed strength on the western periphery.

The state of Kuo, another stalwart over the decades in blocking western-originated incursions, including those mounted by the Hsien-yün, had somewhat surprisingly been similarly sundered. In fact, Kuo seems to have multiplied into several states subsequent to the original two's being founded by Kuo Chung and Kuo Shu, two of King Wen's numerous brothers, because a northern and southern Kuo are also known. ⁸³⁶ The eastern one in Henan near Hsing-yang was finally absorbed by Ch'i, while the western, or original entity, also known as Cheng Kuo, whose existence has been attested by vessels recovered in the Mount Ch'i area, was initially situated near contemporary Pao-chi city in Shaanxi in the Wei River Valley. The discovery of Kuo Wen Kung's tomb and other artifacts provides evidence that a major

portion of the Kuo Chi branch was dispatched to the southwest at some point and ultimately became established at San-men-hsia. ⁸³⁷

The essential question is whether their segmentation was ordered by King Hsüan or occurred after King P'ing's ascension. In the former case, even though perhaps deemed necessary to stem thrusts from Ch'u, their fragmentation would have been particularly inexplicable because it would have significantly undermined the western defensive capabilities even though the clan's major line remained behind. However, this deprecation would partially explain how steppe contingents could have penetrated the perimeter so easily despite Kuo's support of King Yu and Yü Ch'en. Conversely, if the shift occurred after the final debacle (as recently recovered artifacts seem to suggest), ⁸³⁸ only a minimal reduction in Kuo's strength would have resulted from the clan's having willingly dispatched a collateral line to the east, presumably during King Yu's reign. ⁸³⁹

Because the lord of Shen was ensconced in the south, it would have been strategically advantageous for him to enter into an alliance with forces that could strike from the west in a pincer attack. Even though communications would have been difficult over this extended distance, the several years between Yi Chiu's flight and the actual engagement allowed ample time to formulate plans and coordinate action, as well as to periodically visit West Shen to ensure success. The *Ancient Bamboo Annals* states that Yi Chiu fled to West Shen, but "west" is probably an addition by compilers who assumed that ensconcing himself west of Tsung Chou among presumably hostile Jung would have provided both the nearest and best refuge. However, it would have made little sense for him to opt for an antique location with a remnant force rather than the newly vibrant state of Southern Shen then inhabited by his father-in law and nurtured by a vigorous military force.

Resolving Shen's location still does not permit positing a definitive sequence of martial events. Due to a lack of contemporary bronze inscriptions, any reconstruction necessarily depends upon the credibility of traditional texts and the relative assessment of their worth. There is virtual unanimity on Yi Chiu's removal to Shen in King Yu's fifth year and the fatal military clash in the eleventh, but far less concurrence on the site of the battle, the precipitating cause, and the chief protagonists. According to the "Chou Pen-chi's" extremely compressed account, "the Lord of Shen was enraged, so with Tseng, the Hsi Yi, and Ch'üan Jung, he attacked King Yu. King Yu had the fire beacons lit to summon the armies, but none of the troops responded. Subsequently they slew King Yu at the foot of Mount Li, took Pao Ssu captive, seized all the wealth in Chou, and departed." There is no attribution of actions and consequences while the aggressors are

indistinguishably lumped together. Who actually killed the king, how the wealth was shared, and why the final denouement occurred some fifty to sixty *li* outside the capital remain unexplored.

The “Ch’in Pen-chi” is marked by slight but significant differences, chief among them the sudden assignment of a significant role to Ch’in itself:

King Yu of the Chou employed Pao Ssu, displaced the T’ai-tzu, established Pao Ssu’s son as heir, and several times deceived the feudal lords, so the feudal lords rebelled against him. The Hsi Jung, Ch’üan Jung, and lord of Shen attacked Chou and killed King Yu at the foot of Mount Li. Duke Hsiang of Ch’in led the army to rescue Chou, the battle was fought very fiercely, and he had merit.

According to the “Chin Yü” section of the *Kuo Yü*, “Pao Ssu was favored and gave birth to Po Fu. [They] allied with Kuo Shih-fu and subsequently displaced heir apparent Yi Chiu and established Po Fu. The T’ai-tzu went out and raced to Shen; the men of Shen and Tseng summoned the Hsi Jung to attack the Chou and the Chou was thereupon lost.” A (retrospectively) prophetic analysis attributed to Shih Po—who opposed the attack and reportedly moved his wealth out beyond the capital when he realized it was inevitable—in the “Cheng Yü” provides an intriguing fillip: ⁸⁴⁰ “Shen, Tseng, and the Hsi Jung are strong so the royal household is in a quandary. If they want to follow their desires, will it not be hard! The king wants to kill the T’ai-tzu in order to empower Po Fu so they will have to seek him from Shen. The men of Shen are not morally inferior, so they will certainly attack. If [the king] attacks Shen and Tseng and the Hsi Jung ally to attack the Chou, the capital will be defenseless.”

Whether Yi Chiu was ritually named king before the attack and therefore battled to regain control of his kingdom or after the death of King Yu is another interesting question. It might have been more inspiring to fight under the banner of the Chou king, but the conventions of the time suggest it would have been unlikely unless Yu had previously elevated Po Fu to this status. According to accounts such as the *Ku-pen Bamboo Annals*, “The Lord of Shen and Lord of Lu together with the earl of Hsü and the prince of Cheng then established King P’ing at Shen.” However, a note in the *Tso Chuan* asserts that before King Yu and Po Fu died in battle, Shen Hou, Lu Hou, and Hsü Kung had established King P’ing at Shen. Moreover, because he had originally been the designated T’ai-tzu, he was called “T’ien Wang” meaning “Heavenly King” or “Heaven (-Appointed) King.” ⁸⁴¹ If this assertion has any credence, King P’ing’s ascension certainly could have provoked King Yu’s ill-fated attack on Shen.

Conversely, the lord of Shen's presumably righteous anger at Yi Chiu's displacement has always been deemed his sole motivation for attacking King Yu even though personal insult no doubt compounded his rage. However, no speculation on whether he intended to slay the king or simply restore the heir apparent's rights and eliminate Pao Ssu's clique has ever appeared. Even for warriors unbound by the sort of theocratic power that had accrued among the earlier Shang monarchs, this sort of rebellion against an acknowledged overlord, particularly one protected by major military forces and supported by powerful states, would not have been undertaken lightly.

It might appropriately be asked what finally prompted him to initiate the Western Chou's downfall. According to entries already cited from the *Bamboo Annals*, Po Fu's formal designation as heir apparent triggered the movement to onslaught. Although this appears to be the case, no thought having been given to assassins or other means, the (somewhat bizarre) claim has also been raised that Po Fu was actually named king at this point, evidence being seen in reports that one of Ch'in Hsiang Kung's female relatives had married a king of Feng.⁸⁴² However, apart from its being extremely tenuous, it would have required King Yu to relinquish some of his prestige, if not authority, hardly consonant with his personality and perverse penchants. Any action that appeared to solidify or enhance Po Fu's power would certainly have intensified the Lord of Shen's anger, but his measured approach to the actual engagement remained unaffected.

When the geostrategic possibilities are weighed and the behavioral tendencies of men in conflict assessed, either because the king was impatient to resolve the uncertainty and assure Po Fu's future ascension or because he was provoked by the competing acknowledgement of Yi Chiu as the legitimate heir, perhaps enraged he had been designated king, he acted precipitously by mounting an attack upon Shen in his tenth year. One of two possibilities then unfolded: either Chou troops happened to encounter Shen's forces at Mount Li where a decisive battle ensued and the king perished, or they launched an attack on the bastion of Shen, were repulsed, and retreated back to the capital.

Shih Po's analysis has long provided the basis for the first scenario.⁸⁴³ Although not impossible, particularly as Mount Li was to the east in the general direction of Southern Shen, unless the Lord of Shen had received intelligence about the expeditionary force and decided to launch a surprise attack while the Chou army was still en route, the likelihood of such a coincidental meeting was extremely small. Despite the Lord of Shen's being tactically bold, without augmentation by the Ch'üan Jung or other western forces he would have certainly been outnumbered, making the maintenance of an

ensconced defense far preferable.

The king probably struck just when the lord of Shen was assembling the men and means for his own expedition against Tsung Chou. The Chou royal forces, being perhaps less than prepared and hardly enthusiastic to fight on behalf of a wastrel like King Yu, were repulsed and retreated back to the capital. Two possibilities again arise: either they reached the safety of the capital, in which case the traditional account of suffering a Ch'üan Jung attack well coheres, or they reengaged at Mount Li and were vanquished. Although concrete evidence is lacking, to the extent that King Yu's onslaught may have caught Shen before the ruler had been able to assemble the other components of his coalition force (such as the troops from Tseng) and the moment for the subsequent coordinated pincer attack not yet arrived, it is likely that King Yu's bedraggled forces were allowed to retreat back to the capital.

Thereafter, in the eleventh year, the core components of King P'ing's coalition, Shen and Tseng, launched their long-planned pincer assault. Because most of the capitals' defensive forces failed to respond to the summons of the drums, the offensive front was able to penetrate Feng and Hao. King Yu fled but was reengaged by coalition components—whether Shen or the Ch'üan Jung is unimportant—and in the final clash that unfolded at the foot of Mount Li, the nobility, including King Yu and Pao Ssu's son Po Fu, together with the accompanying remnants of the royal guards, were annihilated. ⁸⁴⁴ Meanwhile, the Ch'üan Jung smashed into the city and exploited the victory by rampaging and plundering before carrying off the capital's spoils, including the vixen herself. Rather than fully abandoning the area, they then continued to occupy much of the surrounding terrain until Ch'in forays finally succeeded in driving them out.

At the outset of this conflict, the states of Chin, Jui, Wei, Yü, Lu, Wey, and Ch'in supported the old royal house and eventually Kuo Kung Han's establishment of Yü Ch'en as King Hsi. In opposition were arrayed just Shen, Tseng, and Lü, but their forces were temporarily augmented by the various external peoples who reacted to the opportunity despite their almost certainly not being under Shen's control. ⁸⁴⁵ However, by 747 BCE when King Yu actually moved to Ch'eng Chou, King Hsi had been slain by Chin, Ch'in was ostensibly sustaining the Chou royal house, and Cheng had been enfeoffed for its role in supporting Yu's rulership and also entered into a marriage relationship with Shen.

Various reasons have been advanced for the shift in loyalties, otherwise known as betrayals, chief among them that King Hsi failed to satisfy Chin's demands for legitimization. Conflict was also rife among the feudal states themselves as the more dynamic—Ch'in, Chin,

Shen, and the incipient entity of Cheng—contended for ultimate authority even as they expropriated land belonging to the ancient Chou domain. Loyalties and alliances diverged depending solely upon the profit that might be achieved rather than any inclination to restore order and bring tranquility to the long suffering populace. King Hsi's death at Chin's hands resolved the visible dilemma but not the lasting quandary of Chou precariousness.

The reasons for the Chou's abandoning the longtime capital and moving to their eastern bastion of Ch'eng Chou can be pondered in this context. The two main *Shih Chi* accounts, the "Chou Pen-chi" and the "Ch'in Pen-chi," explicitly attribute the movement to a need to avoid barbarian pressures: "the movement to Luo-yi was to escape Jung incursions" and "in order to escape difficulty caused by the Ch'üan Jung they shifted eastward to Luo-yi." Although this became the sacrosanct interpretation once the *Shih Chi* began circulating in the Three Kingdoms Period, it came to be challenged by many historians who believed that either Tsung Chou's destruction or environmental factors had made habitation impossible; Ch'in posed the real coercive threat; the royal clan's security could best be preserved in the context of major eastern-state support; they needed to confront ongoing threats from the Huai Yi; or that the capital was voluntarily abandoned. ⁸⁴⁶

The traditional accounts previously cobbled together indicate that Tsung Chou suffered extensive damage during the conflict. Assuming the rebuffed attack on Shen was followed by an assault on Tsung Chou in which the defenders failed to heed the call to deploy, the battle that raged about the city would have inflicted significant damage even before the Ch'üan Jung exploited the victory to plunder the now defenseless city, compounding the destruction and rendering it uninhabitable. ⁸⁴⁷ How extensive the raiding and plundering was throughout the remainder of the valley is another question, one related to whether the Jung actually occupied the major portion of the terrain. The impact of years of drought, possible pollution and exhaustion of the land, and deteriorating economic conditions would have further predisposed the authorities to move to unaffected areas in the east. ⁸⁴⁸

A second explanation attributes the move to a need to escape entrenched interests and intense political infighting. (It might be asked how the former could have survived with the capital in ruins, but history shows that cliques often retain tenacity even in civilizations on the verge of extinction.) Factional clashes within Tsung Chou had apparently been far more extensive than just the obvious skirmish between Pao Ssu's supporters, including Cheng Huan Kung, and those who championed Yi Chiu. Internal strife among the

increasingly debauched and perhaps effete nobility is minimally attested by historical vestiges such as the statement that attributes the eastward shift to the “Chou household having been *pei* [crude, morally inferior, uncouth].” ⁸⁴⁹ The ongoing nature of this dissidence and the breakdown of the *tsung-fa* (sacrosanct familial relationships) are perhaps apparent from the segmentation of the important clans into two groups when the movement was undertaken. Some opted to remain at Feng/Hao and were then ostracized by King P’ing, others emigrated to the Ch’eng Chou area where they were allotted land in still sparsely populated areas. ⁸⁵⁰

The laconic records found in the traditional texts tend to obscure the lengthiness of the turmoil, resulting in a sort of time compression and an impression that King P’ing almost immediately moved the capital to Ch’eng Chou. In fact, more than a decade would pass just between his establishment, however ritually appropriate, in Shen as king and the death of the second pretender, Yü Ch’en, subsequently known as King Hsi from the location of his palace at Hsi, reportedly near Ts’ung Chou, in 760 BCE. Although never chronicled, this chaotic interval seems to have been marked by ongoing clashes among the royal parties, manipulation by external powers, economic travail, and even outright fighting. ⁸⁵¹ Even then, another thirteen years would be required before the decision was made and implemented, whether by King P’ing or (more likely) the powerful members of his faction, to attempt to control the realm from King Wu’s long-envisioned power point.

Although barbarian forces (in their embodiment as the Ch’üan Jung) have long been charged with responsibility for the capital’s destruction and its eventual shift eastward, they lacked the strength to have destroyed the Chou alone and clearly played an ancillary role. Fragmented into numerous groups or, perhaps more correctly, composed of numerous peoples and clans encompassed under the broad rubric of Jung, they actually inhabited not just the peripheral terrain but also areas interspersed throughout China proper. Several known by name—the Yang, Chü, Ch’üan (but not the “Ch’üan of the Ch’üan Jung), and Kao—even dwelt in the Yi-Luo region when the Chou administrative center was being erected there. ⁸⁵² In alliance with internal Chou states or in an exploitive role their forces could, and did, prove deadly, but lacking unification, the ancient capital of Tsung Chou could have been rebuilt and successfully occupied by simply reestablishing an active military force and revitalizing the perimeter’s defensive bulwark.

The Lord of Shen’s exploitation of barbarian strength simply amounted to an extemporaneous utilization for tactical purposes, an early form of what would become known as the ploy of “borrowing a

knife to slay someone” in the now-famous *Thirty-six Strategies*. In blaming barbarian threats for the eastward shift the *Shih Chi* not only oversimplified the political situation but also misconstrued the nature of the alliances at that moment. King P’ing’s operational coalition obviously included not just the Chiang states of Shen and Tseng but also members of the Hsi Yi, Jung, and ironically the Chou’s longtime nemesis, the Ch’üan Jung. Ignoring any question of long-range stability in their relationships, their enmity was focused on King Yu, their ostensible objective King P’ing’s forceful restoration to power. ⁸⁵³ Viewing the “barbarians” (whose sole interest was almost certainly the capital’s wealth) as the proximate motivation for abandoning Tsung Chou can only be considered opaque, particularly because Ch’eng Chou would be equally vulnerable to incursions from the north ⁸⁵⁴ as well as the (then-quiet) Tung Yi, highly active Huai Yi, and burgeoning southern power of Ch’u.

The dynamics of encroachment necessarily focus on Ch’in, Chin, and eventually the incipient entity of Cheng. Ch’in had long been waxing powerful, especially if the well-known Pu-Ch’i was Ch’in Chuang Kung, as sometimes suggested, which would have tended to make them headstrong and intractable. According to the most common account, it was their intercession in the fighting at the capital that resulted in expelling the Jung raiders, in which case they could have occupied the capital region as well. This would have deterred King P’ing from returning because they were then allies of King Yu. ⁸⁵⁵ However, the more likely scenario is that the Jung continued to occupy the eastern portion of the valley until they were finally driven out by Ch’in Hsiang Kung (Duke Hsiang of Ch’in) around 750 BCE after more than one attempt, suddenly giving Ch’in effective possession of the entire Wei River Valley. ⁸⁵⁶

According to the “Ch’in Pen-chi’s” summary, “in the sixteenth year Duke Wen attacked the Jung with the army, the Jung were defeated and fled. Thereupon Duke Wen gathered and possessed the remaining Chou populace, retained the land up to Ch’i, but presented the land east of Ch’i to Chou.” In order to gain a degree of sanctification for their expansion, Ch’in thus yielded land east of Mount Ch’i, thereby seemingly (and conspicuously) supporting the tarnished but long-established world order, prompting the Chou to reciprocate by formally bestowing the western terrain on them in 747 BCE. It should be noted that none of the pre-*Shih Chi* texts suggest that Ch’in made major contributions to the Chou’s survival. Coercion certainly played a role, but the Chou attempted to detract attention from this aspect and seize the visible initiative by acting to conspicuously emphasize the royal authorization. ⁸⁵⁷

King P’ing’s questionable relationship with Ch’in is perhaps

reflected in the term employed to indicate that Ch'in participated in the king's move eastward. The "Ch'in Pen-chi" states, "When the Chou shifted [their capital] eastward to Luo-yi to avoid the difficulties posed by the Ch'üan Jung, Duke Hsiang employed the army to send King P'ing off to (Ch'eng) Chou, so King P'ing enfeoffed Duke Hsiang as one of the feudal lords and bestowed the land west of Mount Ch'i upon him, saying: 'Bereft of the Tao, the Jung invaded and seized our terrain about Ch'i and Feng. Ch'in was able to attack and drive off the Jung so they (should) have their land.'"

The character "*sung*" (which basically means "to send" or "send off") is employed in a variety of usages ranging from sending or delivering an item such as a letter or gift through ritual performance, including sending off the deceased. It can have very innocuous meaning, such as accompanying someone somewhere, or more forceful, even martial connotations, such as escorting someone undesirable off premises or even off to exile under guard. Interpretations of this event have therefore ranged from a purely ritual and respectful escorting of the king with due pomp and circumstance through a concealed but minimally coercive action equivalent to frightening him away or, at the extreme, a forceful expulsion.⁸⁵⁸ The validity inevitably depends upon whether Ch'in, having been virtually bootstrapped out of obscurity by participation in Chou affairs, was a grateful ally or an increasingly headstrong nemesis. The events that unfolded within the Wei River Valley suggest it was in fact an essentially ritual act that reflected gloriously upon the participants even as they all understood, if not overtly recognized, Ch'in's coercive power.

With the advent of the chaos, Chin had similarly embarked upon a program of postbattle opportunistic expansion. They reportedly seized land both east and west of the Yellow River, the well-known Ho-tung and Ho-hsi areas, including terrain near the Feng/Hao area, virtually surrounding King Hsi long before killing him.⁸⁵⁹ In order to similarly gain King P'ing's sanction for their acquisitions, they ultimately allowed the Ho-hsi area to revert to Chou control. Meanwhile, Cheng apparently encroached on contiguous territory and seized terrain for itself in the relatively unpopulated areas to the east before it finally was awarded a new fief for the clan's support of King P'ing. It was truly a period when the smaller states had become endangered and any concept of the mutual respect their extended family relationships should have mandated had largely evaporated.

The site of King P'ing's rule during the dual kingship and thereafter, right until moving to Ch'eng Chou in 747 BCE, has been variously said to be Shen, Ts'ung Chou, or a combination of these, with a shift having occurred during the final decade. Insofar as the

capital had been destroyed and Jung elements occupied the eastern portion of the Wei Valley until their being expelled, P'ing must have remained ensconced in the comparatively central state of (Southern) Shen, well protected by its military strength against machinations by King Hsi's strong supporters, Ch'in and Chin. Only after Ch'in and Chin decided that exploiting the traditional order would prove more beneficial did Ch'eng Chou become a viable possibility.

Amid the swirling loyalties that developed in the wake of the royal house's demise, states such as Ch'in and Chin assessed their possibilities in a new light. Although Chin had initially supported King Yu and even played a key role in elevating Yü Ch'en to be king, the Duke of Chin reportedly was personally responsible for slaying King Hsi slightly more than a decade later, after which they participated in a contrived reconciliation that ultimately saw them support King P'ing's move to Ch'eng Chou. Several rather-unsatisfactory explanations have been advanced to explain this blatant betrayal, but it need only be realized that perceived interests and strategic evaluations could quickly change in a tumultuous age driven by ever-evolving power politics rather than familial or ritual concerns. King Hsi may have proven too weak or insufficiently malleable to satisfy Chin's expectations, or he may simply have incurred Duke Wen's rage or provoked his hatred. Even Cheng abandoned him, preferring the rewards proffered by King P'ing. Lacking a strong royal army, King Hsi's existence, not to mention his regal title, continued and ended solely at the whims of others.

Meanwhile, the Ch'üan Jung or other members of the Hsi Jung who participated in King P'ing's quest for legitimacy, having only temporarily forsaken their enmity in order to garner material profits, posed a serious, ongoing threat that certainly contributed to the king's decision. Ch'eng Chou may have been equally exposed to threats originating in the north as well as somewhat constrained by Chin's nearby presence, but at least it was intact, still had its own and nearby military forces capable of mounting an urgent response, and was separated from Ch'in's intrusive presence by the mountains and passes that defined Kuan-chung. Moreover, emigrating there would have required but a minor move northward from his bastion at Shen. Rather than any single factor or explanation, all these considerations must have weighed heavily in the final analysis.

Confronted by obstreperous Ch'in's growing power, pinched by Chin's seizure of key terrain, dismayed by the devastation in Tsung Chou that made it at least temporarily uninhabitable, and faced with the uncertain loyalties of many members of the remaining nobility, King P'ing naturally opted to move his administrative center to the pleasant confines of Ch'eng Chou. Although the area had not escaped

the droughts and pestilence that had dramatically impacted Kuan-chung, the effects were reportedly less severe, the entrenched interests more dispersed. There he could be reasonably confident of defensive support from the contiguous states, whether old Chou fiefs or Chiang powers such as Shen and Tseng as well as Cheng, and realize the geostrategic advantages originally envisioned by King Wu. ⁸⁶⁰

Early historians interested in portraying the Chou in a positive light struggled to craft the era's history in a positive manner. By calling upon barbarian forces, King P'ing's camp brought destruction down on the very realm Yi Chiu sought to rule. Although the Lord of Shen has emerged as the chief instigator, the Chou's rebellious actions were still responsible for the deaths of the legitimate ruler and his chosen successor, the latter's selection falling well within the king's power even if the outcome failed to satisfy some abstract sense of righteousness or moral correctness. King P'ing's shifting the blame for the actual deed onto "barbarian" groups may have had some value in mitigating the aura of perversity that should have thereafter enveloped him, allowing the king to escape the condemnation of history, but could never render him blameless.

IV

Musings and Vectors

Martial Overview

Focusing upon the factors, dynamics, and events that define Chou military history can obscure several crucial issues. These include questions about who actually wielded military power, the nature of Chou military structure and control, the composition of the troops, the nature of combat, types and functions of the weapons employed, the role of the chariot, and the extent to which strategic concepts and tactics evolved. Even though they fall outside the defined scope of the present contemplation, before reviewing the sweep of Western Chou's martial developments and pondering their significance, considering a few tentative observations in the context of the conclusions advanced in our *Ancient Chinese Warfare* might be worthwhile, though with the caveat that they are subject to revision upon further study. ⁸⁶¹

Several modes of warfare can be vaguely discerned amid the military activities already reprised: gradual campaigns of expansion; forceful responses intended to repel incursions; preemptive and punitive campaigns mounted to mitigate threats; aggressive strikes against entrenched enemies, including the earliest known assaults on fortified towns; and decisive battles, with the culmination at Mu-yeh's being a unique encounter that employed all their available forces and exploited the participation of numerous allies. Major efforts required the mobilization of several armies, tactical segmentation of operational forces, lengthy marches, convergence, and intense combat for a short period even though some campaigns saw several battles over a longer time stretch once contact was made with the enemy. Lesser assaults were distinguished more by the limited sizes of the contingents than the shortness of the march or any diminished ferocity in the encounters.

Archaeological discoveries have not yet produced any evidence of functional differences in the weapons employed by the Shang, Chou, or the latter's other enemies. Shang and Chou fighters primarily wielded dagger-axes and short spears and were protected by large shields—but not the sort of oversized shields employed by the ancient Greeks—as well as partial body armor of dubious value. Although the Chou's were stylistically more elaborate, similar weapons appear to

have been used by the indigenous peoples of the Northern complex. The compound reflex bow had already been adapted by virtually everyone except a few southern peoples who would continue to rely on self bows fabricated from locally available bamboo rather the harder woods found in the north, resulting in a consequent diminishment in range but great suitability in the moist environment of the semitropics. They were all deadly at the critical fighting range of thirty to fifty yards and could inflict fatal wounds at twice that distance or farther.

Insofar as their weapons were fundamentally identical, Shang and Chou combat methods must have been highly similar. Both sides would have relied upon archers to reduce its enemy's numbers at a distance and fell its horses, the source of all mobility in antiquity, continuing their fusillades until point blank range. Their warriors would then have engaged with their chosen weapons, either dagger-axes (*ko*) or short spears, the former employed in a sort of arcing mode, the latter in thrusting attacks, in an attempt to pierce any armor and inflict a fatal blow. (Dagger-axes with crescent-shaped lower-blade extensions could also be used in hooking and in limited slashing strikes.) Shields, simple armor, and helmets would have provided some protection for the fortunate, though the legs of warriors on stationary chariots would have been fatally exposed to attack unless the fighters dismounted, the only option if they wanted to join the fray because of the compartments' height above the ground and the relative shortness of their weapons.

Despite the assertion of prominent experts, neither the decisive Shang Chou clash nor the numerous peripheral encounters visible in the historical writings were chariot-centered or chariot-only battles. At most groups of ten and rarely contingents of a hundred may have been employed en masse to penetrate or pursue enemies, but all the operational forces essentially consisted of large numbers of infantry and paltry numbers of chariots. Because of the limitations already discussed in "Elusive Military Issues" (and *Ancient Chinese Warfare*), their functions were almost certainly limited to serving as command and archery platforms, two extremely important roles whose impact should not be underestimated. The steppe peoples clearly possessed them, sometimes in significant but still limited numbers because their production presented complex problems even for the Shang and Chou with their vastly superior woodworking and metallurgical resources.

The inscription found on the *Tuo Yu Ting* explicitly notes that the Chou king commanded Duke Wu to send off his "*yüan shih* "—probably most stalwart forces—in pursuit , and the duke in turn ordered Tuo Yu to lead the chariots in this task. In order to catch the enemy, the accompanying infantry must have been jettisoned and the

chariot forces employed as a self-contained contingent. The small number of enemy troops actually killed and captured, only a couple of hundred, confirms that both forces were limited in size and apparently chariot mounted and the seizure of 117 chariots results in a casualty-to-chariot ratio that strongly suggests each steppe chariot carried just two warriors rather than the commonly assumed three. After the initial clash, Tuo Yu's chariots undertook another pursuit and mounted an assault that produced just over a hundred casualties.

Rather than a typical campaign mounted to repel a major incursion, the *Tuo Yu Ting* inscription describes the Chou's urgent attempt to quickly intercept a small number of mounted raiders before they could terrorize the core area. No major infantry-based expedition could have advanced that quickly and been expected to successfully engage a mobile enemy. Innovative tactics were therefore chosen to blunt a destructive threat instead of repeating those germane to punitive missions. Coincidentally, this episode confirms that the Chou lacked the dispersed forward defenses required to impede, if not quash, such invasions, and implies that the Chou oligarchs had become overly sensitized and frustrated. However, because the forces assigned to the capital could have summarily defeated this paltry raiding party, the incursion should have been regarded as a mere pinprick, however annoying, rather than a threat to their empire.

By the middle to late Western Chou Period, chariots thus seem to have acquired a new, highly limited role in hastily deployed, invariably limited operational contingents rather than simply being confined to command and archery platform functions. The more significant question is whether the army's organization was also moving toward conjoining a fixed number of infantrymen with each chariot and then treating the resulting chariot platoon as one of many subunits that would be integrated into a larger but relatively structured operational array, or the chariots continued to be dispersed across the battlefield in the traditional fashion in order to direct loosely tied infantry groups.

Despite theoretical discussions in the classic military writings, it remains uncertain how closely tied the accompanying infantry components would have been. Ratios in the succeeding Spring and Autumn Period apparently varied between twenty, twenty-two, and even thirty foot soldiers per vehicle even though the systematic grouping of men into squads of five seems to have become prevalent. Discussions in the *Liu-t'ao* indicate that arrays numbering as many as seventy-two infantrymen segmented into three platoons nominally deployed to the left, center, and right of the chariot appeared by the middle Warring States Period. (Their actual positions would depend upon the tactics being implemented and the nature of the terrain.)

Naturally, the more numerous the infantrymen, the greater the likelihood the chariots were being employed as command platforms, the increased density and tactical weight making effective maneuvering almost impossible.

The mere possession of considerable numbers of chariots neither necessarily nor immediately translates into an enhanced military capability. The skills required for their coordinated use must be acquired and appropriate tactics developed to exploit all of the chariot's potential advantages in command, archery, thrusting, and pursuit. Once the army begins to employ horses, the logistical burden dramatically increases and tactical and strategic capability become dependent upon their supply and condition. Although the horses employed in this early period were comparatively sturdy, they were somewhat undersized for the task and therefore easily exhausted when employed on difficult terrain.

Horses are also susceptible to a variety of illnesses and diseases, both idiopathic and communicable, including distemper; readily suffer cracked and bleeding hooves; require periodic rest and recuperation; and need constant attentive care. The requirements for fodder and water quickly become staggering if foraging is not possible, and replacements for fallen or incapacitated animals must be included in all operational efforts. (Horses are easily targeted by even the least-skilled bowman, explaining their high casualty rates.) In addition, expertise and a variety of materials are required to keep the relatively fragile chariots in good repair, further increasing the transport burden. In view of all these factors, it is clear that a lengthy transitional period would have been required in order to manage the chariot component and adopt tactics that would successfully exploit the vehicle's mobility. It cannot be assumed that the early Chou had already progressed through it even though they may have been the conduit for the chariot's introduction into central China.

Finally, as discussed in our *Ancient Chinese Warfare*, the development of fortifications (understood primarily as walls and moats, the two often being deliberately conjoined to create an effective defensive system) represented a crucial step in Chinese defensive strategy. Massive walls had become common as early as the Yang-shao and Lung-shan periods, yet their dimensions dramatically altered with the Chou's inception. Although properly the subject of another volume, it should be noted that important Chou towns and bastions were protected by much narrower but higher walls than earlier and generally encircled by moats on the exterior, interior, or even both. Clearly, these comparatively conservative efforts represent a deliberate response to the difficulties faced by the early Chou as they sought to expeditiously construct the numerous citadels that had

to anchor the newly established fiefs. Accordingly, these initial capitals never attained the dimensions seen in such notable Shang cities as Yen-shih and Cheng-Chou. ⁸⁶²

Military Authority and Organization

The nature of the Chou military edifice and its integration (or lack thereof) in the government's overall structure, especially postconquest, as the demands of administrative necessity eroded the initial martial euphoria, is another crucial topic. The tens of thousands of assiduously studied Shang oracular inscriptions provide far more information about the latter's forces, organization, and utilization than can be gleaned from a hundred or so critical bronze inscriptions that mention martial activities and the dubious vestiges preserved in the traditional historical writings. Continuity with Shang practice has frequently been asserted, but apart from the lack of substantiation, it presumptuously reaches the stated conclusion without being able to describe the Chou and should be deemed irrelevant. In addition, claims such as these assume that states that coexist in time must adopt similar—synonymous with the latest—military methods to have any prospect for survival. However, operating in different environments and facing diverse challenges, it is far more likely the Chou and Shang would have evolved somewhat different structures and tactics. Only in the general area of ritual practice can continuity be seen and then only initially because many aspects were rapidly reshaped after the conquest. ⁸⁶³

Characterizing the Chou military requires contemplating three discrete issues: the basic nature of royal authority and administration, the structure of the military, and the composition and force levels of the standing and operational contingents. In the preconquest decades, the chieftain no doubt possessed the greatest authority but apparently only with the complicity, willing or otherwise, of powerful clan members and eventually a handful of trusted advisors. ⁸⁶⁴ Once King Wen received the Mandate of Heaven and therefore visible sanctification for overthrowing the Shang, the balance of power probably shifted more in his favor and each succeeding king seems to have asserted greater authority over the realm even though their power was actually eroding. Nevertheless, being a highly martial society, responsibility for administrative measures was consequent to military authority, to the individual's place in the clan-based, tribal hierarchy. A sort of incipient bureaucracy gradually emerged as duties were increasingly differentiated and formalized offices gradually replaced ad hoc responsibilities but throughout the early Chou military command could be assigned to almost anyone irrespective of his title and the state of the military structure's ongoing evolution. ⁸⁶⁵

Consistent with bureaucratic developments witnessed elsewhere, increasingly defined functions and somewhat consistent responsibilities started to characterize Chou administrative practice.⁸⁶⁶ Once they began to become solidified and authority (even if originally derivative) more diffused, conflict arose between the monarch and the officials, especially those who might have been in power when a new king ascended the throne. In the Western Chou Period, the ruler seems to have sought to increasingly monopolize power just as the bureaucratic structure began to evolve and attain a certain degree of recognition among its proponents as an appropriate device for controlling the realm. In response, the king turned to the members of his immediate household and entourage, resulting in further estrangement from the state (as would be witnessed in the imperial dynasties), the emergence of new functionaries, and eventually the growth of an additional structure that soon clashed with preexisting edifices. When the important officials such as the *san kung* (three dukes) happened to be powerful state rulers, strife was inevitable and conflict appears to have affected the Western Chou to some extent from the middle period onward. However, determining its severity requires separate study and can only be noted as probably having contributed to the Chou's lack of direction. Meanwhile, the increasing prevalence of these bureaucratic elements began to undermine the Chou's essential martial values and enervate the warrior culture.

According to the retrospective outline found in the *Chou Li*, the most important administrators were known as the *Ta Tsai*, *Ta Ssu-t'u*, *Ta Tsung-po*, *Ta Ssu-ma*, *Ta Ssu-kuan*, and *Ta Ssu-k'ung*. A variety of other titles are also seen in the bronze inscriptions and *Yi Chou-shu*, *Shang Shu*, and *Shih Ching*, including several that recur early in the period. These include the three famous ones of *T'ai Shih*, *T'ai Pao*, and *T'ai Fu*, all of whom seem to have integrated command authority with consultative power, and officials whose titles contained the prefix *ssu* (meaning to oversee or take control of) such as the *Ssu-t'u* and *Ssu-k'ung*. The extant historical sources convey the impression that, despite his having extensive powers, the king still required the acquiescence of these crucial officials, no doubt in part because they were important clan members in their own right.

Collectively, they fell into the category of *ch'ing* or ministers, originally an indefinite number of "big men" or councilors whom the king consulted as needed.⁸⁶⁷ Kuo Chung and Kuo Shu are noted in the *Tso Chuan* as having been *ch'ing-shih* under King Wen⁸⁶⁸ but Chou Kung, Shao Kung, T'ai Kung, Pi Kung, and San-yi Sheng all fulfilled this role before the conquest. Over the decades, these positions became increasingly formalized, a number of new administrative

functions emerged, and a core authoritative body evolved whose members were individually known as *ch'ing-shih* and the edifice as the *ch'ing-shih-liao* , “*liao* ” meaning “to discuss.” ⁸⁶⁹ As important fief lords often held the position of *ch'ing-shih* , they came to exert ever-greater influence just when the king was withdrawing to the splendid isolation of monarchal privilege. This eventually allowed them to displace King Li and also initiate the Kung Ho reign.

As would frequently be witnessed in Chinese imperial history, the servants entrusted with personally serving the king and administering the household, minor functionaries, such as the *shan-fu* , who seem to have originally been entrusted with cooking and serving food, were simultaneously coalescing into a body of administrators whose power was strictly derived from their familiarity and access to the king. But it was the clique of functionaries normally responsible for the preparation and recording of documents and the ongoing activities in the ancestral temple, the *shih* or scribes, that began to acquire real power through its control of the means of administration.

As this group developed into the secretariat or *t'ai-shih-liao* , its members naturally clashed with the *ch'ing-shih* , resulting in a battle for influence and control. By the middle Western Chou Period, the *t'ai-shih-liao* appear to have acquired greater authority, and the *ch'ing-shih* seem to have become (or been reduced to) mere functionaries rather than influential advisors and holders of power. But, as the *Tao Te Ching* observes, extremes tend to be unstable and so power seems to have reverted back to the nobles and thus the *ch'ing-shih* toward the end of the era because many of them also ruled major states.

The number of lesser administrators entrusted with implementing the decisions of these august figures and other minor officials that were expected to exert local control (such as the *chang* and *po*) also continued to multiply throughout the Western Chou. Fortunately, the more important ones have already been cited in earlier military discussions, obviating any need to multiply names such as *yin* , *ts'ai* , *li* , *hsiao-ch'en* , *p'u* , and *yü-shih* endlessly and then attempt to describe their shifting, always-nebulous responsibilities. (Bronze inscriptions and traditional historical writings contain rather different titles, adding to the complexity.) Despite the tendency toward increasing differentiation, true bureaucratization, and specialized knowledge, at this early stage of officialdom many tasks continued to be assigned well outside the normal sphere of responsibility. Without doubt, there were far more officials active at every level at an earlier time than presently apparent, though their effectiveness has been questioned. ⁸⁷⁰

This protobureaucracy developed amid a strong martial ethos and initially relied upon the extended clan and proven members of the

inner government. As their numbers multiplied, their connection with the king diminished even though he seems to have still made the major appointments, confirmed the inheritance of titles within families, and validated the actions of his predecessor upon assuming the throne. In the last decades of the Western Chou Period, the king, *ch'ing-shih-liao* , *t'ai-shih-liao* , and powerful nobles seem to have been caught up in a swirling conflict to control not just governmental power but the military as well, presaging developments in the imperial period when rulers would often manipulate the various officials in an attempt to constrain the bureaucracy as well as ornery clan members, aristocratic families, and fief rulers. ⁸⁷¹

When it comes to military command itself, certainly the *T'ai Pao* and *T'ai Shih* are both well known from the conquest and suppression campaigns and the third of the three high officials. The *T'ai Fu* , or Grand Tutor, also seems to have wielded military authority from time to time even though almost no contemporary references exist. Others entrusted with august responsibility included the *Ssu-t'u* , *Ssu-k'ung* , and perhaps the *Ssu-ma* , an old title with strong martial connotations that would be highly conspicuous in the Warring States Period but surprisingly not yet deeply involved in military matters. ⁸⁷² Bronze inscriptions clearly show that the most important operational military title was commander (師 氏 *shih* or *shih-shih* , not to be confused with the similarly romanized word meaning “scribe”), roughly equivalent to the modern “general” when put in charge of an army (師 *shih*). ⁸⁷³

The functions and responsibilities of numerous other titles, both civil and strictly military such as *tsou-ma* and *ch' ü-ma*, are far less distinct. A further complicating factor was the practice of assigning overreaching authority on a highly temporary basis, thereby obscuring any emerging hierarchical differentiation. For example, according to the bronze inscriptions already encountered, one of the civil officials frequently entrusted with military authority was the scribe (史 *shih*). ⁸⁷⁴ Although noted in Shang oracular inscriptions in this role as well, the scribe's particular expertise was creating documents and handling the equivalent of official secretarial duties, a task for which he was qualified because of the extensiveness of his education in literary rather than military matters. Until many more bronze inscriptions have been recovered, the best characterization might therefore be that the bureaucracy was in its infancy and that virtually all the offices and responsibilities were still comparatively undefined or in flux.

Based upon a brief outline found in the *Chou Li* , it has been claimed that the military edifice that emerged amid this chaos was founded upon what has come to be known as the *hsiang /sui* system. ⁸⁷⁵ The *hsiang /sui* concept, which results in distinguishing the people dwelling in the *hsiang* (village/town) from those outside in the *sui*

(exterior, including the suburbs), both socially and administratively, reportedly underpinned Western Chou military participation. Additional complexities are the characterization of Chou administrative distinctions in terms of the *kuo* ("state," but essentially the area within the town or city walls) and *yeh* ("wilds," but normally the exterior, especially the farmland attached to a village or town) and the interposition of the *chiao* (suburbs between the two, but presumably inhabited by the *kuo-jen* rather than the *sui-jen*). Considerable verbiage has been expended upon arguing the primacy of one or the other as well as attempting to reconcile them by identifying the *hsiang* with the *kuo* and the *sui* with the *yeh* .

The core Chou populace and perhaps a few other highly privileged families theoretically dwelled in the *hsiang* (or *kuo*) and dominated the unit economically and administratively, both in fact and by right as members of the dominant extended Chou state. ⁸⁷⁶ The people living outside the town or walls in the *sui* /*yeh* were presumably the lower classes of Chou society, farmers, any residual indigenous peoples, and displaced Yin families. In the idealized conception only the members of the *hsiang* / *kuo* were qualified and, more importantly, had the obligation to serve as soldiers but the less socially privileged in the exterior, although not as benighted as the barbarians found in distant states, did not escape obligatory duties as ancillary personnel even though deemed too inferior to fight.

As outlined in the *Chou Li* , one *hsiang* should consist of 12,500 families in a hierarchical organization fundamentally based mostly upon multiples of five: *pi* (5 families), *lŭ* (25), *tsu* (100), *tang* (500), and *chou* (2500). ⁸⁷⁷ Not unexpectedly, the names and even the organization for the *sui* differ: *ling* (5), *li* (25), *tsuan* (*tsan* , 100), *pi* (500), *hsien* (2500), and *sui* (12,500). ⁸⁷⁸ The *sui* would include people known as *min* , *yeh-jen* (men of the *yeh*), and *yeh-min* . According to the *Chou Li*, an official under the *Ssu-t'u* (chief official for earth or land) known simply as the *sui-jen* "administers the *yeh* lands of the king's state. In accord with the configuration of the terrain he divides the fields and wilds and based upon the regulations establishes the areas of districts and neighborhoods (*hsien-pi*)."

Apart from theoretically imposing a very stringent order, the structure would empower a hierarchy of officials at several levels who would then be expected to assume command roles if the people were mobilized for warfare. ⁸⁷⁹ In fact, the *sui-jen* was also responsible for inspecting their weapons and teaching agriculture to the exterior's denizens, a task that implies they not only had some sort of military role (which theorists seem to have ignored) but were essentially "farmer-soldiers." Whether the *hsiang* or *sui* structures would have been immediately convertible to an active military contingent in the

manner attempted by the state of Ch'in in the Warring States Period (in accord with Shang Yang's reforms) remains unknown.

Following their two-stage conquest of the realm, the Chou oligarchs would have been particularly well positioned to impose this sort of structure on society at large, especially in areas where new fiefs were being established and in Ch'eng Chou, in which case the *yeh* would have been the dwelling area of the subjugated, the *kuo* the privileged home of their conquerors. But whether they ever had the vision, energy, or capability to rigorously deploy this sort of administrative system is highly doubtful. Even if the people could be organized in this fashion, without a dedicated training system, they would prove incapable in battle despite the camaraderie and cohesiveness that close familiarity would nurture. As Confucius would subsequently observe, "to engage in combat with an uninstructed people can be termed casting them away." 880

The distinctive form of the Chinese city continued to evolve in the Western and especially Eastern Chou, but at the outset it had not yet achieved the idealized form of a two-walled structure in which the ruler's quarters would be ensconced in a separate quarter within the first concentric ring, the important members of the populace being found within the inner and outer rings, and nonentities as well as the farms consigned to the complex's exterior. Nevertheless, references to *sui-jen* or men from the *sui* are seen in a couple Western Chou bronze inscriptions. While inadequate to justify claims that the system was fully or even extensively implemented, it might not be an overstatement to suggest it was beginning to evolve.

References embedded in *Shang Shu* harangues indicate a defined hierarchy based upon multiples of ten was being employed when the attack at Mu-yeh unfolded, but the classic military writings and the *Chou Li*, itself a retrospective product of the Warring States Period, describe a system constructed by fives. 881

UNIT NAME	STRENGTH	POSSIBLE WESTERN EQUIVALENTS
<i>Wu</i>	5	squad
<i>I-ang</i>	25	platoon
<i>Tsu</i>	100	company
<i>Lü</i>	500	battalion (regiment)
<i>Shih</i>	2,500	regiment (brigade)
<i>Chün</i>	12,500	army (corps)

The crucial question then becomes how many of these various units were integrated into the standing and operational armies, the two not necessarily being identical because field forces frequently included a variety of discrete and specialized units such as the Tiger Warriors. (It should be noted that in the Western Chou Period, the largest articulated contingent was the *shih*, operationally an "army.") Several sizes have been proposed for Western Chou armies ranging from one thousand or three thousand troops, the figure most

commonly seen in the Shang and the most likely staffing level in the Chou, through five thousand, sometimes twelve thousand five hundred or fifteen thousand, and even an astonishing forty-five thousand under a *Ssu-ma* .

Neither the term commonly employed for “army” from the Warring States onward, 軍 *chün* , nor the unit of twelve thousand five hundred normally consisting of five *shih* (which would then be functionally equivalent to a western “regiment”) existed in the Western Chou despite discussions in the *Chou Li* . *Chün* does not appear until the Spring and Autumn Period, and then the term is only applicable in the central states because peripheral ones such as Ch’u persisted in their own distinct forms of organization. Thereafter, the term *san chün* or “Three Armies” encountered throughout the military texts would normally refer to the army in general, not just three units of army strength, even though it certainly evolved from the common use of three such forces denominated as left, center, and middle.

During the Eastern Chou, the idea circulated that the king alone had the right to maintain six armies (*shih*), a great feudal lord three, lesser lords but two, and the least of them just one, still an enormous force in comparison with the size of the local population. (Given the prominent existence of the *Yin Pa-shih* [“Eight Yin Armies”], it is somewhat puzzling that royal prerogative was limited to just six armies.) all these dispersed state armies could theoretically be called upon to supplement the royal forces and mount suppressive military campaigns on behalf of the Chou king. However, after the rise of the hegemon in the Spring and Autumn Period, states such as Chin simply disregarded these constraints and eventually fielded as many as six armies.

As seen from the bronze inscriptions already cited, despite frequent efforts to revitalize the army, many campaign forces seem to have been extemporaneously thrown together and therefore included royal troops, often one or both of the six and eight armies, clan (*tsu*) forces, elite warriors and other special groups (possibly including slaves), ⁸⁸² local state contingents, and sometimes contributions from allies, especially those located along the path of march, though never again in the magnitude witnessed in the strike against Emperor Hsin. ⁸⁸³ Contrary to commentators, this admixture continued throughout the era, with clan contingents even assuming a more important role in the guise of state contingents from Kuo, Chin, Shen, and others.

Even though members of the extended Chou clan probably furnished the core strength, the six armies appear to have already become an operational force even before (or perhaps for) Mu-yeh. Six armies were fielded at Mu-yeh according to common belief and vestiges in the historical literature, the remaining forces having been

furnished by their allies and discrete contingents such as the Tiger Warriors. The *Shih Ching* ode “Yü P’u” supposedly describes King Wen campaigning with six *shih*, and the *Lü-shih Ch’un-ch’iu* states that “the six armies had not yet arrived but (Wu Wang) conquered them at Mu-yeh with elite soldiers.”⁸⁸⁴ Due to their late composition dates, neither can be considered reliable sources for these historical events, but from all indications the magic number of six probably characterized the Chou’s preconquest forces, explaining their preference for six rather than four, nine, or some other number of armies throughout the dynasty.

The uncertain composition of these diverse units has prompted extensive speculation. Perhaps the most basic questions arise over who actually served in the military and whether their qualifications and status changed over the Western Chou’s three centuries. In the decades prior to the conquest, all of the clan’s able-bodied members would have been expected to participate and doubtlessly constituted the military’s core strength. However, being a warrior culture of the chieftainship type does not mean every member or even a core portion of the extended clan spent their lives in military training in the manner of the fabled Spartans. Apart from the king, his personal bodyguards, and a few powerful oligarchs, most of the inhabitants may have been primarily farmers who nevertheless devoted considerable time and energy to war fighting when required. But in the absence of archaeological evidence, it cannot be concluded that a large segment did anything other than train or shoulder other military responsibilities in the Chou’s intense martial culture.

At the same time, their limited population base must have compelled them to assimilate large numbers of fighters from among the peoples they conquered or otherwise amalgamated with, especially the Chiang. Similarly, after the conquest the only way their armed forces could have rapidly expanded would have been through incorporating experienced troops from their allies, the minor vanquished states, and the Shang. This explains the visible role of certain Shang clans in Western Chou military affairs as well as occasional references to other groups such as the Pa, Yang, Yi, and Shu.⁸⁸⁵ Even the Western Six Armies may have needed to be reconstituted since many of their personnel probably were wounded or perished in the early period of intense conflict and others presumably reassigned to the eastern armies on a permanent basis.

By the time King Ch’eng assumed power, the Chou maintained or could quickly levy six armies composed of clan members and lower-ranking nobility in the capital region of Feng and Hao; could perhaps prevail upon several contiguous states for forces;⁸⁸⁶ and apparently positioned a few small garrison units at key points

throughout the realm, primarily in the newly constituted fiefs. More uncertain is the composition and role of the Eight Yin Armies stationed in the former Shang homeland and whether there is any substance to the unlikely claims that an additional force of similar strength was eventually deployed at Ch'eng Chou.

For millennia it has been claimed that the Chou simply integrated part of the remnant Shang forces into their own military structure by organizing and dispersing the soldiers into eight newly created units shortly after King Wu's victory. ⁸⁸⁷ Spring and Autumn and especially Warring States practice would subsequently see surrendered enemy troops voluntarily morphed into the victor's forces even though further battles might be in the offing with their former compatriots. In accord with his emphasis upon being ruthlessly effective in warfare, Sun-tzu in fact advocated converting captured forces into one's own: ⁸⁸⁸

When ten or more chariots are captured in chariot encounters, reward the first to get one. Change their flags and pennants to ours, intermix and employ them with our own chariots. Treat the captured soldiers well in order to nurture them for our own use. This is referred to as "conquering the enemy and growing stronger."

How successful or frequently employed this policy may have been requires further investigation, but it would seem that anger and hatred would have prevented it from becoming overly common. As warfare became more ruthless and lethal late in the Spring and Autumn Period and thereafter enemy prisoners were often slain, enslaved, or returned to their native states rather than entrusted with military roles, a hundred thousand or more prisoners being slaughtered despite their having surrendered after two Warring States battles. ⁸⁸⁹

The Shang situation would seem to have presented even fewer options because the threat posed by the soldiers' numerousness should have argued for disarming and possibly enslaving them. On the assumption they had been profoundly affected by King Wu's Virtue and detested Emperor Hsin's perversity, analysts have traditionally regarded them as exceptional candidates for conversion. Even though the most brutal and perverse dictators often have dedicated adherents willing to perish on their behalf and the idea that benevolence attracts may itself be dubious, when confronted with a choice between death and living on as a member of the enemy's forces, self-interest would seem to dictate choosing the latter. Although rather contrary expectations should perhaps prevail in light of the battle's carnage, contemporary bronze inscriptions indicate that at least some Shang

soldiers served in these eight armies, lending a little credence to the idea they may have been largely composed of Shang veterans.

However, these inscriptions fail to indicate whether the units consisted solely of Shang personnel other than the commanding officers, were fully staffed by Chou officers down to the lowest level, or had Chou troops intermixed. The answers theoretically depend upon whether the vanquished Shang troops would have been more unresponsive to Chou officers or have posed more of an uncontrollable threat—not to mention comprising an unknown entity beyond the ken of ready military intelligence—if their supervisors were all Shang natives. Intermixing Chou and Shang soldiers might have also caused festering animosities to turn violent, embroiling the unit in chaos and making it unreliable in combat.

On the other hand, although they could well be accorded a defensive role in conflicts with external enemies—the chief function of Western Chou armies—expecting former Shang military components to play an essentially paramilitary role in maintaining order over a populace that had suffered only one, albeit horrific, defeat might have been overly optimistic even though history provides many examples of conquered forces being employed, often quite willingly, against their own people. Apart from these unresolved aspects, their role in the Shang rebellion under Wu Keng and the three supervisors is similarly unclear, though if King Wu had brought them into existence, they would likely have been entrusted to the command of the two brothers, possibly furnished the core of the rebel forces, and therefore mostly perished. When the Eight Yin Armies were recreated after the rebellion was quashed, they were probably staffed by a disproportionate number of Chou and allied personnel in combination with former Shang soldiers who refrained from rebelling rather than just Yin miscreants, contrary to unsubstantiated claims otherwise. ⁸⁹⁰

The contemporary evidence is suggestive at best and no bronze inscriptions ever mention the two together, yet several scholars have adamantly asserted that King Ch'eng's reign saw two eastern armies established, whether shortly after the rebellion's suppression or following the widely ranging campaign against the Tung Yi and other enemies. ⁸⁹¹ The operational group still known as the *Yin Pa-shih* or Eight Yin Armies was supposedly redeployed in the Shang heartland. The other, purportedly created simultaneously when Ch'eng Chou was being constructed from surrendered Yin personnel, was named the “*Ch'eng Chou Pa-shih*” because it was stationed in the city's vicinity, though the components presumably were not concentrated within the capital itself.

However their contingents may have been dispersed, the tactical and strategic functions assigned to these large forces would probably

have differed. The *Yin Pa-shih* stationed in the greater Wei area would have again primarily functioned as a sort of paramilitary police force tasked with maintaining control of the now-subjugated and dispersed Shang population. Although undoubtedly still responsible for keeping a watchful eye on the Shang segment, their counterparts at Ch'eng Chou would then have been more concerned with protecting the new secondary capital. Although both were theoretically capable of being summoned to repel threats arising from almost any direction, the *Yin Pa-shih* would have been expected to ward off the Tung Yi (as shown by the *Hsiao Ch'en Tzu Kuei*), but the eight assigned to Ch'eng Chou tasked with thwarting Huai Yi incursions and mounting punitive thrusts into the south and southeast even though the *Yin Pa-shih* are recorded as also having undertaken this role. ⁸⁹²

Apart from questioning the tenuous citations and forced interpretations of the few inscriptions that appear to mention the “*Ch'eng Chou Pa-shih* ” or becoming entangled in arguments over whether the names have broader meanings or were used in a less-than-precise manner, raising strong counterarguments against their dual existence might be apropos. For example, stationing two eight-army forces in the east would have obviated any need to summon components from the Western Six Armies, yet inscriptions such as on the *Yü Ting* show that the Six Western and Eight Yin Armies occasionally participated in conjoined campaigns. Rather than requiring this massive western force to undertake an expensive eleven hundred *li* march to even reach the staging area, based upon the anticipated strength of the opposition, some or all of the eight Ch'eng Chou armies could have been temporarily united with the “*Yin Pa-shih* ” (or the reverse) to create a formidable campaign force.

Arguments for the Western Chou's having maintained two eight-army contingents in the east also tend to slight the crucial aspect of economics. Without doubt, the presence of numerous troops just returning from the Tung Yi campaign and others still occupying the former Shang territory would have greatly facilitated their organization in the immediate postrebellion period. Considerable wealth had certainly been confiscated over the years, but in addition to the collateral damage inflicted on the infrastructure, Chou suppressive efforts must have incurred staggering costs in terms of men and materials. Substantial numbers also had to be diverted to undertaking the many tasks, martial and otherwise, in the several fiefs that had just been awarded, considerably diminishing the manpower available. It might therefore be questioned whether the Chou could have afforded to retain such vast numbers in purely military roles rather than returning them to farming and other productive activities.

Proponents who claim the two eastern forces were primarily

staffed by co-opted Shang military personnel, just as the initial eight founded after King Wu completed his conquest, merely shift the nature of the question to one of composition and ignore the animosity then prevalent, not to mention the extensive suppressive measures that distributed the remnant conquered populace among several fiefs. Even allowing for the incorporation of former Shang fighters in these eastern forces, large numbers of Chou officers would still have been required at every level to ensure obedience and preclude another revolt, greatly stretching their human resources.

Accordingly, even if the Chou had wanted to impose heavy strictures on the eastern (primarily Shang) population and levy enormous exactions, it would have been extremely difficult for the young dynasty to financially support and staff two eight-army forces., Even if they succeeded in the latter, they would still have had to solve the problem of providing the requisite logistical support for two dense concentrations of nonproductive individuals, perhaps some forty-eight thousand men calculated at a nominal three thousand soldiers per army or roughly equivalent to the maximum number that originally marched upon Mu-yeh. As the centuries passed, the central government found that sustaining just a single force in the east required the imposition of ameliorative measures such as the deputation of a *Ssu-t'u* after King Mu's reign to make them at least somewhat self-supporting. Before stabilization and the development of agriculture, at the dynasty's outset it would have been even more problematic and a strong argument for extensively dispersing them to maximize local contributions.

Finally, even though the preexistence of the Eight Yin Armies might have imbued the number eight with some sort of felt necessity, it seems highly coincidental that both of the eastern forces would have consisted of exactly eight contingents rather than levels more appropriate to the topography and martial responsibilities, whether four, six, or ten. In view of all these factors, it seems likely that only a single eastern force ever existed, the *Yin Pa-shih* originally established after the first conquest and then reconstituted following the rebellion's suppression and the Tung Yi campaigns. Because they would have been partially relieved of the task of policing the remnant Shang members who had now been dispersed among several fiefs and compelled to emigrate to Ch'eng Chou and even Tsung Chou, their components were probably more widely scattered, including across the greater Ch'eng Chou region. This could have resulted in their acquiring the second designation of the *Ch'eng Chou Pa-shih* or simply being referred to in this fashion when seeking to distinguish them from the Western Six Armies rather than two such forces being confused as one. ⁸⁹³

Sweep of Military Events

Over the several decades preceding the dramatic clash at Mu-yeh, the Chou had harbored their materials and nurtured their forces by judiciously spacing their expeditionary campaigns rather than exhausting their resources and troops. Thereafter, the dynastic military events commenced with the devastation of Shang's dispirited forces in a single battle prior to conducting a brief but intensive series of strikes intended to eliminate residual opposition and pacify the contiguous area. The "chief evildoers" were conspicuously executed back at the capital, but in comparison with the total war that would be practiced in the Warring States and thereafter, the number slain and postconquest measures imposed were relatively restrained. Some elements of the vanquished were shifted westward to facilitate their control as well as to derive benefits from Shang cultural and material achievements. Three royal family members were entrusted with supervising the greater Anyang area and the newly appointed hereditary ruler, but there was little disruption of Shang customs and laws. Chou members who had distinguished themselves in the greater conquest effort were simultaneously awarded fiefs in the greater Wei River Valley, not out in the hinterland as traditionally thought.

Rather than peace and tranquility, the early progenitors unexpectedly found themselves confronted by a rebellion spearheaded by King Wu's own brothers and powered by Shang dissidents and remnant military forces. Before their suppressive efforts ended, the revolt had spread to the Tung Yi and other groups who obviously perceived an opportunity to throw off recently proclaimed, if nominal, Chou strictures. More than two dozen fiefs intended to control the realm and coincidentally provide perimeter defense (particularly in the east) were then established and the Shang populace apportioned among Lu, Sung, and Wei. Extensive campaigns were also undertaken in the southeast and south to ensure the security of the new state. However, the realm had now been defined, there would be no further external conquests or annexation of terrain.

Chou military activities had thus been aggressive but narrowly targeted through the initial victory at Mu-yeh before becoming

repressive and expansively directed in the second conquest. Thereafter, despite a purported early quiescence, they may be succinctly characterized as initially preemptive but subsequently relatively static even though marked by defensive flurries of punitive activity prompted by external predators. The level varied as new aggressors appeared over time and older ones were vanquished, absorbed, or became enervated and simply faded away. More vigorous rulers such as Kings Mu, Li, and Hsüan sporadically sought to revive their warrior heritage and undertake the prosecution of externally oriented campaigns, but even the minimally successful debilitated the army and entailed negative effects.

Complaints about the onerous nature of lengthy service also seem to have surfaced despite the infrequency of Chou combat. However, whether or not the campaign was undertaken for the greater good, troops chronically moan about the rigors and tedium of service and the hazards and hardships of lengthy duty away from home, so their complaints are not necessarily synonymous with excessive deprivation or the travail of overuse. While the odes provide another perspective, it should also be remembered that the disgruntled are normally more motivated to give voice to their emotions than the satisfied or oblivious. The extent of the state's desolation must therefore be weighed against the vibrancy of the early Spring and Autumn Period.

A number of inscriptions refer to scrutinizing maps of battles and borders, and several odes indicate plans or drawings were employed to lay out cities and bounds.⁸⁹⁴ Even though the borders were nebulous at best—mainly highly visible rivers and mountain ranges—and rarely, if ever, formally marked, the oligarchs had a clear sense of empire and the limits of realm despite their presumptuousness that All under Heaven now fell under their purview. However, they found themselves immersed in a very heterogeneous world composed of widely dispersed Chou clan members who constituted a thin veneer outside the Wei River Valley, a large Shang populace located primarily in the east but also in dense enclaves in both the western and eastern capitals, and numerous other peoples variously termed Yi, Jung, and Ti who not only inhabited the peripheral areas but also dwelled in scattered pockets. Postconquest, numerous Shang clans had also been transplanted almost intact, creating additional non-Chou sectors.

Fiefs were quickly established to control the heterogeneous population now found within the realm as well as dominate the contiguous entities within the envisioned sphere of influence. Rather than allocated willy-nilly, they were deliberately parceled out for strategic reasons, and the loyalty of the original recipients assured by

personal relationships cemented by ceremonies and oaths. From the outset they had a strongly martial character, those established on the periphery being larger and more vigorous because they had to confront restless external peoples. Several, such as Ch'i, Yen, Wey, and Lu, even appear to have functioned as local overlords or *fang po* almost in the style of the ancient *Hsi Po* after having been granted authority over nearby smaller entities and entrusted with considerable (but still not thoroughly understood) martial authority, perhaps more coercive than defined. They therefore came to intercede in the power structure, interposing a sort of intermediate polity in the hierarchical order of king / *fang po* / minor fief-holder, even though not authorized to interfere politically. ⁸⁹⁵

Virtually every analyst has emphasized the strategic import of the fiefs' emplacements. For example, Ch'i was entrusted with pacifying the restive Yi in the greater Shandong area while Yen (originally centered at Hebei Yi-hsien) and Chin (as well as Ch'i) were tasked with responsibility for stemming Jung Ti incursions from out of the north. Even "foreign" protostates such as Hsü and Eh were temporarily accorded this status because of the surpassing military importance of their pivotal location in the southeast. Not without justification, writers thus tend to speak of deliberately constructed triads and lines of defense such as from Ch'i down through Lu, ⁸⁹⁶ but it might still be asked whether—or to what extent—the postconquest impositions were the realization of a conscious plan or instead primarily extemporaneous, prompted and constrained by natural geostrategic developments.

In essentially representing an extended actualization of former Shang concepts of domain, however porous and ill defined the Chou's boundaries naturally encompassed areas of major habitation and transport intersection. No conqueror would ever voluntarily forfeit control of the important fortified towns that had already evolved along the rivers, at the base of mountains, near lakes, and wherever else the burgeoning economy could support trade. However, once limits are defined, anyone outside the realm automatically become "foreigner" and thus a potential threat to the civilized inhabitants presumably dwelling within. Unless the lines could be redrawn to encompass them, the denizens in the external world would always remain allies at best, enemies and aggressors at worst, invariably interlopers if they should emigrate into contested frontier areas much in the way the *Tao Te Ching* speaks about the dramatic effects of distinguishing and naming: ⁸⁹⁷

All under Heaven know the
beautiful as beauty, so there

is ugliness.

All under Heaven know
goodness as the good, so
there is the not good.
Therefore, being and nonbeing
mutually produce each
other,
Difficult and easy complement
each other,
Long and short shape each
other,
High and low contrast each
other.

Having evolved along naturally defined transportation routes, the numerous towns at the frontier thus came to represent end points along corridors of external access and therefore acquired great tactical value. Their designation as military colonies and assumption of power projection responsibilities naturally followed. A few fiefs such as Chin may have been established in sparsely populated areas or the midst of animosity (such as Ch'i), but none were inserted into totally uninhabited terrain, on vacant lands, in order to expand the Chou's horizons or impose military might on the hostile within the four quarters. The dictates of geographic necessity and whims of prior existence therefore appear to have played a more significant role in the emplacement of the various perimeter fiefs than schematized strategic intent.

Hostility around the Periphery

Despite the enmity attributed to the many external groups, the major protagonists were the Hsien-yün and Yi, the latter initially in their incarnation in Shandong and later in the Huai River area. Ch'u was always deemed menacing, but the only armed clashes resulted from Chou campaigns into the south rather than Ch'u invasions of core territory. Perhaps still troubled by King Chao's loss, the last Chou monarchs still buttressed their southern-facing defenses with new fiefs, thereby diverting their focus away from their internal problems and inadvertently expending resources on projects that ultimately weakened their western defenses. ⁸⁹⁸

The Tung Yi and Huai Yi had presumably emerged from the remnants of the great Neolithic cultures that formerly inhabited an expansive eastern coastal arc, but their exact heritage is a matter of contention. Disparate local (especially Ying surnamed) groups continued to be interspersed among the more dominant Yi who, well

in accord with their tradition of opposing the Shang, seem to have recognized a commonality of interest that was either prompted or provoked by the Chou and would continue to be problematic into the Spring and Autumn Period. Inscriptions and some vestiges in the *Odes* indicate that Chou kings thought that these eastern and southeastern regions ought to be submissive and forward tribute, especially natural resources including metal ore and provisions for the military, and often retained the latter at frontier depots.

Except when radical changes are effected by a new ruler, segmenting the dynastic sweep into discrete reign periods tends to obscure important continuities and presumes that irrelevant royal activities or propensities are disproportionately influential. Historians speak of King Ch'eng and even King K'ang consolidating the achievements of their ancestors, but more likely the peripheral peoples, having been startled by the Chou victory but feeling sufficiently distant, were willing to give lip service while "hedging their bets" and awaiting developments. Many of them were beyond the reach of Chou power so the image of a consolidated kingdom with an essentially divine right to rule was probably little recognized. However, despite its successful suppression, the early revolt sustained by previously undisturbed Shang elements must have fostered an impression of Chou vulnerability and thus stimulated widespread confidence in their ability to challenge their new overlords. The twin tasks of persuasion and consolidation confronted the Chou, with persuasion being the more acute.

Perhaps because the awesomeness of the Shang conquest had begun to fade, as early as the reigns of King K'ang and King Chao, several of the contiguous, formerly submissive states grew restive. Their purported offenses ranged from being inadequately reverent or even disrespectful through failing to forward obligatory offerings or outright impositions (variously said to be minimal or onerous), as well as mounting incursions, the latter presumably undertaken for the purpose of plundering since they rarely remained on Chou terrain. The Tung Yi, located primarily in the Shandong peninsula, initially were the chief protagonists, but the Hsien-yün, possibly acting under pressure from other migratory groups farther out in Central Asia, caused the greatest consternation when their penetration threatened to reach the western capital.

Attention quickly swung back to the southeast where the Huai Yi in different guises occasionally mangled the border defenses and caused concern in Ch'eng Chou. Coalitions under the lord of Hsü and then the Lord of Eh, both of whom had enjoyed Chou recognition at various times, achieved the greatest success before finally being thwarted. King Mu, King Li, and King Hsüan all attempted to revitalize

the military, the first of these by overawing peoples in the west through his lengthy peregrination, the last with administrative measures, the relocation of fiefs, and a few vigorous campaigns. Considerable defensive responsibilities were also undertaken by the proto-states, especially Kuo then Ch'i, suggesting morbidity in the state's core forces.

The other belligerent entity with sufficient energy to intimidate the Chou was the burgeoning state of Ch'u, often coupled with Ching in textual and inscriptional references even though they were not identical. Although Ch'u would loom ominously throughout the Western Chou era, encroach upon several of the interceding minor Chou enclaves before King Yu's demise, and repeatedly threaten the Chou heritage states during the subsequent Spring and Autumn Period, it never mounted a significant invasion nor attempted to occupy core Chou terrain.⁸⁹⁹ Nevertheless, no doubt because of their subsequent ascent to power, despite its early insignificance, nascent Ch'u's activities and tenuous relationship with the Western Chou have long garnered it disproportionate attention.⁹⁰⁰

Relations between the Chou and Ch'u varied from superficial cordiality through open animosity throughout the era, neither party ever being fully confident of the other's sincerity. Although Ch'u's chieftains must have appeared menacingly antagonistic at times, it was primarily the Chou that acted aggressively by dispatching several expeditionary forces and provocatively fortifying the frontier with indeterminate results.⁹⁰¹ Nevertheless, the Ch'u contented themselves with nibbling away at the intervening territory and directed their energies to seizing the protostates aligned in a sort of horizontal belt as far as the kingdom of Eh. Ironically, they seem to have acted as an erstwhile ally in sustaining Chou military activities, however minimally, on more than one occasion, despite repeated Chou efforts to cower, threaten, and actively suppress them.

Although Ch'u's founding clan had apparently received some form of Shang recognition, prior to the dynasty's outset the early chieftain Yü Hsiung ventured to the Chou capital where he was accorded a similarly cordial reception. Whether he had detected some weakness in the Shang that fated it to extinction or astutely sought to ensure congenial relations with all possible powers, he thus made an effort to establish contact with the vibrant upstarts. Being located in a remote region, his "submissiveness" seems to have been minimal, hardly even nominal. Although no Ch'u contingents are reported as having participated in the conquest campaign, a late reference suggests they supported the effort by forwarding bows and arrows instead.⁹⁰²

In a passage that extols King Wen's zealous efforts to attract

warriors and employ outstanding advisers, the “Chou Pen-chi” describes the king as so dedicated that he did not even have the leisure to eat. ⁹⁰³ Somewhat surprisingly, Yü (Hsiung) Tzu’s name appears together with Po Yi, Hung Yao, and San-yi Sheng in a list of sagacious (*hsien*) early supporters that is frequently cited as evidence of King Wen’s charisma. The somewhat dubious “Ch’u Shih-chia” similarly states that “prince Yü Hsiung served King Wen” and cites King Wu of Ch’u as claiming that Yü Hsiung had been the keeper of the flame and died early, presumably in consequence of his service to the Chou. They suggest in combination that King Wen had recognized the clan’s potential importance and perhaps hoped to preclude aggressive actions on the Chou’s weak southern flank rather than gain Ch’u’s support.

Whatever the initial sincerity of both parties, relations quickly turned antagonistic. As already noted, the vessel known as the *Tso Po Ting* (attributed to King Li’s reign or possibly King Hsüan’s) has a 112-character inscription that refers to the Duke of Chou, an ancestor of the caster, having campaigned in the south after the rebellious eastern states had been crushed, no doubt as part of the ongoing effort to stabilize the perimeter. ⁹⁰⁴ (The Duke of Shao’s reconnaissance in the south was similarly conceived.) The “Tso Luo Chieh” in the *Yi Chou Shu* further indicates the suppression effort was not limited to the hostile peoples in Hsü, Yen, and Ying, but included some seventeen states said to have plotted against the Chou. Since three Hsiung brothers appear among them, it is thought the Hsiung clan dwelling in northern Jiangsu suffered from Chou retribution. ⁹⁰⁵

The members of the extended clan that had expanded or emigrated into the region between the Yangtze and Han Rivers must not have been targeted because “King Ch’eng enfeoffed Hsiung Yi amid the Ch’u Man and enfeoffed his son Nan with land and the surname of Mi to dwell at Tan-yang.” ⁹⁰⁶ This would suggest some sort of reconciliation and efforts to integrate them into the Chou sphere, but when they subsequently participated in King Ch’eng’s great conclave they were reportedly assigned a menial position and became piqued. ⁹⁰⁷

Their less-than-glorious treatment has traditionally been explained in terms of the cultural backwardness always said to have marked many of the peripheral states, including Ch’u. However, the Chou had just emerged from the wilderness and the sort of disdain that became entrenched centuries later had yet to become fully manifest. Moreover, despite their euphoria, the precariousness of the moment should still have been apparent to the oligarchs and their ongoing recognition of incipient Ch’u, therefore strategically based rather than a specious gesture. One plausible explanation for this

apparent contradiction is the Hsiung clan's strong identification with the shamanistic beliefs that would characterize the south and Ch'u for centuries to come.

Supposedly descended from the legendary Chu Jung and the Red Emperor, Ch'u's progenitors early on embraced practices centered on fire, one of the crucial components of civilized and ritual life. Accordingly, it has been suggested they were entrusted with responsibility for all aspects of "fire" at the great ceremony ranging from supplying the firewood through torches, bonfires, and other manifestations that were integral parts of the sacred ritual.⁹⁰⁸ The bows made from peachwood and arrows of bramble they provided for the conquest campaign may therefore have been valued for their mantic connotations and intended for ritual or magically protective use rather than slaying actual enemies.⁹⁰⁹ If the Chou attitude had been one of disparagement, King Ch'eng would probably never have enfeoffed Hsiung Yi, the next leader, near Mount Ching, whatever his strategic concerns.

Despite these positive developments, the Chou kings continued to be troubled at the prospect of a strong competitor's replicating the Chou's ascension in the mountainous security of the Jiang-Han region. King Chao therefore undertook a meandering expedition into the south during his sixteenth year under the guise of a great hunt that was apparently intended to manifest the Chou's new awesomeness without becoming embroiled in actual combat. His well known, ignominious second campaign may have originally been similarly conceived (which would explain the dispatch of the six royal armies but absence of reported clashes) or may equally have developed out of a strategic decision to preemptively suppress this surprisingly energetic southern group before their power might fully evolve, as implied by his personally directing the punitive campaign into the south. Unexpectedly, rather than cowering the Ch'u's chieftains into submission, the ensuing fiasco must have perversely contributed to their confidence and the certainty that they could remain free of the yoke of constraint.

The next indication of military activity is a cryptic entry in the *Bamboo Annals* that surprisingly indicates King Mu led Ch'u in an attack on the Hsü Jung. If Ch'u actually supplied significant forces, its participation must have been prompted by the prospect of the strategic benefit that they might derive from drastically reducing the might of one of the few important eastern states. However, they did not immediately exploit the ensuing power vacuum but instead concentrated on solidifying their own state and gradually absorbing nearby peoples, some of whom apparently joined willingly, as well as nibbling away at the territory about them during the decades

intervening between King Mu's death and King Yi's ascension. A few minor Chou entities may also have succumbed or voluntarily given their allegiance to Ch'u when the Chou monarchs failed to protect them. ⁹¹⁰

Ch'u's first bold action, essentially a sweeping horizontal strike, was launched during King Yi's brief reign: "During King Yi's reign the royal house was weak so some of the feudal lords did not come to court but attacked each other. ⁹¹¹ Having extensively established peaceful relations with many of the peoples in the Chiang Han region, Hsiung Chü mobilized and attacked Yung and Yang Ao and proceeded as far as Eh." ⁹¹² Apart from the usual desire to acquire more terrain, an important objective appears to have been gaining control of the area's copper resources and the crucial transport routes, explaining the immense quantities of bronze subsequently employed in Ch'u despite their comparative lack of copper mines at this early stage. ⁹¹³ Since diverting copper and other ores denied the Chou critical resources, it inevitably increased the friction between them.

Presumably prompted by his success, the Ch'u chief, Hsiung Ch'ü, decided to establish his three sons as kings in the territory of the "Ch'u Man." Reportedly annoyed by the Chou's prejudicial attitude, he justified usurping the title of "king" in terms of their different cultural orientations. ⁹¹⁴ Although his act should have been deemed a huge affront, it did not prompt any royal reprisals. Nevertheless, as attested by the inscription on the *Ch'u Ni-kung Pien Chung* Hsiung Ch'ü remained wary of the Chou's might despite having pretensions to be the leader of the four quarters, apparently fearing that King Li, being more martial and capable, might attack in force. He therefore vacillated by temporarily renouncing use of the title, showing that Ch'u, for all its purported aggressiveness, was as yet unwilling to engage in a major battle with the Chou even on its own advantageous southern terrain.

Apparently oblivious to the difficulties entailed in fighting in the upper Han River area, the vigorous King Hsüan seems to have decided the moment had come to quash the upstart state. In his thirty-ninth year, he therefore ordered the last of the Western Chou's assaults on Ch'u, Fang Shu's expedition to attack the Ching Man, simply a misnomer for Ch'u clan groups if not the increasingly defined protostate of Ch'u itself. Probably some sort of sweep to eliminate contentious elements in the immediately contiguous region, if it at all approximated the much-ballyhooed campaign recorded in the ode, it must have been highly successful and therefore provides evidence that the Chou's forces were still capable of suppressing nearby belligerents with a concerted effort. Correspondingly, Ch'u's failure to repel the invaders or inflict significant casualties suggests their power was

relatively undeveloped, their awesomeness still vacuous, and that Hsiung Ch'ü had calculated correctly, some decades earlier, when he had abandoned the title of kingship out of fear of King Li's reprisal.

Conscious of Ch'u's escalating power, King Hsüan also established the southern fiefs previously discussed in order to thwart predatory advances. Despite their cognizance of contemporary military realities and their increasing isolation from the north as a result of the newly established southern fiefs, Ch'u's arrogance seems to have paradoxically been unaffected. King Hsüan's other actions may have been met with indifferent success and even defeat, but Ch'u's surprising inactivity during King Yu's troubled reign and its immediate aftermath attests to the former's strategic acumen.

Provisional Assessment

Power and military success frequently foster illusions of intrinsic superiority that the Chou royal clan, especially the later kings such as Li and Hsüan, undoubtedly did not escape. But how actively they envisioned their role, how extensive the activities they felt compelled to undertake in order to create and maintain their prestige, is not fully discernible. Dozens of bronze inscriptions and voluminous historical materials chronicle a number of externally initiated belligerent actions, but when viewed in the context of the Chou's roughly twenty-seven decades or the nearly constant battles marking King Wu Ting's reign in the Shang, the frequency is remarkably low. Contrary to assessments of significantly declining Chou prestige, clashes with peripheral peoples were far fewer than would have been expected if Chou suzerainty had been particularly oppressive.

Many of the peoples and states beyond the vaguely enforceable Chou borders were aware the Chou had displaced the Shang, but being more concerned with ordinary life and issues in their immediate vicinity, they appear to have been essentially oblivious to the new reign's presence. Even while disdaining them in their minds, others probably found it convenient to nominally recognize Chou authority by accepting the imposition of a few ritual obligations. However, the nature of "submission" requires contemplation, the fundamental question of what it meant to submit to the Chou still being unanswered. ⁹¹⁵

The events associated with King Hsüan's reign, the last significant one, give the impression of an embattled ruler who found it necessary to thwart repeated foreign incursions through a combination of static defensive measures, rapid response forces, and preemptive punitive campaigns. Measured by battlefield success alone, his efforts proved remarkably effective for more than a decade but the results could not be sustained and following a decade of indifferent

success, significant defeats were experienced in the fifteen years preceding his demise. This sort of waxing and waning in comparative power would be witnessed throughout Chinese history and should not be construed as just a decline in Chou strength but instead the result of increased material wealth, population, and capability among the Northern Zone and other peoples as well.

The alacrity with which the king's armies crumbled and fled during Hsüan's later years, certainly symptomatic of a lack of spirit and depleted resiliency, is more surprising. This sort of unexpected behavior suggests pervasive weariness, inadequate training and discipline, or even a lack of effective punishments and incentives. Just as the ongoing regularization of their ceremonial vessels suggests, the Chou's martial myths and legends may have become too vitiated to motivate heroic behavior. Although the pattern of steppe-sedentary conflict had already been defined to a large extent, these clashes should not be viewed simplistically because many other factors strongly affected the dynamics of interaction in the frontier zone.

The inescapable fact remains that even before the advent of horseback riding, the sedentary central states with their cities, fields, and fixed assets always proved a lucrative target for the increasingly nomadic peripheral peoples. Although the various steppe groups tend to be identified with particular areas to the north and west and they engaged in agriculture wherever possible, their pasturelands were regionally defined, ensuring an elusiveness that was limited only by the speed at which their herds could travel and their ability to overcome any obstacles presented by the other seminomadic peoples they might encounter.

King Hsüan's lengthy era has been characterized as a failed revival, a period marked by external weakness and increasing internal disorder that resulted from internecine quarrels and the appointment of sycophants whose behavior sapped the state's administrative vitality. Although the repeated defeats suffered by the royal forces out on the frontier late in his reign are symptomatic of a seriously eroded military capability, questions remain whether the latter originated from central government neglect, general enervation, or just significant overuse in extended efforts. Neither nearly constant foreign incursions nor occasionally penetrating invasions need invariably have debilitated or fatally weakened the state. The outcome depends upon the nature of the response, whether it is dedicated and vigorous or negligent and essentially ad hoc, whether it treats the attacks as a military reality rather than an affront, as ever present and inherently lethal instead of surprising annoyances or outrageous insults.

The Chou may have deteriorated to the point they lacked the resources and dispersed administrative structure necessary to clear the

periphery of troublesome and predatory entities in the manner of Wu Ting or conduct the massive, far-reaching campaigns that would be initiated by Wu-ti, the Martial Emperor, in the Han Period or commanded by Li Ching in the T'ang Period. King Hsüan might still have formulated measures that would have allowed the preemptive thwarting of marauding tribes. As he realized early on, the government needed to revitalize the martial spirit that had been so decisively manifest at the conquest, as well as eliminate extravagance and debauchery while instilling vigorous administrative guidance.

The army's poor performance may also be indicative of an inability to integrate a mishmash of military and paramilitary units, institute strict command and control, and undertake more active training. Perhaps more importantly, the army's economic and material basis had to be significantly improved if its operational capabilities were to be sustained. The campaign mounted against the Huai Yi purportedly intended to assure the payment of tribute or other virtual taxes seems to have been undertaken specifically to fund the army's operations rather than just acquire additional wealth for the royal coffers. Even though cogent arguments that the central government's resources had become inadequate to sustain their military activities may be essentially accurate, nothing would have precluded a charismatic ruler from motivating the states to vigorously defend the realm and repress inimical forces in their immediate area.

Although Ch'u generally refrained from invading the border in force, the Hsien-yün vigorously challenged Chou preeminence during King Hsüan's reign. ⁹¹⁶ The question of their nebulous origins—whether they simply were the Hsi Jung in another guise, a heritage people descended from one of the Shang's steppe nemeses, or even the Hsien-yü—as well as their likely domain continue to be matters of dispute. ⁹¹⁷ Well-manned, fortified strongpoints and barriers at key strategic points, especially the passes on the primary invasion routes in the Ching River Valley where “one man can control ten,” rather than extemporaneous disorganized responses, might have been effective in thwarting them. In addition to Cheng's establishment, distant strongpoints were fortified to some extent, simple walls erected, and outposts established as far out as T'ai-yüan, but they proved to be limited and ineffective. ⁹¹⁸ The estrangement of traditional allies and shifting of powerful lords certainly weakened the western and northern perimeters, but the establishment of additional buffer states in areas the Chou formerly inhabited (just as seen in their exploitation of the proto-Ch'in) might have succeeded in protecting the heartland in this era of constrained mobility and early weapons.

Another critical issue is the origin and composition of the response forces: were they derived from the six armies based in the

capital region (consisted of minor nobility dwelling in the vicinity), or resulted from an admixture of these and clan units (in which case questions might be raised about their training and integration)? With an occurrence interval of several years, the low frequency of major clashes should have allowed time for a full recovery, the leisure to implement training and improve organization, and an opportunity to develop anticipatory tactics between engagements. Prolonged warfare is invariably debilitating but occasional clashes should nurture fighting skills and foster cohesiveness among allies.

King Hsüan and the other late Chou kings apparently spent considerable time at Ch'eng Chou because of its centrality, a practice that would have facilitated political integration and stimulated the secondary capital's vibrancy, though only at considerable expense and the enervation of the original capital. Whether for punitive or defensive campaigns, forces were frequently dispatched from Ch'eng Chou not just for expeditionary efforts to the south and east but even in response to Hsien-yün attacks when they threatened Tsung Chou, explaining the thousand *li* distance and lengthy marching time. ⁹¹⁹ This is a surprising development in the context of eastern campaigns (such as against Su) having employed royal forces from the Western Six Armies and could have been a major factor in their increasing inability to respond with the necessary rapidity.

Contemporary scholars have also faulted the Chou, especially King Hsüan, for repeatedly employing older generals who are thought to have been incapable of adapting to new battlefield realities. However, the nature of warfare did not evolve significantly over the Western Chou Period, nor did it change radically during King Hsüan's reign. Expeditionary forces still consisted primarily of infantry with a limited number of chariots either intermixed or possibly assembled into limited contingents of roughly a hundred each. New commanders also continued to appear, men such as Pu Ch'i from a younger generation. Martial science became more sophisticated as military specialization advanced, making experience in organizing and commanding large bodies of men crucial for rapid and far-reaching campaigns in which constraint had to temper vigor yet not destroy fervor. It may be fashionable to condemn the turgid inflexibility historically witnessed in military enterprises, but in the context of fairly static practices, comparative caution and expertise in best practices are more likely to ensure freedom from mistakes, though not necessarily victory, than Huo Ch'ü-ping's momentarily successful adventurism. Abandoning conservatism to arbitrarily appoint new commanders in the context of multiple threats rather than employing men with a record of achievement would have been folly.

On the assumption that the terrain and therefore warfighting

methods must inherently differ, King Hsüan's use of armies normally stationed in the south to bolster, if not undertake, an ill-fated northern campaign has been cited as another example of his tactical ineptitude., Despite the landscape's being somewhat more arid and the action more dispersed than in the Jiang-Han region, insofar as the same fighting techniques would have been employed in the upper Wei River Valley and beyond, dispatching them might equally be interpreted as a bold move intended to crush the Hsien-yün while providing relief for enervated Tsung Chou fighters. Had the commander succeeded, their diversion would be applauded as an astute innovation, but since he failed, is instead condemned as shortsighted or worse.

Dynamics and Consequences

Just as the Shang in vanquishing the Hsia, the Chou came to power by overthrowing their overlords in a decisive battle following a deliberate trek along a carefully chosen route of advance rather than through the voluntary yielding of empire to the most worthy in the manner of the legendary Sage Rulers. Although achieved in a single clash, their victory was not of a moment's making but instead the strategically envisioned result of concerted preparation that followed the gradual expansion of their power base, formation of carefully wrought alliances, forceful neutralization of nearby enemies, and the subjugation of more distant peoples and protostates. ⁹²⁰

It might well be asked if the Chou's rise mimicked that of the Goths, Alamanni, and Franks in their being the result of having interacted with an imperial power (Rome) in a variety of ways ranging from aggressive to benign. ⁹²¹ The Chou's being situated on the periphery of Shang culture, within the comparatively isolated but easily defended terrain of the Wei River Valley, they were able to assimilate many of the material advantages and cultural achievements of Shang civilization in relative freedom while successfully developing a strong agricultural base, nurturing indigenous technologies, and evolving their own identity. External threats, although rarely successful in penetrating their core terrain, stimulated their military skills, organizational abilities, and tactical thought; thereafter, the Shang shortsightedly enhanced their military prowess by entrusting the Chou with the task of subjugating barbarian peoples and thwarting threats from the west, no doubt in a futile effort to compel their ongoing participation in the Shang political sphere.

Foremost among the numerous questions prompted by their ascension and the ensuing centuries of domination is whether warfare nurtures unity and creates a sense of identity, thereby fostering state creation, or cohesion and a sense of self-identity are necessary precursors. Despite the existence of historically attested, highly militarized societies such as Sparta, much of the literature describing the rise of early political entities assumes that civil government, although of the chieftain type, normally evolves and eventually prevails. Military aspects, especially the creation and mobilization of

forces, are relegated to afterthoughts, often being deemed ad hoc fabrications rather than the very core of a particular society and its values.

Despite having seized power through several decades of forceful campaigns, consonant with traditional Chinese depictions that have long emphasized Tan Fu's avoidance of more warlike peoples, the Chou tend to be characterized as an essentially pacifist society whose leadership reluctantly adopted military measures in order to rid the world of perversity. In order to extol Virtue's all-encompassing power, violent conquest was transformed into a palatable tale that obscured the bloodshed and ignored the sacrifices. The pervasive influence of Confucian beliefs apart, this outcome may have been inevitable because the Chou had suffered few strictures and could have easily asserted their independence without crushing the Shang. But, contrary to idealistic depictions, they had continued their highly martial orientation following the shift to Mount Ch'i, long before their incipient energy burgeoned into the amalgamation known as Chou civilization.

The sequential conquest of their hapless enemies through a lengthy development process attests to the power and efficacy of the Chou war machine. Rather than the effective persuasion of Virtue, it was their slaying of enemy troops, whether aggressive foes or simply unfortunate groups that impeded Chou expansion, and the annexation of territory that founded Chou success. The martial prowess created by this unqualified string of victories no doubt became an important factor in cowering otherwise willful opponents into submission. Thereafter, the awesomeness of vanquishing the mighty Shang must have terrified many recalcitrant peoples and numerous obstreperous protostates into acknowledging Chou suzerainty.

Their proclamation of having received the Mandate of Heaven—a form of propaganda concocted to persuade allies and coerce others into participating, a felt belief and motivational element deliberately exploited within the Chou, and something of a rationalization emphasized postconquest to justify having overthrown the realm's generally acknowledged rulers—made their intentions manifest. Undeterred by the Shang's might, the early Chou leadership either misperceived the situation, were oblivious to the danger, or were absurdly overconfident.

Although their relationship with the Shang seems to have vacillated between conspicuous submissiveness and concealed belligerency, the Chou's commitment to building an independent state had been obvious ever since the five-planet conjunction of 1059 BCE. The strategic intent of their conquests was transparent; they blatantly telegraphed their aspirations in the run-up at Meng-chin; uneasiness

had prompted the previous Shang emperor to execute King Chi Li; and the Shang had imprisoned both Chi Li and King Wen. Claims that their preparations were so secret that the final campaign was tantamount to a surprise attack are clearly fallacious. Contrary to later depictions that envision nothing but harmony and a pervasive solidarity spawned by a common hatred of the Shang, given the number of states the Chou undoubtedly antagonized and the numerous allies they coerced, King Wu's plans must have been betrayed long before the decisive moment. ⁹²² Only Emperor Hsin's hubris and profound opacity prevented him from regarding the Chou's emergence seriously, prefiguring Stalin's intransigence just prior to Operation Barbarossa.

Except that neither explosives nor airpower were employed, certain modern warfare terms would seem to apply, including "shock and awe" and "decapitation," particularly the latter because the Shang leader had been swiftly slain and his chief officials and certain family patriarchs executed a month later. Since the Chou opted to employ an organized rather than irregular or insurgent approach to their confrontation, out of necessity, Mu-yeh had to be a decisive battle in both conception and execution. ⁹²³ If the Chou had been beaten at Mu-yeh and driven to the Yellow River, without the courage of fighters trapped on fatal terrain they might have been annihilated. ⁹²⁴ Assuming they escaped relatively intact and could ensconce themselves in temporary fortifications outside the Shang's extended lines, their fate would still have been murky.

Given their relatively sparse numbers and the historically proven tendency of allies to be unreliable (especially in adverse circumstances), their chances of surviving a lengthy, attritional conflict or an extended series of battles against an entrenched foe operating on interior lines, well within the realm of normal sustainment, would have been minimal, if not nonexistent. In addition, infectious diseases easily spread throughout crowded encampments while chronic diarrhea caused by *E. coli*, salmonella, and cholera have always plagued armies long deployed in the field, decimating their numbers and incapacitating even the most stalwart. ⁹²⁵ Cut off from their base of supply, isolated on unfamiliar terrain, and weakening by the day, their only prospect for victory would probably have lain in the mass defection of Hsin's soldiers.

The nature of the overwhelming victory at Mu-yeh temporarily annihilated the enemy's will to resist, allowing the Chou to impose a nominal administrative structure over the relatively unperturbed populace. ⁹²⁶ Despite the absence of any real insurgency efforts for some three centuries, with the passage of time the enmity that had long seethed suddenly exploded in a direct confrontation, resulting in what both parties no doubt perceived as a "revolt" or "rebellion,"

though from very different perspectives.

Even though this was not yet an age of material opulence, vital riches including foodstuffs, agricultural implements, weapons, chariots, jewelry, and people, the most important of all, were confiscated throughout the process of ascension. Great wealth was also acquired in the aftermath of Mu-yeh including the tens of thousands of jade pieces discovered in the Shang palace, some reportedly capable of withstanding incineration, and a wide variety of exquisite bronze vessels. Important for manifesting their majesty and authority, these spoils provided crucial resources for rewarding the numerous allies, clan members, officials, and even ordinary Chou warriors who may have fought more for rewards than out of any abstract obligation or motivation to sustain righteousness. ⁹²⁷

Bronze inscriptions recovered over the past century that record previously unknown clashes indicate that Western Chou military activity has long been underestimated. Even if numerous localized conflicts fell below the horizon of historical consciousness, contrary to the disproportionate influence of the dramatic events at the era's end and impressions that the Chou suffered virtually continuous incursions, they were still infrequent. Moreover, several well-recognized battles were not only prompted by Chou initiative but also tended to be of comparatively low intensity, completely unlike the incessant frontier clashes well chronicled in Caesar's memoirs between massive forces that stemmed from Rome's quest to subdue rebellions in the hinterland and subjugate additional peoples.

The era was still marked by bursts of activity when one or another peripheral group waxed powerful or temporary coalitions prompted by growing dissatisfaction or cobbled together through the catalyst of a newly emergent leader targeted the Chou. Their motives varied greatly, but as the Chou prospered, its towns became more lucrative targets, tempting predatory activities. Plunder and a desire to enhance their prestige seem to have been paramount, expanding their domains only secondary, as no one apart from the incipient state of Ch'u ever seem to have harbored any ambition to replicate the Chou's conquest of the Shang and usurp ultimate power.

Arguments about cultural superiority apart, the validity of traditional, albeit simplistic, ethnocentric claims that these peripheral peoples were driven by greed for the material products of more advanced civilizations (rather than necessity or other motives) is partially attested by plundering having been the primary activity. However, plundering almost always accompanies conflict; only the deliberate seizure of prisoners and wanton destruction (said to be inflicted in the paroxysm of violence) are less easily explained. Hatred of Chou imperiousness also seems to have been an important factor,

particularly in the more brutal Hsien-yün raids and repeated Huai Yi invasions of the heartland.

Confrontations between the inhabitants of the agrarian core and various contiguous peoples would continue throughout Chinese history even during the most prosperous imperial regimes. ⁹²⁸ The scope was often limited but the ongoing raiding activity would harass the border regions, threaten the populace, and disrupt productive activities, causing significant mental anguish over time. Rather than simple military clashes, they would tend to be consciously interpreted as the despicable actions of benighted—that is, “barbarian,” “brutal,” “backward,” and “inferior”—antagonists.

A multitude of approaches to defending the realm would be tried over the forthcoming millennia with varying but generally limited success, including:

Mounting aggressive punitive and preemptive expeditions such as conducted by the Shang (especially under Wu Ting), the Han (under Wu-ti), and the T'ang. However, in the Chou, apart from a few preemptive campaigns such as King Chao's ill-fated southern effort, only King Mu tried to manifest Chou might outside the borders.

Initiating externally directed campaigns intended to conquer enemies and occupy their territory in order to dominate an area, thwart military action by the native populace, and create an effective buffer zone. (However, to the extent that the land may then be integrated into the realm, success merely expands the borders and thus the domain that must be actively protected, counter-productively increasing the state's defensive burden.)

Creating border protectorates, whether by employing fiefs, recognizing and exploiting powerful local entities, or using allies.

Implementing ameliorative measures such as the granting of privileges, offering gifts, giving outright bribes, and awarding honors; initiating marriage relations; and exploiting ceremonies, all basically premised on the hypocritical practice of statecraft.

Flourishing the state's majesty and awe to intimidate potential aggressors, much as King Mu repeatedly attempted.

Creating an early warning system and employing strong roving border forces tasked with intercepting and thwarting increasingly mobile enemies.

Relying upon static defenses including walls and bastions, whether independent or integrated. ⁹²⁹

Exploiting the topography to impede aggressors and constrain their (generally predictable) route of approach so that elite forces might repel them at well-prepared strong points.

Subverting the enemy through corruption and manipulation, causing antagonism among groups and dissidence within tribes.

Luring them onto nearby terrain where they might be effectively attacked.

Despite China's proven ability to deploy awesome defensive systems that always integrated substantial walls, expansive moats, and massive forces, in every age its peripheral enemies would invariably enjoy the twin advantages of initiative and mobility. Absent extreme environmental conditions such as intense heat, which could hamper northerners seeking to conquer the south or the advent of freezing sleet in the north, they could freely choose the moment of attack and the target. Depending upon the intelligence they might acquire, relevant topographical constraints, and their basic strategic perspicacity, they could strike when and where unexpected, just as the *Art of War* would advocate.

Early in the regime the sparse population was widely dispersed and the terrain controlled by the newly established fiefs highly limited; therefore, invaders could bypass population centers and fortified towns with ease. Any remaining obstacles, including narrow passes and bodies of water, whether static or vigorously flowing, would be problematic only to the extent they might be defended by troop deployments or protected by emplaced citadels and could not be circumvented. Coupled with their comparatively greater mobility (even when still unmounted), this tactical freedom meant sedentary China's armies would always be forced into a responsive mode unless battlefield commanders seized the initiative, undertook preemptive strikes, or employed unorthodox tactics. ⁹³⁰

Given the lengthy communication times and the Western Chou's proclivity to concentrate their forces in a few urban centers, the likelihood of intercepting nimble invaders or mounting an effective counterstrike remained minimal unless the raiders foolishly lingered longer than necessary. Despite their greater proximity, even the localized contingents—primarily the clan forces resident in the protostates—probably required more than a day to mobilize and commence their march to contact once they learned of the aggressors, far longer if they had to wait for central government authorization to proceed.

Inscriptions (such as on the *Tuo Yu Ting*) show that chariot forces unencumbered by infantry that were urgently dispatched from the Tsung Chou area to repel incursions in the upper Wei River Valley required a minimum of four to six days to reach their objective. ⁹³¹ In the absence of an effective signaling system such as drum relays or fire towers, simply receiving the baleful news would have consumed an

equal amount of time if it were conveyed by the fastest chariots. This afforded their enemies nearly ten days to leisurely plunder the countryside, fortify any positions they might want to defend, or simply disappear. Rather than intercepting the aggressors, the no doubt exhausted Chou armies might end up chasing a chimera or plunging into an ambush.

Because of their comparatively greater mobility and lack of permanent settlements further out on the steppe, the northern intruders were rarely compelled to defend any particular location. Topographical constraints meant that they could anticipate and thus observe or ambush any outwardly mounted response. For centuries the Shang had therefore found it necessary to strike into the enemy's heartland and attack their semipermanent encampments rather than just neutralize marauding bands and had even felt compelled to target formidable groups such as the Kung-fang year after year for punitive and preemptive assaults.

Being forced to chase elusive targets not only meant they sacrificed the initiative but also that they could easily be manipulated through deceptive lures and advantageous enticements until they became dispirited, exhausted, and easily defeated.⁹³² Although the Shang managed to vanquish several prominent enemies, domination of the northern and western regions would await Han Wu-ti's employment of massive numbers and segmented forces in campaigns that ranged over vast distances and incurred almost unimaginable losses. Accordingly, the limited success enjoyed by various aggressors during the Western Chou should not be construed as necessarily synonymous with any Chou weakness or pronounced incapacity but simply the inherent result of an overreaching grasp, one that inescapably encompassed vital gaps and inevitable vulnerabilities.

Militarized colonies located in the far northwest and the few fortified strong points that had augmented them, the sole remnants of their ancestral heritage, still existed in the early Western Chou but they seem to have declined, even been abandoned, within a century. On the other hand, many of the original fiefs (such as Yen and Ch'i) and several others established later in the era were all tasked from their inception with defensive burdens and sometimes expected to furnish troops for nearby campaigns. Nevertheless, contrary to expectation, because their armies still generally operated under central government control or were commanded by local rulers formally entrusted with royal responsibility (such as Duke Mu and the Duke of Kuo), despite the immediacy of the threat their responsiveness was at best lethargic, at worst hopelessly tardy, and therefore ineffective in deterring enemies from undertaking future predatory actions. However, as royal power eroded and they found themselves

victimized by incursions or threatened by growing powers, self-interest began to prompt local authorities to formulate coping measures and strengthen their own forces, resulting in the more powerful being able to cower not just their enemies but also the minor Chou entities about them.

Adding to the complexity, the Chou were neither homogenous nor monolithic but instead encompassed disparate enclaves ranging from indigenous peoples who had managed to retain their identity under the Shang, numerous identifiable Shang clans and other members of the former Shang populace, various foreign groups ranging from the Yi through the Ti that existed in pockets within the newly proclaimed borders, and a range of basically unsubmissive protostates and other entities that had been satellites or allies of the previous dynasty.⁹³³ Although some, especially a few Shang clan groups, made considerable contributions to the Chou's defense, others were indifferent or outright hostile, attitudes that no doubt impeded defensive efforts insofar as the local inhabitants had to be mobilized for ancillary tasks.

Because the kingdom's vast extent, albeit far more claimed than actual, fundamentally precluded mounting an impenetrable defense, predatory incursions were inevitable. Rather than being allowed to entail earthshaking consequences they simply had to be tolerated, the raiders expelled as expeditiously as possible, and recovery efforts focused on reversing the material and psychological impact. The real strategic question would then become how to react to invasions mounted in limited but still warlike force and thwart the rise of powerful coalitions under charismatic leaders capable of more deeply penetrating the vacuous perimeter. Achieving the latter would of course provide a partial solution to the former.

Although natural in the context of their early conquest history, concentrating the state's military forces and then retaining them at just two locations, Tsung Chou and Ch'eng Chou, compounded the difficulty. Without doubt, ensuring the Chou's immediate security by protecting the heartland, recently occupied Shang terrain, and the secondary capital were paramount in the minds of the oligarchs. Apart from any reluctance to segment their clan forces to no visible purpose, maintaining large groups of forces realized the critical objective of manifesting the martial awesomeness essential to securing compliance and respect while minimizing expense. However, entrusting these two focal forces with responsibility for warding off any invaders that managed to penetrate the distant perimeter precluded any sort of rapid response and severely limited Chou tactical flexibility.

The answer for a warrior culture such as the early Chou should have been to divert their limited resources away from lavish palaces,

pleasurable pursuits, massive bronze vessels, and the performance of increasingly elaborate ceremonies to instead expend them on their military forces, peripheral strong points, collective bastions, and allies capable of playing a defensive role. But because displays, great hunting and drinking feasts, and formal entertainments enhanced the king's awesomeness just when his augustness was increasing and he was becoming estranged from both the important clan members and the nobility in general, they were probably deemed priorities rather than dispensable extravagances.

Vectors of State

The Chou might best be described as a lineage-based, extended-kinship state, a sort of de facto feudal organization that lacked the sort of defined mutual obligations that characterize Western feudalism. At the outset, the king's relatives and a few well-proven associates were deputed to establish strongpoints and control the contiguous terrain but whether the Chou finally became a unified state or remained a loosely integrated assemblage of individual entities essentially beyond central government authority is largely, but not totally, an academic question. Opinions range from true domination of the known realm to concentrated success in the Wei River Valley with significant geographical gaps outside it.

The oligarchs obviously believed that Shang authority encompassed the whole realm and that they had now replaced rather than simply displaced them. Rather than imposing real bureaucratic management, their chosen administrative method created fief-like polities that have sometimes been compared with the city states of ancient Greece, though others believe the emplacement of supervisors and continuing reassertion of kingly power limited their independence.⁹³⁴ (Ironically, this sort of supervision would have been least necessary at the outset when the emotional fervor of the conquest and esteem for the ruling clan members would have been greatest.) Nevertheless, it is currently common, almost fashionable, to attribute the Western Chou's collapse to an array of inherent weaknesses, particularly deficiencies associated with their attempt to admix fiefs with an evolving quasibureaucratic system of control. In one view, the only solution would have been the thorough implementation of a centrally directed bureaucracy.

Even though the number of early Chou functionaries gradually increased and specialization soon emerged, it would be many centuries before the essentially bureaucratic *chün-hsien* (commandery and district) system would be formulated in the Warring States Period and therefore more than three centuries after the *chün's* first employment late in the Spring and Autumn Period. Furthermore, it

would not be widely implemented until Ch'in embarked on its conquest of the realm and sought to impose this new administrative structure throughout the land. Even then, despite at least a century of historical experience, the early Han Period reverted to a mixture of fiefs and bureaucratically administered districts, spawning doubt and consternation until the former were finally eliminated in a series of bloody clashes.

However, unlike in later revolutions when the concept and practice of central government administration had long existed and would simply be adopted dynasty after dynasty, the only apparent option for authoritative control was entrusting people with responsibility for localized areas, thereby artificially creating something like the Shang's satellite statelets. Participation in the kingdom's forceful founding and close personal connections with the ruler served at the outset as the emotional and thus substantial basis not just for the appointments, but also the fief holders' ongoing fidelity and subservience.

The formerly theocratic or magico-religious nature of kingship that had virtually defined the Shang was simulataneously reanimated as a crucial monarchical element after having been significantly de-emphasized in the former dynasty's last decades. Only the ruler was empowered to conduct the celestial and other ceremonies essential to maintaining the Chou's relationship with Heaven and ensuring harmony with cosmological and environmental factors. ⁹³⁵ These rights would also continue to be the exclusive prerogative of descendants in the royal clan's main lineage, contributing to their ongoing dominance.

Relationships were highly personal for the initial protostate founders and probably the immediately subsequent generation. Local appointments were normally hereditary even though subject to royal confirmation, and with the passage of time, the charisma of participation evaporated, familiarity eroded, and self-interest rose to the fore. By King Chao's reign, if not earlier, unless they grew up near one of the capitals or had frequently ventured to the court with their parents, local rulers would have had little or no contact with the king or other major court officials. Similarly, the king would be equally unfamiliar with anyone who had not served in some immediate capacity or been deputed on combat duties and personally returned to report.

Chou cohesiveness thus fundamentally depended upon maintaining the critical clan ties embodied by the *tsung-fa* system and employing techniques to reinforce an obligatory sense of hierarchy. Apart from the history and myths that might be volitionally perpetuated within individual families, ceremonies and awards

provided the only means for maintaining a sense of participation in the greater Chou complex. A variety of rituals was intended to revisit the tale of conquest and thereby revitalize the achievements of the ancestors in the minds of even the most distant clan members, especially those entrusted with power in the realm's outer areas. Until the close clan connections with the ruling house became more remote, systematized, and bureaucratic, participation in the Chou hierarchy was largely a matter of reliving these legends and emphasizing martial achievement.

Scholars have long emphasized their immense psychological impact, the awesomeness of the royal court, the necessity of precise behavior, and the role of the vessels themselves, some of which retell King Wu's glorious tale of achievement. Later ritual writings such as the *Li Chi*, a Warring States compilation, provide crucial insights into the attitude and experience of the participants. But in the *Li Chi* the *li*—the ritually prescribed forms of behavior—are as much intended to elicit the proper attitude and stimulate appropriate emotions as detail behavior and prescribe constraints. ⁹³⁶

From the Taoist perspective that would be articulated in the early Warring States Period, relying upon ritual rather than the substance of true emotion and natural fidelity is inherently doomed:

Only after the Tao has been lost is there Virtue;

Only after Virtue has been lost is there benevolence;

Only after benevolence has been lost is there righteousness;

Only after righteousness has been lost is there ritual.

Now ritual is the veneer of loyalty and sincerity, the start of chaos. ⁹³⁷

Just as with religious belief, ceremonies and awards will have little effect beyond self-aggrandizement if the participants lack faith, do not accept the premises, or no longer revere or otherwise immerse themselves in the world view and its associated value system. In addition, socially oriented practitioners in almost every hierarchical structure and religion range from zealots to hypocrites and outright exploiters. Many others find their obligatory participation in what has become empty rhetoric and specious formality more annoying than edifying, precluding any emotional involvement in the myths and beliefs and therefore the Chou's vaunted stories of travail and conquest.

Over the Western Chou Period, the design and detailing of the bronze vessels became more standardized, the citations more formulaic and perfunctory, suggesting a major loss of emotional impact had been occurring and that the martial myths and legends

had been become vitiated. ⁹³⁸ Early on, the central government's monopoly of natural resources and bronze production significantly enhanced the value attached to the ritual vessels that were conspicuously awarded to various individuals but several of the feudal lords gradually acquired their own copper sources, developed production facilities, and began to exchange vessels among themselves for diplomatic and other purposes including gift giving. ⁹³⁹ This not only multiplied their numbers but also degraded their value, gradually turning them into commodities, albeit expensive ones.

Bronze vessels thus retained their potency as measures of control only to the extent that people continued to value and hold them in awe. Once they were viewed as mere things, bereft of connotations and sanctifying authority, they lost their power and thus their ability to serve as incentives, affect attitudes, and induce desirable behavior. As a result their psychological impact also eroded, and their importance in maintaining the extended state's cohesiveness weakened. Even the role of royal awards gradually became minimized, the vessels becoming gifts rather than covenant embodiments or otherwise symbols of psychological transactions before declining precipitously. ⁹⁴⁰ This would be especially true as the number of local authorities casting their own vessels increased and the conquest legend dimmed, becoming a tired story from archaic times rather than a thrilling tale to be vicariously absorbed in communal retelling.

Another important vector contributing to the ongoing process of estrangement was the fundamental effect that the habits, beliefs, and material goods belonging to indigenous peoples had on the individual protostates, especially those located outside the Wei River Valley where the Chou populace constituted a minority and Chou culture remained a veneer. The conquest form of Chou culture might be preserved for a generation or two providing that the privileged but limited number of Chou members isolated themselves or they rigorously enforced their customs. However, ongoing interaction with localized "mini" civilizations as well as members of the Shang populace dwelling in their domains must have affected their daily lives and cultural practices and thus shaped the distinctive personalities subsequently visible in the individual Spring and Autumn states.

Although the dynamics of intermixing are complex, in the Chou's absorbing new characteristics the resulting amalgamation must have increasingly diverged from the traditional (but not necessarily static) culture preserved in the bastion of the Wei River Valley. These minor differences in turn definitely affected their respective personalities and approach to interaction, probably contributing as

much, if not more, to the states' distancing from the royal court than any other factor. Other local issues also stimulated the development of regional power centers and fostered the emergence of leaders who focused upon their own affairs while either ignoring or feeling outright disdain for the kingship.

Despite subtle indications of disaffection, other than the final denouement this loss of emotional participation had no discernable impact. No inscriptional evidence has yet surfaced to suggest any of these local rulers, however powerful, ever seriously questioned the ruler's right to rescind their awards or failed to acquiesce in decisions as extreme as designating commanders or appointing heirs. Fiefs were sometimes transferred virtually intact, often over great distances in a time of few roads and little transport, and local authorities assigned heavy defensive responsibilities without any central government sustainment.

Apart from the participants in the final debacle, none of the Western Chou's fief holders ever opposed the central government, despite the increasingly tenuous nature of its governance and erosion of local allegiance over the period's last century. Even though their focus might be increasingly localized, self-interest predominated, making fervent, if hypocritical, participation in the authority system and the pretense of unswerving loyalty worthwhile. Willful isolation and the hollowing out of ritual control, while affecting vigor and vibrancy, therefore essentially remained nonissues until the Spring and Autumn Period.

The absence of other forms of internal strife in a vast empire populated by powerful individuals with highly divergent interests is also remarkable. The odes indicate considerable disaffection among the people in the final reigns, even unhappiness at extended military service, and a few bronze inscriptions record bitter conflicts over land and sometimes slaves, as well as several skirmishes, but never fervent armed clashes among Chou interest groups or political entities. Not until late in the era would greed and ambition, the incipient causes of many conflicts, result in the more dynamic states' beginning to eclipse, then encroach upon and finally annex their withering neighbors even though the ruling families often had the same surnames and they all purportedly participated in the Chou hierarchy.
⁹⁴¹ Although some perished rather than be willingly annexed, the process was little marked by the lethality that would characterize the internecine strife of the Spring and Autumn Period.

The Chou thus sought to implement an exceptional method of control that was flawed neither inherently nor in conception, but simply lost its resiliency and became vitiated over time due to the mutually deleterious effects of economics, distance, external

challenges, and human nature. Despite having varying but significant impact, all these detrimental factors could have singularly been overcome but synergistically they became lethal. Nevertheless, it might have been possible to redress these negative tendencies by imposing vigorous control measures, many of them especially feasible because the court had early on positioned local supervisors and observers in the fiefs, ironically when they would have been least necessary because of the conquest's residual emotional fervor and the pervasive esteem seen for the ruling clan.

Among other possible methods, reducing the magnificence of the awards and requiring more substantial tribute from the feudal lords would have had the collateral effect of keeping them relatively impoverished and thus more dependent upon the central government for support, though certainly at the expense of increased animosity. The more charismatic leaders could have ordered the protostates to undertake extensive military service instead of deploying the central armies, thereby reducing their insolence while ensuring national security. Requiring frequent court attendance, possibly for extended periods, would have augmented connectedness, familiarity, and subservience while financially depleting the coffers of the increasingly prosperous lords who would have been compelled to expend their wealth on palatial mansions and other expenses attendant to their enforced sojourn in the capital.

The ruler might have even begun visiting the lords on a rotating basis, a practice that would necessitate provisioning and entertaining his entourage even as he renewed personal contacts, investigated local affairs, and generally made himself known. Instead, the kings tended to become increasingly isolated, effete, arrogant, and debauched, allowing cliques and power factions to become entrenched, corruption to prevail, and life to devolve into misery and hopelessness. Closeted heirs would cause problems throughout Chinese history, with especially intense conflict being witnessed whenever a new ruler's ascension perturbed the court, prompting trepidation and antagonism among the established. Meanwhile, anyone not enjoying the court's largess undoubtedly resented the ritual demands and constant distractions from the ordinary business of life, including their own factional battles.

Another intractable complexity would always be the presence of powerful individuals, whether officials, favorites, or important fief holders, who battled for influence in the court, just as witnessed at the end of the era. The arrogant attitude of neophyte rulers further compounded the problem by causing resentment not only in the capital but also among distant states. Accordingly, although created through serious contemplation, dispersed military colonies could not

escape being an extemporaneous solution to an almost insurmountable problem. However, none of these admittedly important factors in the dynamics of estrangement inherently had an adverse impact on military capability nor made the Chou's destiny inescapable.

Martial Funding and Military Economics

Bronze inscriptions have illuminated some aspects of Chou military economics, but many fundamental questions remain, including whether the warriors in the royal and clan armies were sustained through a sort of stipend system or derived their income from minor landholdings. In a period of relative peace their readiness would have depended upon whether they were standing forces or just notionally constituted and therefore had to be engaged in productive occupations even though always subject to immediate call up. Lacking these sinecures, the ordinary troops recruited from among the populace at large, as well as the Shang and other peoples, must have been at least partially self-supporting or have had some unknown compensation. ⁹⁴²

Armies have voracious appetites at rest; in the field they require staggering logistical support. They disrupt the countryside and trample the land even as they divert men from the crucial tasks of agricultural and craft production. Battlefield clashes result in casualties, burdensome needs to treat the wounded, the destruction of vital equipment, and the devastation of the infrastructure, further compounding the expense. ⁹⁴³ Even though the economy, subsequently emphasized by the *Wei Liao-tzu* as the basis of a strong military, continued to prosper during the Chou and the population was increasing, economic factors are frequently cited for the marked decline witnessed in its military capability over the last century or more.

No doubt an important cause of this enervation was the somewhat greater frequency of military activity than indicated in traditional accounts. Even if the clashes were highly limited or unexceptional, they still consumed resources and perturbed the people. More importantly, a number of inscriptions show the king awarded significant gifts of land and other items, including people, in the Wei River Valley to various individuals for civil accomplishment and combat achievement, as well as sometimes out of simple favoritism. These awards invariably depleted the royal landholdings in the core domain, drastically reducing royal prosperity and the income necessary to sustain the government even as the protostates continued to experience continued growth.

Rather than simply a means of recognizing and thereby encouraging martial accomplishment, these generous awards of land,

valuables, and even people to important commanders such as the Duke of Kuo and Tuo Yu have been understood as evidence of ongoing court conflict and an indication that the king's interests were being constrained by powerful aristocrats whose position and influence were periodically enhanced through military achievement. ⁹⁴⁴ Although probably a valid assessment of the complex dynamics prevailing in the court, the interaction of the various parties had not necessarily changed much from the early chieftain days when the other important leaders probably had significant, even decisive voices in military and other major undertakings and certainly controlled significant landholdings.

Questions about the king's authority apart, the sources and the method for funding Chou military activities remain uncertain. ⁹⁴⁵ At the outset the royal coffers had to support the newly established protostates (even if merely through assigning territory), but once local authority had been imposed and the economy became self-sustaining, the fiefs could have begun remitting taxes or goods. It has been argued these local entities were providing some form of tribute within two or three generations, but also claimed they were neither systematic nor adequate to sustain the central government's military expenses. ⁹⁴⁶ Therefore, the burden still fell primarily on a royal domain that continued to shrink as Wei Valley lands were transferred and external campaigns simultaneously depleted its fiscal resources. Lacking funds, the ruler became reluctant to employ his forces and therefore increasingly turned to peripheral clan armies for border defense.

Contrary to inscriptional evidence of distant state participation, it has also been claimed that the king had to resort to using his personal troops late in the era. ⁹⁴⁷ Nevertheless, in the absence of new contradictory discoveries, the foregoing characterization of Chou military economics seems well founded. However, the relatively ineffectual performance of the central armies increasingly witnessed in the last half of the Western Chou Period should perhaps be attributed to the combination of two factors, one financial, the other cultural, that combined to undermine both readiness and performance.

Deficiencies in the funds necessary to maintain well provisioned, highly trained warriors would have contributed to the soldiers' becoming lethargic and moribund. However, the thoroughgoing vitiation in martial spirit that resulted as the Chou transformed itself from a dynamic warrior-based culture to a static rulership in which civic (or civil) values predominated probably had the greatest impact. The vigor of directness, immediacy of action, and ability to cope with emerging threats declined because distinctly different orientations necessarily prevail in the civil and martial realms. ⁹⁴⁸ Perhaps in

evidence it might be noted that no heroes with the stature of Achilles or charisma of Kuan Kung were ever lionized, even though the odes show the people sang the praises of accomplished leaders in the virtuous mode and great awards of land and valuables were in fact bestowed upon the valiant.

Succinctly put, the punctiliousness of ritual became emphasized and monarchical power displaced “big man” culture. This change not only estranged the nobility but also the ordinary soldiers who had to continuously engage in rigorous training to hone their skills long before risking their lives in battle. The lack of frequent combat challenges induced laxity just when the esteem accorded to ritual coupled with an emerging ethos of hedonism proved to be fatal disincentives to nurturing the requisite combat spirit. It was the fervor of their warriors that had ironically allowed the Chou to prevail over the Shang despite the latter’s power and heritage.

As the Chou’s standing forces atrophied, the potency of contingents in many of the burgeoning states, particularly those out on the periphery where they endured constant threats or were occasionally called upon to furnish expeditionary forces, correspondingly increased. ⁹⁴⁹ Engagement in low-level, localized conflict and the need to repulse vigorous border aggressors, however infrequently, contributed to their military organization and expertise while ensuring the values that would underpin their survival in the Spring and Autumn Period flourished. Original states such as Ch’i, Chin, and Lu, as well as newly emerging, martially oriented entities beyond the perimeter such as Ch’in and Ch’u, were therefore well positioned to contend for dominance in the forthcoming era devoid of effective central authority.

Many of the perimeter states, whether in the Chou fold or further afield, also benefited from superior natural resources and more conducive climates. Even though not invariably harbingers of strength, they facilitated life’s manifold activities. External enemies in the southeast and south who were often deemed inferior because they lacked some aspect of the Chou’s “high culture” such as writing or intricate bronze casting similarly enjoyed environmental advantages. Furthermore, they rarely suffered from the pernicious effects of the pervasive ceremonial courtesies and royal etiquette increasingly inflicted upon Chou society. Simply put, being brutish could, even should, have been synonymous with a macho ethos highly conducive to the task of warfighting.

The heterogeneous nature of their martial edifice further increased the Chou’s defensive complexity. Contrary to traditional impressions that unity prevailed and the government relied almost solely upon the six western and eight eastern armies, several

recognizable force variants coexisted throughout. The most readily identifiable were the clan troops found at all levels, the king and important divergent lines all having contingents composed of their primary family members, key dependents, and even non-Chou individuals, including former Shang fighters and their offspring. Bronze inscriptions indicate the protostates, having been founded when the appointees emigrated to their designated terrains with their clan forces and extended families, particularly depended upon them.

Other, not-so-easily-delineated, contingents included the king's personal bodyguards, remnant Shang units attached to important clans that had been preserved largely intact or continued to survive in independent enclaves, and specialized fighters such as the Tiger Warriors (who were not necessarily synonymous with the king's bodyguards), *wang ch'en* (king's subordinates), and occasionally *sui jen* probably composed by men of less than warrior status who somehow found themselves engulfed in battle. Additional groups continue to be ferreted out such as the "*ko ch'en* " or so-called "*ko* wielders" who seem to have been particularly distinguished by their skill with the dagger-axe (*ko*) and individually served in the capital, possibly as bodyguards, but are otherwise unknown. One bronze inscription indicates two hundred were transferred at one time, a not-insignificant number in the context of clan forces and small contingents. ⁹⁵⁰

Even when effectively cobbled together for expeditionary campaigns this admixture of contingents with varying qualifications and characteristics must have presented command difficulties that would have been compounded by feelings of superiority or disdain among the participants. Lacking training and experience in coordinated tactics they would have constituted a "cloud of crows," an image that would be commonly employed to describe a conglomeration of soldiers bereft of cohesiveness and direction. Insofar as this complexity thwarted cooperation and allowed the persistence of "big men" and individual warriors (rather than soldiers), it must have adversely impacted administrative and battlefield effectiveness.

Final Musings

Historians have exclusively viewed the Chou saga from the latter's perspective, essentially complicit with the notion that they accorded with the trends of history and realized a sanctified and righteous objective in conquering the realm. The decline of the Chou royal house and enervation of central authority are therefore almost invariably characterized as negative events, harbingers of disorder and darkness rather than an unfettering of tightly constrained but highly dynamic peripheral cultures. Furthermore, in attempting to answer

how a mighty state, one in no way inferior to Rome, could have fallen, contemporary analyses emphasize the innately engendered nature of the Chou's destruction.

Although the resulting explanations range from the plausible through the absurd, they all tend to stress the ineffective, morally deficient character of the later kings (thereby accounting for the prominence of stories about Pao Ssu); the dynamic energy of the newly enfeoffed states (and the consequent tendency to fragmentation); the Chou's fiscal instability and eventual bankruptcy; their failure to institute bureaucratic controls; and the increasing estrangement of the protostates as the heritage myths faltered and clan ties became ineffective. Broadly characterized, the Western Chou's history is basically viewed as a lengthy decline from early Virtue and vibrancy under the aegis of a series of self-indulgent and increasingly pernicious rulers. All these perspectives have merit, any one might partially explain the dynamics of collapse, but none of them taken singularly is adequate in itself.

Characterizations that bemoan the Chou's devolution fundamentally err in assuming it ever controlled the realm and only the drastic erosion of its power and vibrancy could have allowed others to prey upon it.⁹⁵¹ But rather than being stagnant, many of the numerous peoples and protostates both within and without its envisioned borders had been growing economically and militarily, and some had seized slaves and acquired material goods through raiding and plundering. A few of the contiguous protostates must also have resented their subservient status and hoped to gain their own independence before going on to subjugate others.

Insofar as human desire inevitably causes conflict, short of stripping the outer areas of all wealth and goods and occupying the land with draconian troops, thereby keeping the inhabitants in total subservience and poverty (and possibly provoking insurgencies), there was little hope for tranquility. Because friction was inevitable, questioning what went wrong with the Chou is thus fundamentally inappropriate. Instead, astonishment might be a more appropriate response to their ability to prevail for some three centuries despite the usual internal conflicts and dynamic changes about them. The challenge confronting the Chou oligarchs had been finding an administrative method that would share their defensive burdens with the emerging states while formulating methods for enforced coexistence with peripheral enemies. Meanwhile, faced with a lack of impregnable borders, foreign incursions simply had to be tolerated and governmental efforts focused on minimizing the material and psychological impact.

History may not consist solely of epochal acts or heroic figures

but without doubt the great ones inspire the people and implement critical plans whereas the evil brutalize the people and pursue pleasure at the expense of the greater good, even the very destruction of the state. The Western Chou came into being through the strategic vision and martial actions of its warrior leaders, survived through three centuries of often undistinguished monarchs, and finally perished not because of any inherent incapability but because of the weakness and mutual disaffection of its leaders, foreshadowing the great misfortunes the Chinese people would endure under the ensuing two millennia of arrogance and incompetence. It well be asked what empire has not collapsed due to inertia, corruption, and morbidity in the face of new challenges. However, insofar as only relatively paltry enemies ever assaulted the Western Chou, never the highly mobile mounted hordes of Hsiung-nu, Toba, Khitan, Mongol, and Jurchen invaders seen in later eras, it merely needed to heed the admonition found in the ode “Yi”: [952](#)

Prepare your chariots and horses,
Bows, arrows, and lethal weapons,
To be used to constrain Jung risings,
To be used to repel the Man-fang.

Abbreviations Employed in the Notes and Bibliography

AM	<i>Asia Major</i>
BIHP	<i>Bulletin of the Institute of History and Philology, Academia Sinica</i> (中央研究院歷史語言研究所集刊)
BMFEA	<i>Bulletin of the Museum of Far Eastern Antiquities</i>
BSOAS	<i>Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies</i>
CKCHS	<i>Chung-kuo Che-hsüeh-shih</i> 中國哲學史 (Beijing)
CKKTS	<i>Chung-kuo Ku-tai-shih</i> 中國古代史 (Beijing)
CKSYC	<i>Chung-kuo-shih Yen-chiu</i> 中國史研究 (Beijing)
EC	<i>Early China</i>
HCCHS	<i>Hsien-Ch'in Ch'in Han Shih</i> 先秦、秦漢史 (Beijing)
JAOS	<i>Journal of the American Oriental Society</i>
HJAS	<i>Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies</i>
JAS	<i>Journal of Asian Studies</i>
JC	<i>Entry number for bronze inscriptions found in Yin Chou Chin-wen Chi-ch'eng</i>
JEAA	<i>Journal of East Asian Archaeology</i>
JL	<i>Entry number for bronze inscriptions found in Chin-ch'u Yin Chou Chin-wen Chi-lu</i>
JMH	<i>The Journal of Military History</i>
KK	<i>K'ao-ku</i> 考古 (Beijing)
KKHP	<i>K'ao-ku Hsüeh-pao</i> 考古學報 (Beijing)
KKWW	<i>K'ao-ku yü Wen-wu</i> 考古與文物 (Beijing)
LSYC	<i>Li-shih Yen-chiu</i> 歷史研究 (Beijing)
MS	<i>Monumenta Serica</i>

SHYCS	<i>hung-kuo She-hui K'e-hsüeh-yüan</i>
	<i>K'ao-ku Yen-chiu-suo</i>
TP	<i>T'oung Pao Wen-wu</i>
WW	<i>Wen-wu</i> 文物 (Beijing)
WWKKYCS	<i>Wen-wu K'ao-ku Yen-chiu-suo</i> 文物 考古研究所
YCS	<i>Yen-chiu-suo</i> 文物考古研究所

Notes

¹ Considerable controversy marks the purported intent of these inscriptions being cast into massive bronze vessels. (In addition, in searching for a single interpretation, scholars often overlook that whatever common practice may have been, intention and understanding may have varied significantly among individuals.) Because they are generally visible only from above, from the perspective of Heaven, it has been argued that they were created purely to report achievements to the ancestors (and thus ensure the receipt of continued blessings), and that their meanings or functions were primarily religious. (For example, Lothar von Falkenhausen ["Issues in Western Zhou Studies: A Review Article." EC 18 (1993), 138–226]) believes the inscriptions were intended to communicate with the spirits rather than to act as historical records for descendants.)

However, being about the most permanent of human creations, their importance in writing family history and creating clan heritage has also been stressed. (See Edward L. Shaughnessy, *Sources of Western Chou History*, 176–82; Tu Nai-sung, "Ch'uan-kuo T'ung-ch'i Chien-ting Suo-chien Chin-wen K'ao-ch'a," HCCHS 2002:2, 22.) Even the *Mo-tzu*, a famous Warring States work, states in "Lu Wen" that "they attack neighboring states and slay their people in order to make inscriptions on cauldrons to transmit to their descendants."

In either case, whether for their predecessors or for posterity, it seems unlikely that the terse accounts went unedited, that the principals would not stress their achievements and deemphasize or omit failures and difficulties. (Insofar as an award text was prepared in advance by governmental scribes, the caster's editorial freedom would have been somewhat limited.) Accordingly, employing them as the sole historical source for Western Chou events can only result in a very distorted chronicle, especially when considerable disagreement mars the dating of individual vessels.

² Some of the most important include Bernhard Karlgren, "The Early History of the *Chou Li* and *Tso Chuan* Texts" and *On the Authenticity and Nature of the Tso Chuan*; Barry B. Blakeley, "On the Authenticity and Nature of the *Zuo Zhuan*' Revisited"; Edward L. Shaughnessy, "The Editing and Editions of the *Bamboo Annals*" and "On the Authenticity of the *Bamboo Annals*," as well as his *Sources of Western Zhou History and Rewriting Early Chinese Texts*; David Schaberg, *A Patterned Past: Form and Thought in Early Chinese Historiography*; and Michael Loewe, *Early Chinese Texts: A Bibliographic Guide*. Important overviews are also found in Li Feng's *Landscape and Power* and Herrlee Creel's *The Origins of Statecraft in China*, but the most important discussion has been stimulated by the ongoing work of E. Bruce Brooks and his associate Taeko Brooks, readily available on the Warring States Project website and epitomized by their seminal translation of the *Analects*. ³ Recent contemplations of dialogue authenticity include Yuri Pines, "Intellectual Change in the Chunqiu Period: The Reliability of the Speeches in the *Zuo Zhuan* as Sources of Chunqiu Intellectual History," EC 22 (1997): 77–132, and David Schaberg, "Remonstrance in Eastern Zhou Historiography," EC 22 (1997): 133–79. (Also see Yuri Pines, *Foundations of Confucian Thought*.) Long viewed with disdain as a compilation of clever persuasions

and stories, the *Kuo Yü* is once again being viewed as a potential source of important events and discussion.

Apart from obviously fanciful and mythical events, our practice in *Conquest and Domination* has been to regard the antique events reprised in the *Tso Chuan* as essentially reliable but its recorded speeches as fourth century BCE creations of compilers that, at best, based them upon cryptic notes or oral traditions that may have preserved the gists of the moments. In the process of being expanded, shaped, and polished, many speeches came to incorporate numerous illustrative analogies

⁴ Decades of work have allowed discrepancies and errors to be ferreted out, but also the essential reliability of much material to be ascertained. (For example, Li Hsüeh-ch'in ["Yu-kuan Ku-shih te Shih-ko Hsin Fa-hsien," HCHS 2005:5, 3–7] notes that the finds at Shaanhsi Mei-hsien Yang-chia-ts'un have attested to the validity of Ssu-ma Ch'ien's sequence of Chou kings.) ⁶ For example, the *Shih Ch'iang P'an* (JC 10175), a basin discovered together with 102 other bronze vessels during a 1976 excavation in Shaanxi, and the *Li Kuei* (JC 4131), discussed below. The former's lengthy inscription recounts the Chou's early history from King Wen's Virtue through the martial conquests achieved by the first rulers as late as about 900 BCE. (For an annotated English translation and bibliography of relevant articles on the *Shih Ch'iang P'an*, see Edward L. Shaughnessy, *Sources of Western Zhou History*, 1–4 and 183–92. For another interpretation not cited by Shaughnessy, see Huang Jan-wei, *Yin Chou Shih-liao Lun-chi*, 369–79. JC references indicate the entry number for the rubbing and transcriptions of inscriptions found in the *Yin Chou Chin-wen Ch'ch'eng*.) ⁷ For two recent examples of interpretations derived from traditional texts, see Ssu Wei-chih, "Tsao Chou te Li-shih Ch'u-t'an," LSYC 1978:9, 56–60 or Wang Lu, "Hsi-Chou Hsing-ch'i te Ta-shih Chi," HCHS 1989:1, 55–63, who abstracts essential materials from the *Yi Ching*. (Also see Niu shih-shan, "Lun Hsien-Chou Wen-hua te Yüan-yüan," KKW 2000:2, 48–55, who stresses the Chou's multiple origins, and the archaeological overview of Wang Wei and Hsü Liang-kao, "Hsien-Chou Wen-hua te K'ao-ku-hsüeh T'an-suo," KKH 2000:3, 285–310.) Rather than provide a comprehensive examination of the Chou's possible early origins, the intent of this section is simply to recount and ponder elements of their prehistory that have relevance for military evolution within a geographical context. (For broad contemporary interpretations the relevant chapters in the *Cambridge History of Ancient China* are fundamental, as are the accounts in Li Feng's *Landscape and Power in Early China: The Crisis and Fall of the Western Zhou, 1045–771 BC*, hereafter *Landscape and Power*; Hsu and Linduff, *Western Chou Civilization*, and H. G. Creel's earlier (1970) *The Origins of Statecraft in China*. In Chinese, Hsü Cho-yün's somewhat revised *Hsi Chou Shih* and Yang K'uan's similarly titled *Hsi Chou Shih* are both essential.) ⁸ For a brief summary of these positions, see E. L. Shaughnessy, "Western Zhou History" in *The Cambridge History of Ancient China*, 299–307. (For a typical example of how *Shih Ching* materials might be employed, see Li Chia-shu, "Ts'ung Shih-ching-chung K'an Tsao-Chou She-hui te Mien-mao ping Lun Hsi-Chou She-hui Hsing-chih Wen-t'i," *Hsing-kang Chung-wen Ta-hsüeh Chung-kuo Wen-hua YCS Hsüeh-pao*, 17 (1986): 163–200.) It should be noted that significant elements in the *Shih Ch'ü*'s account derive from material embedded in the odes, all of which predate Ssu-ma Ch'ien's great work by a few to many centuries. (For a basic appraisal of the *Shih Ching*'s contents, including probable dates, see Michael Loewe, "*Shih ching*," in M. Loewe, ed. *Early Chinese Texts: A Bibliographic Guide*, 415–23.) ⁹ For a classic exposition of commonality of the Hsia, Shang, and Chou, see K. C. Chang, "Sandai Archaeology and the Formation of States in Ancient China: Processual Aspects of the Origins of Chinese Civilization," in *The Origins of Chinese Civilization*, 495–521 or his *Shang Civilization*, 348–55. ¹⁰ For example, see Yeh Wen-hsien, "Hsien Chou-shih

Su-yüan,” HCCHS 1996:1, 14–20. ¹¹ Based upon the second character being composed from components meaning “woman” and “source” or “origin” her name has been understood as meaning something like the “origins of the Chiang,” but since she came from another clan, often said to be the Yu-t’ai clan, and married into the Chi, she obviously can’t be the progenitress of the Chiang clan. Among various interpretations, Chiang Yüan is seen as reflecting a matriarchical age and her stepping in the footsteps of the spirit some form of participatory dance. (See, for example, Ssu Wei-chih, “Hou Chi te Chiang-sheng yü Sheh te Ch’ung-pai,” HCCHS 1991:10, 48–51.) Temples to Hou Chi are known in the general area of Mount Ch’i and Chiang Yüan’s tomb is supposedly located to the south. (E. L. Shaughnessy, “Historical Geography and the Extent of the Earliest Chinese Kingdoms,” AM 3rd series, 2:2 (199), 7.) ¹² The term for perceiving this suitability is “*hsiang*,” associated from the late Spring and Autumn onward with the practice of physiognomy, both of people and horses. ¹³ Rather than “agricultural adviser,” “*nung shih*” can be taken as a title, the *shih* (preceptor) for *nung* (agriculture) or Master of Agriculture, but it would be totally anachronistic. ¹⁴ Chiang Lin-ch’ang claims that, even though they dwelt among the barbarians, they maintained their distinctiveness. (*Hsia Shang Chou Wen-ming Hsin-t’an*, 295–99.) ¹⁵ For typical discussions see Li Min, “Shih Shang Shu ‘Chou-jen Ts’un Hsia’ Shuo,” CKSYC 1982:2, 128–34 or Chiang Lin-ch’ang, *Hsia Shang Chou Wen-ming Hsin-t’an*, 295–310. (Most of the early history just recounted is derived from the ode “Sheng Min” found in the *Shih Ching*.) ¹⁶ Based upon his analysis of traditional accounts, Chiang Lin-ch’ang (*Hsia Shang Chou Wen-ming Hsin-t’an*, 302) concluded that the Chou and Hsia had the same ancestors, both being descended from the Yellow Emperor’s clan. However, this sort of approach makes unwarranted assumptions about the nature of traditional texts. (Chiang notes that the Chiang of Chiang Yüan’s name are so-called Chiang Yen and therefore related to Red Emperor.) Conversely, Ch’en Ch’ang-yün (“Ts’ung Chou-tsu te Ch’i-yüan-lun chi Huang-ti Shih-tsu te Fa-hsiang Ti,” HCCHS 1996.3:17–22) believes the Chou was the only dynasty with same surname as Yellow Emperor, Chi. It might be noted that some historians see the Chou’s agricultural knowledge, whether early on or later, when revived, as having been furnished by the Chiang clan, themselves reputedly descendants of Shen Nung and the Red Emperor. ¹⁷ Whether their agricultural outreach was intended to build a strategic base and thus constitutes a deliberate advisory program, as sometime claimed, deserves contemplation. ¹⁸ See Hu A-hsiang, “Chung-nung Te-cheng yü ‘Chou’ Tsu-ming Kuo-hao Yu-lai,” HCCHS 2000:3, 50–57. While not particularly credible, it certainly avoids the difficulty of explaining Shang oracular references to the Chou-fang long before they entered the Wei River Valley and settled near Chou-yüan. ¹⁹ For another translation, see William Nienhauser, Jr., ed., *The Grand Scribe’s Records*. Volume 1: *The Memoirs of Pre-Han China*, 55ff. It currently is fashionable to argue that the terms “*jung*” and “*ti*,” primarily but not exclusively used in reference to external peoples who occupied the steppe and otherwise forbidding territory, should not be translated as “barbarian” but instead something like “non-Chinese.” While often true, from the perspective of their vaunted culture, these outer peoples were historically viewed as benighted, uncultured, and brutish, and the terms applied to them are generally fraught with connotations of disparagement including at the time of the *Shih Chi*’s composition, though not necessarily at the Chou’s inception. (For a classic discussion of the concept of the barbarian in China see Herrlee Creel, *Origins of Statecraft in China*, 194–241.) ²⁰ Sometimes read as Ch’ü rather than K’u. ²¹ A similar statement appears in the “Chou Yü” section of the *Kuo Yü*. Both are frequently

interpreted as connoting Pu K’u’s abandonment of agriculture.

²² Not the Wei River of the Wei River Valley. ²³ The “Tao of the Chou,” their way of

life, organization, governance, and customs, all that would distinguish them as a separate polity.²⁴ From the perspective of the vaunted Hua-Hsia self-identity, this sort of “contamination” by barbarian cultures needed to be de-emphasized by later writers in the imperial age. (For an example of emphasizing this aspect, see Chou Wei-chou, “Chou-jen, Ch’in-jen, Han-jen ho Han-tsu,” CKSYC 1995:2, 11–18.)²⁵ For a discussion, see Ko Chih-yi, “Chou-jen Pien Jung Fu Hsia K’ao-lun,” CKSYC 1991:4, 122–29.²⁶ For example, see Chiang Lin-ch’ang, *Hsia Shang Chou Wen-ming Hsin-t’an*, 274. (The early Chou chieftains must have enjoyed almost legendary longevity; otherwise five hundred years would be impossible, since the preconquest generations from Hou Chi to King Wu only total about twenty, and the reigns in the wilds about ten.)²⁷ For a brief discussion of these fortified villages, see Sawyer, *Ancient Chinese Warfare*, 43–46.²⁸ For example, see Ch’en Ch’ang-yün, “Ts’ung Chou-tsu te Ch’i-yüan-lun chi Huang-ti Shih-tsu te Fa-hsiang Ti,” HCCSH 1996.3:17–22. (“Ti” was a general term with similarly negative “barbarian” connotations for the mainly northern dwelling steppe peoples.) No doubt in summary of earlier texts, in its chapter on the Hsi Jung, the third century CE *Hou Han-shu* notes that “during the chaos that arose under King Chieh [of the Hsia], the Ch’üan Yi dwelled in the area between Pin and Ch’i.”²⁹ Rather than having different geographic origins, Edwin G. Pulleyblank believes that the Chi and Chiang were members of the same people and that from inception (as embodied by Chiang Yüan), rather than just from the Chou shift to the Mount Ch’i area, the two main clans were interrelated through ongoing marriage partnerships. (“Ji and Jiang: The Role of Exogamic Clans in the Organization of the Chou Polity,” EC 25 (2000), 1–27.) Several Chou kings would subsequently take consorts from the Chiang including K’ang, Mu, Yih, Hsiao, Li, and even Yu.³⁰ For example, see Chiang Lin-ch’ang, *Hsia Shang Chou Wen-ming Hsin-t’an*, 282.³¹ Yeh Wen-hsien, “Hsien Chou-shih Su-yüan,” HCCHS 1996:1, 14–20.³² However, in view of the lack of evidence, others assert that their interrelationship didn’t commence until the shift to the lower Wei River Valley. (For example see Ch’en Ch’ang-yün, “Ts’ung Chou-tsu te Ch’i-yüan-lun chi Huang-ti Shih-tsu te Fa-hsiang Ti,” HCCHS 1996.3:17–22.)³³ See Chiang Lin-ch’ang, 283–84.³⁴ As evidenced by their movement around Gansu, Shaanxi, and Shanxi, Yang Shan-ch’ün even argues that the early pre-Chou were essentially seminomadic. (“Chou-tsu te Ch’i-yüan-ti chi-ch’i Ch’ien-hsi Lu-hsien,” HCCHS 1991:1, 43–49.)³⁵ Pin’s location, although frequently identified with contemporary Pin-hsien, is variously claimed to have been anywhere from the middle to the upper reaches of the Ching River, with the former view being the most common. (Chiang Lin-ch’ang, *Hsia Shang Chou Wen-ming Hsin-t’an*, 274, is one of the proponents of the latter.)³⁶ For example Yao Cheng (“Lun Chou-tsu te Ch’i-yüan – Chien Lun Huang Ti,” CKKTS 1995:10, 39–48) claims that archaeological evidence supports their origination in the upper Ching River Valley out of the Yellow Emperor’s clan and then their subsequent amalgamation with the Chiang. Similarly opting for the upper Ching River, Li Feng (*Landscape and Power*, 28) identifies them with Nien-tzu-p’o. (Li provides an extensive discussion of the region’s topography; *The Cambridge History of Ancient China* also contains basic materials on the archaeological evidence and early terrain.) Chiang Lin-ch’ang (*Hsia Shang Chou Wen-ming Hsin-t’an*, 274) believes that they moved to Pin from Gansu’s Ch’ing-yang area.³⁷ “Chou Pen-chi,” *Shih Chi*. It should be noted that the Chou were already powerful before this confrontation with the other barbarians; therefore, the traditional account is obviously highly simplified, if not badly distorted.³⁸ Li Feng, *Landscape and Power*, 47.³⁹ As discussed in our *Ancient Chinese Warfare*, climatic cooling was probably a factor in the proto-Shang’s movement southward. (Shen Ch’ang-yün [“Chou-tsu Ch’i-yüan Chu-shuo Pien-cheng,” CKSYC 2009:3, 117–30] stresses the environmental factors in Tan Fu’s move to a more advantageous climate, but also see Chiang Lin-ch’ang, “Ku-

kung Tan-fu 'Chih yü 'Ch'i-hsia' yü Wei-shui Liu-yü Hsien-Chou K'ao-ku Wen-hua," KKW 2000:2, 56–63.)⁴⁰ For concise descriptions and valuable firsthand impressions, see Li Feng, *Landscape and Power*, 30–58. A highly experienced archaeologist, Li's familiarity with the area is reflected in his descriptions of the topography. (Unlike most historians who tend to view geographical constraints as a mere inconvenience, Li thoroughly explores both the constraints and facilitations or, as the military writers like to say, advantages of terrain.) For additional discussion, also see Wang Hui and Ho Shu-ch'in, "Yen-Chiang-tsu yü Nung-yeh Shuai-pien Wei Pan-nung Pan-pu-luo te Huan-ching K'ao-ku-hsüeh T'an-suo," HCCHS 2009:4, 3–10.

⁴¹ Chou-yüan K'ao-ku-tui, "2005-nien Shaanxi Fu-feng Mei-yang-ho Liu-yü K'ao-ku Tiao-ch'a," KKHP 2010:2, 207–28. ⁴² Yeh Wen-hsien, "Hsien Chou-shih Su-yüan," HCCHS 1996:1, 14–20. ⁴³ Wang T'ing-ch'ia, "Shih-ching yü Yü-lieh Wen-hua," CHSYC 1995:1, 3–11. ⁴⁴ The intent of this section is to provide an abstracted account of early Shang-Chou relations based upon the detailed discussion in our *Ancient Chinese Warfare*. Only abbreviated notes and references to materials not previously cited or that have appeared in the interval between the completion of that manuscript and this work are appended here. ⁴⁵ Inscriptions referring to a Fu Chou include *Yi Pien* 8894 and HJ22264. ⁴⁶ See Ts'ao Ting-yün and Liu Yi-man, "Yin-hsü Hua-yüan-chuang Tung-ti Ch'u-t'u Chia-ku Pu-tsu-chung te 'Chung Chou' yü Tsao-ch'i Yin-Shang Kuan-hsi," KK 2005:9, 60–63. ⁴⁷ Ten shells are noted on *Yi-pien* 5452, another shell on *Ping-pien* 274.5. ⁴⁸ Examples of solicitous inquiry include *Chia Pien* 436, HJ6782 (referring to whether the Fang would "tun" the Chou), and *T'ieh* 26.1 (asking whether the Kuan would harm them), among others. (Also see the discussion on subversion at the end of Part I.) In aggregate, there seems to be no question that the king was interested in such developments, though not necessarily out of concern, because any inherent conflict among peripheral groups potentially reduced their lethality and, therefore, danger to the Shang. However, questions can be raised about the actual meaning of each inscription because the king may well have ordered an assault by the Ch'üan and been wondering about the results. ⁴⁹ For example, see *T'ieh* 128.2 and *Ch'ien* 6.63.1. ⁵⁰ Examples of the Chou mounting a strike on behalf of the Shang are *Yi Pien* 7312 and *Ping Pien* 289, where they seem to be acting as vanguard for the Ch'üan who must have reverted to submissive status. (For further discussion and additional evidence of the Chou acting as a battlefield ally, see Lin Hsiao-an, 246 or David N. Keightley, "The Shang State as Seen in the Oracle-bone Inscriptions" [EC 5 (1979–80), 25–34].) ⁵¹ Most analysts date the clash with the Chou to late in Wu Ting's era, but a few attribute it to the middle part based upon various queries belonging to the Pin diviner group. The key inscriptions for the conflict are reprised in Ch'en Meng-chia, *Yin-hsü Pu-ts'u Tsung-lei*, 291–92, 492; Chang Ping-ch'üan, 321, 435, 492; Fan Yü-chou, 224–25; Wang Yü-sheng, 166ff; and P'eng Yü-shang, 150–51. ⁵² Pin, their final dwelling place before moving to Mount Ch'i, may well have been in the vicinity of modern Pin-hsien, somewhat below the middle reaches of the Ching River, though other locations upriver and back along the Fen River are also argued. ⁵³ HJ6825. ⁵⁴ HJ6812, HJ6813. ⁵⁵ HJ6812 *cheng*, and also HJ6813, HJ6814, HJ6815, and *Hsü* 984. ⁵⁶ HJ6824. ⁵⁷ See Fan Yü-chou, 225; HJ6816, HJ6817, HJ6818, HJ6819, HJ6821, HJ6822, and HJ6825. The *tuó yin* were also dispatched on one occasion. ⁵⁸ HJ6782. ⁵⁹ A conclusion necessarily subject to modification if several inscriptions are shifted to the reigns of Wu Yi and Wen Ting. ⁶⁰ Yeh Wen-hsien ("Hsien Chou-shih Su-yüan," HCHHS 1996:1, 14–20) is among those recently arguing that the conflict dates to Wu Ting's era but refers to Kung Liu, also known as a Ku Kung, with the location being Pin in the middle Ching River Valley. Tan Fu's movement to Mount Ch'i would then be dated to Tsu Chia's or Ping Hsin's era. ⁶¹ According to the very late *Hou Han-shu* chapter "Hsi Ch'iang Chuan," "reaching the time when Wu Yi was brutal

and perverse, the Ch'üan (dog) Jung made incursions across the borders. Chou Ku Kung went over Mount Liang and avoided them below Ch'i." ⁶² Although Yang K'uan (*Hsi Chou Shih* , 38–40) may well be correct in concluding that this conflict represents another, distinctive event that unfolded when Shang central authority broke down under Wu Yi's dissolute and repressive rule (as indicated in the more nebulous "His Ch'iang Chuan" in the *Hou-Han-shu*), it seems unlikely that the same sequence of attacks would have been repeated. Rather, attributing the event to Wu Yi's reign is likely erroneous. Conversely, assuming the events occurred late in Wu Ting's reign raises some question about the length of various Chou reigns and whether the period between Chou Tan-fu's action and the conquest of the Shang would not now become too long. (For additional discussion, see *The Cambridge History of Ancient China* , 299–307, and Yang K'uan, *Hsi-Chou Shih* , 35–45.) ⁶³ Even now the traditional view that emphasizes governmental aspects, the civil, and Virtue in the Chou's victory while deemphasizing the martial and seeing it as founding the vital Hua-Hsia tradition continues to be proclaimed. (For an example, see Luo Hsin-hui, "Shang 'wen' chih Feng yü Chou-tai She-hui," *HCCHS* 2004:5, 32–44.) ⁶⁴ Articles supporting the alternatives of preexistence and later creation continue to appear. (For an example of the former, see Liu Huan, "Ch'iang P'an Ming-wen Tsa-chi," *HCCHS* 2004:3, 40–41.) Even though the contents of the *Yi Chou-shu* are not homogenous and the harsh reality of military power is a prominent theme, several chapters emphasize the concept of Virtue and the need to benefit the people. ⁶⁵ For example, see Wang Pao-kuo, "Yin Shang Shih-ch'i Chung-min Pao-min Ssu-hsiang Tang-yi," *HCCHS* 2002:6, 46–49, 64. ⁶⁶ For a brief discussion, see Chao Chung-wen, "T'ung *Shang Shu* K'an Shang Chou Liang-tai 'Ching Te' Kuan-nien te Yen-pien," *CKCHSYC Chung-kuo Che-hsüeh-shih Yen-chiu* 1986:2, 3–11. ⁶⁷ Liu Huan, for example, asserts that the idea of Heavenly sanction was present among both the Shang and the Chou and that the idea of Virtue preexisted the Chou's adaptation. (Liu Huan, "Ch'iang P'an Ming-wen Tsa-chi," *HCCHS* 2004:3, 40–41.) ⁶⁸ "Inferior Strategy," *Three Strategies of Huang-shih Kung* . Works like the *Liu-t'ao* (*Six Secret Teachings*) emphasize that actions should be initiated early on, when streams are merely a trickle and saplings have not yet grown to trees. ⁶⁹ *Analects* XIX:20. It has also been suggested that the descriptions in the *Basic Annals*, in which large amounts of alcohol were consumed, excerpted below, are reminiscent of early religious ceremonies or festivities and were simply exaggerated in size and frequency for didactic purposes. ⁷⁰ For an analysis of the Shang's several distinctive drinking vessels see Li Shao-lung, "Ch'ing-t'ung-chüeh te Kung-yung, Tsao-hsing chi ch'i yü Shang Wen-hua te Kuan-hsi," *HCCHS* 1999:3, 3–17. The *Ta Yü Ting* attributed to King K'ang's reign provides an early example of Chou belief in Shang debauchery through alcoholic beverages. ⁷¹ According to the "Shang Pen-chi" or "Shang Basic Annals" in the *Shih Chi* . ⁷² Here and throughout our work, references to "King Chou [of the Shang]" and "Emperor Chou [of the Shang]" have been uniformly changed to "Emperor Hsin" (derived from Ti Hsin, his posthumous title, Ti eventually coming to mean emperor whatever its understanding at this time) to avoid confusion with the name of the Chou dynasty. ⁷³ The archetypal seductress played an extensive but tragic role throughout Chinese history, with several infamous examples bringing the imperial house to ruin. Even less famous *femme fatales* were constant sources of tension because the almighty emperors—despite having numerous consorts, concubines, and other female attendants—were easily persuaded by their favorites to grant favors and power to the women's relatives, weakening the imperial house and creating sources of dissension. The replacement of an old consort by a new beauty or the displacement of an heir also caused interminable strife and intrigue. ⁷⁴ Variants of the bribe story identify different individuals as responsible for this effort. ⁷⁵ "Ch'i T'ai Kung Shih-chia." ⁷⁶ The texts for the individual lines of the hexagram

are frequently attributed to the Duke of Chou, one of his sons, and even Confucius, who has traditionally been closely identified with the book, though he certainly did not play any role in its completion.⁷⁷ For discussions of the Shang and Chou chronologies, see, among others, David N. Keightley, "The Bamboo Annals and the Shang-Chou Chronology," *HJAS*, 38:2 (1978): 423–38; Edward L. Shaughnessy, "On the Authenticity of the Bamboo Annals," *HJAS* 46:1 (1986): 149–80; Chou Fa-ko, "Chronology of the Western Chou Dynasty," *Hsiang-kang Chung-wen Ta-hsieh Chung-kuo Wen-hua Yen-chiu-so hsieh-pao* 4:1 (1971): 173–205; Ch'ü Wan-li, "Shih-chi Yin-pen-chi chi ch'i-t'o chi-lu-chung so-tsai Yin-Shang shih-tai te shih-shih," *Taiwan Ta-hsü wen-shih-che hsieh-pao* 14:11 (1965): 87–118; Jung Meng-yüan, "Shih-t'an Hsi-Chou chi-nien," *Chung-hua wen-shih lun-ts'ung* 1 (1980): 1–21; Ch'ü Wan-li, "Hsi-Chou shih-shih kai-shu," *BIHP* 42 (1971): 775–802; Tung Tso-pin, "Hsi-Chou nien-li-p'u," *BIHP* 23 (1951): 681–760; and Ho Yu-ch'i, "Chou Wu-wang fa-Chou te nien-tai wen-t'i," *Chung-shan Ta-hsieh hsieh-pao* 1 (1981); 64–70. Although not unchallenged, the most impressive work to date has been David W. Pankenier's articles on certain Hsia, Shang, and Chou dates, especially "Astronomical Dates in Shang and Western Chou," *EC* 7 (1981–1982), which discusses the implications of astrologically important phenomena.⁷⁸ As well as how the bronze inscriptions are dated, for there is a certain, perhaps unavoidable element of circularity in their evaluation, particularly when full month, day, and year data is missing, as is usually the case. Moreover, depending upon where the vessel was cast and where it was discovered, two distinct issues, dating by style and other reconsiderations are also fraught with problems, including the impact of technological diffusion and copying. (See, for example, Noel Barnard, "Western Zhou Ritual Bronzes from the Arthur M. Sackler Collections," A Review Article," *TP* 79 (1993), 281 ff.)⁷⁹ More than fifty articles justifying some thirty-six different dates were recently gathered into a massive topical volume, *Wu-wang K'o Shang chih Nien Yen-chiu*. Although extensive, it still cannot be considered comprehensive because many articles and several traditional views were omitted, some of the latter only being cited within the compendium's articles. Furthermore, new interpretations and variations on old arguments continue to appear. For example, Hsü Po-hung's "P'an Keng Ch'ien Yin Nien-tai-k'ao chi Ta-gui Su-pan Li-fa Fu-yüan," which argues for 1075 BCE; Wu Chin-sheng and Wu Wei-wei's "Wu-wang k'o Yin' nien-tai 30 chia i-shuo tsung-shu," which, after surveying the views of some thirty scholars, based upon the *Bamboo Annals* rather than the *Shih Chi*, concludes that the victory occurred on the tenth day in second month, 1050 BCE, King Wu's twelfth year; Wang Chan-k'uei, "*Ku-pen Chu-shu Chi-nien* yü Hsi Chou Nien-tai"; and Chang Wen-yü, "Kuan-yü 'Wu Ch'eng' te Chi-ko Wen-t'i," *HCCHS* 1994:4, 54–65, who calculates a date of 1106.⁸⁰ For example, David S. Nivison, "The Xia-Shang-Zhou Chronology Project: Two Approaches to Dating," *JEA* 4 (2002), 359–66; Lin Yün, "Shang-Chou K'ao-ku Chieh-piao' P'ing-lun," *HCCHS* 2005:1, 19–28; and Chang Fu-hsiang, "*Chu-shu Chi-nien* yü Hsia Shang Chou Tuan-tai Kung-ch'eng Hsi Chou Wang-nien te Pi-chiao Yen-chiu," *HCCHS* 2006:3, 9–17. For more general questions, see, for example, Chiang Lin-ch'ang, *Hsia Shang Chou Wen-ming Hsin-t'an*.⁸¹ Although judging among them proves difficult at best, the two possibilities of 1046 BCE (advocated by Pankenier) and 1045 BCE (by Shaughnessy), both based upon calendrical and astronomical reconstructions as well as detailed analysis of relevant historical materials, seem the most probable. (Based upon his incisive astro-analysis of early records, David W. Pankenier concluded that the conquest date should be March 20, 1046 BCE ["The Cosmo-Political Background of Heaven's Mandate," *EC* 20 (1995), 130], a full sixty-day cycle later than his previously computed date of January 20, 1046 ["Astronomical Dates in Shang and Western Zhou," *EC* 7 (1981–1982), 15]. Nevertheless, as Shaughnessy's *Source of Western Chou History* contains a lengthy reign period analysis that integrates

traditional and inscriptional evidence to provide a coherent dating scheme for the W. Chou kings, the date of 1045 is jointly adopted here.⁸² The bestowal of horses incidentally shows their importance as a status gift.⁸³ Although bearing the same name, these “Kuei” are thought to be different from the troublesome enemies of King Wu Ting’s era.⁸⁴ This may simply be an example of retrospective projection.⁸⁵ In James Legge’s terminology (*Shoo King*, “Prolegomena,” 139.)⁸⁶ For further discussion and examples see “Political Intelligence” in Sawyer, *The Tao of Spycraft*. Although the Chou valued talented individuals, any over emphasis is the effect of Warring States esteem (when a state’s survival depended upon them) for overachievers.⁸⁷ The *Yi Ching*, which has been translated numerous times including most famously by James Legge and Helmut Wilhelm, is thought by some scholars not to just represent a different means of prognostication (insofar as it replies upon the manipulation of milfoil stalks rather than the cracking of plastrons and bones), but the emergence of a concept or orientation to change coincident with the overthrow of the Shang. (See Wang Hui, “Yin-mo Chou-ch’u yi Shih wei Chien Yi-shih yü Ssu-hsiang Wei-hsin Yün-tung,” HCHS 2008:5, 35–39. For a translation of a recently discovered tomb text dating to the late Warring States and therefore an earlier redaction than the traditionally received version, see E. L. Shaughnessy, *I Ching: The Classic of Changes*.)⁸⁸ Commentators have often taken this as meaning that the king, who is now being referred to by the title bestowed upon him by the Shang, established a standing army for the first time, but the term *chih ping*, “order the army,” simply means he organized and disciplined them, whether they were core troops or conscripts to be mustered in time of need.⁸⁹ The Chou’s basically nomadic character or a growing inadequacy in the water supplies have also been suggested as motivating factors. However, given the prevalence of streams, rivers, and other bodies of water (and a high water table), any “inadequacy” would probably have stemmed from pollution.⁹⁰ For a complete translation and extensive discussion of the historical context, see Sawyer, *The Six Secret Teachings*, in *Seven Military Classics*.⁹¹ Assuming it is accurate, this citation indicates that the Chou not only heeded Heaven but continued to respect Shang Ti, the focus of Shang belief.⁹² For example, in “Fa Chih” (in *Ping* 2) the Ta’i Kung speaks about constraint and measure being the result of training, and *Ping* 6, after noting Sun-tzu’s idea that warfare is the Tao of deception, provides examples of “*shih ch’üeh*” (showing fear) in reply to King Wu’s question of what to do if the enemy has already securely occupied an advantageous position in great strength, identical with material found in the *Six Secret Teachings*.⁹³ Although the *Shih Chi* did not begin circulating until the Three Kingdoms period, many of the key materials that Ssu-ma Ch’ien employed to craft his accounts, including the *Shang Shu* (also known as the *Shu Ching* and, in English, the *Book of Documents*) and *Kuo Yü*, were increasingly disseminated in the late Warring States and early Han periods.⁹⁴ Both accounts are largely derived from the “Chou Yü” chapter of the *Kuo Yü* and sections of the *Shu Ching*, including its late portions. Interspersed dialogues are of course imaginative reconstructions and projections. Although the *Shih Chi* evidences careful scrutiny of the preexistent sources, whether out of a fundamental moral sense or personal indignation Ssu-ma Ch’ien may well have enhanced Hsin’s perversities.⁹⁵ Normally explained as saying she had not been formally raised from being a concubine to the status of official consort.⁹⁶ It is also traditionally said that they, or at least some of them, were created by his concubines or imposed for their amusement.⁹⁷ Although the “San Kung” or “Three Dukes” would often be the highest ranked officials in subsequent eras and three dukes are mentioned with reference to the early Western Chou, in this context the designation of *kung* or duke seems to have been nominal, honorific without any known responsibilities or authority. However, even though he is sometimes said to have been married to a Shang princess, his entitlement is somewhat puzzling because

Shang oracle bones indicate continued friction between their respective courts at this time. ⁹⁸ The T'ai Kung's biography in the *Shih Chi* notes that he also participated in this rescue effort: "When the Lord of the West was confined at Yu-li, San-i Sheng and Hung Yao, having long known him, summoned the T'ai Kung. The T'ai Kung also said, 'I have heard that the Lord of the West is a Worthy, and moreover excels at nurturing the old, so I guess I'll go there.' The three men sought out beautiful women and unusual objects on behalf of the Lord of the West, and presented them to King Chou in order to ransom him. The Lord of the West was thus able to go out and return to his state." If true, it obviously contradicts the idea that King Wen had already engaged him as an advisor. ⁹⁹ A bizarre name meaning "evil coming." ¹⁰⁰ Here *shih*, which often simply designates the lowest ranks of nobility or warriors, reflects a later conceptualization in referring to men distinguished by their character and cultivation. ¹⁰¹ Ironically, this is not slander but an accurate assessment of the situation, as the remainder of the biography confirms. According to the late Warring States's *Three Strategies*, "a state about to mobilize its army concentrates upon making its beneficence ample. A state about to attack and seize another concentrates upon first nurturing the people." ("Superior Strategy.") ¹⁰² The practice of benevolent and righteous government would historically prompt both subversive and aggressive action against the newly "threatening" state. For example, as noted in our *Tao of Spycraft* (59–60), Ch'i employed female musicians to subvert Confucius's efforts in the state of Lu and according to *Mencius* (IIB5) both Ch'i and Ch'u reviled and attacked the state of Sung, which was purportedly attempting to practice the government of true kings. ¹⁰³ The two minor states of Yü and Jui subsequently participated in the coalition thrust against Hsin. The incident, which will be discussed further in the analytic section, appears in a number of Warring States and early Han texts, including the *Shuo-yüan* and *Han-shih Wai-chuan*, and came to epitomize the persuasive effects of exemplary morality. ¹⁰⁴ "Chou Pen-chi." ¹⁰⁵ His comments betray strong Taoist conceptions. The version found in the *Shuo Yüan*'s "Chün Tao" runs as follows: "The people of Yü and Jui sought to dispute their achievements before King Wen. When they entered King Wen's borders they noted that the people yielded to the high officials; when they entered the bounds of the capital they saw that the high officials yielded to the dukes and ministers. The [emissaries from] the two states said to each other, 'The people yield to the high officials; the high officials yield to the dukes and ministers. Even so, the ruler yields the realm and doesn't occupy it.' Even without seeing King Wen in person, the representatives yielded the land over which they were disputing, letting it become fallow terrain between them, and returned home." ¹⁰⁶ Including T'an Ch'i-hsiang's multivolume *Chung-kuo Li-shih Ti-t'u-chi*, 11–12. ¹⁰⁷ Chang T'ien-en, "Jui-kuo Shih-shih yü K'ao-ku Fa-hsien te Chü-pu Cheng-ho," WW 2010:6, 35–42. ¹⁰⁸ In other accounts, Ch'i is referred to as Chi (a character meaning famine), but in the *Shang Shu Ching* retelling of this incident and Tsu Yi's remonstrance it is referred to as Li. ¹⁰⁹ "Chou Pen-chi." Note that the timing of the attacks differ in the *Bamboo Annals* and "Chou Pen-chi." ¹¹⁰ Tsu Yi's remonstrance is essentially taken from the *Shang Shu* chapter "Hsi Po K'an Li." ¹¹¹ The term "human nature" is clearly anachronistic. ¹¹² This is an important assertion in the debate about whether he was termed a king in his lifetime. ¹¹³ Also found in the T'ai Kung's biography in the *Shi Chi*. (For a complete translation, see the introduction to the *Six Secret Teachings* in Sawyer, *Seven Military Classics of Ancient China*.) ¹¹⁴ This incident also appears in the "Yin Pen-chi" and "Ch'i T'ai-kung Shih-chia." ¹¹⁵ Their discussion is purportedly preserved in the "Wei-tzu" section of the *Shang Shu*, a portion considered by many to be relatively credible yet traditionally dismissed as too vulgar for such paragons of Virtue. ¹¹⁶ As Nivison and Shaughnessy have pointed out, two year discrepancies in the dates recorded here and in others texts such as the *Bamboo Annals* resulted from

a delay in naming the new king's reign period because of ritual mourning obligations.¹¹⁷ What follows is not from the "T'ai Shih" (in the *Shang Shu*) but surprisingly the "Mu Yeh," a text whose validity was doubted due to the brusqueness of the language, the latter presumably inappropriate for such paragons of Virtue!¹¹⁸ The "Ch'i T'ai Kung Shih-chia" places these items in the hands of the T'ai Kung prior to his swearing of the initial oath. ("When the army set out, the T'ai Kung wielded the yellow battle ax in his left hand and grasped the white pennon in his right in order to swear the oath.") From this point to the end of the paragraph, the text is basically identical with the *Shang Shu*'s "Mu Yeh" chapter.¹¹⁹ Note the idea of "using" them, of sparing them for their future employment (as slave or conscripted labor) rather than welcoming and freeing them in some virtuous and idealistic fashion is explicitly expressed. This is an obviously realistic aspect in an otherwise sanitized portrait.¹²⁰ The "K'o Yin" section of the *Yi Chou-shu* states that King Wu ordered the Shang Fu and Po Fu to "*chih shih*," which can also mean "raise the army's [spirit]." (The term *pai-fu*, here rendered as "hundred stalwarts," is sometimes mistakenly understood as "captains of a hundred.")¹²¹ Emending *yi to pu*, meaning "not," although without any substantial basis apart from the impossibility of them fighting with each other! (However, see the discussion that follows on the *Yi Chou-shu*'s depiction of the battle.) Burton Watson, in his *The Grand Scribe's Records* (Vol. 1, *The Memoirs of Pre-Han China*, 61), translates the line even more explicitly as "Chow's host all turned their weapons around and fought their way to the capital, opening the way for King Wu."¹²² Although the term is *chien*, which designates a sword in later eras, as shown in our *Ancient Chinese Warfare* nothing longer than a short dagger existed at this time.¹²³ Among the minor discrepancies in the *Shih Chi*'s three accounts, the "Ch'i T'ai Kung Shih-chia" simply concludes by stating "Chou forces then pursued and beheaded Emperor Hsin."¹²⁴ "Chou Pen-chi."¹²⁵ Apparently a flag with the moon on it, as would be appropriate since the moon was regarded as the concrete embodiment and symbolization of *yin* and martial affairs were, at least in later times, considered to fall under its auspices.¹²⁶ Said to be water collected by the light of the moon.¹²⁷ For his full biography from the *Shih Chi* and contextual information, see the introduction to the *Six Secret Teachings* in our *Seven Military Classics of Ancient China*.¹²⁸ The nine great bronze cauldrons had reputedly come to symbolize imperial authority over the realm; therefore, possessing them was deemed a matter of great consequence for establishing dynastic power and legitimacy. Whether they ever existed as more than mere myth is another question.¹²⁹ In addition to the classic translations by James Legge and Bernhard Karlgren (as well as their copious notes and Karlgren's extensive glosses) listed in the bibliography, see Edward L. Shaughnessy's appraisal, "*Shang Shu*," in M. Loewe, ed., *Early Chinese Texts: A Bibliographic Guide*, 376–89. For relatively recent discussions of the Old Text / New Text controversy, see Michael Nylan, "The Ku Wen Documents in Han Times," TP 81:1–3 (1995), 25–50; "The Chin Wen / Ku Wen Controversy in Han Times," TP 80:1–3 (1994), 83–145; and Hans Van Ess, "The Old Text / New Text Controversy: Has the Twentieth Century Got it Wrong?" TP 80:1–3 (1994), 149–70. Recent tomb text discoveries held at Ch'ing-hua University have been cited (in informal Internet reports) as evidence that the *Shang Shu*'s *Ku-pen* edition is a forgery and that the text did not exist in this form in the late Warring States Period.¹³⁰ For a complete translation of this section, see James Legge, *Shoo King*, 306–16.¹³¹ Mencius, 7B3 and 7B4.¹³² In Mencius's era, narrow bamboo strips that could contain from fifteen to about thirty characters (depending upon length and the size of the characters themselves) served as the written medium. A single "chapter" might require ten to thirty such strips.¹³³ James Legge, *The Shoo King*, 315.¹³⁴ Even though China has repeatedly been said not to have heroes or glorify the martial, it should be noted

that this poem does both. (For further examples of odes with martial themes see Arthur Waley's convenient arrangement in his *Book of Songs* .) ¹³⁵ Although often understood to be the T'ai Kung's admonition to King Wu, the words are obviously King Wu's, uttered as a final inspiration. ¹³⁶ Consonant with other indications that the battle actually unfolded shortly after first light. ¹³⁷ For a detailed analysis of the contents and translation possibilities, see E. L. Shaughnessy, *Sources of Western Zhou History* , 87–105. ¹³⁸ "Nine Terrains," *Art of War* . ¹³⁹ "When the army of a hegemon or true king attacks a great state, their masses are unable to assemble." ("Nine Terrains," *Art of War* .) ¹⁴⁰ The term "fu" generally means "prisoner," someone—or, by extension, something—captured or seized through conflict. Originally raised by Ku Chieh-kang, "Yi Chou-shu 'Shih-fu P'ien' Chiao-chu, Hsieh-ting yü P'ing-lun," *Wen-shih* 2 (1963), 1–42, the issue of the "Shih Fu's" authenticity was reexamined by Edward L. Shaughnessy in his "New Evidence on the Zhou Conquest," EC 6 (1980–1), 57–79, subsequently revised for inclusion in his compilation volume *Before Confucius* , 31–67. (Shaughnessy provides a complete translation with extensive commentary and historical explications that raise many core and collateral issues and, except where noted, his interpretations are generally followed.) However, others view the chapter as a later compilation or a partial account at best, one to be compared with the "K'o Yin" version, itself a chapter that has been accorded even less authenticity despite having largely been adopted by Ssu-ma Ch'ien for his "Chou Pen-chi." (Tu Cheng-sheng, "Lüeh-lun Yin Yi-min te Ts'ao-yü yü Ti-wei," BIHP 53:4 [1982], 662–64, reads the "K'o Yin" and "Shih-fu" chapters as paired in the *Yi Chou-shu* with the former intended to persuade, the latter to warn those who do are unwilling to submit.) Several of the *Yi Chou-shu*'s chapters clearly deserve intensive study. (The best edition to date, used herein, is the *Yi Chou-shu Lei-chiao Chi-chu* edited by Huang Huai-hsin, Chang Mao-jung, and T'ien Tan-tung.)

¹⁴¹ More recently, based upon a comparison with sacrificial rituals as preserved in the inscriptions found on early Western Chou bronze vessels, especially the *Hsiao Yü Ting* , Chang Huai-t'ung ("Hsiao Yü Ting yü 'Shih Fu' Hsin-cheng," CKSYC 2008:1, 41–48) concluded that the chapter is based upon authentic contemporary materials. However, rather than intended to record the conquest sequence, it describes the presentation of prisoners and valuable captured objects, including the large quantity of precious jade noted in the very last paragraph. Moreover, even though perhaps not compiled by a single hand, the language reflects oracular and other presentation usage, further attesting to its authenticity. ¹⁴² "Incendiary Warfare." A well-known passage in the *Mencius* (IIB4) asserts that the upper ranks welcomed the Chou conquerors with baskets of silk and the common people brought out food and drink. Although naïve, Mencius does acknowledge that King Wu's objective had been to punish them. ¹⁴³ As will be discussed, the degree of integration and amount of control subsequently exercised over these many statelets is another contentious subject, with opinions ranging from true domination throughout the known realm to concentrated success in the Wei River Valley, but significant geographical gaps outside it. However, if the number is not enormously exaggerated, the nature of these entities must be questioned since only about a third that number ever appear in Shang oracular inscriptions. ¹⁴⁴ "Ch'i T'ai Kung Shih-chia," *Shih-chi* . ¹⁴⁵ "Yüeh/Hsi/Fang" have been variously interpreted as the names of three Shang towns, the Hsi-fang named Yüeh, and as stated above. ¹⁴⁶ Wei has also said to have been east of Chao-ko. ¹⁴⁷ Shaughnessy's reconstruction of the campaign dates, including the addition of a full sixty-day cycle, although not uncontested, is followed here. (See "New Evidence," 48–49, in *Before Confucius* .) However, also see Chang Huai-t'ung, "Wu Wang Fa Chou Shih-shih Pu-k'ao," CKSYC 2010:4, 59–74. ¹⁴⁸ The attack on Shu is somewhat surprising because Shu is listed as one of the allies that

participated in the Chou coalition in some accounts. While this would not preclude turning upon them for strategic or other reasons, the assault suggests that Shu's appearance in the list of eight is incorrect. (Another question would be Shu's location at this time. Neither a distant site in Sichuan nor one in southern Shandong could have been targeted from Heng/Hao in the allotted time.) ¹⁴⁹ Resolving the odd textual difficulty of "eight hundred and three hundred" as 830 rather than 803. However, eight hundred may have been seized from the first, three hundred from the second. ¹⁵⁰ In a still unknown location, it should not be confused (from the Romanization) with the previously vanquished state on the Shang periphery ¹⁵¹ Ch'ü Wan-li and others cite the holding of a hunt as partial proof of authenticity. The number of animals slain approximated the eleven thousand reportedly slaughtered in the Coliseum games Trajan held to celebrate the Roman conquest of the Dacians at the end of the first century. ¹⁵² See "Middle Strategy" in the *Three Strategies of Huang-shih Kung*. For the positive effects of feasting, note "Stimulating the Officers" in the *Wu-tzu*. ¹⁵³ Chang Huai-t'ung, 47. Shaughnessy, "New Evidence," 35 and note 20, following Ch'iu Hsi-kuei, indicates that they were "shot." ¹⁵⁴ As Shaughnessy notes, "New Evidence," 55. ¹⁵⁵ See Wang Hui ("Chou-ch'ü Kai-chih K'ao," CKSYC 2000:2, 19–33), who notes that even though King Ch'eng and Duke of Chou reformed the rites, transforming them into Chou practices, the *Chou Li* cannot be attributed to the latter. Moreover, even though the Chou quickly discontinued the state practice of human sacrifice, it would persist to minor extent for centuries in Sung, home of the vanquished Shang populace. (There are occasional references to the sacrificial slaying of the Chou prisoners in Warring States writings such as in "Ku Yüeh" of the *Lü-shih Ch'un-ch'ü*.) For a discussion of the Shang's numerous human sacrifices and extensive references, see Sawyer, *Ancient Chinese Warfare*; for further discussion of the rites under the Chou, see, among many, Han Tung-yü, "Ts'ung Chou-tai She-hui Chieh-kou K'an 'Li' te She-hui Kung-neng," HCCHS 1986:10, 35–40. ¹⁵⁶ *Shuo Yüan*, "Kuei Te." (It is also essentially found in the integrated *Han-shih Wai-chuan* version.) ¹⁵⁷ For a report on the multiple tunnels used to systematically rob the royal Shang graves in the Hsi-pei-kang area of Yin-hsü see Ching Chung-wei, "Yin-hsü Wang-ling-ch'ü Tsao-ch'ü Tao Ch'ieh-k'ang te Fe-sheng Nien-tai yü Pei-ching," KK 2010:2, 78–90. However, Lin Yün ("Shang – Chou K'ao-ku Chieh-piao' P'ing-yi," HCCHS 2005.1:19–28) disputes the claim that there is clear evidence of a sudden overlap in Shang cultural elements in Feng and Hao right after King Wu's conquest. (Also see Jessica Rawson ["Western Zhou Archaeology" in *The Cambridge History of Ancient China*, 387] who argues the Chou did not begin casting and employing ritual vessels [in imitation of the Shang] until after the conquest.) ¹⁵⁸ Several inscriptions and vessels such as the *Kuo Po Kuei* (seized during an early expedition into Ch'ü under King Chao) and *Ni-pieh Chung* will be cited in later chapters. (Also note Tuan Yü, "Ch'ü-kung Ni-pien-chung yü Chou Hsüan-wang Fa Ch'ü," HCCHS 2004:3, 50.) ¹⁵⁹ According to the "Chou Pen-chi," which notes a pronouncement by the name of "Fen Yin chih Ch'ü" —now lost— was given. ¹⁶⁰ A famous phrase, *yen wu hsiu wen* means "deemphasize the martial and promote the civil." ¹⁶¹ This paragraph, the second in the "Wu Ch'eng," sets the scene for the succinct, retrospective account of the campaign that follows. ¹⁶² "Benevolence the Foundation." (A complete translation of the *Ssu-ma Fa* may be found in our *Seven Military Classics of Ancient China*.) ¹⁶³ "Obligations of the Son of Heaven." ¹⁶⁴ "Obligations of the Son of Heaven." ¹⁶⁵ See the well-known chapter "Vacuity and Substance." ¹⁶⁶ Claims that the campaign was directed against Mu-yeh from the outset because the Shang had quartered eight armies there lack substantiation. Furthermore, there is no evidence the Shang ever maintained eight standing units or concentrated their forces in this fashion instead of assembling them at a staging area before embarking on external campaigns. The Eight Yin Armies

subsequently created by the Chou and dispersed throughout this general area probably gave rise to this belief. ¹⁶⁷ Luo K'un, *Hsia Shang Hsi-Chou Chün-shih-shih*, 233. ¹⁶⁸ For a brief discussion of the problem of numbers in the ancient period, a reflection of doubts about Delbruk's principles for historical authenticity, see Sawyer, "A Minor Meditation on Numbers," Warring States Project, May, 2000. ¹⁶⁹ For a likely explanation of how the characters for "seven" and "ten" often became confused in ancient works, see Huang Jan-wei, "Ku-shu 'shih' 'ch'i' erh-tzu Hu-wei T'an-yüan" in *Yin Chou Shih-liao Wen-chi*, 347–351. ¹⁷⁰ Including Chiang T'ao, *Jen-k'ou yü Li-shih*, and Ko Chien-hsiung, *Chung-kuo Jen-k'ou Shih*, a work in four volumes. ¹⁷¹ Sung Chen-hao, *Hsia Shang She-hui Sheng-huo Shih*, Beijing: Chung-kuo K'o-hsüeh She-hui, 1994. ¹⁷² In an earlier article, "Hsia Shang Jen-k'ou Ch'u-t'an," HCCHS 1991:10, 20–34, Sung Chen-hao projected Anyang's population at the end of the dynasty at about 230,000. ¹⁷³ However, Sung Chen-hao also believes that the legendary casualty figures of 487,000 slain or taken prisoner represent 1/16th of a populace projected as (an astonishing) 7.8 million. (See "Hsia Shang Jen-k'ou Ch'u-t'an," HCCHS 1991:10, 33.) Note that in estimating the number of men available for military duty the *Chou Li* classifies families into three levels based on their size ranging from five to seven people. Three members of a family of seven were expected to undertake military service. However, only one would actually serve in the army, the others being consigned to ancillary roles. ¹⁷⁴ Cited by Hsü and Linduff, *Western Chou Civilization*, 69 (based on Li Ya-nung). ¹⁷⁵ Slaves—the helots, constituting the rear Spartan ranks—manned ships at Salamis. (See Peter Hunt, *Slaves, Warfare and Ideology in the Greek Histories*, Cambridge: University Press, 1998.) A complicating factor in China is the existence of small contingents of *yung*, though to be people confined to menial station or possibly slaves. ¹⁷⁶ For a brief discussion of the status of *chung* in the Shang see Sawyer, *Ancient Chinese Warfare*, 225–28. The term *yung*, which has been interpreted as referring to slaves in the Chou, appears in bronze inscriptions discussing their transfer and a military role. ¹⁷⁷ Despite traditional belief, there is no evidence the Chou had begun fielding six armies before Mu-yeh. However, six is a number that resonates with the Chou and their quick postconquest adoption of and location in the west suggests they may have preexisted the conquest. (Traditionally, very few have ever questioned the army's strength amounted to 3,000 warriors. However, several other estimates that have recently been offered will be discussed in the concluding section.) ¹⁷⁸ However, some of these are said to have been former Shang troops, as discussed separately. ¹⁷⁹ For example, see Hsü Pei-ken, *Chung-kuo Kuo-fang Ssu-hsiang-shih*, 274–75 and 291–93. However, the best analysis of Chou agriculture is found in Yang K'uan's *Hsi Chou Shih*, 213–86. ¹⁸⁰ At this time chariots were few, wheelbarrows and mounted riding unknown, and only a mélange of primitive wagons and carts had come into existence. Raiders were therefore compelled to carry much of their plunder on foot, yet raiding was apparently still deemed profitable. (Apart from small valuables and other metal products, Chou agricultural products were probably highly prized.) However, seizing goods would not always have been the only objective; the battle for domination and terrain perhaps loomed foremost. (For a concise formulation of the negative aspects of wealth, see Chapter 9 of the *Tao Te Ching*.) ¹⁸¹ For one such claim see Tuan Yü, "Lun Chou, Ch'u Tsao-ch'i te Kuan-hsi," HCCHS 1986:11, 49–56. Teng Yao-ch'ün, "Hsi Chou 'Pao Min' Ssu-hsiang Fa-wei," HCCHS 1993:5, 26, discerns significant population flight from the central region under the Shang. ¹⁸² For a discussion of the modes of recognition and their importance see the section on "knowing men" in our *Tao of Spycraft*. ¹⁸³ Although apparently a valid characterization, detailed substantiation is lacking. However, for a general discussion, see Cho-yun Hsu and Katheryn M. Linduff, *Western Chou Civilization*, chapters 4–6. ¹⁸⁴ For the most recent overview see Li Feng, *Landscape*

and Power , or the earlier *Cambridge History of Ancient China* .¹⁸⁵ Commentators inclined to envision sexual and age distinctions sometimes add that when the army moved, the men protectively enveloped the two units of women and children. Still another view believes that *san tan* should be understood as three clashes or battles, and that the proto-Chou seized the territory around Pin with just this number. (For an example of the latter, see Tu Cheng-sheng, “Chou-tai Feng-chien te Chien-li,” BIHP 50:3 [1979] 488, in part following Yü Sheng-wu.)¹⁸⁶ Liu Chün-sheh has suggested that the proto-Ch’in had been responsible for Kung Liu’s migration. If so, it would extend Ch’in/Chou interactions back several centuries. (See “Ts’ung K’ao-ku Yi-ts’un K’an Tsao-ch’i Chou Ch’in Wen-hua te Kuan-hsi,” KKW 2000:5, 32–38.) Liu also believes the Ch’in must have been subservient to the Chou because a Shang oracular inscription (*Yi Pien* 7312) queries whether the Chou would be sending in women from the Ch’in. The move to Mount Ch’i then ended the relationship.¹⁸⁷ *Mao* #237¹⁸⁸ Accords with archaeological reports of circular, semisubterranean dwellings, some apparently protected by thatched roofs overlaid with mud, as the ode suggests.¹⁸⁹ This “racing” has traditionally been interpreted as depicting their flight from the barbarian hordes but more likely just refers to his rapid reconnaissance efforts.¹⁹⁰ The origins, segmentation, and identities of these antique peoples and their major clans continue to be matters of debate. The K’un Yi are sometimes said to have been part of the Ch’üan Jung, but the contrary view has also been espoused that the former subsumed the latter; however, others have argued that the groups acquired different names over time. (For an example of the first view, see Ko Chih-yi [“Chou-jen Pien Jung Fu Hsia K’ao-lun,” CKSYC 1991:4, 123], who believes that the K’un Yi emerged from the Yung-chou K’un-lun mountain people slightly northwest of Mount Ch’i.)¹⁹¹ *Mao* #241. The Ch’uan Yi (串夷), who should be distinguished from the Ch’üan Yi (犬夷), are presumed to be the K’un Yi (昆夷) under another name.¹⁹² Presumably a reference to their burial mounds about Mount Ch’i.¹⁹³ “Chih Wu,” *Shuo Yüan* .¹⁹⁴ Shanxi Ch’ang-chih-shih Li-ch’eng-hsien Shen Chien-hua, “Ch’ing-hua Ch’u-chien ‘Wu Wang Pa-nien Fa Ch’i’ Tang-yi,” KKW 2010.2: 102–4.¹⁹⁵ This is also the sequence outlined in the *Cambridge History of Ancient China* , 307.¹⁹⁶ “Chih Wu,” *Shuo Yüan* ¹⁹⁷ A highly didactic *Tso Chuan* passage (Hsi Kung, nineteenth year) asserts that when thirty days proved insufficient to overcome the city, King Wen devoted himself to cultivating his Virtue before again besieging the town, after which the fortifications readily fell.¹⁹⁸ *Mao* #241.¹⁹⁹ James Legge’s classic translation (*The She King* , 454–55) reflects the traditional interpretation as well as the commentators’ long established understanding of many obscure terms:

God said to King Wen,

“Take measure against the country of your foes.

Along with your brethren,

Get ready your scaling ladders,

And your engines of onfall and assault,

To attack the walls of Ch’ung.”

The engines of onfall and assault were gently plied,

Against the walls of Ch’ung high and great;

Captives for the question were brought in one after another;

The left ears [of the slain] were taken leisurely.

He sacrificed to God, and to the Father of war,

Thus seeking to induce submission;

And throughout the kingdom none dared to insult him.

The engines of onfall and assault were vigorously plied,

Against the walls of Ch'ung very strong;

He attacked it, and let loose all his forces;

He extinguished [its sacrifices], and made an end of its existence;

And throughout the kingdom none dared to oppose him.

The apperception of direct instructions from Shang Ti is of course mere poetic device, the only possible indication having been an auspicious divinatory result, no tradition of divine speech ever being suggested.

²⁰⁰ The importance of military intelligence (such as the morale of the people, plethora or lack of provisions, and strength of the troops) had already become apparent in the Shang. The deliberate capture of enemy personnel for the purpose of interrogation is mentioned in other odes as well, including "Ch'u Ch'e," Mao #168.

²⁰¹ The term means mobile ram rather than chariots designed to penetrate the enemy, a later signification. ²⁰² For a discussion of siege towers and overlook carts see Robin D. S. Yates, "Early poliorcetics: The Mohists to the Sung" in Joseph Needham and Robin D. S. Yates, *Science and Civilization in China*, vol. 6, Cambridge: University Press, 1994, 373ff and 437ff respectively. ²⁰³ Scholars such as Chiang Lin-ch'ang (*Hsia Shang Chou Wen-ming Hsin-t'an*, 288) and Tu Cheng-sheng ("Chou-tai Feng-chien te Chien-li," BIHP 50:3 [1979]. p. 489) locate Ch'ung in modern Xian's suburbs and thus close to Feng and Hao. However, others following Ch'en P'an believe it was situated near Mount Sung and therefore near Cheng-chou. (Also see Hsu and Linduff, *Western Chou Civilization*, 91 and *The Cambridge History of Ancient China*, 307.) ²⁰⁴ Variouslly identified as between Feng and Hao, near P'eng-ch'eng or Hsü-chou in Chiang-su, around T'ung-chou and thus in Shaanxi Ta-li-hsien, around the Sung-shan region of Henan or even Lao-niu-p'o in Shaanxi, but in any event—and most reasonably—south of the Yellow River on the strategically important approach to Meng-chin. (For recent discussions, see Hsü Liang-Kao, "Chou, Ch'ung, Tuan-tai, Wen-hsien," KKW 2004:2, 81–84, 91, or Ch'ang Chin-ts'ang, "Hsi Chou Ch'ing-t'ung-ch'i Tuan-tai Yen-chiu te Liang-ko Wen-t'i," KKW 2006:2, 36–40, 45.) ²⁰⁵ See Shen Chien-hua, "Ch'ing-hua Ch'u-chien 'Wu Wang Pan-nien Fa Ch'i' Tang-yi," KKW 2010.2: 102–4, based on the reconstructed "Chi Yeh." Shen also points out this coheres with the conclusion of scholars in the T'ang and Sung. ²⁰⁶ The concept of enmiring terrain would become one of the focal categories in the martial recognition of terrain configurations and the development of principles for their exploitation that evolved in the Warring States. First articulated in the *Art of War*, the potentially fatal difficulties posed by wet terrain are emphasized in the *Wu-tzu* and *Six Secret Teachings*. (For an introductory discussion of the Chinese concept of "configurations of terrain," see the introduction to Sawyer, *Sun-tzu Art of War*, or the initial chapters on aquatic warfare in Sawyer, *Fire and Water*. After some decades of its being overlooked, if not actively ignored, interest in the effects of difficult terrain, especially wetlands and mud, has once again been revived among Western analysts. For example see John M. Collins, *Military Geography for Professionals and the Public*; C. Wood, *Mud: A Military History*; and Harold A. Winters, *Battling The Elements*. For a recent article that includes useful

reports on the wetness of the Wei River Valley, see Chou-yüan K'ao-ku-tui, "2005-nien Shaanxi Fu-feng Mei-yang-ho Liu-yü K'ao-kü Tiao-ch'ä," KKHP 2010:2, 207–28.) For an extensive discussion of the battle of Ma-ling, see the historical introduction to Sawyer, *Sun Pin Military Methods* .²⁰⁷ "Interest" is, of course, an overly comprehensive term that leads to questions about how it might be defined and interpreted. The greater good or profit of a few leaders? Short term or long term? Purely economic, synonymous with seizing goods (such as by plundering), or annexing people and territory? ²⁰⁸ For a brief characterization, see the text and especially commentary to the chapter titled "Preparation of Strategic Power" in Sawyer, *Sun Pin Military Methods* .²⁰⁹ "Planning for the State," *Wu-tzu* .²¹⁰

Whether their languages were identical or merely mutually intelligible, or whether the Chou spoke some variant of Sino-Tibetan but had also acquired Shang writing, remain uncertain despite extensive phonetic reconstruction and argumentation.²¹¹ Even though his views do not remain unchallenged (such as by Everett L. Wheeler, "Methodological Limits and the Mirage of Roman Strategy." Part I, *JMH*: 1993:1, 7–41; Part II, 1993:2, 215–40; or Kimberly Kaga, "Redefining Roman Grand Strategy," *JMH* 2006:1, 333–62), for an examination of the question of grand design in Rome and Byzantium, see the seminal works of Edward Luttvak, who raised the strategic question in *The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire* and *The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire From the First Century A.D. to the Third* .²¹² For recent overviews of this somewhat heated issue see Liu Kuo-chung, "Chou Wen Wang Ch'eng-wang-shih Shih-pien," *CKSYC* 2009:3, 25–30, and Ch'ang Chin-ts'ang, "Hsi Chou Ch'ing-t'ung-ch'i Tuan-tai Yen-chiu te Liang-ko Wen-t'i," *KKWW* 2006:2, 36–40, 45. Writing in the third century CE, Huang-fu Mi believed that the multiplanet celestial spectacle prompted King Wen to change his reign count from his forty-second year to the first year of "shou ming" ("receipt of the mandate") and style himself king.²¹³ The "Pao Hsün" strips, which purportedly record the words of King Wen to the future King Wu shortly before his death, have also been cited in regard to whether King Wen styled himself king or not. However, even though some of the language seems to reflect the earliest period, the materials heavily reflect Spring and Autumn and Warring States ideas and certainly date to the latter, the strips themselves perhaps to 305 BCE, give or take thirty years. Controversy continues as to whether the speaker was in fact King Wen. (For discussions see Ch'ing-hua Ta-hsüeh Ch'u-t'u Wen-hsien Yen-chiu yü Pao-hu Chung-hsin, "Ch'ing-hua Ta-hsüeh Ts'ang Chan-kuo Chu-chien 'Pao-hsün' Shih-wen," *WW* 2009:6, 73–75; Li Hsüeh-ch'in, "Lun Ch'ing-hua-jien 'Pao-hsün' te Chi-ke Wen-t'i," *WW* 2009:6, 76–78; Huang Jen-erh, "Ch'ing-hua Ta-hsüeh Ts'ang Chan-kuo Chu-chien 'Pao-hsün' Chia-tu," *KKWW* 2009:6, 73–79; and Wang Hui, "Ch'ing-hua Ch'u-chien 'Pao-hsün' 'Wei Wang Wu-shih-nien' Chieh," *KKWW* 2009:6, 69–72, 85, who particularly doubts the King Wen identification. Chou oracular inscriptions are discussed below, in the subsection on subversion. However, note that Li Hsüeh-ch'in [Li Xueqin, "Are They Shang Inscriptions or Zhou Inscriptions?" *EC* 11–12 (1985–1987), 173–76], concludes the Chou did not yet use the term king.)²¹⁴ Reaction to the effrontery of the first state rulers that called themselves kings in the Warring States and similarly to the leader of Yüeh in the Han might be noted in this regard.²¹⁵ For example, Ho Chih-hu believes the Chou had a long tradition of cultivating *te*, synonymous with solicitude for the people's material welfare and nonaggression. (See "Hsi Chou 'Tsun Te' Ssu-hsiang te Hsing-ch'eng yü Fa-chan," *CKCHS* 1991:9, 35–41.) However, *te* was not completely absent from the Shang repertoire.²¹⁶ The tale is found in the "Chou Pen-chi" and other compilations. However, insofar as the practice of primogeniture did not prevail at the time, it might be asked why Tan Fu did not simply yield the role of chieftain to King Wen, bypassing Chi Li as well. (It has also been suggested that the conflict was more violent than traditionally recorded, a sort of precursor to the postconquest

revolt, and the brothers had to flee after being defeated.) ²¹⁷ Tung Chung-shu's idea of man and Heaven being in resonance and Heaven responding to the ruler's performance exemplifies this thrust. (Being a major topic in Chinese philosophical studies, secondary discussions are extensive. However, with reference to the early Chou see, for example, Yang Chien-hua, "Lun Hsien-Ch'in Te Hsing Ho-yi te Cheng-chih-kuan," HCCHS 1993:1, 45–52, and Wang Pao-kuo, "Ts'ung 'Lü-hsing' K'an 'Ming Te Shen Fa' Ssu-hsiang Tsai Hsi-Chou te Yen-pien," HCCHS, 2003:3, 64–67.) It might be noted that in "Benevolence the Foundation" the *Ssu-ma Fa* states "Not mobilizing the army in either winter or summer is the means by which to love both your own and the enemy's people." Although not a proscription that can be imputed to antiquity, it was ignored by the Chou campaign, which proceeded in the depths of winter. ²¹⁸ *Huang-shih Kung San-lüeh*, "Superior Strategy," citing the already lost "Military Pronouncements." Further discussion will be found under the section on the psychology of the moment. ²¹⁹ For example, "King Wen's Teacher," "Six Preservations," "and "Opening Instructions." Being later redactions that probably date to the late Warring States Period they have no real historical value but do provide a sense of the issues. ²²⁰ "Instructions on According with the People." ²²¹ "Benevolence the Foundation." ²²² Teng Yao-ch'ün, "Hsi Chou 'Pao Min' Ssu-hsiang Fa-wei," HCCHS 1993:5, 25–29. ²²³ Despite the Shang's visible achievements, the Chou's increasingly attested superiority in agriculture, bronze, and the light handicraft industries of ceramics and bone, in comparison with the peoples immediately about them, would have proven materially attractive. (For one example, see Shaan-hsi Chou-yüan K'ao-ku-tui, "Fu-feng Yün-t'ang Hsi Chou Ku-ch'i Chih-tsau Tsuo-fang Yi-chih Shih-chüeh Chien-pao," WW 1980:4, 27–38.) ²²⁴ Teng Yao-ch'ün, "Hsi Chou 'Pao Min' Ssu-hsiang Fa-wei," HCCHS 1993:5, 26. ²²⁵ It has been suggested that women (as exemplified by Fu Hao) traditionally enjoyed much higher status in the Shang, whereas the Chou embraced a new emphasis upon masculinity. (However, it might be noted that one of King Wu's elite advisors was reportedly a woman.) ²²⁶ According to E. L. Shaughnessy's survey in *Early Chinese Texts* (p. 379) the "Chiu Kao" probably dates to King Ch'eng's reign, postrebellion, and therefore could not have been uttered by King Wu, whether pre- or postconquest. Even the "Wei-tzu," no doubt the product of Chou authors, has the Earl of Wei sorrowfully describing the depravity and drunkenness about him. (The "Chiu Kao" has also been translated by W. A. C. H. Dobson, *Early Archaic Chinese*, 145–48; James Legge, *The Shoo King*, as "The Announcement about Drunkenness," 399–412; and Bernhard Karlgren, *The Book of Documents*, 43–46.) ²²⁷ Even granting the power of the ruling clan and their monopolization of resources, one also has to wonder about the availability of liquor and the size of the grain surplus that would allow its large-scale production diversion. ²²⁸ For a brief discussion of this aspect, see, for example, Li Shao-lung, "Ch'ing-t'ung-chüeh te Kung-yung, Tsao-hsing chi-ch'i yü Shang Wen-hua te Kuan-hsi," HCCHS 1999:3, 11–18, or Christopher Fung, *JEAA* 2:1–2 (2000), 67–92. ²²⁹ Sun-tzu is famous for saying that anger is necessary to slay the enemy and a very complex psychology of combative *ch'i* (spirit, will to fight) was elaborated in the various military writings, as will be discussed below. Later ages also noted that nothing except rewards motivates men more than anger, and the rewards the Chou offered were presumably great since the *Yi Chou-shu* records that considerable wealth, especially jade, was confiscated from the Shang. Moreover, the inscriptions found on numerous Western Chou vessels show the deliberately manipulative bestowal of munificent material rewards to loyal subjects. ²³⁰ "Benevolence the Foundation." ²³¹ Surprisingly, despite his strong religious background, the great early Sinologue James Legge often translates "Shang Ti" as "God," though no doubt because he was searching for cultural equivalents in religious expression. Doubts have, however, been raised about the role, even

eminence of (Shang) Ti. See, for example, Robert Eno, "Was there a High God Ti in Shang Religion?" EC 15 (1990), 1–26. ²³² Various theories about the origin and nature of Heaven according to the Chou have appeared over the past century, including that Heaven was a purely Chou concept; that it originated among external peoples; and that it preexisted the Chou, already having shadowy existence in Shang oracular inscriptions. (For essential discussion see Herrlee G. Creel, "The Origin of the Deity T'ien," Appendix C, *The Origins of Statecraft in China*, 493–506; Kuo Mo-juo "Hs'ien-Ch'in T'ien-tao-kuan chih Chin-chan" (Shanghai Ku-chi, 1936, 1–18); Huang Jan-wei, *Yin Chou Shih-liao Lun-chi*, 203–12; Sarah Allan, "On the Identity of Shang Di and the Origin of the Concept of a Celestial Mandate (*Tian Ming*)," EC 31 (2007), 1–46; Allen dismisses T'ien as a potent deity and regards Heaven as simply the physical (realm) sky where Shang Ti continued to be active and bestowed the mandate upon the Chou, though acknowledging that celestial patterns reveal these orders. (Allen also claims that among the Shang, T'ien meant sky.) Chen Sanping, "Son of Heaven and Son of God: Interactions among Ancient Asiatic Cultures regarding Sacral Kingship and Theophoric Names," JRAS, Series 3, 12:3 (2002), notes (289–90) that the character for t'ien rarely appears in oracular inscriptions, and then is usually a variant of ta, meaning large. He concludes that t'ien first surfaces in Western Chou bronze inscriptions, after which the term t'ien ming (Mandate of Heaven) appears, and finally t'ien-tzu (Son of Heaven). Some historians (including Creel, *The Origins of Statecraft in China*, 496–503) have identified it as a foreign or barbarian deity that came to be assimilated by the Chou. ²³³ For example, in the *Shih Ch'iang P'an* inscription. Although not an early document, the ode "Wen Ming" (Mao #235) asserts that Shang Ti gave the order. ²³⁴ For further discussions, see, among many, Wang Hui, "Hsi-Chou Li-shih Li-hsing te Ch'ieh-ch'i yü Chou-jen Ssu-hsiang Wei-hsin Yün-tung," HCCHS 1999:5, 46–53; Yang T'ien-yu, "Chou-jen Chi T'ien Yi-tsu P'ei-T'ien K'ao," HCCHS 2005:5, 24–26; and Ho Chih-hu, "Hsi Chou 'Tsun Te' Ssu-hsiang te Hsing-ch'eng yü Fa-chan," CKCHS 1991:9, 35–41. David Pankenier ("The Cosmo-Political Background of Heaven's Mandate," EC 20 (1995), 170–75) has concluded that the Chou revitalized Heaven/Shang-ti as ethical actors, the late Shang having come to focus on the ancestral cult. ²³⁵ Hsia Tzu-hsien particularly emphasizes the lack of Shang orientation to the people. ("Lüeh-lun Shang Chou T'ien Jen Shih," HCCHS 1993:3, 25–31.) ²³⁶ Several of the early chapters of the *Liu-t'ao* (*Six Secret Teachings*, discussed elsewhere) emphasize the primacy of the people's welfare (as well as exploiting professed concern for it to overthrow the Shang), but being late Warring States compositions, dated too late to be considered evidence. According to the "Piao-chi" section of the *Li Chi*, "The people of Yin honored spirits and led the people to serve the spirits, putting ghosts first and the li afterward." Wang Hui has insightfully concluded that the crucial shift occurred in a milieu that no longer believed the mandate of Heaven was immutable, but instead subject to change, and (as the *Li Chi* noted) a primary shift occurred from worshipping spirits to emphasizing man. ("Yin-mo Chou-ch'u Yi-shih-wei-chien Yi-shih yü Ssu-hsiang Wei-hsin Yün-tung," HCCHS 2008:5, 35–39.) ²³⁷ Although the Chou is generally thought to have created this theory of history to coincide with the Mandate of Heaven idea, Pankenier ("The Cosmo-Political Background of Heaven's Mandate," EC 20 [1995], 161–62) believes a concept of an interventionist sky god predates it. (Also see Herrlee Creel, "Mandate of Heaven" in *Origins of Statecraft in China*, 81–100.) ²³⁸ As the *Ssu-ma Fa* would subsequently articulate, failing to act at the appropriate time is heinous: "Thus [when action should be initiated] one who hesitates and is quiet, without advancing, seriously injures all living beings. Weapons are inauspicious instruments, and the Tao of Heaven abhors them. However, when their employment is unavoidable it accords with the Tao of Heaven." ("Inferior Strategy.") Works like the *Liu-t'ao* emphasize that actions should

be initiated early on, when streams are merely a trickle and saplings have not yet grown to trees. ²³⁹ The details of this work, especially the highly detailed and insightful results of David Pankenier, lie beyond the scope of our investigation; only key aspects that affected military developments are therefore abstracted. (See David W. Pankenier, "Astronomical Dates in Shang and Western Zhou," EC 7 [1981–1982], 2–37; "Mozi and the Dates of Xia, Shang, and Zhou: A Research Note," EC 9–10 [1983–85], 175–83; and especially "The Cosmo-Political Background of Heaven's Mandate," EC 20 [1995], 120–76.) ²⁴⁰ As calculated by David W. Pankenier, "Astronomical Dates in Shang and Western Zhou," EC 7 (1981–1982), 21. The coincidence is remarkable, but the delay means the conjunction should only be seen as empowering, not coincident with, the event. ²⁴¹ As translated by David W. Pankenier, "Astronomical Dates in Shang and Western Zhou," EC 7 (1981–1982), 3. The entry dates to the twenty-third year of King Ching. ²⁴² Pankenier also notes that the reconstructed date of 1071 for the relevant *Bamboo Annals* entry is off by one twelve-year Jupiter cycle. ²⁴³ Pankenier, for example, claims that the use of Jupiter to predict battle outcome already existed at the time of the Chou conquest. (See "The Cosmo-Political Background of Heaven's Mandate," EC 20 [1995], 131.) ²⁴⁴ Another instance of multiple planets temporarily being in proximity, thereby prompting a conviction of Heavenly conferred sanction, has recently become evident from analysis of memorial tablets dating to the T'ang dynasty and prepared for associates of An Lu-shan. One in particular, inscribed for Yen Fu, the father of An Lu-shan's strategist Yen Chuang, records that a four-planet conjunction in Wei in 750 CE provided inspiration for their naming their new dynasty Yen and believing, as well as propagandizing, that their Virtue—that of metal—would allow them to prevail over the T'ang, itself identified with the phase of Earth. (See Ch'iu Lu-meng, "Wu-hsing Hui-chü yü An Shih Ch'i-ping te Cheng-chih Hsüan-ch'üan," *Wei-Chin Nan-pei-ch'ao Sui-T'ang-shih*, 2011:4, 63–72.) ²⁴⁵ The chapter includes a melodramatic historical illustration wherein the water brought in to a prebattle feast "turned into blood." (For a complete translation and commentary see Sawyer, *The Hundred Unorthodox Strategies: Battles and Tactics of Chinese Warfare*.) ²⁴⁶ "Determining Rank." ²⁴⁷ *Questions and Replies*. ²⁴⁸ For discussion and examples, see our *Ancient Chinese Warfare* and the references therein. ²⁴⁹ "Determining Rank." ²⁵⁰ "Opening Instructions." This passage of course reflects late Warring States and subsequent Han thought on the interrelationship or resonance between Heaven and Man. ²⁵¹ According to the paragraph's continuation, the signs in Shang were already manifest: "Now there is the case of Shang where the people muddle and confuse each other. Mixed up and extravagant, their love of pleasure and sex is endless. This is a sign of a doomed state. I have observed their fields—weeds and grass overwhelm the crops. I have observed their people—the perverse and crooked overcome the straight and upright. I have observed their officials—they are violent, perverse, inhumane, and evil. They overthrow the laws and make a chaos of the punishments. Neither the upper nor lower ranks have awakened to this state of affairs. It is time for their state to perish." ("Opening Instructions") ²⁵² "Ch'i T'ai-kung Shih chia," *Shih Chi*. Since the central plains had been suffering from an extended drought, the onset of rain could have simply been interpreted as a highly auspicious sign. ²⁵³ For further discussion of the early role of divination and its subsequent, though ineffective, denial in martial contexts, see the final section of our *Tao of Spycraft: Intelligence Theory and Practice in Traditional China* and Sawyer, "Paradoxical Coexistence of Prognostication and Warfare," *Sino-platonic Papers* 157 (August, 2005). A sample of the prognosticatory materials common in the imperial age may also be found in Sawyer, "Martial Prognostication," in *Martial Culture in Imperial China*. ²⁵⁴ This incident, augmented with additional dialogue, also appears in the *Han-shih Wai-chuan*. (For a translation, see James Hightower, *Han Shih Wai*

Chuan , 89–90.) ²⁵⁵ For a recounting and analysis of the highly important clash at Li-che, see the historical introduction to our single volume *Art of War* . ²⁵⁶ “Heavenly Offices.” ²⁵⁷ The Yellow Emperor’s words are of course pure fabrication. ²⁵⁸ “Martial Plans.” The passage reflects the rise of professional generals and assertions of their necessary independence that begin with the *Art of War* . ²⁵⁹ Wei Liao-tzu’s acceptance of the myth of the bloodless battle, while understandable in the wake of Mencius’s influence, is highly surprising. ²⁶⁰ “Chih Wu.” ²⁶¹ Although anachronistic, the core issue is clearly articulated: the realm regards Hsin as the emperor, whereas the Chou ruler is merely a feudal lord in the established power scheme. ²⁶² “Ch’üan Mou.” ²⁶³ Burning or sinking the boats would become a well-known technique for stimulating the army’s *ch’i* in the Warring States Period, the basis of an aphorism (*ch’eng-yü*) for casting aside all hope of survival in a death-defying effort. ²⁶⁴ This is somewhat odd because he is supposed to have been one of the early wise men that came over to the Chou cause. ²⁶⁵ “Shield” is generally amended to “yoke,” probably unnecessarily. ²⁶⁶ “T’ui Jen-shih P’o Tsai-yi.” The incident certainly enhances the T’ai Kung’s status at the expense of the Duke of Chou! ²⁶⁷ The year star. ²⁶⁸ It appears in the latter half, in a subsection titled “T’ui Jen-shih P’o Tsai-yi.” There is another brief mention of Chou campaign omens in “Ti Chan.” ²⁶⁹ “Chin-hsian Ch’ü-yi,” “Prohibit Auspicious Omens, Dispel Doubt.” ²⁷⁰ For a recounting and analysis of this famous incident, see Sawyer, *Fire and Water* , 115–18 or the *Tao of Deception* , 3–6. ²⁷¹ However, as Victor Kam has shown in *Surprise Attack* , rehearsals may serve to undermine subsequent expectation of an attack. ²⁷² “In his ninth year, wanting to continue King Wen’s task, King Wu mounted an attack in the east to observe whether the feudal lords would assemble or not.” ²⁷³ David W. Pankenier, “The Cosmo-political Background of Heaven’s Mandate,” EC 20 (1995), 121–76. ²⁷⁴ David W. Pankenier, “Astronomical Dates in Shang and Western Zhou,” EC 7 (1981–1982), 2–37. ²⁷⁵ “Yi Ping,” Hsiün-tzu . Hsiün-tzu’s pronouncement appears in a concocted Warring States debate with the Lord of Lin-wu. ²⁷⁶ “Li Lou,” IVA:9. (The character *hsin* encompasses the meaning of mind and heart.) ²⁷⁷ Wu-tzu , “Controlling the Army.” ²⁷⁸ “Waging War.” As previously noted, the dialogue is a Warring States creation and should be understood as representative of that era’s thought even though King Wu must have understood the need for unity. ²⁷⁹ “The Tao of the Military,” *Six Secret Teachings*. ²⁸⁰ *Ts’ao-lu Ching-lieh* , “Yi Chung” (“Unify the Masses”). The unity of King Wu’s ministers and subjects (in contrast to those serving Emperor Hsin) is twice asserted in the “T’ai Shih,” replicated below. ²⁸¹ The concept’s full range of meaning and its application in medicine, martial arts, cosmology, philosophy, and the interpretation of natural phenomena would require volumes to chronicle. In some spheres it is envisioned as purely metaphysical and ethereal, in others concrete and discernible. While recognizing a physical basis, martial thought tends toward the former, clearly differing from the way *ch’i* is characterized in, for example, Sung dynasty Neo-Confucianism. Although the obscurity of characters’ origins quickly prompted imaginative theories that envisioned its symbolizing vapors or clouds, it is commonly believed that *ch’i* originally depicted fragrant vapors rising from steaming rice and therefore connotes the idea of nourishment or nourishing in its primary sense. (The modern character is written with a component that means “rice.”) The character seems to have appeared in the Spring and Autumn Period (722–481) but it did not become frequent in historical and philosophical texts until the middle Warring States (403–221). As the concept of *ch’i* still lacks a serious monograph in English even though it is discussed in a number of places in Needham’s *Science and Civilisation in China* , recourse must still be made to Genji Kuroda’s *Ki no Kenkyu* and Onozawa Seiichi, Fukunaga Mitsuji, and Yamanori Yu’s *Ki no Shiso* . However, for an expanded discussion of *ch’i* in Chinese martial thought, see Ralph Sawyer, “Martial

Qi in China: Courage and Spirit in Thought and Practice,” *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies* , Winter 2008/2009. ²⁸² Slightly different than the well-known *Seven Military Classics* made canonical in the Sung, the seven are the *Art of War* , *Sun Pin Military Methods* , *Ssu-ma Fa* , *Wu-tzu* , *Liu-t’ao* , *Wei Liao-tzu* , and *San-lieh* . (*Seven Military Classics* differs in including *Questions and Replies* rather than the then unknown *Military Methods* .) ²⁸³ *Lü-shih Ch’un-ch’iu* , “Chung-ch’iu Chi” (“Records of Mid-autumn”). ²⁸⁴ “The General’s Losses” and “Male and Female Cities.” ²⁸⁵ “Combat Awesomeness,” *Wei Liao-tzu* . ²⁸⁶ *Lü-shih Ch’un-ch’iu* , “Chung-ch’iu Chi.” ²⁸⁷ “Ping-fa Pai-yen , “Chen.” ²⁸⁸ *Lü-shih Ch’un-ch’iu* , “Chung-ch’iu Chi,” subsection titled “Decisive Victory.” ²⁸⁹ “Strict Positions,” *Ssu-ma Fa* . ²⁹⁰ “Strict Positions.” ²⁹¹ “Stimulating the Officers,” the *Wu-tzu* . ²⁹² “Military Combat,” *Art of War* . This is the only passage in the extant text in which the term *ch’i* appears. ²⁹³ The stupidity of misunderstanding Sun-tzu’s observation would subsequently be discussed by the great T’ang general, Li Ching. (See Sawyer, *Questions and Replies* , 354.) ²⁹⁴ *Tso Chuan* , Duke Chuang, 10th year. Presumably Sun-tzu and other theorists before him would have been familiar with this battle. If the depiction is at all accurate, it indicates that a basic understanding of *ch’i* dynamics significantly predated the *Art of War* ’s articulation. ²⁹⁵ “Strict Positions.” ²⁹⁶ “Chieh Lao.” ²⁹⁷ “Waging War.” ²⁹⁸ A late Sung dynasty tactical work, it selectively compiles one hundred essential principles of Chinese military science and illustrates them with historical battles. (For a complete translation and commentary, see Sawyer, *One Hundred Unorthodox Strategies: Battle and Tactics of Chinese Warfare* .) However, note that in “Military Combat,” the *Art of War* states: “In order await the disordered; in tranquility await the clamorous. This is the way to control the mind.” ²⁹⁹ *Ssu-ma Fa* , “Strict Positions.” ³⁰⁰ *Ssu-ma Fa* , “Strict Positions.” ³⁰¹ Warring States analysts, having observed significant differences in battlefield performance by fighters from the individual states, tended to conclude that terrain or culture created these characteristics. (For one description, see “Evaluating the Enemy” in the *Wu-tzu* .) More importantly, Wu-tzu would comment: “In general, on the battlefield, which is soon to become a graveyard, if the soldiers are committed to fight to the death they will live, whereas if they seek to stay alive they will die. A good general will act as if in a sinking boat or trapped in a burning building—there’s not enough time for the wise to make plans nor the courageous to get angry. Only engaging the enemy will do! Thus it is said that the greatest harm that can befall the army’s employment [stems from] hesitation, while the disasters that strike the Three Armies are born in doubt.” ³⁰² *Shang-chün Shu* , “Hua Ts’e.” ³⁰³ *Ssu-ma Fa* , “Strict Positions.” ³⁰⁴ “Determining Rank.” The concept of an “old” army, one that was broken and unresponsive, was also common. However, there is no evidence that Hsin’s army could be characterized in this way. ³⁰⁵ With some astounding exceptions whereby negligent generals doomed their forces to defeat, Chinese commanders generally understood the importance of military intelligence and therefore employed extensive measures, including reconnaissance and spies, to learn about the enemy’s strength and position, as well as the commander’s name. The more astute also tried to ascertain the enemy’s physical condition, especially whether they were fatigued or rested, adequately fed or famished, and even mounted active probing measures. (The nature and scope of intelligence practices, including spycraft, in pre-Ch’ing China is extensively examined in our *Tao of Spycraft: Intelligence Theory and Practice in Traditional China* .) ³⁰⁶ Several examples are described in the *Wu-tzu* , while Sun Pin spoke in “The General’s Losses” and “Male and Female Cities” in the *Military Methods* about enemies who can be attacked because their *ch’i* has severely diminished from prolonged warfare. ³⁰⁷ “Waging War,” *Art of War* . ³⁰⁸ Such as in “Initiative” in the *Unorthodox Strategies* . The *Wei Liao-tzu* states, “Those from whom the initiative has been taken have no *ch’i* .” (“Tactical Balance of Power in Warfare”)

309 For example, see “Those Whose Ch’i Has Declined Can Be Attacked” in the *Wu-ching Tsung-yao* , as well as “Those Who Are Fearful Can Be Attacked.” Similar materials are found in the military sections of the *T’ung-tien* , including “A Campaign Army Whose Troops are Dispirited and Afraid Will Be Defeated” and “An Enemy Who Lacks Solidified Will Can Be Seized,” a derivative of which appears in the *Wu-ching Tsung-yao* ; *Ts’ao-lu Ching-lieh* , “Po Ti”; and *Ping-fa Pai-yen* , “Yen” and “Ai.”

310 Apart from the passages cited in our explication, discussions are primarily found in the *Hu-ch’ien Ching* , *Wu-ching Tsung-yao* , *Wu-pei Chih* , and *Ping-fa Pai-yen* .

311 A translation of the entire chapter, with extensive comments, may be found in Sawyer, *Military Methods* , 138–45.

312 Such as through public oath-making and emotionally charged denouncements of the enemy’s offenses that are intended to justify the campaign.

313 More than two thousand years underground has caused some of the characters (indicated by the dots) to become illegible.

314 “Nine Terrains,” *Art of War* .

315 “Nine Terrains,” *Art of War* , somewhat condensed. Although the term *ch’i* does not appear in these passages, the measures are all directed toward overcoming the problem of dispirited troops by manipulating their *ch’i* state. (Achieving a death-defying commitment requires treading a fine line between fostering it and provoking such despair that they completely lose the will to live, as frequently happened in hopeless battlefield situations throughout history.)

316 Also see “The Guest” in *Unorthodox Strategies* . The *T’ung-tien* preserves a lengthy collection of passages of uncertain date known as “Nine Configurations” that purport to be a dialogue between Sun-tzu and the king of Wu in which the tactics for various types of terrain seen in the *Art of War* are discussed, including the psychological state of the troops. Naturally, measures for stimulating the troops are included. (For a translation, see “Nine Configurations” in Sawyer, *Art of War* , 238–44.)

317 “Nine Terrains,” *Art of War* .

318 For an example of Han Hsin’s exploitation of fatal terrain, see “Han Dynasty Realizations” in Sawyer, *The Tao of Deception* .

319 For a discussion of the concept and implications of *shih* , see the introduction to Sawyer, *Sun-tzu Art of War* (in which we originated the term’s translation as “strategic configuration of power.”)

320 “Determining Rank.”

321 “Strategic Military Power,” *Art of War* .

322 *T’ai-pai Yin-ching* , “Jen Wu Yung-ch’üeh.” (For a complete translation see Sawyer, *Strategies for the Human Realm: Crux of the T’ai-pai Yin-ching* .)

323 “Stimulating the Officers,” *Wu-tzu* .

324 “Discussion of Regulations,” *Wei Liao-tzu* .

325 This is reportedly also the way the great Warring States commander Wu Ch’i defeated Ch’in. (See, *Wu-tzu* , “Evaluating the Enemy.”) Warring States writers also began emphasizing superior physical capabilities and the exploitation of prior adverse experience and emotions such as shame.

326 For example, see “Stimulating the Officers” in the *Wu-tzu* , which shows how to build camaraderie and spirited allegiance.

327 Although uncertain, as otherwise noted, it has been asserted that Chi Li’s wife was from the Shang royal clan, though probably not the ruling family, and that King Wen was supposedly married to Emperor Yi’s daughter, theoretically ranking her with emperor Hsin. (See Wang Hui, “Chi Li Hsüan-li chih Mi yü Kuei-tsu Teng-chi Ming-hao Ch’uan-tzu-chih,” CКСYС 51–57.)

328 “The Tao of Warfare.”

329 *Ssu-ma Fa* , “Strict Positions.”

330 *Ssu-ma Fa* , “Strict Positions.” This *Ssu-ma Fa* passage is of course describing conditions at a later time, one when the active participation of the stronger states had to be elicited.

331 *Ssu-ma Fa* , “Benevolence the Foundation.” The effects of such oaths are also discussed in the *Ts’ao-lu Ching-lieh*’s “Shih Shih.”

332 As required by the dictums of later history and subsequent encumbrances upon the virtuous to be righteously circumspect. The only exception would seem to be the reference to “horns falling off” in the speech at Mu-yeh, perhaps slang for something more akin to their impotence in the face of the Chou threat.

333 Another anachronistic but subsequently famous term, “Hua Hsia.”

334 The usual

understanding of the clause is as Legge (*The Shoo King* , 312) translates: “Heaven’s favor stirs them up.” ³³⁵ Throughout King Chou, herein and otherwise termed Emperor Hsin, is called “King Shou.” ³³⁶ Also anachronistic. ³³⁷ Although perhaps a belief at the time, it certainly was never articulated until late in the Warring States period. ³³⁸ This is one of the few charges lodged against his officials in general. ³³⁹ Commentators generally understand it as meaning that the ruler should accord with Heaven. ³⁴⁰ The root meaning of the character translated as “catalysts” is “chaotic” or “disordered” but by extension could mean capable of causing chaos and therefore even reform. However, traditional commentators understand it as synonymous with “ordered” or capable of governing. ³⁴¹ “Humanity” or “humanness,” *jen* , is anachronistic. ³⁴² “The hundred surnames,” *pai-hsing* , is anachronistic. ³⁴³ The concluding remarks are found as the third part of the “T’ai Shih.” ³⁴⁴ The number six may be a true figure despite its idealization in later writings such as the *Chou Li* , which hold that the “son of Heaven” could have six armies, but the major feudal lords only three or fewer, depending on status. The concept of six being appropriate to the ultimate ruler may well derive from the Chou’s historical usage, six being closely associated with the early period in texts and inscriptions, though they were much smaller units, *shih* rather than *chün* , the latter subsequently said to consist of three *shih* . ³⁴⁵ The term *chün-tzu* is anachronistic. ³⁴⁶ The “five constants” (*wu ch’ang*) is variously interpreted, including as the “five phases,” all anachronistic. ³⁴⁷ Pi-kan. ³⁴⁸ “Flourished his awesomeness.” ³⁴⁹ Although the highest officials in the early Chou hierarchy, many just refer to instructors (rather than strategists) and some sort of adviser known as the protector. ³⁵⁰ The term *ch’i* , subsequently “unorthodox,” is anachronistic. (See Sawyer, the *Tao of Deception* , for a complete study of the term.) ³⁵¹ King “Wu” cannot be called “wu” at this time. ³⁵² Yang K’uan (*Hsi Chou Shih* , 87) thinks the feudal lords were also perturbed that Shang harbored criminals and escaped slaves, making it a target. ³⁵³ The highest-ranking officials in the subsequent Chou administration. ³⁵⁴ “Tactical Balance of Power in Attacks.” ³⁵⁵ “Discussion of Regulations.” ³⁵⁶ In “Military Vanguard,” the T’ai Kung includes fear among the “perceived opportunities” for mounting an attack, and in “Unorthodox Army,” even sees it as a combat multiplier, advising that “taking advantage of their fright and fear is the means by which one can attack ten.” ³⁵⁷ “Strict Positions.” ³⁵⁸ “The Army’s Strategic Power,” *Six Secret Teachings* . This of course is the reason the inimical effects of baleful omens have to be defused. ³⁵⁹ For example, see “Employing Masses” in the *Ssu-ma Fa* . ³⁶⁰ Wei Liao-tzu , “Tactical Balance of Power in Warfare.” (At least they didn’t rely on ravines to mount their defense, an indication of lack of combat will according to the *Wei Liao-tzu* , which states that “one who occupies ravines lacks the mind to do battle; who lightly provokes a battle lacks fullness of *ch’i* ; who is belligerent in battle lacks soldiers capable of victory.” [“Tactical Balance of Power in Attacks,” *Wei Liao-tzu* .] The *Wu-tzu* , *Liu-t’ao* , and other classic military works all enumerate indications when an enemy can be attacked, mostly derivatives of enervation and being dispirited.) ³⁶¹ “Nine Terrains.” ³⁶² From the *Art of War* onward, Chinese military theorists would always warn against deploying with a river to the rear. ³⁶³ According to the *Ssu-ma Fa*’s “Strict Positions,” in general, in warfare, “if you advance somewhat into the enemy’s territory with a light force it is dangerous. If you advance with a heavy force deeply into the enemy’s territory you will accomplish nothing. If you advance with a light force deeply into enemy territory you will be defeated. If you advance with a heavy force somewhat into the enemy’s territory you can fight successfully. Thus in warfare the light and heavy are mutually related.” ³⁶⁴ “Nine Terrains.” A similar concept is found in Sun Pin’s “Preparation of Strategic Power.” ³⁶⁵ Even the *Art of War* had already begun advocating capturing the enemy’s resource and turning them to use. (“Waging War” states, “Treat the captured soldiers well in

order to nurture them [for our own use].”³⁶⁶ For a recent discussion of this complex problem see Niall Ferguson, “Prisoner Taking and Prisoner Killing in the Age of Total War: Towards a Political Economy of Military Defeat,” *War in History* 11:2 (2004), 148–92. There are any number of issues that might be raised in this connection, including whether cultural values affect the rate of surrender, much as evidenced by the Japanese commitment to die fighting in World War II. Conversely, the Greeks seem to have readily yielded the battlefield even though serious casualties might result.) It has been suggested that the enthusiasm of motivated citizen soldiers always proves superior but equally that it readily crumbles in adversity, explaining why some armies (German, Japanese) imposed draconian discipline to ensure performance in both conducive and negative circumstances. The shift from individual combat to the anonymity of collectivism also changes the mindset because the individual’s actions are neither so visible nor likely to be probed.³⁶⁷ *Wu-tzu*, “Evaluating the Enemy.”³⁶⁸ The term *Po-fu* (*pai-fu*) is best understood as a “hundred stalwarts” rather than “captain of a hundred” or a reference to Nan-kung Po-ta.³⁶⁹ “Ten Questions,” *Sun Pin Military Methods*. Being a vast force, the Shang had of course deployed in an extended horizontal fashion.³⁷⁰ For typical expressions of this view see Chang Shao-sheng and Liu Wen-ch’an, eds., *Chung-kuo Ku-tai Chan-cheng T’ung-lan*, vol. 1, 7–10; Li Chen, *Chung-kuo Li-tai Chan-cheng Shih-hua*, 13–19; Hsü Pei-ken, *Chung-kuo Kuo-fang Ssu-hsiang-shih*, 282–90; or *Chung-kuo Li-tai Chan-cheng-shih*, vol. 1, 71–84. (For further discussion, see Sawyer, *The Tao of Spycraft*; the historical introduction to our translation of *Six Secret Teachings in Seven Military Classics of Ancient China*; and especially the chapter notes to “Civil Offensive.” For Yi Yin’s possible role in the Shang, see *Ancient Chinese Warfare*, 109–15, or our *Tao of Spycraft*, 7–11. Also note that in “Planning for the State” in the *Wu-tzu*, Wu Ch’i says “You must be deferential to subjugate the strong; you must employ deceit to subjugate the fierce.”)³⁷¹ See Ch’en Li-chu, “Wei-tzu Feng-chien K’ao,” *HCHS* 2006:2, 19–22.³⁷² See “Ch’i T’ai Kung Shih-chia” in the *Shih Chi*, “Ch’i Ts’e” in the *Chan-kuo Ts’e*, and discussions of the T’ai Kung’s role and local guides in our *Tao of Spycraft*. Sun-tzu states: “One who does not know the topography of mountains and forests, ravines and defiles, wetlands and marshes cannot maneuver the army.”³⁷³ However, to the extent they claimed to be only targeting “the one man” but actually executed numerous highranking people, they employed disinformation. (The *Liu-t’ao*’s outline for the army’s staff includes officers for this purpose.)³⁷⁴ Ten shells are noted on *Yi-pien* 5452, another on *Ping-pien* 274.5. Yang K’uan (*Hsi Chou Shih*, 36–37) views the forwarding of women as a deliberate subversive effort, but the action was probably far less insidious even though there were already historical antecedents for exploiting the debilitating power of beauty and sex.³⁷⁵ Chou-yüan K’ao-ku-tui 1979; Li Hsüeh-ch’in 1981; and Yen Yi-p’ing, “Chou-yüan Chia-ku,” *Chung-kuo Wen-tz’u* NS 1 (1980), 159–85. For contextual analysis, also see Chang Kuang-chih, “Yin Chou Kuan-hsi te Tsai Chien-t’ao,” *BIHP* 1980:6, 197–216. The discoveries were the subject of “The Early China Forum,” *EC* 11–12 (1985–1987), whose articles include E. L. Shaughnessy, “Zhouyuan Oracle-Bone Inscriptions: Entering the Research Stage?”, 146–63; Wang Yuxin, “Once Again on the New Period of Western Zhou Oracle-Bone Research,” *EC* 11–12 (1985–1987), 164–72; Li Xueqin, “Are They Shang Inscriptions or Zhou Inscriptions?” *EC* 11–12 (1985–1987), 173–76; and Fan Yuzhou, “Some Comments on Zhouyuan Oracle-Bone Inscriptions.” *EC* 11–12 (1985–1987), 177–81. As with the earlier Shang inscriptions the characters first have to be identified and their meaning penetrated, after which the sense of the inquiry can be worked out, an activity that often requires revising the understanding of the characters. (Reports of new, additional inscribed shells continue to appear, but as of the winter of 2011/2012 they have not yet been published.)³⁷⁶ The second claim essentially

focuses upon these few in isolation, thereby ignoring the roughly seventeen thousand other bones that lack inscriptions, a number far too large to have been Shang remnants. There is also the problem of how or why the inscriptions would possibly be preserved at Chou-yüan, the ritual heart of preconquest Chou. (E. L. Shaughnessy, “Zhouyuan Oracle-Bone Inscriptions,” 150–51, denies claims that, for example, H11:1 and H11:84 are Shang creations that were somehow brought back to Chou; Li Xueqin, “Are They Shang Inscriptions or Zhou Inscriptions?” EC 11–12 [1985–1987], 173–76, concludes that H11:112 records Wen Wang’s appointment as Hsi Po, just as the “Yin Pen-chi” suggests, but concludes the divination was performed by a Chou diviner at a Shang ancestral temple in the Shang capital.)³⁷⁷ Tu Chin-p’eng, “Chou-yüan Kung-tien Chien-chu Lei-hsing chi Hsiang-kuan Wen-t’i T’an-t’ao,” KKHP 2009:4, 435–68. In contrast, Shang oracular media seem simply to have been periodically discarded into nondescript pits.³⁷⁸ The inscription on H11:1 has been translated by Shaughnessy (“Zhouyuan Oracle-Bone Inscriptions: Entering the Research Stage?” EC 11–12 [1985–1987], 156) as “On guisi (day 30), performing the yi-ritual at the temple of the accomplished and martial Di Yi; divining, “The king will sacrifice to Cheng Tang, performing a cauldron-exorcism of the two surrendered women. He will perform yi-ritual with the blood of three rams and three sows. We desire that it be correct.” However, in Li Xueqin’s interpretation says (EC 11–12 [1985–1987], 174), “Guisi (day 30), divining in the temple of Wenwu Di Yi, the king will offer steamed and boiled sacrifices to Cheng Tang, perform yu-sacrifice, employing two women, the ritual items to be used include the blood of three rams and three pigs, this is correct.”

The *Pan Fang-kuei* dated to Hsin’s reign also contains a reference to conducting a sacrifice to Wen Wu Ti Yi. (Li Hsüeh-ch’in, “Shih-lun Hsin Fa-hsien te Pan Fang-kuei ho Jung Chung Fang-ting,” WW 2005:9, 59–65, 69.) This vessel has been more precisely dated to Hsin’s 22nd year. (See Hsü Feng-hsien, “Pan Fang-ting yü Shang-mo Chou-chi Hsi-t’ung,” WW 2005:9, 66–69.)

³⁷⁹ For example, see Wang Yuxin, “Once Again on the New Period of Western Zhou Oracle-Bone Research,” EC 11–12 (1985–1987), 164–72. ³⁸⁰ E. L. Shaughnessy, “Extra-Lineage Cult in the Shang Dynasty,” EC 11–12 (1985–1987), 182–94, concluded there are examples showing that extralinesage sacrifices could and did occur, such as the with ruler of Ku (who also married into the Shang), and that the Shang even offered sacrifice to the ancestors of selected allies. ³⁸¹ The traditional source for knowledge of Shang/ Chou marriage relations has always been the well-known ode “Ta-ming” (*Mao* 236), found in the “Ta Ya” section of the *Shih Ching*. A key stanza notes that Chi Li married a princess from “Yin Shang,” though without specifying her exact relationship to the emperor. Another stanza notes that King Wen greeted his future consort, a woman of the state of Hsin, by building an elaborate floating bridge across the Wei. Various views are held about her affiliation and whether these women were actually descendents of these emperors or (more likely) the daughters of various important royal clan members (as seen in dynastic *ho-ch’in* practice). However, as the discussion will show, the issue holds significant implications for Chou rulership. ³⁸² H11:84, as translated by E. L. Shaughnessy, 156: “Divining: The king will seek aid from Da Jia and perform a promissory sacrifice to Earl Zhou of the Zhou Country; we desire that it be correct and not harm in the receipt of their aid.” According to Li Xueqin, 174: “Divining, the king will perform a ben-sacrifice, making offering to Tai Jia, reporting about the Earl of Zhoufang, using grain to sacrifice, this is correct, there is no mistake and will receive protection.” H11:82 is similar. H11:82, as translated by E. L. Shaughnessy, 156: “...cultivated and martial...the king will entreat Di...Da...and perform a promissory sacrifice to Earl...of the Zhou Country; we desire that it be correct and have no harm...receipt

of their aid.” According to Li Xueqin, 174: “Divining in [the temple of]...Wenwu,... the king will perform a di-sacrifice, will report to heaven about the Earl of Zhoufang,...this is correct, there is no mistake,...the king will receive protection.”

³⁸³ Tu Chin-p'eng, “Chou-yüan Kung-tien Chien-chu Lei-hsing chi Hsiang-kuan Wen-t'i T'an-t'ao,” KKHP 2009:4, 435–68. Wang Yuxin (“Once Again on the New Period of Western Zhou Oracle-Bone Research,” EC 11–12 [1985–1987], 164–72), had previously concluded it would have been impossible for the Chou to have built a temple to the Shang. The temple was apparently dedicated to Wen Wu Ting, as indicated by the inscription on H11:112: “Divining in the temple of Wenwu Ding, the king on the next day yiyou (day 22) performs a ben-sacrifice, establishes a banner,... offers fragrant wine to Wu Ding, and...also kills a sacrificial offering, [will not meet with] a mistake, the king [will receive protection].” (Translated by Li Xueqin, 173.) Reports of an additional temple having been discovered have been circulating but not yet formally published.

³⁸⁴ Tu Chin-p'eng, “Chou-yüan Kung-tien Chien-chu Lei-hsing chi Hsiang-kuan Wen-t'i T'an-t'ao,” KKHP 2009:4, 435–68. It might be noted that the inscription of the Shang oracle HJ 30793 shows the Shang king seeking rain on behalf of the Chou and the Chou's submissive attitude.

³⁸⁵ Contemporary suggestions that he suffered from one or another psychological disorder are not only speculative, but also avail nothing, being little more than labeling the already apparent.

³⁸⁶ For evidence of Shang intelligence practices see *Ancient Chinese Warfare*, 228–29.

³⁸⁷ See especially “Vacuity and Substance.”

³⁸⁸ “Initial Estimations.”

³⁸⁹ “Tactical Power in Defense.” Although fortifications had evolved somewhat over the intervening eight hundred years, primarily becoming higher and lessening their dependence upon moats, the changes are not strategically significant.

³⁹⁰ “Planning Offensives.”

³⁹¹ “Planning Offensives.”

³⁹² “Military Vanguard,” *Six Secret Teachings*. It adds that “when their battle array is in disorder they can be attacked.”

³⁹³ In a famous Spring and Autumn incident, in order to fully observe the rituals of battle, the Duke of Sung refused to allow his troops to attack Ch'u's forces while they were crossing the river or arraying themselves for battle. It was a fatal mistake because the nature of warfare had changed. However, such concerns are inapplicable here.

³⁹⁴ “Vacuity and Substance.”

³⁹⁵ “Military Combat.”

³⁹⁶ “Military Combat.”

³⁹⁷ “Nine Changes.”

³⁹⁸ “Nine Changes.”

³⁹⁹ “Military Combat.” This is said to be “the way to control the mind.”

⁴⁰⁰ As made by numerous scholars and even military specialists such as Hsü Pei-ken, *Chung-kuo Kuo-fang Ssu-hsiang-shih*, 285–86, and the compilers of the *Chung kuo Li-tai Chang-cheng-shih*, vol. 1, 74–76. Despite being somewhat outdated, both continue to be the basis of ongoing assertions.

⁴⁰¹ According to the *Hou Han-shu's* chapter on the Tung Yi, there was internal conflict among the Yi themselves, and Yi groups were also pushing into the central China area, the latter probably being in part caused by the former.

⁴⁰² For a discussion of Hsin's campaigns, see Sawyer, *Ancient Chinese Warfare*, 198ff.

⁴⁰³ Cheng Hui-sheng, “Shang Chiao Mu-yeh Pien,” *Chia-ku Pu-ts'u Yen-chiu*, 233–34

⁴⁰⁴ “Vacuity and Substance.” For an extensive discussion of the concept of the unorthodox in China, see Sawyer, *The Tao of Deception: Unorthodox Warfare in Historic and Modern China*.

⁴⁰⁵ “Maneuvering the Army.” In “Military Vanguard,” in discussing fourteen changes in the enemy that present opportunities to strike, *Six Secret Teachings* states that “when they are fording rivers they can be attacked.”

Wu-tzu's “Evaluating the Enemy” adds, “When fording rivers and only half of them have crossed, they can be attacked. On narrow and confined roads they can be attacked.”

⁴⁰⁶ “Tao of the General,” *Wu-tzu*.

⁴⁰⁷ “Responding to Change,” *Wu-tzu*. In “Military Vanguard,” discussing another of the fourteen changes in the enemy that present opportunities to strike, *Six Secret Teachings* asserts: “When the enemy encounters the difficulty of precipitous ravines or are on narrow roads they can be attacked.” Sun Pin similarly counseled exploiting ravines and narrows to

offset a disadvantageous force ratio. ⁴⁰⁸ In “Military Vanguard,” the *Six Secret Teachings* states: “When they are traversing long roads they can be attacked.” Nothing could have been longer than their 1100 *li* march. ⁴⁰⁹ Yin Chün-k’o, 1994, 114ff.; Li Min, *HCCHS* 1988:4, 41–48; and Chu Chen, *HCCHS* 1989:8, 3–10. ⁴¹⁰ Ch’iao Teng-yün and Chang Yüan, *Shang-tai Wen-ming Yen-chiu*, 162–74. ⁴¹¹ Both Li Min (46–48) and Chu Chen (7–10) discuss the generally neglected subject of Chao-ko. ⁴¹² Some stone wall remnants have been found, but their function is still imperfectly understood. ⁴¹³ For a discussion of Anyang’s strategic advantages according to various ancient military thinkers, see *Ancient Chinese Warfare*, 145–51. Other explanations, such as insufficient labor, are also possible. ⁴¹⁴ Career-military-men-turned-historians, such as Hsü Pei-ken, see the long preparatory period as not just providing the time necessary to cultivate Virtue and slowly develop the economic basis for a powerful state with a satisfied populace but also being the minimum interval required to produce the military weapons that would permit the Chou to effect unexpected operational tactics and thereby prevail over the vastly superior Shang. (See Hsü Pei-ken, *Chung-kuo Kuo-fang Ssu-hsiang-shih*, 284–86, and *T’ai kung Liu-t’ao Chin-chu Chin-yi*, 14–26. General Hsü is a particularly strong advocate of the chariot’s decisive importance at Mu-yeh, the first battle in which he and others believe it was employed en masse. Based on his estimates, the Chou could probably not have constructed more than a score of armored chariots per year, while at least three thousand horses had to be bred and trained. Charioteers also had to become practiced in the requisite individual skills and coordinated in integrated battle tactics. In addition, Hsü believes the Chou did not bring their chariots to the first coalition assembly at Meng-chin but instead concealed them for explosive use in the actual engagement. [See his *Chung-kuo Kuo-fang Ssu-hsiang-shih*, 285–86 or the *Chung-kuo Li-tai Chan-cheng-shih*, Vol. 1, 74–76.] However, since the Chou’s possession and battlefield exploitation of chariots had long been known and it is inconceivable that the elite warriors would not have ridden in them for most, if not all, of the eleven hundred *li*, his suggestion can be dismissed. [Although his annotated vernacular translations suffer from textual errors, dubious interpretations, and outright misunderstandings, his views on technological limitations and requirements merit study.]) ⁴¹⁵ “Waging War.” ⁴¹⁶ For a summary discussion of the chariot’s appearance and evolution in China, see Sawyer, *Ancient Chinese Warfare*, “The Chariot in China.” ⁴¹⁷ Articles other than those noted herein are too numerous to mention. However, T’an Ch’i-hsiang’s multivolume *Chung-kuo Li-shih Ti-t’u-chi* remains unsurpassed for period maps, and Wang Yü-min’s two-volume *Chung-kuo Li-tai Ti-li Kai-lun* (Beijing: Jen-min, 1987) encompasses a wealth of detailed information. Pinpointing the identity and location of the eight prominent allies continues to be problematic despite several tentative identifications. Yung is unlikely to have been the state located north of the Yellow River close to Mu-yeh but instead a similarly named entity in Hubei on the Han River; P’eng was reportedly situated in Mei-hsien in Sichuan; Lu possibly near Hsiang-yang in Hubei; Wei south of the Wei River in Shaanxi; the Ch’iang in Gansu; Shu near Ch’eng-tu in Sichuan; P’u along the Hubei-Sichuan border; and Mao either east of Shu in Pa-hsien or near San-men-hsia along the Yellow River. ⁴¹⁸ Ch’ên Hsü, “Shang-tai Chan-cheng te Hsing-chih chi-ch’i Li-shih Yi-yi,” *Hsia Shang Wen-hua Lun-chi* (2000 [1988]), 242–43. ⁴¹⁹ T’an Ch’i-hsiang’s Shang map shows it south of the Yellow River. ⁴²⁰ Pao-chi-shih Yen-chiu-hui, “Shaanxi Pao-chi Chih-fang-t’ou Hsi Chou Tsao-ch’i Mu-tsang Ch’ing-li Chien-pao,” *WW* 2007:8, 28–47 ⁴²¹ Shu is not listed among the Chou’s eight allies in the *Bamboo Annals*, having been replaced by Su, but appears in the “Mu Shih” chapter that is followed by the “Chou Pen-chi.” ⁴²² From Chou Yüan, H11:68 has “attack Shu,” H11:97 has “conquer Shu,” and Steven F. Sage (*Ancient Sichuan and the Unification of China*, 31–34, 40–41) notes that the protocharacter for Shu appears in

roughly forty Shang oracular inscriptions, whereas the Chou versions are full form. Those who deny Shu was located at Cheng-tu or anywhere in Sichuan at this time (or even that it can be identified with the subsequent state of this name) variously envision its location as Shandong, the upper Han River area in Shaaanxi, or south of the bend in the Yellow River near the Chou. ⁴²³ Tuan Yü, "Lun Chou, Ch'u Tsao-ch'i te Kuan-hsi," HCHS 1986:11, 49–56. Tuan Yü locates the incipient Ch'u people in middle Henan at this time but believes they may have previously dwelled in the southern plains of Shandong and eastern Henan. ⁴²⁴ In addition to a much smaller core population, the Chou certainly did not have the extensive mining and other material resources found in the well developed Shang bronze industry; therefore, productive capacity could only have been a portion of the Shang's, though trade may have supplemented indigenous capabilities. As attested by recovered artifacts, their technical expertise in molding and casting bronze weapons certainly was comparable and they were clearly able to supply functional weapons for whatever number of soldiers they might field. ⁴²⁵ Hsu and Linduff (*Western Chou Civilization*, 77), to date the only historians who have attempted a real assessment of the decisive factors at Mu-yeh, claim that the "Chou weapon kit included a few distinctive items" and that "The Chou *ko* was an improved striking halberd. It was more firmly fastened to a pole and more complicated than its Shang counterpart." However, the examples shown in their plates are all straight tabbed, some with crescent (but not extravagant) extensions, rather than the socketed models identified with the Northern complex—exactly the same as styles seen in the middle to late Anyang period. Moreover, even if all the Chou dagger-axes had been socketed, there would have been no real difference in durability because the early versions had rotational issues. In addition, an inherent breaking point existed where a fulcrum is created by the bottom edge of the bronze socket, resulting in forces that tend to snap the narrowed shaft backward. Slotted shafts are also invariably weak, but the impact is distributed down the flange that presses against the wooden shaft. (Further discussion of Western Chou weapons and their [somewhat limited] evolution will appear in the integrated section on Chou dynasty combat implements in our Spring and Autumn volume, which will cover weapons' history down through the Warring States period. Discussion of the early evolution of these weapons and basic fighting issues may already be found in the weapons' section of our *Ancient Chinese Warfare*.) ⁴²⁶ Although Hsu and Linduff conclude (on page 81) that "the use of this weapon alone is not sufficient to explain the Chou victory over the Shang," they assert that "the Chou bronze sword was a new addition" and that "the Chou sword was somewhat superior in certain types of combat to the short dagger used by the Shang soldiers." However, although detailed examination of these weapons is deferred to our next volume, based on recovered artifacts, there is no discernible difference in length, and Hsu and Linduff's illustration shows a rather undistinguished willow-leaf blade. (Apart from being irrelevant, insofar as it is almost certainly a late embellishment to the account, their citation of King Wu's ritual use of a sword to reslay Emperor Hsin as further evidence is somewhat puzzling.) ⁴²⁷ Daggers and knives were of course used to slash the necks of prostrate enemies, as well as to sever ears for accounting. ⁴²⁸ "Chou armor was, however, somewhat more efficient than the Shang equipment. Shang armor consisted of large pieces of rawhide, which protected the front of the warrior but greatly restricted his movement. Newly excavated fragments of Chou armor have allowed reconstruction of a different model. Three plaques of bronze were fastened to the front of the garment, and two were attached to the back. A bronze helmet, protective knee plates, and breast plates were the complete protective covering of the Chou warrior. This costume, although heavy, was flexible and provided more extensive protection than did Shang armor." (Hsu and Linduff, *Western Chou Civilization*, 81.) ⁴²⁹ Only three studies of armor

and helmets have appeared to date: Albert E. Dien, "A Study of Early Chinese Armor," *Artibus Asiae* 43 (1981-1982), 5-66; Albert E. Dien, "Armor in China before the T'ang Dynasty," *JEA* 2:3-4 (2000); and Yang Hung, *Chung-kuo Ku-ping-ch'i Lun-t'ung*, which discusses armor on pages 1-78. However, virtually nothing exists on the Shang and Chou, though Chou helmets were certainly less decorative. (Also see Sawyer, *Ancient Chinese Warfare*, 300-4.)⁴³⁰ For example, according to Hsu and Linduff, *Western Chou Civilization*, 88, "the Chou victory may in part be attributed to clever strategy, especially to their facility on broken terrain." However, it should be noted that their reasoning is largely based upon the more difficult exterior terrain hampering the use of chariots, causing greater reliance upon infantry, which they view as a decisive factor.⁴³¹ According to Hsu and Linduff, *Western Chou Civilization*, 88, "The Chou flanked the Shang on both wings and then took advantage of the Shang soldiers to attack on the other front as well."⁴³² "Ku Yüeh." Incorporating a heritage of late Warring States thought, the chapter reflects the belief that the victory was swift and unmarked by bloodshed.⁴³³ In addition to General Hsü Pei-ken, many others such as Chia Hai-sheng, "Lun Pu Ch'i Kuei Ming-chung te Po Shi chi Nan Chung," *HCCHS* 2005:4, 48-51, believe the chariots were a focal force.⁴³⁴ "Blitzkrieg-like," as commonly understood as referring to the German practice of employing highly mechanized units to punch through enemy lines early in World War II. (It should be noted that the nature, even very existence, of the theoretical concepts that supposedly underlay Blitzkrieg operations and even whether there was an evolved doctrine or not have recently been questioned in a number of books and articles, including J. P. Harris, "The Myth of Blitzkrieg," *War in History* 1995:3, 335-52.)⁴³⁵ Unless they were captains simply entrusted with berating the army, an interpretation sometimes seen, the term actually indicates another commander's name, so that two commanders shouldered the initial burden, equally unlikely in view of the T'ai Kung's exalted status.⁴³⁶ See, for example, "The Tao of the General" in the *Wu-tzu*.⁴³⁷ The *Mo-tzu* notes that one hundred chariots were employed, *Mencius* indicates three hundred. If the astonishing but improbable number of four thousand were true, they would certainly have constituted a significant combat multiplier. (If the eight hundred feudal lords were each accompanied by ten chariots the number would soar to eight thousand; five each, four thousand is readily achieved even without the Chou's contribution; if only one or two personal vehicles, a total coalition force of four thousand would become perfectly reasonable, making the critical question whether they all had sufficient economic means and the skills to build them.)⁴³⁸ Hsü Pei-ken *T'ai-kung Liu-t'ao Chin-chu Chin-yi*, 14-26.⁴³⁹ For extensive discussion of all these issues see the four chapters on the chariot in our *Ancient Chinese Warfare*.⁴⁴⁰ For example, see the tables provided in Wang Hai-ch'eng's "Chung-kuo te Ma-ch'e Ch'i-yüan," *Ou-ya Hsiieh-k'an*, 2002, 1-75, or in Lu Lian-cheng's earlier "Chariot and Horse Burials in Ancient China," *Antiquity* 67 (1993), 824-38.⁴⁴¹ Hsu and Linduff (*Western Chou Civilization*, 85) similarly note that there were no significant differences in Shang and Chou chariots and therefore no military advantages.⁴⁴² For example, see Hsu and Linduff (*Western Chou Civilization*, 85-88) based upon the implications of a Shang military unit that has been reconstructed from a burial array at Hsiao-t'un. However, apart from any question whether the unit was ever deployed in any numbers, the reconstruction has been challenged for the arbitrary grouping of the graves and significant differences in the time of interment. (For a discussion, see *Ancient Chinese Warfare*, 368-70, and the references provided therein.) Nevertheless, they conclude (on page 88) that "the emphasis on infantry is a distinctive feature of the Chou military, one which allowed them the strength to overcome the clumsy formations of the Shang army and was a particular advantage in mountainous regions."⁴⁴³ The basis for this belief is an incident in the Spring

and Autumn Period (cited by Creel as well) in which the commander of a chariot contingent had his men dismounted to fight a steppe infantry force because the chariots were a liability *on the constricted terrain*. Victory was achieved because of the surprising, unorthodox nature of his actions. While the incident shows a recognition of the vulnerability of chariots to freely maneuvering infantry forces—as always obtained throughout history except on the most level, open terrain—it does not negate their use in fast-moving, operational contingents or as the nuclei of infantry platoons. (For a discussion of the incident's chariot implications see *Ancient Chinese Warfare*, 383–85.)⁴⁴⁴ Even though Hsu and Linduff (*Western Chou Civilization*, 81–88) envision chariot clashes having occurred, they also believe the chariot functioned mainly as a command platform. However, they also doubt its effectiveness as an archery platform.⁴⁴⁵ Tso Chuan, at Duke Hsüan 12th year, notes that “Emperor Chou had a hundred victories but no posterity in the end.”⁴⁴⁶ Excavations to date have produced evidence solely for networks within a few capitals and other important cities. For example see Chung-kuo She-hui K'e-hsüeh-yüan KK YCS An-yang Kung-tso-tui, “Ho-nan An-yang-shih Yin-hsü Liu-chia-chuang Pei-ti 2008-nien Fa-chüeh Chien-pao,” KK 2009:7, 24–38. About three hundred fifty meters of roads that had widths of about ten meters crisscrossed Yin-hsü on more or less east/west and north/south axes. Some had layers of yellow earth, others were packed with pebbles, stones, and ceramic chards for greater hardness, and many were provided with subsurface drainage ditches. The construction work reputedly dates to the second through fourth periods. (For a general introduction to the history of paved surfaces in the west, see M. G. Lay, *A History of the World's Roads and of the Vehicles That Used Them*.)⁴⁴⁷ P'ang Hsiao-hsia and Kao Chiang-t'ao, “Wan-Shang Shih-ch'i Shang Wen-hua Tung-chin T'ung-tao Ch'u-t'an,” HCHS 2010:1, 5–11. Transport needs and routes are also discussed in Li Liu and Chen Xingan, *State Formation in Early China*.⁴⁴⁸ The classic analysis of the logistics of Alexander's campaigns has always been Donald W. Engels, *Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army*, but more generally, see Jonathan P. Roth, *The Logistics of the Roman Army at War (264 BCE–235 CE)*.⁴⁴⁹ “Evaluating the Enemy.”⁴⁵⁰ “Vacuity and Substance.”⁴⁵¹ “Vacuity and Substance.”⁴⁵² “Obligations of the Son of Heaven.”⁴⁵³ “Controlling the Army,” Wu-tzu. Two of the very few references to the events at Mu-yeh found in the *T'ung Tien* discuss the need for measured advance. “Ping,” 2 (“Fa Chih”), speaks about constraint and measure resulting from training. “Ping,” 10, commences with King Wu on the verge of attacking Emperor Hsin and asking about situations of difficulty. The T'ai Kung replies with tactical advice that emphasizes measure.⁴⁵⁴ Shang oracular inscriptions include queries about whether boats should be used in campaigns.⁴⁵⁵ Hsü Pei-ken, for example, stresses that this route, coupled with the swiftness of the Chou's advance, prevented King Chou from being able to muster all his forces or recall his expeditionary forces. (See Chung-kuo Kuo-fang Ssu-hsiang-shih, 285–86, and Chung-kuo Li-tai Chan-cheng-shih, vol. 1, 74–76.)⁴⁵⁶ For a summation of these incidents see Sawyer, *Fire and Water*, 250–51.⁴⁵⁷ “Military Combat.”⁴⁵⁸ Several studies have included calendrical reconstructions that chart the Chou march and battle sequence day by day, including T'ang Lan, Chao Kuang-hsien, Li Hsüeh-ch'in, Luo K'un, E. L. Shaughnessy, and David Pankenier.⁴⁵⁹ However, Luo K'un (*Hsia Shang Hsi-Chou Chün-shih-shih*, 233) estimates forty *li* per day as a reasonable rate of march.⁴⁶⁰ According to the *Lü-shih Ch'un-chiu*, “Hsien Shih Lan,” King Wu enfeoffed four hundred states, and more than eight hundred submitted or voluntarily gave their allegiance, eight hundred being the nominal figure generally associated with the campaign itself. Moreover, as already seen, accordingly to the “Shih Fu” section of the *Yi Chou-shu*, 652, recognized the Chou. Although certainly rounded and exaggerated, these figures give a strong sense of rapid acceptance.⁴⁶¹ In “Planning for the State” Wu-tzu said,

“Being victorious in battle is easy, but preserving the results of victory is difficult.”
⁴⁶² “Incendiary Warfare.” ⁴⁶³ For example, see Chapter 80, titled “A Small State with Few People” in my martial translation of the *Tao Te Ching*, titled *The Tao of War*. ⁴⁶⁴ In contrast to the traditional view, historical accounts over the last two or three decades have come to emphasize the Shang’s residual strength and resulting Chou difficulties.

⁴⁶⁵ An Yi heritage state in the eastern part of Henan, near Shandong, Chang's existence is attested by the *Chang-tzu Fang-ting* generally dated to King Ch'eng's era. (Wu Wan-li, "Chi Hsin Fa-hsien te Chi-chien Hsi-Chou T'ung-ch'i," KKW 2010:4, 41–44.) ⁴⁶⁶ Mei's ruler was termed a *Po* while Tse's ruler was called a king. ⁴⁶⁷ Although Hsün-tzu, a Warring States political philosopher, noted that King Wu originated the practice of enfeoffment by granting territory to meritorious ministers, descendants of previous generations, and his own clan members, the nature of Chou dynasty "feudalism" and even the applicability of the term "feudal" remain matters of debate because of numerous perceived differences with Western historical manifestations. While recognizing the distinctive character of these appointments, for discussion purposes, these protostates will be treated here as feudal-like. (The field is replete with discussions of this issue. However, for three brief considerations see Barry B. Blakeley, "On the 'Feudal' Interpretation of Chou China," EC 2 (1976), 35–37; Li Feng, *Landscape and Power*, 110–12 and 280–82, as well as his "Feudalism and Western Zhou China: A Criticism," HJAS 63.1 (2003), 115–44; and Herrlee Creel, *Origins of Statecraft in China*, 317–87. For the obligations that may have constrained them, see Luo Yu-ts'ung, "Lun Hsi-Chou te Meng-shih Chih-tu," KKW 2007:2, 42–47. Further discussion also appears below, in the post-second conquest section.) ⁴⁶⁸ The extensive discussion required to characterize these walled cities is necessarily deferred to another work. However, for a brief overview, see Luo K'un, *Hsia Shang Hsi-Chou Chiin-shih-shih*, 272–84. ⁴⁶⁹ Although it seems that Chou bureaucratic functions evolved in response to growing administrative needs and functional differentiation early on, coming to constitute an incipient or "proto" bureaucracy (in H. G. Creel's estimation), the issue is widely debated. (For seminal discussions, see, among many, Herrlee G. Creel, *The Origins of Statecraft in China*, 101–93; Hsu and Linduff, 227–57; and Yang K'uan, *Hsi Chou Shih*, 297–350.) ⁴⁷⁰ For several discussions of the importance of ritual as well as of the vessels employed in ceremonies of reward and investiture, see, for example, Jessica Rawson, "Western Zhou Archaeology" in *The Cambridge History of Ancient China*; Virginia C. Kane, "Aspects of Western Chou Appointment Inscriptions: The Charge, the Gifts, and the Response," EC 8 (1982–1983), 14–28; and Constance A. Cook, "Scribes, Cooks, and Artisans: Breaking Zhou Tradition," EC 20 (1995), especially 240–50. ⁴⁷¹ For a discussion of the early fiefs see Luo Yu-ts'ang, "Lun Hsi-Chou te Meng-shih Chih-tu," KKW 2007:2, 42–47, and Sun Chien, "Shang Chou T'u-ti Kuo-yu-chih Shih-hsi," HCCHS 1991:5, 37–44. ⁴⁷² For useful collateral analysis and discussion, see Edward L. Shaughnessy, "Historical Geography and the Extent of the Earliest Chinese Kingdoms," AM, 3rd Series, 11:2 (1989), 1–22. ⁴⁷³ For example, see *chuan* 3, *Han-shih Wai-chuan*. ⁴⁷⁴ *Tso Chuan*, Hsi Kung 24th year. ⁴⁷⁵ *Tso Chuan*, Hsi Kung 24th year. However, note that the famous state of Lu is not even mentioned. ⁴⁷⁶ Abstracted from "Kuei Te" in the Han dynasty *Shuo-yüan*. It is coupled with two other set pieces in the 3rd *ch'üan* of the *Han-shih Wai-chuan* and also appears in the "Wu Ch'eng" section of the *Shang Shu* and the Duke of Shao's biography ("Lu Chou-kung Shih-chia") in the *Shih Chi*. ⁴⁷⁷ By the Han period, the term *chung* had come to mean "the masses," but in the Shang and Chou periods would have referred to the troops or a special class of the populace. ⁴⁷⁸ Translated as traditionally understood, meaning that future errors would be the fault of the ruler. However, it would seem preferable to understand it as meaning that any transgressions committed by the common people up to that point were because of one man—Emperor Hsin—so that (in accord with their proclamations) they should be held blameless. ⁴⁷⁹ The *Ta Yü T'ing* (JC2837) provides one example. The question of their status is beyond the scope of our study; however, for basic views see Yang K'uan, *Hsi Chou Shih*, 271–76, and Hsü Hsi-ch'en, "Chung" 'Shu-jen' Ping Fei-nu-li-lun Pu-cheng," HCCHS 1984:2, 34–41. (Tu Cheng-sheng, "Lüeh-lun Yin Yi-min te Ts'ao-yü yü Ti-wei," 661–709,

argues persuasively that no members of the Shang were ever enslaved.)⁴⁸⁰ For example, according to Wu Wan-li, “Chi Hsin Fa-hsien te Chi-chien Hsi-Chou T’ung-ch’i,” KKWW 2010:4, 41–44, the *Chang-tzu Fang-ting*, dated to King Ch’eng’s period, shows the existence of Yi heritage Chang state, formerly a Shang entity, under the early Chou.⁴⁸¹ Ch’ien Chieh, “Hsün-shih Chu-ch’i Ming-wen chi ch’i Hsiang-kuan Li-shih Wen-t’i,” HCCHS 2009:4, 21–31.⁴⁸² Chang Pi-p’o, “Lun Chou-ch’u te Su-shen-tsu yü Chou-jen tui Tung-pei te Ching-lüeh,” HCCHS 2001:3, 36–41, based on traditional materials in the *Kuo Yü’s* “Lu Yü,” the *Bamboo Annals*, and at least one Chou oracle bone fragment.⁴⁸³ As separately discussed.⁴⁸⁴ As attested by inscription on the *Pao Yu*. (E. L. Shaughnessy [“The Role of the Grand Protector Shi,” 140–42] has concluded that the the *Pao Yu* should be renamed the *Ch’uo Yu* after the recipient.)⁴⁸⁵ Although debate continues, it appears likely that King Wu compelled important families to immigrate to the capital region, as argued by Tu Cheng-sheng, “Lüeh-lun Yin Yi-min te Ts’ao-yü yü Ti-wei,” 661–709; and Chang Huai-t’ung, “Wu Wang Fa Chou Shih-shih Pu-k’ao,” CKSYC 2010:4, 59–74, who stresses the deliberate exploitation of these clans for their skills and cultural knowledge.⁴⁸⁶ Citing Shirakawa, Ku Chieh-kang notes that bronze inscriptions provide evidence that a number of Shang clans continued their allegiance to the Chou including Ch’ien and the group leaders on the *Hsiao Ch’ien X Kuei*, the Lord of Eh on the *Ch’eng Ting*, the Hu on the *Shih Hu Kuei*, Ling on the *Ling Kuei*, and others who distinguished themselves in a military role. (See Ku Chieh-kang, “San-chien chi Tung-fang Chu-kuo te Fan-Chou Chün-shih Hsing-tung ho Chou-kung te Tui-ts’e – Chou-kung Tung-cheng Shih-shih K’ao-cheng chih san,” HCCHS 1987:2, 68.) The office of *shih*, initially a sort of enhanced secretarial assistant entrusted with duties ranging from actually being a scribe through officiating at sacrifices and exercising military command, gradually declined over time to being more of a record keeper and high administrative official.⁴⁸⁷ Wang Chien-chün, “Yin Chou Shih-ch’i te “Chü-tsu” chi-ch’i Hsiang-kuan Wen-t’i,” KKWW 2010:1, 57–62. (From HJ5771, they are known to have had a contingent of three hundred archers in the Shang.)⁴⁸⁸ Tu Cheng-sheng, “Lüeh-lun Yin Yi-min te Ts’ao-yü yü Ti-wei,” 669–74. (Tu’s assessment is based upon inscriptions found on several bronze vessels discovered in a horde at Fu-feng, the very heart of Chou territory. However, their exact relationship with Wei-tzu requires further inquiry.)⁴⁸⁹ Tu Cheng-sheng, “Lüeh-lun Yin Yi-min te Ts’ao-yü yü Ti-wei,” 674–81. (Tu’s assessment if based upon eleven different vessels found in another horde.) As will be seen below, Lu Tung commanded troops assigned to Ch’eng Chou under Po Huai-fu against the Huai and his son Po Tung led the *Hu-ch’ien* and others against the Huai Yi. (The question of whether Lu Fu was a different person from Wu Keng lies well beyond the scope of our investigation. However, for another example of core Shang clan participation see Tu’s article, 682–87.)⁴⁹⁰ Although generally accepted by traditional scholars, for Ch’i-tzu to have been Hsin’s uncle would require that he be seventy or older at the time of the conquest.⁴⁹¹ It has sometimes been claimed that Ch’i-tzu was the Grand Tutor who appears in a discussion of the state’s impending doom with Wei-tzu himself.⁴⁹² For a translation of the “Wei-tzu chih Ming,” see James Legge, *The Shoo King*, 376–80. For a rather different interpretation of events, see Ch’ien Li-chu [“Wei-tzu Feng-chien K’ao,” HCCHS 2006:2, 13–22], who believes it was Wei-tzu’s nephew enfeoffed in Sung.⁴⁹³ Ch’ien Li-chu. “Wei-tzu Feng-chien K’ao.” HCCHS 2006:2, 13–22.⁴⁹⁴ Numerous scholars such as Yang Shan-ch’ün (“Chou-kung Tung-cheng Shih-chien ho Lu-hsien te K’ao-ch’ü,” HCCHS 1988:11, 35) assume Wu Keng was emplaced at Chao-ko. (The continued use of the honorific “wu” in his posthumous title is puzzling.)⁴⁹⁵ Ku Chieh-kang, for example, doesn’t think Huo had any such role. See “San-chien’ Jen-wu chi-ch’i Chiang-ti,” *Wen-shih* 22 (1984), 6–13; and “Wu Wang te Ssu chi-ch’i Nien-sui ho Chi-yüan,” HCCHS 1984:3, 37.⁴⁹⁶ For typical

discussions see Ch'en Ch'ang-yüan and Ch'en Lung-wen, "'San-chien' Jen-wu Chiang-to chi ch'i Ti-wang Pien-hsi," HCCHS 2004:4, 59–66; Wang Yung-p'o, "Chou-ch'u Yin Tung-san-kuo Feng-chien Wang-tai Shih-cheng—chien T'an Shang-ku-shih chih Chiao-wang Kuo-cheng ho Ch'ung-chien," *San-tai Wen-ming Yen-chiu*, 333–44; Yang K'uan, *Hsi Chou Shih*, 113–25; and Ku Chieh-kang, "'San-chien' Jen-wu chi-ch'i Chiang-ti," *Wen-shih* 22 (1984), 1–19. (According to Ku, the northern part encompassed southern and middle Hebei province and was assigned to Wu Keng; the eastern portion, which included eastern Henan, southwest Shandong, and northwest Jiangsu, was controlled by Kuan-shu; and the western segment, which covered the Yin capital, northeast Henan, and western Shandong, was allotted to Ts'ai-shu.)⁴⁹⁷ Yang Shan-ch'ün ["Chou-kung Tung-cheng Shih-chien ho Lu-hsien te K'ao-ch'a," HCCHS 1988:11, 35] locates Kuan in the Henan Cheng-chou city area, Ts'ai at Henan Shang-ts'ai-hsien, and Huo (quite surprisingly, way back) at Shanxi Huo-hsien, so that they exercised supervisory functions from the south, southeast, and northwest. Surprisingly, recent archaeological discoveries have been interpreted as suggesting that Wa-liu might have been the actual site. (See Cheng-chou-shih WWKK YCS, "Cheng-chou-shih Wa-liu-ts'un Hsi-Chou Tsao-ch'i Mu-tsang [ZGW99M1] Fa-chüeh Chien-pao," WW 2001:6, 28–44.) In this case, Kuan-shu's enclave might have been intended to function as the last bastion in the event of an uprising, but it certainly would have made the task of supervising the Anyang area more difficult.⁴⁹⁸ For example, see *Han Shu*, "Ti-li Chih." However, Ch'en Meng-chia has been noted as believing that Kuan supervised the northern Yin area around Anyang/Wei (Henan Ch'i-hsien area), Ts'ai the northeast area of Yung (Henan Shang-ch'iu), and Huo the northeast of Pei (Hebei Yi-hsien, Lai-shui). Yung is also said to have been to the south of Chao-ko.⁴⁹⁹ See, for example, Yang Shan-ch'ün, "Chou-kung Tung-cheng Shih-chien ho Lu-hsien te K'ao-ch'a," HCCHS 1988:11, 35. Conversely, Ch'en and Ch'en, 61, conclude they exercised their *chien* functions outside their fiefs.⁵⁰⁰ The Western Chou would soon commence dispatching central government agents to the various fiefs, no doubt in part to preclude recurrences of these problems.⁵⁰¹ The "Lu Chou-kung Shih-chia" states that "the Duke of Chou did not go to his fief but remained to assist King Wu." Various texts and their associated commentaries, including chapters in the *Shang Shu* and *Yi Chou-shu*, similarly indicate that the three *kung* (dukes) remained in the capital.⁵⁰² For initial reports, see Hu-nan-sheng WWKK YCS et al., "Hu-nan Ning-hsiang T'an-ho-li Hsi Chou Ch'eng-chih yü Mu-ts'ang Fa-chüeh Chien-pao," WW 2006:6, 4–35, and Hsiang T'ao-ch'u, "T'an-ho-li Ch'eng-chih te Fa-hsien yü Ning-hsiang T'ung-ch'i-ch'ün Tsai Yen-chiu," WW 2006:8, 35–44.⁵⁰³ It has traditionally been accepted that King Wu died just two years after the conquest, but based upon various texts, it has also been held that his demise occurred either five or six years later. (For succinct discussions, see Edward L. Shaughnessy, "On the Authenticity of the Bamboo Annals"; Ku Chieh-kang, "Wu Wang te Ssu chi-ch'i Nien-sui ho Chi-yüan," HCCHS 1984:3, 37–66; or Chao Kuang-hsien, "Kuan-yü Chou-ch'u Nien-tai te Chi-ko Wen-t'i," HCCHS 1988:1, 49–56.) Liu Kuo-chung, "*Shang Shu* 'Chiu Kao' wei T'ien-chiang Ming Ch'i Wo-min Wei Yüan-chi Chieh," CKSYC 2011:1, 87–92.⁵⁰⁴ The *K'ung-tzu Chia-yü*, "Kuan Sung," for example states that King Ch'eng was thirteen when he ascended to the throne on King Wu's death.⁵⁰⁵ E. L. Shaughnessy's "Western Zhou History" in *The Cambridge History of Ancient China* (310–17) encapsulates his somewhat controversial views on the Duke of Chou's likely usurpation of power and the Duke of Shao's criticism found in his earlier article, "The Duke of Zhou's Retirement in the East and the Beginnings of the Ministerial–Monarch Debate in Chinese Political Philosophy," EC 18 (1993), 41–72, also reprinted in *Before Confucius*. (In addition, see David S. Nivison's rebuttal, "An Interpretation of the Shao Kao," EC 20 [1995], 176–93, based upon a different reading of two critical *Shang Shu* documents, particularly the "Ta Kao," and Ch'i

Liang, “Chou Kung Shih-chi Hsin-shuo,” HCCHS 1991:6, 32–38.)⁵⁰⁶ As portrayed in the *Shang Shu*’s “T’ang Shih.” However, not without merit, it has been claimed that this section was composed by Chou propagandists seeking to justify their usurpation of Shang authority.⁵⁰⁷ According to the *Shu Hsü*, “When King Wu died, the three supervisors and the Huai Yi revolted. The Duke of Chou, acting as minister to King Ch’eng, wanted to disperse the Yin and so composed the ‘Ta Kao.’” A complex text found in both versions of the *Shang Shu* and variously said to be genuine or a work of the later Western Chou, it appears to be written in the language of the period. The opening words, “*wang juo yüeh*, ” might be best understood as “it is as if the king speaks as follows,” rather than that the Duke of Chou had assumed the title of king or the child ruler actually gave such an address.⁵⁰⁸ Whether the passage represents the edict derived from the oracle and thus the mandate of Heaven or, as is more likely because of the form of oracular divination from the Shang onward, the charge for which a response was desired continues to be argued, as well as reflected in the modern English translations.

Even though the “Ta Kao” apparently dates from the early Western Chou, allowance should be made for probable embellishments and the reconstruction of the original admonition. At the same time, there well may have been a transcription or prepared text for the speech that served as the basis for this version. (For a complete translation see James Legge, translator, *The Shoo King*, 362–75, or Bernhard Karlgren, *The Book or Documents*, 36–39. W. A. C. H. Dobson also provides an evaluation and translation of the “Ta Kao” in *Early Archaic Chinese*, 151–54.)

⁵⁰⁹ This assertion would spawn unsubstantiated historical assertions that the ten were prescient members of the Shang who had chosen to be loyal to the newly emergent Chou. However, being unnamed, they are more likely to have been Chou clan members or notable worthies because foreign wanderers were unlikely to have had access to tribal councils or high-ranking members of the Chou warrior nobility.⁵¹⁰ The *ning wang* or “tranquilizing kings.”⁵¹¹ Including the *Shang Hsü* (or *Shu Hsü*) and his biography in the *Shih Chi*, “Lu Chou-kung Shih-chia.”⁵¹² Among discussions of this issue over the decades the following are particularly useful: Ku Chieh-kang, “Chou Kung Chih-cheng Ch’eng Wang,” *Wen-shih* 23 (1985), 1–30 (who notes some divination shards suggest the Duke of Chou styled himself king but the evidence is inconclusive); Ko Chih-yi, “Chou Kung She-cheng Chi-nien K’ao,” HCCHS 2001:1, 65–72; Yang Hsiang-k’uei, “Lun ‘Chou Kao’ chung Chou Kung te Cheng-chih Ti-wei Wen-t’i,” HCCHS 1991:3, 36–40; Kuo Yin, “Chou Kung Hwan-cheng Ch’eng Wang Shuo Chih-yi,” HCCHS 1997:1, 15–21; Li Chiao-fa, “Lüeh-lun Chou Kung yü Hsi Chou Fa-chih,” HCCHS 1993:8, 35–38; Ch’i Liang, “Chou Kung Shih-chi Hsin-shuo,” HCCHS 1991:6, 32–38; and Yang Chao-ming’s dedicated chapter “Chou Kung Sheh-cheng erh wei Ch’eng Wang” in his *Chou Kung Shih-chi Yen-chiu* (Cheng-chou: Chung-chou Ku-chieh, 2001), 42–137. Also see Edward L. Shaughnessy, “The Role of the Grand Protector Shi in the Consolidation of the Zhou Conquest” in *Before Confucius: Studies in the Creation of the Chinese Classics* (Albany: State University of New York, 1997; reprint of same from *Ars Orientalis* 24 (1989), 137–64, and his “The Duke of Zhou’s Retirement in the East and the Beginnings of the Ministerial-Monarch Debate in Chinese Political Philosophy,” EC 18 (1993), 40–72, also found in *Before Confucius*, 101–36. Yang K’uan, for example, believes the situation was sufficiently dire that the duke had to actually become king rather than just act as his nominee; otherwise, he would have been unable to coerce people into obeying his directives and responding to the government’s needs. (See his *Hsi Chou Shih*, 126–29.)⁵¹³ For an extensive examination, see E. L. Shaughnessy, “The Duke of Zhou’s Retirement in the East and the Beginnings of the Ministerial-Monarch Debate in Chinese Political Philosophy,” EC 18 (1993), 40–72, also found in *Before Confucius*,

101–36. ⁵¹⁴ See Wang Hui, “Chou-ch’u Kai-chih K’ao,” CKSYC 2000:2, 19–33, but especially 28–30. ⁵¹⁵ According to the “Kuan Ts’ai Shih-chia” in the *Shih Chi*, Kuan was older than Tan but Yang Chao-ming claims that Tan, the Duke of Chou, was older than Kuan-shu. (See “Chou Kung Chang yü Kuan-shu K’ao,” HCCHS 1999:1, 70–76.) ⁵¹⁶ Surprisingly, Ssu-ma Ch’ien essentially memorialized them with a conjoined biography in his *Shih Chi*, one that retains value despite its succinctness even though it claims that only Fa (King Wu) and Tan (Duke of Chou) were sagacious (*hsien*). ⁵¹⁷ *Tso Chuan*, Ting Kung, 4th year. ⁵¹⁸ Based on the statement in the “Lu Chou Kung Shih-chia” that “when King Ch’eng (assumed) the management of affairs, some men slandered the Duke of Chou so he fled to Ch’u,” Yang Shan-ch’ün (“Chou-kung Tung-cheng Shih-chien ho Lu-hsien te K’ao-ch’a,” HCCHS 1988:11, 33–34) believes the Duke of Chou went to Ch’u for a brief period rather than to the east for two years. (Tan-yang’s proximity and consequent short travel time is seen as making such a brief retirement possible.) He was recalled after the king found the prayer calling upon the spirits to take him instead of King Ch’eng, who had been sick (which is similar to the story that he offered to die in place of King Wu in the “Chin T’eng,” suggesting that a basic tale that featured King Wu has been repeated without basis.) He also believes that after the duke returned, Chou Kung composed the “Tuo Shih” to admonish King Ch’eng about licentious and idleness, contrary to the *Shang Hsü*, which claims it was directed to segments of the populace from Yin that had been moved to Ch’eng Chou. ⁵¹⁹ Or “Metal Bound Coffin” in James Legge’s translation, *The Shoo King*, 351–61. ⁵²⁰ This sort of interpretation well coheres with late Warring States and early Han thought, strongly suggesting that the melodramatic aspects in both the “Chin T’eng” and *Bamboo Annals* originated then. ⁵²¹ “Lu Chou-kung Shih-chia,” *Shih Chi*. ⁵²² This interpretation is (quite reasonably) based upon understanding the character *pi/p’i*, whose range of meanings can include “law” as in “impose legal measures/punishment on” through “open” and “avoid,” but also “eliminate” or “get rid off,” as “eliminating” (the rebels) rather than “avoiding” (the court and dwelling in retirement). ⁵²³ For a detailed analysis and extensive discussion of the retirement question, see E.

L. Shaughnessy, “The Duke of Zhou’s Retirement in the East and the Beginnings of the Ministerial-Monarch Debate in Chinese Political Philosophy,” EC 18 (1993), 40–72, also found in *Before Confucius*, 101–36. Shaughnessy concludes he was compelled to retire in some disrepute, having lost in the power struggle with King Ch’eng and the Duke of Shao over the disposition of the mandate and powers of ministers, and lived the last two years in exile in the area formerly known as Kai (Yen), in Lu.

⁵²⁴ For translations of this ode, Mao 155, see James Legge, *The She King*, 233–35, or E. L. Shaughnessy, “Duke of Chou’s Retirement” in *Before Confucius*, 120. ⁵²⁵ The reconstruction proposed here depends upon the tenuous, but hopefully judicious, employment of materials embedded in crucial traditional texts such as the *Shang Shu*, *Shih Chi*, *Yi Chou-shu*, *Lü-shih Ch’un-ch’iu*, *Mencius*, and even *Shih Ching*, augmented wherever possible by recently recovered bronze inscriptions and archaeological discoveries. The *Shang Shu* and *Yi Chou-shu* documents attributed to the early period, although of uncertain dates, are believed to reflect the substance of current issues. Some of the language in fact appears in near contemporary bronze inscriptions, but in general, the documents are too lengthy, wordy, and reflective of later concerns to be pristine originals. Nevertheless, all the major historical accounts (such as the *T’ung Shih*) extensively use them to construct their portraits of the period.

In addition to particularly useful overviews provided by Yang K’uan (*Hsi Chou*

Shih , 126– 48) and Luo K'un (*Hsia Shang Hsi Chou Chün-shih Shih* , 236–47), several focal articles over the past half century including Ku Chieh-kang's posthumous published series with the title "Chou Kung Tung-cheng Shih-shih K'ao-cheng" and Ts'ao Ting-yün's "Pei-ching Liu-li-ho Ch'u-t'u te Hsi Chou Pu-chia yü Shao Kung Pu 'Ch'eng Chou'," KK 2008:6, 80–84, have reinterpreted the results of centuries of traditional but still critical scholarship.

⁵²⁶ Mencius IIB9. ⁵²⁷ Based upon the "Ch'in Pen-chi" Yang K'uan (*Hsi Chou Shih* , 523) has identified Fei Lien as a Ying (Ch'in) clan ancestor formerly associated with Emperor Hsin who had been known for "*shan tsou* " (which means "excelled at running"). Since the Ch'in's early progenitor had been skilled at training animals, Yang interprets passage as the Chou literally seeking to eliminate anyone associated with nomadic practices. However, it seems more likely that "*shan tsou* " would have been applied to someone good at maneuvering and that the animals were unit designations, not to be confused with the five animal schools associated with late martial arts practice. ⁵²⁸ However, note that according to the *Chin-pen Bamboo Annals* , in King Wu's sixteenth year, the Chou royal armies had already extinguished it. Obviously it wasn't extinguished twice, despite contorted efforts to justify this obviously erroneous entry. ⁵²⁹ The Hsiung and Ying tend to be identified as members of the Tung Yi; the Hsü are sometimes said to be the leaders of the Ying clan groups; and Yen and the Hsiung also said to be members of the Chu-jung peoples. However, these identifications are highly tenuous, not particularly informative, and subject to debate. ⁵³⁰ "T'ai Kung Ch'i Shih-chia" notes that the T'ai Kung was ordered to rectify five marquises and nine earls. (For the ancestry issue, see Ku Chieh-kang, "San-chien chi Tung-fang Chu-kuo te Fan-Chou Chün-shih Hsing-tung ho Chou-kung te Tui-ts'e—Chou-kung Tung-cheng Shih-shih K'ao-cheng chih san," HCCHS 1987:2, 59–69. Ku believes even Ch'u and Ch'in were then located in the east and participated in the rebellion and that the suppression campaign penetrated well into the south.) ⁵³¹ According to the "Ts'ai Chung chih Ming" preface to the *Bamboo Annals* , he was executed; however, the *Yi Chou-shu* , "Tso Luo," states that he hung himself. ⁵³² According to the *Yi Chou-shu* , "Tso Luo," Ts'ai-shu was imprisoned at Kuo-ling. However, according to the combined biographies for Kuan and Ts'ai in the *Shih Chi* , the Duke of Chou displaced Ts'ai-shu but gave him ten chariots and seventy followers. ⁵³³ "Ts'ai Chung chih Ming" preface to the *Bamboo Annals* . ⁵³⁴ He receives no mention in the *Yi Chou-shu* . ⁵³⁵ Ts'ao Ting-yün ("Pei-ching Liu-li-ho Ch'u-t'u te Hsi Chou Pu-chia yü Shao Kung Pu 'Ch'eng Chou'," KK 2008:6, 80–84) claims the Duke of Shao was the commander in chief of the troops tasked with the northeast suppression campaigns. ⁵³⁶ *Yi Chou-shu* , "Tso Luo." ⁵³⁷ "Shuo-lin, Shang." ⁵³⁸ Yang Shan-ch'ün holds the opinion that the Eight Yin Armies were composed of the troops from Kuan-shu and Wu Keng's forces. Having just surrendered, they couldn't immediately be used against Yen and other strong states, so the southern campaigns had to be initiated first. (Yang Shan-ch'ün, "Chou-kung Tung-cheng Shih-chien ho Lu-hsien te K'ao-ch'a," HCCHS 1988:11, 37.) However, whether the eight had already been created is an open question. ⁵³⁹ Reading *huo* as a region rather than a state but otherwise following the interpretation of E. L. Shaughnessy and previous commentators. (See, for example, "The Role of the Grand Protector Shi," 140.) The *Pao Yu* (or *Ch'uo Yu*) and *Pao Tsun* actually record an audience and awards granted to someone surnamed Ch'uo, apparently a member of the Shang who did not revolt but participated in the campaign. (There is some question as to what sort of action was intended, the character *chi* [which normally means something like "to extend to"] being variously explained by Shaughnessy [note 26, 157 of "Grand Protector"] as meaning "to reach" in the sense of "to apprehend." ⁵⁴⁰ The authenticity of the *Jan Fang Ting* is extensively analyzed by E. L. Shaughnessy, Sources, 45–62. ⁵⁴¹ Luo K'un, *Hsia Shang*

Hsi-Chou Chün-shih-shih , 241, interprets the inscription as referring to the pre-attack plans, the king's having come up to the forward base at Wei where he gave orders for the preparations. However, the *Hsiao Ch'en Tan Chih* (JC 6512) records that the Duke of Chou made an award at Ch'eng Chou after "the king had extinguished the Shang." The *Yi-hou Tse Kuei* (JC 4320) refers to the present king's having looked at the maps of King Wu's and King Ch'eng's attacks on the Shang as well as those for the Eastern States. Given his youth (and therefore lack of martial training), not to mention that the Duke of Shao and Duke of Chou were powerful figures, "big men" in control, the king is unlikely to have exercised any sort of authoritarian or battlefield role.)⁵⁴² Although the contents seem relatively clear, there is some question as to the actual target. Yang K'uan (*Hsi Chou Shih* , 524) understands it a small state named Lu rather than Wu Keng, one possibly located at Liu-an in Anhui (as suggested by Kuo Mo-jo), whose ruler had been titled a "tzu" because of his submission to the Chou but later rebelled and was therefore attacked by the *T'ai Pao* . The reading seems forced, but he notes that, as attested by bronze inscriptions, Lu reappears later in a supporting role. On the other hand, Luo K'un (*Hsia Shang Hsi-Chou Chün-shih-shih* , 213–14) believes Lu-tzu Sheng refers to Wu Keng's son who also revolted and was therefore eliminated by the Duke of Shao.⁵⁴³ Punctuating the inscription after *Chou Kung mou* and therefore reading as, "After he had returned from attacking the Lord of Kai for which the Duke of Chou had done the planning." However, note that in "The Duke of Zhou's Retreat," 106, E. L. Shaughnessy translates it as, "The king attacked the lord of Gai. The Duke of Chou planned with Ch'in to make entreaty."⁵⁴⁴ "T'ai Kung Ch'i Shih-chia."⁵⁴⁵ For a brief appraisal of Anyang's defensive weakness see Sawyer, *Ancient Chinese Warfare* , 145–51.⁵⁴⁶ Ku Chieh-kang has suggested that Yen was also a Ying clan state. See "San-chien chi Tung-fang Chu-kuo te Fan-Chou Chün-shih Hsing-tung ho Chou-kung te Tui-ts'e—Chou-kung Tung-cheng Shih-shih K'ao-cheng chih san," HCCHS 1987:2, 61.⁵⁴⁷ In the tomb text fragment known as "Four Changes," Sun-tzu discusses the relative advantages of attacking fortified cities when on the march, offering a somewhat different perspective from his well-known admonition not to undertake assaults unless unavoidable. (For a translation, see Sawyer, *Sun-tzu Art of War* , 244–45.)⁵⁴⁸ In Jiangsu, the refugees apparently established Yen-ch'eng, reportedly a large city with three concentric walls and two moats for each of the two outer walls, each moat reportedly one *chang* (eight feet) deep and an immense eleven or twelve *chang* wide. Marked by segregated royal quarters, the outer wall had a circumference of six *li* and the inner three *li* . (The reliability of this account is unknown but for a brief discussion see Ho Kuang-yüeh, "Yen-kuo te Lai-yüan ho Ch'ien-hsi," *Chung-kuo Ku-tai-shih* , 1995:5, 32–36.)⁵⁴⁹ Ku Chieh-kang ("Yen ho P'u-ku te Nan-ch'ien—Chou-kung Tung-cheng Shih-shih K'ao-cheng chih san," HCCHS 1989:8, 48) is among proponents of the former, while Ho Kuang-yüeh ("Yen-kuo te Lai-yüan ho Ch'ien-hsi," *Chung-kuo Ku-tai-shih* , 1995:5, 34) espouses the castration view based upon the etymology of Yen's name.⁵⁵⁰ Especially by Yang Ch'ao-ming, "Chou-kung Tung-cheng Shih-shih Ch'uan-shuo," HCCHS 2001:2, 48–54. (The idea of the Huai Yi suppression's requiring three years derives from a statement in the Duke of Chou's biography in the *Shih Chi* .)⁵⁵¹ See, for example, Yang Ch'ao-ming, "Chou-kung Tung-cheng Shih-shih Ch'uan-shuo," HCCHS 2001:2, 48–54.⁵⁵² It should be noted that interpretations of this ode vary considerably. Arthur Waley, for example, understands it as a sorrowful description of a warrior long away on campaign who returns to find desolation and abandonment because his wife had assumed he had perished and remarried (explaining the reference of the gaiety of the new union). While a poignant rendering, it is not sustained by any of the traditional commentators or, it would seem, by the practices common to the era, the second marriage unlikely to have been undertaken with the pomp and joy of a first

marriage. (See Waley, *The Book of Songs* , #125, 116–17.) ⁵⁵³ Mao 157. ⁵⁵⁴ Interpretations of the speakers also vary, including that they are the rebellious members of the Shang. Accordingly, the ode would become more a paean in praise of the Duke of Chou's Virtue and restraint than the misery suffered by the soldiers dispatched for the task. ⁵⁵⁵ Yang Shan-ch'ün, "Chou-kung Tung-cheng Shih-chien ho Lu-hsien te K'ao-ch'a," HCCHS 1988:11, 33–43, views a number of vessels generally attributed to subsequent reigns or (as here), later operations under King Ch'eng, as part of the three year effort.¹ ⁵⁵⁶ See Hsu and Linduff, *Western Chou Civilization* , 113–19; Tu Cheng-sheng, "Lüeh-lun Yin i-min the tsao-yü yü ti-wei," BIHP 53 (December 1982), 661–709; Ho Tzu-chin, "Chung-kuo te Tsao-ch'i Wen-ming ho Kuo-chia te Ch'i-yüan," CKSYC 1995:2, 3–10; and the discussion on Ch'eng Chou, which follows below. (It's thought that the so-called *wan min* —*wan* meaning obstinate, wayward, stupid, corrupt, greedy—were dispatched to Ch'eng Chou.) ⁵⁵⁷ The text appears in both the ancient and current editions of the *Shang Shu* . ⁵⁵⁸ A term used by the Shang to refer to their capital, as shown by numerous occurrences in their oracular inscriptions. ⁵⁵⁹ However, in a paper entitled "The Shu and Chinese Legal History," presented at the American Oriental Society's 222nd Meeting, 2012, E. Bruce Brooks concludes that the "K'ang Kao" is a discursive product of the Warring States Period intended to promote new concepts of law and punishment. ⁵⁶⁰ Scholars such as Ho Tzu-chin ("Chung-kuo te Tsao-ch'i Wen-ming ho Kuo-chia te Ch'i-yüan," CKSYC, 1995:2, 3–10) believe Shang labor service obligations were more onerous than imposed on Chou natives, as would be expected. Unfortunately, apart from the prominent example of Ch'eng Chou, no records exist. ⁵⁶¹ For a translation see James Legge, *The Shoo King* , 399–412. Opinion varies about the "Chiu Kao's" authenticity as well as the overall accuracy of the claim that the Shang had become immersed in drunkenness even though a high percentage of vessels recovered from Shang sites were intended for heating and serving wine. ⁵⁶² There is a certain amount of tension between two views expressed in the various *Shang Shu* documents and relevant chapters of the *Yi Chou-shu* , as well as within the latter. It has traditionally been claimed—perhaps emphasized might be a better term—that the Chou did not claim to be mounting a revolution or forcibly overthrowing the realm's sanctioned government; rather that the Shang had lost the mandate, "let it fall," whereupon Heaven, in responding to the needs of the people, recognized the Chou's potential to resolve the looming problems and therefore accorded it the necessary sanction. This view appears in several documents, as well as in early bronze inscriptions, but there are also far more forceful assertions that they received a mandate to conquer, even extinguish the Shang. For example, in the "Shao Kao," the idea is clearly expressed that Heaven ended their *ming* , but in the "Chiu Kao," a more moderate view of the *ming* 's falling to the ground appears. (However, Virginia Kane ["Aspects of Western Chou Appointment Inscriptions," EC 8 (1982–1983), 25, note 4] notes that in the *Ta Yü Ting* , in speaking about the loss of mandate, "the verb used is [*shu*], a neutral, non-judgmental term meaning merely 'to hand over,' 'to pass a long,' or 'to proceed to.' To equate this verb with [*chui* / fall down / sink], as Kuo Mo-jo and others have done, may actually violate an important piece of evidence concerning Early Western Chou attitudes toward their Shang predecessors." [Words in brackets indicate the Chinese characters used in the original note.]) The "Tuo Shih" asserts that King Wu stated that their mandate was to "*kua* ," "cut up" or "cut off," Yin; the *Yi Chou-shu* 's "Shang Shih" states that "Shang Ti mandated that our small state conquer the state of Shang (*ko Shang-kuo*)." ⁵⁶³ Based on the "Chiu Kao," Tu Cheng-sheng concluded, perhaps prematurely, that the Shang retained the ranks of *hou* , *tien* , *nan* , *wei* , and *pang-po* and had officials with the titles of *pai-liao* and *shu-yin* for the ordinary people, the "*shu* ," as well as *Wei-ya* , *Wei-fu* , *Tsung-kung* , and *Li-chün* for the *pai-hsing* , literally "hundred surnames" but anachronistic

at this time. (Tu Cheng-sheng, “Lüeh-lun Yin Yi-min te Ts’ao-yü yü Ti-wei,” *Li-shih Yü-yen Yen-chiu-suo Chi-k’an* 53:4 (1982), 665.) ⁵⁶⁴ Although not universally accepted, basing their arguments on textual vestiges and archaeological evidence, a number of scholars believe that up to several thousand families were also shifted into Kuan-chung. For example see Hsü and Linduff, *Western Chou Civilization*, 116, and Tu Cheng-sheng, “Lüeh-lun Yin Yi-min te Ts’ao-yü yü Ti-wei,” *Li-shih Yü-yen Yen-chiu-suo Chi-k’an* 53:4 (1982), 661–64. ⁵⁶⁵ Ho Tzu-chin, for example, believes these separate enclaves only gradually amalgamated in the Spring and Autumn Period when location rather than clan came to determine identity and loyalty. (Ho Tzu-chin, “Chung-kuo te Tsao-ch’i Wen-ming ho Kuo-chia te Ch’i-yüan,” CKSYC, 1995:2, 3–10.) ⁵⁶⁶ For brief discussions, see Kuo Hsü-tung, “Yin-hsü Chia-ku-wen Suo-chien te Shang-tai Chün-li,” CKSYC 2010:2, 47–69. ⁵⁶⁷ For a discussion of Shang mobilization methods, see Sawyer, *Ancient Chinese Warfare*, 215–24. ⁵⁶⁸ Wang Hui, “Chou-ch’u Kai-chih K’ao,” CKSYC 2000:2, 19–33. The *Chou Li*, one of the three cardinal books of rites with the *Yi Li* and *Li Chi*, centers on an idealistic reconstruction (or perhaps fantasized projection) of a highly systematized administration that fully accords with the seasons and fundamental Confucian principles. It lacks a translation into English, but for an overview, see William G. Boltz, “Chou li,” in M. Loewe, ed., *Early Chinese Texts*. Traditionally attributed to Chou Kung himself, the characters, style of writing, and historical and philosophical content show the *Chou Li* to be a work of the late Warring States Period. Although therefore not a forgery created by Liu Hsin, it is of little utility in discussing early Chou military organization. (Ch’ên Lien-ch’ing, who has analyzed the influence of Warring States materials on the text, notes that the military organization tends to be derived from parts of the *Kuan-tzu*. [“*Chou Li* Ch’eng-shu Nien-tai te Hsin T’an-suo,” *Chung-kuo Ku-tai-shih Yen-chiu* (1991), 892–919.]) For brief discussions of the text, see Bernhard Karlgén, “The Early History of the *Chou li* and *Tso chuan* Texts,” BMFEA 3 (1931), 1–59, and Sven Broman, “Studies on the *Chou li*,” BMFEA 33 (1961), 1–89. ⁵⁶⁹ Wang Hui, “Chou-ch’u Kai-chih K’ao,” CKSYC 2000:2, 24–26; Han Tung-yü, “Ts’ung Chou-tai She-hui Chieh-kou K’an ‘Li’ te She-hui Kung-neng,” HCHS 1986:10, 35–40. ⁵⁷⁰ Although it doesn’t settle arguments about when and where Ch’i was first established, it might be noted that apart from the information contained in his biography (reprised below), the *Han Shu*’s “Ti-li Chih” states, “During King Ch’eng’s reign the P’u-ku clan and four eastern states together fomented chaos. King Ch’eng extinguished them and enfeoffed the Shih Shang-fu [there].” ⁵⁷¹ Insofar as extensive English language discussions of Chou dynasty fiefs may be found in *Western Chou Civilization*, 149–85, *Landscape and Power* (which is particularly recommended for its extensive geographical information and topographical detail), and Luo K’un’s *Hsia Shang Hsi-Chou Chün-shih-shih*, our succinct examination is confined to states with military significance. ⁵⁷² The “Chou Pen-chi” states: “He had Wei-tzu K’ai replace [Wu Keng] in order to continue Yin’s posterity, his state being Sung.” ⁵⁷³ For a brief discussion see Fu Ssu-nien, “Chou Tung-feng yü Yin Yi-min,” BIHP 4:3, 285–90. ⁵⁷⁴ *Shou Yüan*, “Chih Kung,” but also found in the *Lü-shih Ch’un-ch’iu*. The anecdote includes another savant who positions his city in the midst of others for similar reasons and is prefaced by the claim that the Duke of Chou had not been as perspicacious as the T’ai Kung in selecting the area for his fief, Ch’ü-fu supposedly being neither as fertile nor as topographically secure as Ying-ch’iu. (This fallaciously presumes they had a choice rather than simply having had territory allocated to them by the king or oligarchs.) ⁵⁷⁵ In addition to the general discussions cited above, see Yang Chao-ming, “Shih-lun Hsi-Chou Shih-ch’i Lu-kuo ‘Yin-min Liu-tsu’ te She-hui Ti-wei,” HCHS 1996:6, 49–52. Yang (52) notes that the respective burial customs particularly illustrate the preservation of distinctive practices. However, certain Shang practices (such as the

burning of witches) were also adopted and even imposed on the Yen segment, and Yin altars stood side by side with Chou sacrificial altars. ⁵⁷⁶ Lionel M. Jensen, "Wise Man of the Wilds: Fatherlessness, Fertility, and the Mythic Exemplar, Kongzi," EC 20 (1995), 407–37. ⁵⁷⁷ "Yen Shao Kung Shih-chia." The text adds that "Duke Shih of Shao had the same surname as the Chou, being named Chi." (For discussions of Yen's establishment and character, see Hsü and Linduff, *Western Chou Civilization*, 194–201; Li Feng, *Landscape*, 335–42; Ch'ü Ying-chieh, "Chou-tai Yen-kuo K'ao," LSYC 1996:5, 60–74; and Wang Ts'ai-mei, *Yen-kuo Chien-shih*. The area had apparently been the site of an earlier protostate called Yen that existed under the Shang umbrella, hence the designation.) According to the *Shou Yüan*, "Chih Kung," Shao Kung divined about it just as Chou Kung did about Lu. ⁵⁷⁸ See note 590, below. ⁵⁷⁹ Opinion on this reading, which turns upon whether the character k'o refers to a name or should be understood as meaning something like "undertake responsibility for," though tending to the former, is far from unanimous. (There is also disagreement over whether the exercise of responsibility over the ten enumerated peoples noted in the next line refers to Yen's domain or the Chou as a whole. However, the former seems a preferable understanding.) For further discussion, also see Luo K'un, "Li Kuei 'Sui Ting' Hsi-yi," KK 2006:9, 55–60. ⁵⁸⁰ Archaeological activity related to the Shang / Chou interstice in this area has been highly productive. For two recent reports see Ch'ü Ying-lieh, "Chou-tai Yen-kuo K'ao," LSYC 1996:5, 60–74 and Liu Hsü and Chao Fu-sheng, "Liu-li-ho Yi-chih Hsi-Chou Yen Wen-hua te Hsin Jen-shih," WW 1997:4, 34–41. ⁵⁸¹ See Hsu and Linduff, *Western Chou Civilization*, 195–98, or Ch'en En-lin, "Lu, Ch'i, Yen te Shih-feng chi Yen yü P'i te Kuan-hsi," LSYC 1996:4, 15–23. Chang Pi-p'o, "Lun Chou-ch'ü te Su-shen-tsu yü Chou-jen tui Tung-pei Ching-lieh," HCCHS 2001:3, 39, claims that the Yen area actually included nine former fang-kuo including Ku-chu, Yung-ling, Tzu-yü, and Yu-hou. ⁵⁸² Liu-li-ho KKT, "Liu-li-ho Yi-chih 1996-nien-tu Fa-chüeh Chien-pao," WW 1997:6, 4–13. ⁵⁸³ "Middle Strategy." The *Tso Chuan* (Hsi Kung, 4th year) also states that after the T'ai Kung was ordered to punish the five marquises and nine *po* in order to sustain the house of Chou, he was allocated rulership of all the land from the ocean to the east as far as the Yellow River in the west and from Mu-ling in the south to Wu-ti in the north. ⁵⁸⁴ This enfeoffment in the central region probably reflects actuality, his fief initially being granted somewhere in the core domain, probably Henan, and only shifted to the upper Shandong area after the second conquest. ⁵⁸⁵ Fu Ssu-nien believed that Ch'i was only minimally non-Shang. If so, given that the T'ai Kung reportedly accorded with their customs rather than imposing Chou cultural norms upon them, it would explain how Shang practices tended to persist until nearly the Spring and Autumn. ⁵⁸⁶ For the initial report see Shan-tung-sheng Wen-wu K'ao-ku Yen-chiu-suo, "Shan-tung Kao-ch'ing-hsien Ch'en-chuang Hsi-Chou Yi-ts'un Fa-chüeh Chien-pao," KK 2011:2, 3–21. ⁵⁸⁷ Ch'en-chuang's identity is discussed by Li Hs'üeh-ch'in and others in an accompanying second article: Li Hs'üeh-ch'in et al., "Shan-tung Kao-ch'ing-hsien Ch'en-chuang Hsi-Chou Yi-chih Pi-t'an," KK 2011:2, 22–32. ⁵⁸⁸ Full inscriptions have not yet been published, but a bronze vessel known as the *Yin Kuei* that apparently postdates King Mu's reign apparently shows the king appointed a central government official to continue to control Ch'i's army just as his ancestor had. This provides significant evidence the king still had significant power over military authority in the protostates. (See Li Hs'üeh-ch'in et al., "Shan-tung Kao-ch'ing-hsien Ch'en-chuang Hsi-Chou Yi-chih Pi-t'an," KK 2011:2, 24–28.) ⁵⁸⁹ The "Chou Pen-chi" contains a somewhat edited account cobbled together from materials found in two Yi Chou-shu chapters, "Tu Yi Chieh" and "Tso Luo Chieh." Unfortunately, despite comparatively copious commentaries many questions remain about the geographical references and exact interpretation of the somewhat laconic remarks attributed to King Wu. ⁵⁹⁰

Among three plastrons discovered at Liu-li-ho, one has the name Ch'eng Chou. (See Ts'ao Ting-yün, "Pei-ching Liu-li-ho Ch'u-t'u te Hsi Chou Pu-chia yü Shao Kung Pu 'Ch'eng Chou'," KK 2008:6, 80–84.) *Shang Shu* chapters primarily show Shao Kung divining about the site's appropriateness. According to the "Shao Kao," the Duke of Shao did the initial divination and laid out the plans; in the "Luo Kao" the Duke of Chou apparently again divined to assess the appropriateness of the terrain and then encouraged the king to sacrifice and conduct ceremonies according to the rites of Yin. (The continued employment of Yin rites was perhaps deemed appropriate to the use of captured Yin populace.) The "Chou Pen-chi" asserts that the Duke of Chou consulted the oracle and went to inspect the city's construction, but Ssu-ma Ch'ien attributes the initial construction and the authorship of these chapters to just before undertaking the second stage of the suppression: the campaign against the Yi and others in the east. (For further discussion of their roles see Yang K'uan, *Hsi Chou Shih*, 160–68.)⁵⁹¹ Aspects of the city continue to be discussed, including whether an entirely new edifice was erected after the second conquest that replaced an old military garrison or the populace and the king had separate cities on opposite sides of the river, Ch'eng Chou itself and the Wang-ch'eng or king's city. It is claimed that there were two forcible immigrations to this area, the first about two years after the conquest [King Ch'eng's third year after defeating Yen], the second when the Wang-ch'eng was built in King Ch'eng's fifth year, and even then another city was built for King P'ing. Conversely, it is also argued that there was just one city on the Ch'an River, a tributary of the Luo, but King P'ing built a new one on the east bank of the Chien River. [For the former view, see P'eng Yü-shang, "Hsin-yi K'ao," HCCHS 2001:1, 51–64; for the latter, Liang Yün, "Ch'eng-Chou yü Wang-ch'eng K'ao-pien," KKWW 2002:5, 51–55. Also note Wang Yü-che, "Hsi Chou P'ang-ching Ti-wang te Tsai T'an-t'ao," CKKTS 1994:4, 48.] The displaced Yin populace probably had separate dwelling quarters.⁵⁹² Several terms can be differently interpreted, some simply as place names (such as P'i and even Wan), others as actual mountains (such as Yü), with San-t'u being variously argued and the term translated above as junction/ conjunction (*jui*) otherwise thought to be a "bend in a river" or "northern side of the a river." In addition, in speaking about dwelling in the *yang* (of *yin* and *yang*, a later combination), an alternate reading is *yi* or "easy," a term that would come to mean accessible in Warring States military thought and appears in the "Chou Pen-chi" version. Finally, most commentators understand the character *hsia* as referring to the dynasty (as discussed below) and therefore the region of the former Hsia Dynasty, which, if the location was still known in King Wu's time, would have been around Erh-li-t'ou and thus somewhat east of Ch'eng Chou. For example, as translated in *The Grand Scribe's Records: The Memoirs of Pre-Han China* edited by William H. Nienhauser, Jr., 63, it reads: "From the north shore of the Luo River to the north shore of the Yi River the land is easily settled and without obstruction. Here was the settlement of the Hsia. If I might gaze south to the San-t'u Mountain and north to the slopes of the Sacred Mountain, if I might look back to the Ho (Yellow River) and look out to the Luo and Yi, this would not be far from a Heavenly residence." (For locations, see the notes to that translation, 62–64, as well as the synthesized commentaries of Huang Huai-hsin et al., *Yi Chou-shu Lei-hui Chi-chu*, 512–14.)⁵⁹³ This is also the essence of Wang Hui's argument, 19–23, cited below.⁵⁹⁴ For discussion and analysis of the inscription, see Michael F. Carson, "Some Grammatical and Graphical Problems in the Ho Tsun Inscription," EC 4 (1978–79), 41–44; Hsu and Linduff, *Western Chou Civilization*, 96–98; and Li Feng, *Landscape*, 62–63. (For more extended discussions also see Luo K'un, *Hsia Shang Hsi-Chou Chiün-shih-shih*, 269–70 and 296–99, and Yang K'uan, *Hsi Chou Shih*, 160–68, 493–96, and 503–12.) Perhaps more credibility has been accorded this vessel than deserved because it may well encompass a deliberate persuasion.⁵⁹⁵ Wang Hui,

"Chou Wu Wang Tung-tu Hsüan-chih K'ao-pien," CKSYC 1998:1, 14–24. Also see Wang Yung-p'o, "Chou-ch'u Yin Tung-san-kuo Feng-chien Wang-tai Shih-cheng—chien T'an Shang-ku-shih chih Chiao-wang Kuo-cheng ho Ch'ung-chien," *San-tai Wen-ming Yen-chiu* , 333–44; T'u Pai-k'uei, "Shuo Ho Tsun te 'Fu...tzu T'ien' chi hsiang-kuan Wen-t'i," KKW 2010:1, 91–94; and Huang Kuo-huai, "Hsin-chien Ho Kuei Ts'ai-yi," KKW 2011:1, 104–6. ⁵⁹⁶ Wang Hui, "Chou Wu Wang Tung-tu Hsüan-chih K'ao-pien," CKSYC 1998:1, 16. ⁵⁹⁷ According to Wang Hui's emendation of *yang to yi* , "easy," understood as "easy terrain." Wang also assumes *jui* means north of the river rather than simply a bend; *yi* means flat terrain so goods will flow freely to the center, and he eventually cites later views that those with Virtue could easily hold it, without Virtue would rapidly lose it. ⁵⁹⁸ Wang Hui, "Chou Wu Wang Tung-tu Hsüan-chih K'ao-pien," CKSYC 1998:1, 17. (There is some controversy about the meaning of "center," whether it was an astronomical definition [which seems unlikely despite Wang's citation of later *Chou Li* material on shadow length] or communication locus.) Hsü Pei-ken (*Chung-kuo kuo-fang ssu-hsiang-shih* , 274–75) claims that King Wu conceived of the Shang as the center of civilized power and strove to move the Chou's center of gravity there. ⁵⁹⁹ Although relevant to the turmoil that beset early Chou rulership, the controversy lies beyond the scope of our study. However, for a seminal discussion, see E. L. Shaughnessy, "The Duke of Zhou's Retirement in the East and the Beginnings of the Minister-Monarch Debate in Chinese Political Philosophy," EC 18 (1993), 41–72 (reprinted in *Before Confucius* , 101–36). ⁶⁰⁰ See D. L. McMullen, "The Cult of Ch'i T'ai-kung and T'ang Attitudes to the Military," *T'ang Studies* 7 [1989]: 59–103. The early T'ang emperors, who valued the martial more than the civil, sanctioned the establishment of a state temple honoring the T'ai Kung as an exemplary military figure and the progenitor of military studies. Yet Confucian-oriented literati, who denigrated the T'ai Kung as a mere military man, continually opposed such efforts. In their view the civil—the *li* and concepts of Virtue—constitutes everything required to govern well. (The battle between adherents of the martial and civil would be unrelenting.) They thus repeatedly cited Confucius's statement that he never studied military affairs (*Analekts* XV:1) but ignored his famous assertion (preserved in his *Shih Chi* biography) that both the civil and martial are necessary. Although they eventually succeeded in having the state cult dismantled, the T'ai Kung unofficially continued to be the patron figure for martial values for centuries more. ⁶⁰¹ A number of passages found among bamboo texts recovered from the early Han indicate that rather than being a forgery of the T'ang dynasty as previously claimed, the text (or at least a portion of it) was in existence in the Warring States Period. Further analysis is needed to date the disparate materials encompassed in its sixty, often-lengthy chapters; one or two traditional military scholars still believe it reflects the tradition of Ch'i military studies and preserves at least vestiges of the oldest strata of Chinese military thought. However, conceptually it falls into middle to late Warring States philosophical milieu and contains extensive material that expands Sun-tzu's ideas, including the idea of the unorthodox, the characteristics and role of commanders, manipulating the enemy, enervating the enemy's *ch'i* , strategic power, and formulating tactics appropriate to specific configurations of terrain. The late Warring States military classic known as the *Three Strategies of Huang-shih Kung* —the Duke of Yellow Rock—has also been associated with his name. (Further discussion and complete translations of the *Six Secret Teachings* [Liu-t'ao] and *Three Strategies* [San-liieh] , see Sawyer, *Seven Military Classics of Ancient China* .) ⁶⁰² Although hardly proof of his existence because of their late nature, references to the T'ai Kung are found in *Hsiin-tzu* , *Han Fei-tzu* , *Lü-shih Ch'un-ch'iu* , *Huai-nan-tzu* , *Kuo-yü* , and *Shuo-yüan* . Extensive dialogues purportedly between the T'ai Kung and King Wu appear in the *Shuo-yüan* , several pages of quotations are seemingly

preserved in the *T'ung-t'ien*, and fragments cited in the *T'ai-p'ing Yü-lan*. In noting that the T'ai Kung had been dwelling off the coast of the Eastern Sea before he was attracted by King Wen's beneficent government, even Mencius (IVA13) acknowledged him as one of the realm's "great old men." ⁶⁰³ For example see Sarah Allan, "The Identities of Taigong Wang in Zhou and Han Literature," MS. 30 (1972-73), 57-99 or her subsequent book, *The Heir and the Sage*. ⁶⁰⁴ In accepting the authenticity of the "Shih-fu" chapter, Ku Chieh-kang, the father of the twentieth century skeptical movement, necessarily acknowledged the T'ai Kung's existence and role. (See his "Yi Chou-shu 'Shih-fu' p'ien chiao-chu hsieh-ting yü p'ing-lun," *Wen-shih* 2 [1963], especially 6-7 where he provides glosses on the passage referring to the T'ai Kung.) In his *Origins of Statecraft in China*, 343-44, H. G. Creel also recognizes his authenticity. Contemporary military histories such as the *Hsia Shang Hsi-Chou Chün-shih-shih* invariably assign a crucial role to him. The T'ai Kung's appearance in the Chou is mentioned in the *Bamboo Annals*. Under King Wen's thirty-first year, the *Ku-pen* version states, "The Hsi Po ordered the troops at Pi and gained Lü Shang as his *shih*." Both editions contain an entry for the king's forty-second year that state, "Hsi Po Fa [ie., King Wu] received a vermillion book [of strategy] from Lü Shang." (A chapter in the late *Ta Tai Li-chi*, "Wu Wang Ch'ien-tso," purportedly records King Wu's inquiry about what sort of actions might benefit a myriad generations.) ⁶⁰⁵ No other non-Chou royal clan member even achieved his level of royal recognition. ⁶⁰⁶ See Wei Ju-lin, *Chung-kuo Li-tai Ming-chiang chi-ch'i Yung-ping Ssu-hsiang*, 2. ⁶⁰⁷ For further discussion of the term *shih* and its military role in the Shang/ Chou era, see *Ancient Chinese Warfare*, 209-11. (Also see Yang Yün-ju, "Chiang-hsing," 109-12.) ⁶⁰⁸ Recent scholars have questioned the veracity of the T'ai Kung's eastern origin as depicted in the *Lü-shih ch'un-ch'iu*. For example, noting the Chiang clan's early marriage relations with the Chou, Yang Yün-ju concluded that the Chiang did not venture eastward until after the Chou conquest. ("Chiang-hsing te min-tsu ho Chiang T'ai-kung te ku-shih," in *Ku-shih pien*, ed. Ku Chieh-kang, vol. 2 [Shang-hai ku-chi, Shanghai, 1982; original copyright 1930], 113-17.) However, Mencius twice (IVA: 14, VIIA:22) mentions that the T'ai Kung dwelled on the coast of the Eastern Sea to avoid King Chou, and the *Hsin-shu* (10:9B) mentions his coming from the seacoast to give his allegiance. ⁶⁰⁹ *Shuo-Yüan*, "Tsa Yen." The *Shih Chi*'s "Ch'i Shih-chia" and *Chan-kuo Ts'e*'s "Ch'i Ts'e" both claim the T'ai Kung was a butcher in the market at Chao-ko before moving on to the Chou. ⁶¹⁰ *Shuo-yüan*, "Tsa Yen." In the *Han-shih Wai-chuan* he is laboring as a boatman when he encounters King Wen. (This incident is translated in James R. Hightower in his *Han shih wai chuan*, 140-42.) ⁶¹¹ *Shuo-yüan*, "Tsun Hsien." ⁶¹² For a discussion of the tradition and importance of "knowing men" in traditional Chinese culture, see Ralph D. Sawyer, *The Tao of Spycraft*. Note that in "Martial Plans," the *Wei Liao-tzu* states: "When T'ai Kung Wang was seventy he butchered cows at Ch'ao Ko and sold food in Meng-chin. He was more than seventy years old but the ruler did not listen to him and people all referred to him as a mad fellow. Then when he met King Wen he commanded a mass of thirty thousand and with one battle All under Heaven was settled. Without his understanding of martial plans how could they have achieved this unification? Thus it is said, 'If a good horse has a whip, a distant road can be traversed; if Worthies and men of rank unite together the Great Tao can be illuminated.'" ⁶¹³ According to the *Bamboo Annals*, the T'ai Kung did not die until King K'ang's sixth year at an age that commentators calculate as 110! ⁶¹⁴ "Ch'i T'ai Kung Shih-chia." ⁶¹⁵ *Lun-yü*, VII:5. ⁶¹⁶ The only contemporary bronze inscriptions that refer to the Duke of Chou—the *Hsiao Ch'en Tan Chih*, *Ch'in Kuei*, and *Jan Fang-ting*—note his participation in the suppressive activity. ⁶¹⁷ Whatever the other evidence, the *Analects* appear to have provided a significant impetus to the idea that the Chou adopted many Shang rituals. For

example, in “Wei Cheng” (2:23): “Tzu Chang asked whether ten generations could be known.” Confucius replied, “Being based upon the ritual forms (*li*) of the Hsia, what the Yin eliminated and added can be known. Being based upon the Shang *li*, what the Chou eliminated and added can be known. Whoever continues the Chou, even a hundred generations hereafter, can be known.” However, in “Pa Hsiu” (3:9) he notes that the practices seen in contemporary heritage states do not adequately exemplify the ancient rituals: “I can speak about the *li* of the Hsia but (the state of Chi) is not sufficient to attest to them. I can speak about the *li* of the Shang but the state of Sung is not able to attest to them. The literary records are inadequate. If they were adequate, then I would be able to attest to them.” Although purportedly a record of the Chou’s administrative and ritual practices, the *Chou Li* is a highly idealized work of the Warring States Period with only vestiges of reality.⁶¹⁸ It would seem that if his retirement to the east had been forced and intended to remove him as a threat, he would not have been entrusted with military power. (D. S. Nivison, who would resurrect the Duke of Chou’s eminence, claims he never suffered from the disgrace envisioned by others (including Shaughnessy) and believes that he was the author of the important “Shao Gao.” (Nivison, D. S. “An Interpretation of the ‘Shao Gao’,” EC 20 (1995), 177–96.)⁶¹⁹ According to the Duke of Chou’s biography in the *Shih Chi*, he also persuaded the T’ai Kung of his sincerity. However, there is a noticeable difference in the nature of the placatory effort, real fervency being noted (elsewhere) only in the Duke of Shao’s case.⁶²⁰ According to the “Yen Shao Kung Shih-chia” in the *Shih Chi*. However, even though it would account for the Duke of Chou’s activities in the east, this rather nebulous claim lacks substantiation. (The Duke of Shao is always referred to as the *T’ai Pao*, the Duke of Chou often as the *Ta’i Shih* [even though the T’ai Kung supposedly was awarded this designation], and the T’ai Kung as the *T’ai Fu* rather than the *T’ai Shih*.)⁶²¹ The “K’o Yin” section of the *Yi Chou-shu* attributes a major role to the Duke of Shao.⁶²² “Ch’i T’ai Kung Shih-chia,” *Shih Chi*. Although it condenses the two steps in the fief’s establishment into one, insofar as Ch’i always acknowledged the T’ai Kung as its founder, the *Shih Chi* provides a plausible account. However, apart from a few archaeological reports that indicate probable Chou origins for a sudden overlay culture in Ch’i, there is little confirmation of its rendition of events.⁶²³ Note that Ch’en Ch’ang-yün (“Ts’ung Chou-tsu te Ch’i-yüan-lun chi Huang-ti Shih-tsu te Fa-hsiang Ti,” HCCHS 1996.3:17–22) believes this was part of the original thrust to repress the Yi.⁶²⁴ The “Fei Shih,” one of the very last chapters in the *Bamboo Annals*, purports to be Po Ch’ün’s instructions to his troops just prior to initiating the campaign. His opening words state that “the Huai Yi and Hsü Jung have risen together,” but the rest of the brief speech is devoted to admonishing them to be prepared and adhere to the regulations, particularly those concerned with livestock. Probably dating to the end of the Western Chou or somewhat thereafter, it would be insufficient evidence of the Huai Yi and Hsü Jung revolts without confirmation by bronze inscriptions. (For a complete translation, see James Legge, *The Shoo King*, 621–25.)⁶²⁵ Our reconstruction thus concurs with Luo Kun’s conclusion that the conflict with Hsü arose subsequently rather than was part of the eastern rebellion. (See *Hsia Shang Hsi Chou Chün-shih Shih*, 245–6.)⁶²⁶ Li Po-ch’ien, “X-kung Kuei yü Chin-kuo Tsao-ch’i Li-shih Juo-kan Wen-t’i te Tsai Jen-shih,” HCCHS 2009:3, 53–57; Luo K’un, *Hsia Shang Chou Chün-shih-shih*, 245. According to Luo K’un, the state was located slightly south of contemporary Shanxi Yi-ch’eng-hsien. (For a brief assessment of the *kuei* that shows T’ang’s appointment as earl of Chin see Li Hsüeh-ch’in, “Shih Shu,” KK 2009:9, 90–91, and more generally Chang Ch’ang-shou and Wen Kuang, “Po Luo-chao-t’ang Ts’ang *Sung-ting Sung-p’an* T’o-pen,” WW 2009:9, 49–54.)⁶²⁷ Yang Shan-ch’ün, “Chou-kung Tung-cheng Shih-chien ho Lu-hsien te K’ao-ch’a,” HCCHS 1988:11, 36–37. For a translation of the lengthy explication see

James Legge, *The Li Ki* (London: Oxford University Press, 1885, 2 vol.), Vol. 2, 121–24. ⁶²⁸ For example, the *Ling Fang Yi* (JC 9901) mentions that the king went to Ch'eng Chou. (Though various attributions have been suggested, Tu Yung ["Kuan-yü *Ling Fang Yi* te Nien-tai Wen-t'i," CКСYС 2001:2, 3–16] dates the vessel to King Ch'eng's reign.) ⁶²⁹ An interesting vessel of 112 characters, the *Tso Po Ting* is variously attributed to King Li's and King Hsüan's reigns. (For an assessment, see Chu Feng-han, "Tso Po Ting yü Chou Kung Nan-cheng," WW 2006:5, 67–73, 96.) ⁶³⁰ E. L. Shaughnessy, "The Role of the Grand Protector Shi", note 23, 155–56. ⁶³¹ E. L. Shaughnessy, "On the Authenticity of the *Bamboo Annals* " in *Before Confucius* , 81–89. ⁶³² This seems somewhat problematic as they were supposedly exterminated in the eastern campaign. However, E. L. Shaughnessy (89) doesn't find it troubling as he believes this represents the second destruction of P'u-ku. ⁶³³ Yang Shan-ch'ün ("Chou-kung Tung-cheng Shih-chien ho Lu-hsien te K'ao-ch'a," HСCHS 1988:11, 37) claims the postcampaign sweep that extended into the south primarily targeted the Hu-fang. However, in contradiction, it might be noted that, although the Hu were a major Shang enemy and would reappear as an important antagonist somewhat later in the Western Chou, Yang's views are based upon vessels such as the *Chung Ting* that are generally attributed to later reigns. ⁶³⁴ Tuan Yü, "Lun Chou, Ch'u Tsao-ch'i te Kuan-hsi," HСCHS 1986:11, 49–56. (Ch'u's emergence and military activity are discussed in our concluding chapters.) ⁶³⁵ According to the *Tso Chuan* , they were slighted at King Ch'eng's conclave at Chou-yüan for their rusticity. (The Ch'u actually referred to themselves as Man Yi.) The Chou may have therefore considered them unworthy of "covenanting," and Tuan Yi believes it may have prompted subsequent aggressive actions. (Tuan Yü, "Lun Chou, Ch'u Tsao-ch'i te Kuan-hsi," HСCHS 1986:11, 54.) ⁶³⁶ The *Hsiao Yü Ting* , JC 2839, is also known as the *Erh-shih-wu-nien Yü Ting* . (A translation may be found in Dobson, *Archaic Chinese* , 226–32.) The *Lai P'an* also notes that the Kuei-fang had become rebellious in this period. ⁶³⁷ For an overview, see Sawyer, *Ancient Chinese Warfare* , 179–81. ⁶³⁸ *Ta Yü Ting* , JC 2837. For a translation of the details and significance of this award, see Li Feng, 127–28. (A complete translation also may be found in Dobson, *Archaic Chinese* , 221–25.) ⁶³⁹ Appended almost as sort of an afterthought, his report seems more likely to be an account of what his personal clan forces accomplished rather than a report of a second clash, as is usually understood (such as by Yang K'uan, *Hsi Chou Shih* , 527, and Liu Huai-chün et al., "Lai-p'an Ming-wen Shih-shih," WW 2003:6, 92.) ⁶⁴⁰ All the chariot constraints discussed in Sawyer, *Ancient Chinese Warfare* , continue to apply, and there is almost no suggestion that infantry contingents in any number were operationally tied to individual chariots. (The assignment of infantry platoons would not, in any event, be synonymous with chariot-centered combat but merely command being exercised by a chariot officer. Further discussion of this aspect will be found in the concluding section titled "Martial Overview.") ⁶⁴¹ Several books and numerous articles on the logistics of historical campaigns have appeared over the past decades, beginning with Donald W. Engels's *Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army* and including Van Crevald's *Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton* ; John Lynn's *Feeding Mars* ; Kenneth Macksey, *For Want of a Nail: The Impact on War of Logistics and Communications* ; Julian Thompson, *The Lifeblood of War: Logistics in Armed Conflict* ; J. F. Lazenby, "Logistics in Classical Greek Warfare," *War in History* 1994:1, 3–18; and Yuval Noah Harari, "Strategy and Supply in Fourteenth-Century Western European Invasion Campaigns," JMH 64:2 (April, 2000), 297–333. ⁶⁴² "Waging War," *Art of War* . ⁶⁴³ Fundamental disagreement marks the dating of the *Hsiao Ch'en Lai Kuei* (JC 4238, 4239) and other vessels, especially those specifically indicating the eleventh month, apparently associated with this campaign. E. L. Shaughnessy includes the *Hsiao Ch'en Lai Kuei* (which he terms the *Hsiao Ch'en Tzu Kuei*) under King K'ang's reign,

and Yang K'uan (*Hsi Chou Shih* , 524–27) bases his important reconstruction upon a similar attribution. However, Luo K'un (*Hsia Shang Hsi Chou Chün-shih Shih* , 380–81) concludes the thrust belongs to King Chao's era. (A translation of the inscription may be found in Dobson, *Archaic Chinese* , 127.)⁶⁴⁴ As recorded on the *Pao Ting Kuei* , which states that the king performed the *liao* sacrifice when they exterminated the Tung Yi. (See Yang K'uan, *Hsi Chou Shih* , 526.)⁶⁴⁵ The site has also been identified as T'u, from the component for rabbit at the bottom.⁶⁴⁶ Following Yang K'uan's explication, *Hsi Chou Shih* , 524–27.⁶⁴⁷ According to the *Lu Hou Tsun* per the *Hsi Chou Shih* , 525–26. (The *Lü Ting* , previously noted under King Ch'eng's reign as indicating that the T'ai Pao led a strike force against these enemies, is attributed to King K'ang's reign by Yang K'uan, in which case the Grand Protector would not only have enjoyed great longevity but also led a third strike force in an even more complex campaign.)⁶⁴⁸ Generally known as the *Ling Yi* , the two are termed the *Tse Ling Fang Tsun* (JC 6016) and *Tse Ling Fang Yi* (JC 9901) in the *Chi-ch'eng* . The date of these vessels, whether they and the *Ming Kung Kuei* should be assigned as early as King Ch'eng's reign or as late as King Chao's remains uncertain. However, for a detailed analysis of the problem, see E. L. Shaughnessy, *Sources* , 193– 215, who—based in part on Ming Kung's probable age—concludes that a King Chao date would be reasonable. However, based on the same criteria and the spurt of activity in King K'ang's era, dating it to the latter seems more accurate. (In contrast, Tu Yung ["Kuan-yü *Ling Fang Yi* te Nien-tai Wen-t'i," CKSYC 2001:2, 3–16] dates the vessel to King Ch'eng's reign.)⁶⁴⁹ See Yang K'uan, *Hsi Chou Shih* , 525–26.⁶⁵⁰ For example, the *Shao Po Tsun* preserves a record of Po Mao-fu awarding a horse (or horses) to Shao Po at Yen.⁶⁵¹ According to the *Shang Shu Hsü* , a rather late composition.⁶⁵² See Luo K'un, *Hsia Shang Hsi Chou Chün-shih Shih* , 378.⁶⁵³ According to the *Lai P'an* ; some sort of response had been mounted in which their ancestor Kung Shu took part.⁶⁵⁴ Chang Pi-p'o, "Lun Chou-ch'u te Su-shen-tsu yü Chou-jen tui Tung-pei te Ching-lüeh," HCCHS 2001:3, 36–41. The usual debates about the vessel's attribution have arisen, but in the absence of datable criteria, the activities seem more likely to have occurred in K'ang's era as he confronted threats west, north, and east, whereas King Chao was more focused on the south.⁶⁵⁵ Being suggested as Hsi-ch'uan, Chih-chiang, and Tzu-kuei. However, the expedition clearly proceeded beyond the Han River, whatever Tan-yang's location and its actual date of inception. (Questions about Tan-yang's location have stimulated extensive scholarly discussion. For example, see Barry Blakely, *Early China* 13 and *Early China* 15, or Li Feng, *Landscape* , 328.)⁶⁵⁶ The *Tso Ts'e Che Ling Kuei* (JC 4300, 4301), which Yang K'uan dates to King Chao's reign, refers to the king's being at Yen in the year he attacked Ch'u Po. The *Hsiao Tzu Sheng Fang Ting* refers to the year in which he made a punitive campaign into the south; and the *Ch'i Ts'un* (JC 5983), variously dated to King Chao's reign but also to King Mu's, reports that Ch'i followed the king southward to punitively campaign against the people in the mountains and valleys of Fang.⁶⁵⁷ Citing the *Bamboo Annals* , the *T'ai-p'ing Yü-lan* (*chüan* 874) states, "In the last year of King Chao of the Chou, five colors illuminated Tzu-wei at night."⁶⁵⁸ "Chou Pen-chi."⁶⁵⁹ "Yin Ch'u." According to the *Bamboo Annals* , King Mu awarded Hsin Yü-mi the rank of Po, perhaps an action taken in recognition of his effort to save King Chao.⁶⁶⁰ "Nine Terrains," *Art of War* .⁶⁶¹ For example, see Yang K'uan, *Hsi Chou Shih* , 529–30.⁶⁶² According to the *Tso Chuan* , Hsi Kung, fourth year or about three centuries after the incident, during Duke Huan's hegemony when a Ch'i led coalition force was moving forward to attack Ch'u, an emissary from the latter came forth to query its justification. Kuan Chung, Ch'i's famous national security advisor, replied that Ch'i had been entrusted with enforcing order in the realm and was proceeding as part of an inquiry as to why Ch'u was not forwarding the requisite tribute for sacrificial performances, as well as to investigate the reason

King Chao never returned from his expedition to the south. Ch'ü's emissary adroitly dodged the latter by retorting that answers should be sought from the Han River, not them.⁶⁶³ They are referred to as the Hu Yi in one of the *Tso Chuan*'s latest entries, Ai Kung, fourth year.⁶⁶⁴ Two virtually identical vessels, JC 2751 and 2752. The *Wei Yen* also makes reference to Nan Kung's campaign. (Note that Yang Shan-ch'ün, HCCHS 1988:11, 37, dates these vessels and the campaign to King Ch'eng's reign and thus believes the effort was part of the post-second conquest consolidation.)⁶⁶⁵ *Chung Yen* JC 949; *Chung Fang Ting* JC 2751, 2752.⁶⁶⁶ Sun Ch'ing-wei, "Ts'ung Hsin-ch'ü *Wei Yen* K'an Chao-wang Nan-cheng yü Chin-hou Hsieh-fu," WW 2007:1, 64–68.⁶⁶⁷ As indicated by the *Yü Ting*, JC 2704. Wang Chiang is briefly discussed by Shaughnessy, *Sources*, 208–9.⁶⁶⁸ For a brief discussion of the encounter, see Luo K'un and Chang Yung-shan, *Hsia Shang Hsi-Chou Chün-shih Shih*, 378. (Hui's appearance in the "Chou Yü" attests to their survival as a state.) E. L. Shaughnessy (*Sources*, 178) includes the *Yüan Yu* (JC 387) among the vessels for King K'ang's reign that pertain to conflicts with the Huai Yi, but others, including Yang K'uan (*Hsi Chou Shih*, 528), attribute it to King Chao's era. Rather than a distinct effort, it may have been a correlated aspect of one of the other campaigns. (Hui's location is said to have been near Hsin-cheng in Henan, putting it near the Chou heartland.)⁶⁶⁹ Based upon E. L. Shaughnessy, *Sources of Western Zhou Tradition*, 248–54, who observes that "fifty-five" was probably the king's age when he died. However, also see Yang K'uan, 530–33, and Liu Chün-she, "Mu Wang Tsai-wei Nien-shu," KKW 2003:3, 31–34.⁶⁷⁰ The few entries in the *Bamboo Annals* for his first decade record the construction of two palaces and a temple to King Chao.⁶⁷¹ The latter is prefaced by an acknowledgement that the recognized decline of the Chou Tao prompted the king to appoint a strong official to rectify the government and restore order. However, at the same time, some of the feudal lords had been deemed inadequately sincere, resulting in pressure upon the king to rectify the legal statutes.⁶⁷² See especially Luo K'un, *Hsia Shang Hsi-Chou Chün-shih Shih*, 384–91, who cites several inscriptions in attestation. (Because of its importance in the Shang and Chou martial ethos, archery's neglect rather than its continuance would be noteworthy.)⁶⁷³ As scholars such as Li Feng have noted (95), their existence is attested by relatively contemporary bronze inscriptions including those found on the *Li Fang Yi* (JC9899) and *Li Fang Tsun* (JC 6013).⁶⁷⁴ Was this because the Chou had lost some of its essential martial spirit, in contrast with the Chiang who perhaps retained their warrior ethos to a greater degree? (For Lü's establishment, see Luo K'un, *Hsia Shang Hsi-Chou Chün-shih Shih*, 264–66, or Li Feng, *Landscape and Power*, 228–31.)⁶⁷⁵ *Han Shu*, "Hsiung-nu, Shang."⁶⁷⁶ Liu Yü, "Chin-ch'ü Yin Shang Chin-wen Tsung-shu," HCCHS 2003:3, 8–9.⁶⁷⁷ Essentially the same remonstrance appears in the *Kuo Yü*'s "Chou-yü, Shang." It may have been Ssu-ma Ch'ien's source, or both accounts may have been based on another recounting. (For a translation, see William H. Nienhauser, Jr., ed., *The Memoirs of Pre-Han China*, 67–68.) The *Yi Chou-shu* includes a chapter titled "Chai Kung Chieh" ("Explanations of the Duke of Chai") that purports to be a dialogue with King Mu in which the Duke of Chai attempts to impart some last instructions on Virtue and governing before succumbing to his increasingly severe illness. Although probably a Warring States fabrication, the recently recovered bamboo strips from Ch'ü held by Ch'ing-hua University include a brief text titled "*Chai Kung chih Ku-ming*," which is apparently another version of the incident. Depending upon its composition date, the text may additionally attest to the continued existence of the Three Duke (*San Kung*) system under King Mu, as well as the famous Mao Pan's role as one of them. (See Shen Chien-hua, "Ch'ing-hua Ch'ü-chien 'Chai Kung chih Ku-ming' chung te San Kung yü Hsi Chou Shih-ch'ing Chih-tu," HCCHS 2011:3, 32–36.)⁶⁷⁸ Similar arguments are found in the *Huang-shih Kung San-lieh* and, to a lesser extent, the *Ssu-*

ma Fa , two Warring States military classics. (For translations, see Sawyer, *Seven Military Classics* .) ⁶⁷⁹ The opening paragraph of the *Ssu-ma Fa* similarly recognizes the need for warfare. ⁶⁸⁰ “Hsi Ch’iang.” ⁶⁸¹ Hsü, which previously came into conflict with Po Ch’in, is said to have been an Ying clan state located in southeast Shandong or the border region of Shandong and Jiangsu before it moved down to the middle to lower reaches of the Huai. (Chu Feng-han, “Tso-Po Ting yü Chou Kung Nan-cheng,” WW 2006:5, 73.) ⁶⁸² JC 4341. For another translation and discussion, see Shaughnessy (*Sources of Western Zhou History* , 250–54), who, however, attributes it to a campaign late in King Mu’s reign; Yang K’uan, *Hsi Chou Shih* , 530–531; and W. A. C. H. Dobson, who also provides some comments and a translation in *Early Archaic Chinese* , 179–84. (Although there is the usual disagreement about the identification and transcription of a few characters, the overall meaning is clear.) ⁶⁸³ Actually a *po* or baron/viscount, later in the inscription termed duke (so duke is used throughout for clarity). ⁶⁸⁴ Amended to read Hsü. ⁶⁸⁵ This sentence occasions much dissension. Shaughnessy takes it as referring to Ch’ien, who, as overall commander, issued the order (251–52), even though the vessel was cast by Mao Pan, the father. Dobson also takes *ch’ien* as referring to an unknown official, but others do not. Yang K’uan interprets the order as generally intended, but it likely was specifically directed to the Mao clan troops. ⁶⁸⁶ Numerous additional laudatory sentences follow that are inconsequential beyond conveying the idea that victory is achieved by the virtuous and showing the vessel is dedicated by Mao Pan. ⁶⁸⁷ Yang K’uan (*Hsi Chou Shih* , 530–31) emphasizes the importance of taking control of the apparently newly acquired states of Fan, Shu, and Ch’ao slightly to the southeast in An-hui as they were close to the Huai Yi, and Ch’ao itself had originally been a Huai Yi state. ⁶⁸⁸ For example, see E. L. Shaughnessy’s highly cogent, chronologically based argument in *Sources of Western Zhou History* , 250–54. However, the inscriptions seem to pertain to two different encounters, one (under Hsü) that originated more toward the east, the other (encompassing the Huai Yi) in the southeast. ⁶⁸⁹ As attested by bronze inscriptions (such as the *Li Chü Tsun* , JC 6011, and *Li Chü Tsun Kai* , JC 6022) and their frequent award for valor, horses (and especially their lack) played an increasingly crucial role in early China. Tsao Fu reportedly surpassed all others in driving skills because of his intimate knowledge of their nature. (For a general discussion of the early role of horses, see Sawyer, *Ancient Chinese Warfare* ; for Duke Mu’s possible quest and their importance therein, see Hsü Cho-yün, *Hsi Chou Shih* , 191–92.) ⁶⁹⁰ The *Mu T’ien-tzu Chuan* initially speaks of a punitive expedition (*cheng*) being mounted against the Ch’üan (Dog) Jung and makes several references to Tsao Fu and the six armies accompanying the king, but no military clashes are recorded, the only semimilitary event being several extensive hunts. Various peoples present enormous numbers of animals, sometimes even thousands, including horses and sheep, which would have been sufficient for the army’s protein requirements, but their highly sporadic nature would have been problematic. There is some reference to *yin* and *yang* , even an *Yi Ching* hexagram, prompting claims that is a work of the Warring States *yin-yang* theorists or *fang-shih* . (See Ch’ang Chin-ts’ang, “*Mu T’ien-tzu te Shih-tai ho Wen-hsien Hsing-chih*,” HCCHS 2007:2, 38–45.) The text has obviously undergone extensive revision and suffered losses but still reflects the Chinese concept of bringing the west under domination. Whether it is based upon a transmitted kernel of events or simply represents an attempt, however fictionalized, to integrate a vast amount of observational, perhaps reconnaissance based information, not unlike the *Shan-hai Ching* that is also dated to this period, is an open question. (For useful analyses, see See Remi Mathieu, “*Mu t’ien tzu chuan* ” in *Early Chinese Texts: A Bibliographic Guide* , Michael Loewe, ed., 342–46; Shih Wei-yao, “*Mu T’ien-tzu Hsi-cheng Shih-t’an*,” CKSYC 1992:3, 86–93; Deborah Porter, *From Deluge to Discourse: Myth, History, and the Generation of Chinese*

Fiction, Albany: SUNY, 1996; Yang K'uan, *Hsi Chou Shih*, 577–89, who suggests it is an account produced by the guide; or “Discussion of the *Mu T'ien-tzu Chuan*” in Shaughnessy, *Rewriting Early Chinese Texts*, 172–77.) The book appears in the *Tao Tsang* as well as standard collections such as the *Ssu-k'u Ch'uan-shu* where it is classified as a fictional work.⁶⁹¹ See, for example, Li Hsiu-sung, “Huai Yi T'an-lun,” *HCCHS* 1991:9, 29–36; Chu Feng-han, “Tso-Po Ting yü Chou Kung Nan-cheng,” *WW* 2006:5, 71–72.⁶⁹² As preserved on the *Lu Tung Yu* (JC 5419, 5420).⁶⁹³ The *X You* (JC 5411) states that the caster followed Shih Yung-fu when he defended at Ku, the character for Ku being quite clear (and somewhat different from more complex forms on other vessels). The *Chien Tsun* (JC 6008) similarly makes reference to the year when he defended at Ku, and the *Yü Yen* (JC 948) states that Yü followed Shih Yung-fu when he defended at Ku-shih.⁶⁹⁴ E. L. Shaughnessy takes Hu to be the name for the tribe. However, we have instead followed Yang K'uan's interpretation.⁶⁹⁵ Shaughnessy provides a summary of the relevant bronze inscriptions on page 178 and a partial translation of the *Tung Kuei* on 179–80. Yang K'uan also provides convenient transcriptions on 530–32. Numbers are not supplied for each type of individual weapon, only the aggregate figure of 135.⁶⁹⁶ Based upon E. L. Shaughnessy's analysis, which is followed by Li Feng, *Landscape and Power*, 96–98.⁶⁹⁷ For an overview, see Shaughnessy, *Sources of Western Zhou Tradition*, 249–53, and Yang K'uan, *Hsi Chou Shih*, 530–31, as well as the articles and references listed below. (Yang K'uan's account generally conflates several inscriptions that appear to refer to two distinctive campaigns.)⁶⁹⁸ Yang K'uan, citing several variants of this entry (*Hsi Chou Shih*, 532), believes in this case, Yüeh, called “Ta Yüeh” in one variant that reads “King Mu of Chou attacked the Ta Yüeh, mobilizing nine regiments,” should be “Yang Yüeh” because they were then dwelling in Chiu-chiang, a location he and others have identified as being southeast of Eh-ch'eng in Hubei.⁶⁹⁹ See Liu Huai-chün et al., “Lai-p'an Ming-wen Shih-shih,” 93.⁷⁰⁰ These include two whose inscriptions refer to the king by name. (See E. L. Shaughnessy, *Sources of Western Zhou History*, 153–55, 254–55, and the table of “Proposed Absolute Dates for Fully Dated Bronze Vessels” on 284. Li Hsüeh-ch'in's summary, 61, “Lun Hsi Chou Chung-ch'i chih Wan-ch'i-ch'u Chin-wen te Tsu-ho,” *HCCHS* 2000:6, differs slightly but concurs in placing the *Tso Kuei* in Kung's reign. However, he also includes the *Wu-ch'i Kuei*, ascribing it to King Kung's thirteenth year.)⁷⁰¹ According to E. L. Shaughnessy's reconstruction in *Sources of Western Zhou History*, 254–55, and the discussion on King Mu's reign preceding it, as already noted.⁷⁰² *Shih Chi*, “Chou Pen-chi.” A nearly identical version is found in the *Kuo Yü*.⁷⁰³ In order to distinguish the two rulers whose names are normally romanized as *yi*, the first is conventionally written “*yih*” and the second “*yi*.” (For a discussion of King Yih's dates of 899/897, to 873 see E. L. Shaughnessy, *Sources*, 256–59.)⁷⁰⁴ Shaughnessy, for example, attributes these three vessels to King Yih's reign in *Sources of Western Zhou History* (178), but in his chapter in the *Cambridge History of Ancient China* discusses these campaigns under King Yi. In contrast, Yang K'uan employs them in his account of King Li's reign.⁷⁰⁵ As with most vessels, there are disagreements about the punctuation and interpretation of the inscription. Key accounts will be found in Li Hsüeh-ch'in, “Shih Mi Kuei Ming Suo-chi Hsi-Chou Chung-yao Shih-shih K'ao,” *HCCHS*, 1991:5, 44–49; Chang Mao-yung, “Shih Mi Kuei yü Hsi-Chou Hsiang-sui Chih-tu,” *WW* 1991:1, 26–31, and “An-k'ang Ch'u-t'u te Shih Mi Kuei chi-ch'i Yi-yi,” *Ku Wen-tzu yü Ch'ing-t'ung-ch'i Lun-chi*, 24–33; and Wang Lei-sheng, “Yu Shih Mi Kuei Ming K'an Chiang-hsing Ts'ai, Ch'i-tsu te Tung-ch'ien,” *KKWW* 1997:6, 77–82.⁷⁰⁶ Somewhat surprisingly in view of the specificity of the force composition, Li Feng (*Landscape*, 55) believes it was a royal campaign mounted with assistance from Ch'i.⁷⁰⁷ Yang K'uan believes the presence of *sui-jen*—troops levied from outside the core clan members (or central portion of the state)

—confirms the existence of the *kuo / sui* organization at this time. (*Hsi Chou Shih* , 534.) But there are dissenting views, including that the *kuo / sui* system did not exist in any form until the Spring and Autumn Period. (Here the *sui-jen* , although decidedly forming different contingents, may have been the reserves rather than the core clan warriors. However, see the discussion that follows in “Martial Overview.”) For a somewhat different reading of the inscription, see Liu Chao, “T’an *Shih-mi-kuei* Ming-wen-chung te ‘Tien’ Tzu,” *KK* 1995:5, 434–35. (Further discussion will also be found in our concluding chapters, below.) ⁷⁰⁸ Chi originally consisted of Hsia descendants, but because they had long been surrounded by barbarian peoples and immersed in barbarian cultures, they were said to have largely adopted so-called “barbarian customs.” Chow (“boat”), transcribed here with a w at the end (but properly “Chou”) in order to avoid confusion with the ruling dynastic state, may have been a Chiang clan state despite the Chiang’s having long been close allies of the Chou. (Yang K’uan, *Hsi Chou Shih* , 534, indicates that Chi had originally been located in Chi-hsien in Henan but later moved to Hsin-T’ai-hsien in Shandong.) ⁷⁰⁹ However, some Han dynasty commentators assert that the Duke of Kuo led the six armies forth. ⁷¹⁰ For example, Luo K’un, *Hsia Shang Hsi-Chou Chün-shih-shih* , 389–90. ⁷¹¹ According to the *Shih Chi* , “Ch’in Pen-chi,” Fei-tzu excelled at breeding horses and had therefore been recommended to the king. However, Ch’in’s early history is neither so simplistic nor accidental. ⁷¹² “Ch’i T’ai-kung Shih-chia.” The incident was symptomatic of factional conflict within Ch’i. ⁷¹³ As the *Shih Shih Kuei*’s inscription begins with a full-date notation, including the “fifth year,” it is alternatively known as the *Wu-nien Shih Shih Kuei* . (For a discussion of this reign, see Shaughnessy, *Sources* , 267–71.) These events are often seen as showing factional strife between the original ruling house and collateral lines. Li Feng (*Landscape* , 97–99), for example, cites the incident as evidence of turmoil within Chou central authority; however E. L. Shaughnessy (*Cambridge History of Ancient China* , 329) (somewhat puzzlingly) concludes it shows the ruler’s weakening power, presumably a sort of lashing out, but it might equally be interpreted as reasserting authority out of displeasure. That, overall, the Ch’i apparently submitted to this interference (despite the rather immediate slaying of the Chou appointed ruler) and did not openly rebel should probably be construed as evidence of a respectful posture. ⁷¹⁴ *Bamboo Annals* (both versions), 7th year. (The state of Yung mentioned in the chronicle is assuredly not the well-known one located north of the Yellow River—in which case their forces would have already advanced far northward, past Ch’eng Chou—but a smaller one generally said to be just south of the Han River and thus somewhat northwest of Tan-yang or possibly in the Wu-han area.) ⁷¹⁵ “Ch’u Shih-chia.” ⁷¹⁶ *JC* 2810. This vessel is often attributed to King Li’s reign because of virtual unanimity that the *Yü T’ing* (*JC* 2834), which records a Chou suppressive campaign against a newly rebellious Lord of Eh, definitely belongs to King Li’s era. However, it is highly unlikely that he would have rebelled immediately after being feasted and granted numerous awards. Moreover, the southern campaign would well cohere with King Yi’s personality and activist approach to military affairs. (Shaughnessy [*Sources* , 178–179] somewhat surprisingly dates the *Eh-hou Yü Fang-t’ing* to King Yi’s reign; Li Feng [*Landscape* , 103, 331] inclines to a King Li identification even though recognizing that it might be slightly earlier.) ⁷¹⁷ E. L. Shaughnessy (*Sources* , 330) locates it at Nanyang in modern Henan and therefore at a key control point for approaches to both the Wei River valley (through Wu-kuan) and also the southern approach to the capital at Luo, but over the centuries other commentators have placed it at Wu-ch’ang in Hubei. Recent discoveries have essentially confirmed Eh’s location was centered at Yang-tzu-shan slightly to the southwest of Tseng found at Yeh-chia-shan in the Sui-chou area of Hubei. (See Li Hsiieh-ch’in et al., “Hu-pei Sui-chou Yeh-chia-shan Hsi Chou Mu-ti Pi-t’an,” *WW*

2011:11, 64-77; Huang Feng-ch'ün, Ch'ên Shu-hsiang, and Fan Kuo-tung, "Hu-pei Sui-chou Yeh-chia-shan Hsin-ch'ü Hsi Chou Tseng-kuo T'ung-ch'ü chi hsiang-kuan Wen-t'ü," WW 2011:11, 78-86; Chang Ch'ang-p'ing, "Lun Sui-chou Yang-tzu-shan Hsin-ch'ü Eh-kuo Ch'ing-t'ung-ch'ü," WW 2011:11, 87-94; and Hu-pei-sheng WWKKYCS, "Hu-pei Sui-chou Yeh-chia-shan Hsi Chou Mu-ti Fa-ch'üeh Chien-pao," WW 2011:11, 4-60.) ⁷¹⁸ For brief studies of the still controversial Kung Ho era see Ch'ao Fu-lin, "Shih-lun 'Kung-ho Hsing-cheng' chi-ch'ü Hsiang-kuan Wen-t'ü," CKSYC 1992:1, 45-54 and "'Kung-ho Hsing-cheng' yü Hsi Chou Hou-ch'ü She-hui Kuan-nien te Pien-ch'ien," HCCHS 1992:7, 44-54; Chang P'ing-che, "Hsi Chou 'Kung-ho Hsing-cheng' Chen-hsiang Chieh-mi," HCCHS 1992:10, 31-34; and Wang Lei-sheng, "Kuan-yü 'Kung-ho Hsing-cheng' Juo-kan Li-shih Wen-t'ü te Tsai K'ao-ch'ü," HCCHS 2000:2, 23-30. ⁷¹⁹ For a discussion of King Li's dates, see Shaughnessy (whose dates are followed here), *Sources of Western Zhou History*, 272-286, and Chang Chia-ch'ü, "Shih-lun Hsi Chou Hu-kuo te Tsu-yüan," HCCCH 1993:2, 46-52; Chang Chia-ch'ü, "Shih-lun Hsi Chou Hu-kuo te Tsu-yüan (Hsü)," HCCHS 1993:11, 72-76; Luo Tsu-chi, "Ch'ung-hsin P'ing-chia Chou Li-wang," CKKTS 1994:4, 24-30; and Li Chung-ts'ao, "Tsai-lun Chou Li-wang Tsai-wei chih Nien," KKKWW 2003:1, 38. ⁷²⁰ In addition to Li Feng cited above, see Hao T'ieh-ch'uan, "Hsi Chou te 'Kuo-jen' yü 'Chih-chih-luan'," HCCHS 1984:2, 3-6. ⁷²¹ For slander see, for example, "Ch'iao Yen," Mao #198. (For a translation see Legge, *The She King*, p. 340.) However, there is no inherent basis for attributing it to King Li's reign. ⁷²² Mao #253 and Mao #254 respectively. ⁷²³ Mao #256. ⁷²⁴ Mao #257. The ode also notes that the good are being neglected, not employed in government. ⁷²⁵ Assuming no error in the dating, the discrepancy might be due to the use of dual calendars. ⁷²⁶ Shortly after its discovery, Li Hsüeh-ch'ün and others generally attributed the *Tuo Yu Ting* to King Li's era, a view that has been adopted by Luo K'un, Yang K'uan, and Li Feng (*Landscape*, 131-132 and 146ff). However, some scholars have held that it records a campaign that unfolded during King Hsüan's reign, including E. L. Shaughnessy in his *Early China* article, "The Date of the 'Duo You Ding' and its Significance," EC 9-10 (1983-85), 55-69. (Shaughnessy believes it describes an outwardly directed effort that was mounted between the campaigns that can be reconstructed from the *Kuo Chi-tzu Pai P'an* and *Pu Ch'ü Kuei* and should be dated to the tenth month of the twelfth year or 816 BCE. Accordingly, a second Hsien-yün force knifed through the Chou's perimeter defenses, bypassing Pu Ch'ü's temporarily deployed forces. This shift would increase the scope of the effort required in King Hsüan's era but correspondingly decrease the number of known Hsien-yün invasions. Although Shaughnessy's contention is, as always, well argued, the King Li attribution seems on the whole more probable, if only because fewer forces and thus less effort would have been required at one time.) ⁷²⁷ Likely his personal (state) forces but there was always a small possibility that Wu Kung had command of some or all of the standing six armies. ⁷²⁸ Based upon Shaughnessy's analysis, *Sources*, 66. ⁷²⁹ Li Feng's assertions that the Hsien-yün were extensively chariot based and therefore had to adhere to relatively flat terrain remains to be proven. Although the Chou reportedly employed 3,000 (but more probably 300) in the south, only ten went forth as a vanguard. Furthermore, even though the steppe region was almost certainly the conduit for the chariot's introduction into China, massive resources were required to build them. Wood, horses, and some metals (that were also readily employed for casting weapons) could be secured in the perimeter region, but a sedentary lifestyle is far more conducive to the complexity of chariot manufacture. ⁷³⁰ For a discussion of the nature of the reconstruction and examples of the detailed difficulties involved in rectifying apparent errors, see E. L. Shaughnessy, "The Editing and Editions of the Bamboo Annals" in *Rewriting Early Chinese Texts* as well as his earlier articles on the *Annals* listed in the bibliography. ⁷³¹ Although the various vessels undoubtedly

depict aspects of southern campaigns, their inter-relationship and their attribution to the reigns of King Yi and King Li, if not other rulers as well, remains highly uncertain and often the subject of acrimonious debate. The reconstruction offered here is therefore highly tentative; nevertheless, the dynamics of Chou / perimeter interaction can be clearly seen, even if not the exact sequence. (The key question is where to place a victorious southern campaign reportedly led by the king since the *Bamboo Annals* do not record any such effort under his leadership. In addition, King Li's exile in his 12th year precludes him from being militarily active in his 13th year unless the two year offset proposed by Nivison is allowed or the king in question is actually Kung Ho Po.) Many of these vessels, including the *Hu Chung*, which were formerly attributed to King Chao's reign are now deemed to have been cast by King Li himself because "Hu" was his personal name. (See E. L. Shaughnessy, *Sources*, 169-172 for a summary evaluation and discussion.) However, it has also been argued that the *Huan P'an* previously attributed to King Li should be dated to King Hsüan's reign. (See Chang P'ei-yü, "Lai-ting te Yüeh-hsiang Chi-jih ho Hsi Chou Nien-tai," WW 2003:6, 78-84.)⁷³² In a translation provided in footnote 20, 169-70 of *Sources*, Shaughnessy takes *fu-tzu* as subject peoples rather than a name and *fa ch'i chih* as "rammed their advance." (Also see Yang K'uan, *Hsi Chou Shih*, p. 535.)⁷³³ E. L. Shaughnessy dates them to King Yi's reign rather than King Li's in the *Cambridge History of Ancient China*, 331-2.⁷³⁴ E. L. Shaughnessy attributes it to King Yi's reign, Yang K'uan and others to King Li.⁷³⁵ The *Yü Ting* should be distinguished from the *Yü Kuei*. (For a complete translation of the inscription, see Edward L. Shaughnessy, "Western Zhou Bronze Inscriptions" in *New Source of Early Chinese History*, 82-3.)⁷³⁶ Luo K'un suggests that the ruler may have felt pressured by Ch'u.⁷³⁷ With warfare having become this intense and vicious, the *Ssu-ma Fa*'s advocacy of restraint, which is often seen as an argument for dating even the most antique of passages to no earlier than the late Spring and Autumn, demands revisiting.⁷³⁸ For example, according to the *Bamboo Annals*, "in the thirty-second year the king's regiments attacked Lu, killed Po Yü, and mandated that Duke Hsiao take the title in the Yi Palace."⁷³⁹ *Current Bamboo Annals*, King Hsüan, 4th year. According to the ode "Han Yi" he also established marriage relations with Han's ruling family.⁷⁴⁰ *Bamboo Annals* (both versions), King Hsüan, 1st year. The nature of China's military tax would vary across the ages. Payment would sometimes be required in material goods such as grain, oxen, or horses, but at others the tax obligation would simply be converted into a monetary payment or grain equivalent. One or more adult males might also be required to undertake military or labor service in the border areas as part of the military tax, but conscription and martial levies were normally separately mandated. The character for the tax, *fu*, which consists of the character for a "shell" coupled with *wu*, the character for "martial," on the right, is thought to graphically express the original meaning. (There is an extensive literature on the history of the military tax, but there are also many questions about its nature and when it was first imposed. Little is known about Western Chou practices, and a lengthy monograph would be required to chart its evolution throughout Chinese history.)⁷⁴¹ Complete translations of the "Ch'in Pen-chi" may be found in Burton Watson's *Records of the Grand Historian: Qin Dynasty* and William H. Nienhauser, ed., *The Grand Scribe's Records: The Memoirs of Pre-Han China*. According to the "Ch'in Pen-chi," Ch'in reprisals did not end with this victory. Duke Chuang's eldest son, seeking to avenge the death of his grandfather, went forth to mount a surprise attack on the Jung with the objective of slaying their ruler. The results are unrecorded, but before departing he swore not to return unless he succeeded and his younger brother thus became the next ruler. The Ta-luo branch of what became the extended Ch'in clan had been founded several generations earlier. (For an examination of the relationship between the proto Ch'in and the

Ch'üan Jung see Wang Hsiüeh-li, "Tung Hsi Liang Ch'üan-ch'üu yü Ch'in-jen Ju-lung," KKWW 2006:4, 60–65.)⁷⁴² Liu Chün-sheh claims that their relations extend back into predynastic times, that the proto-Ch'in (who evolved out of the Shang and Yi) were responsible for pressuring the early Chou (Kung Liu) into shifting their habitation. But the incipient Ch'in must have also been somewhat subject to Chou because a Shang oracular inscription inquires whether the Chou will be sending in women from the Ch'in. The shift to the Mount Ch'i area then supposedly ended Ch'in's relationship with the Shang. (See Liu Chün-sheh, "Ts'ung Ka'o-ku Yi-ts'un K'an Tsao-ch'i Chou Ch'in Wen-hua te Kuan-hsi," KKWW 2000:5, 32–38.)⁷⁴³ Li Feng provides a somewhat different analysis of the Hsien-yün campaigns that includes an extensive consideration of geographic issues and highly useful maps in the section titled "Enemies at the gate: the war against the Xianyun," found in his *Landscape and Power*.⁷⁴⁴ Mao #177. The last stanza, simply a paean of praise, is here omitted.⁷⁴⁵ "Sacrificing our bodies (ie, "skin") for our duke" would read far better but is not sanctioned by any of the commentators.⁷⁴⁶ Assuming Fang should be understood as P'ang rather than another city named Fang located somewhere to the north of the twin capitals in turn raises the question of the latter's historical location. Several views have been advanced, including by Wang Yü-che who has concluded that cities in this period, including Hao, were often split by rivers. However, rather uniquely, he believes Hao was originally situated north of the Wei River but later absorbed P'ang (which Wang believes is the Fang in the ode) on the south bank of the Wei where the Feng River enters near the Wei's confluence with the Ching. (See "Hsi Chou P'ang-ching Ti-wang te Tsai T'an-t'ao," CKKTS 1994:4, 43–44.)⁷⁴⁷ Commentators have argued over the centuries whether Hao is not another location similarly to the north of the river, as it may well be.⁷⁴⁸ T'ai-yüan's location has long been a matter of disagreement. (For a summary, see Li Feng, *Landscape*, 165–69.) The traditionally identified location of T'ai-yüan city in Shanxi has been essentially discarded in favor of the high Ku-yüan plateau, as Li Feng argues based upon earlier suggestions. (Li notes that extensive Chou remains, including a chariot burial, have been found in the general vicinity, attesting to a strong Chou presence at some point.) However, note that Yü Feng-ch'un believes it to have been in Chin-chung, northern Shaanxi, where there are high plains of yellow earth, citing as partial justification the *Shang Shu Ta-chuan* notation that "a large and high level area is referred to as *ta-yüan*." Accordingly, when King Mu moved the Jung to T'ai-yüan it would have been to the Shaan-pei/Chin-chung region or somewhat eastward because the Chou had lost control of the western area. (See "Chou P'ing-wang Tung-ch'ien Fei Pi-Jung nae T'ou-Jung P'ien," HCCHS 1984:1, 19–20.)⁷⁴⁹ For a complete translation and brief commentary on the significance of the *Hsi Chia P'an's* (JC 10174) contents, see E. L. Shaughnessy, "Western Zhou History," in *The Cambridge History of Ancient China*, 346, or his *Sources*, 141. Neither Shaughnessy nor Yang K'uan, who also cites this *p'an* (540), comment on the discrepancy in the dates for the campaign's initiation.⁷⁵⁰ Whether this simply refers to a year away or a year of compulsory border duty, which should therefore have a fixed limit (but rarely did) is uncertain but more likely the former.⁷⁵¹ This is traditionally understood as the tenth month, when winter commences even though the initiation of *yang*'s activity intimates the heat of spring and summer.⁷⁵² Chün-tzu, here understood as commander.⁷⁵³ Yang K'uan, *Hsi Chou Shih*, 540, (justifiably) believes "Ts'ai Wei" pertains to this campaign rather than any earlier ones because no such victories were won during King Yih's era.⁷⁵⁴ This line suggests the chariots required protection by infantry as the horses were very vulnerable despite the increased adoption of armor.⁷⁵⁵ The bamboo records (*chu shu*) might be the ruler's orders (as traditionally interpreted) but are more likely the tablets that recorded attendance, accomplishments, and demerits. (A record for

desertion would justify a death sentence.) Similar fears are expressed in the ode “Hsiao Ming” (Mao #207), whose author would return home were it not for the law. ⁷⁵⁶ Again the term is *chiün-tzu*, but here clearly employed by a woman remaining at home to refer to her husband. (The traditional commentators indulge in great verbiage to transform the context so that it becomes a moralistic expression of the soldiers’ longing admiration for their lord.) ⁷⁵⁷ This is the traditionally ascribed dating. However, based upon a recently recovered bell, Tuan Yü (whose arguments appear below) argues that the campaign did not unfold until the king’s the thirty-ninth year. ⁷⁵⁸ The term “*man*” is of course tinged with deprecatory connotations. Exactly who the Ching Man may have been is somewhat uncertain because they cannot simply be identified with proto-Ch’u. ⁷⁵⁹ *Mo-tzu*, “Ming Kuei, Hsia.” ⁷⁶⁰ Also transcribed as the *Shih Huan Kuei*. ⁷⁶¹ Chi was a dynamic Chiang clan state that preexisted the Chou but became integrated into its hierarchy, both politically and defensively. It seems to have interacted with contiguous Chiang entities and had a somewhat peripatetic history, moving up into Liao-hsi before expanding from the eastern Shandong area of Huang-hsin down into the region about the subsequently famous fortified town of Chi-mo. (See, for example, Li Feng, *Landscape*, 314–48, or Sun Ching-ming, “Liang Chou Chin-wen yü Chi-shih Hsin-cheng,” HCCHS 1999:5, 28–32.) ⁷⁶² Presumably the basis for the final verses of “Chiang Han.” ⁷⁶³ Mao #263. By implying that a standing army should be ever ready for military action, the title occasioned much speculation in subsequent centuries, particularly when the literati sought to de-emphasize the military and rulers hoped to defuse threats such as An Lu-shan’s from armed camps. ⁷⁶⁴ Some commentators have suggested that they were simply awed into submitting just as the Shang had been when confronted by King Wu of the Chou. Such idealized portrayals inevitably recur whenever writers hope to emphasize a conqueror’s innate greatness. ⁷⁶⁵ The *Kuo Chi Tzu Po P’an* is also known as the *Kuo Chi Tzu Pai P’an*. Attribution of these vessels to King Hsüan’s era is not without controversy. (For example, see Ko Chih-yi, “Chou-jen Pien Jung Fu Hsia K’ao-lun,” CKSYC 1991:4, 122–29. For further discussion and a translation, see E. L. Shaughnessy, “New Evidence of the Chou Conquest,” EC 6 [80–81], 63.) Note that Li Hsiieh-ch’in believes Pu Ch’i was actually Duke Chuang of Ch’in—although it seems unlikely he would be referred to in such a diminutive way—and that Yang K’uan (*Hsi Chou Shih*, 541) takes the term *yü fang* as a title rather than a verb object combination meaning “secure the area” in his reading of the inscription. Among other attributions, Chia Hai-sheng (“Lun Pu Ch’i Kuei Ming-chung te Po Shi chi Nan Chung,” HCCHS 2005:4, 48–51) dates the *Pu Ch’i Kuei* to King Hsüan’s eighth year, or 820 BCE, and ties the participants to the ode known as “Ch’u Ch’e,” identifying Po Shih with Nan Chung and asserting that Pu Ch’i is actually the poem’s author. (He similarly identifies [48] Pu Ch’i with Ch’in Chuang Kung Ch’i, one of Chuang Kung’s brothers known for their attack on the Hsi Jung.) Li Feng has provided a well-informed, detailed analysis of the probable campaign routes and locations in a dedicated section on the Hsien Yün in *Landscape and Power in Early China*. ⁷⁶⁶ For example, according to the *Bamboo Annals*, “in the thirty-second year the king’s regiments attacked Lu, killed Po Yü, and mandated Duke Hsiao take the title in the Yi Palace.” ⁷⁶⁷ For reports and analysis see Shim Jaehoon, “The ‘Jinhou Su Bianzhong’ Inscription and its Significance,” EC 22 (1997), 43–75; David S. Nivison and Edward L. Shaughnessy, “The Jin Hou Su Bells Inscription and its Implications for the Chronology of Early China,” EC 25 (2000), 29–48 and CKSYC 2001:1, 3–10; Wang Shih-min et al., “Chin Hou Su Chung Pi-t’an,” WW 1997:3, 54–66; Li Hsiieh-ch’in, “Chin-hou Su Pien-chung te Shih, Ti, Jen,” *Chung-kuo Wen-wu Pao*, 1996, 3; Feng Shih, “Chin-hou Su Chung yü Hsi-Chou Li-fa,” KKHP 1997:4, 407–42; and Chang Wen-yü, “Chin-hou Su Chung chih Ch’in-chien,” HCCHS 1998:1, 38–44. Depending upon how minor differences in interpretation and dating are

resolved, reconstructions of the campaign's length differ by a single ten-day period. (Shim Jaehoon, 61–70, concludes it should dated to 846 BCE in King Li's reign, contrary to many others who attribute the campaign to King Hsüan's.) ⁷⁶⁸ Reading region (*yü*) rather than state (*kuo*). ⁷⁶⁹ See Shim Jaehoon, "The 'Jinhou Su Bianzhong' Inscription and its Significance," 57. ⁷⁷⁰ The royal components included the chariot component of the *Ta Shih hsia ch'en*, the minor officials apparently suborned to the Great Chamber. ⁷⁷¹ Shim Jaehoon, "The 'Jinhou Su Bianzhong' Inscription and its Significance," EC 22 (1997), p 49. All distances cited are based upon Shim's reconstructions. E. L. Shaughnessy has suggested that Fan-hsien and Yün-ch'eng were near or in Lu. ⁷⁷² Evidence of Chin's increasing wealth (and thus power) in the middle-through-late Western Chou is visible in its large tombs. For example, see Shan-hsi-sheng KK YCS and Ch'ü-wo-hsien Wen-wu-chü, "Shan-hsi Ch'ü-wo Yang-she Chin-hou Mu-ti Fa-chüeh Chien-pao," WW 2009:1, 4–14, 26. ⁷⁷³ *Bamboo Annals*, also found in the *Kuo-yü*, "Chou-yü, Shang." ⁷⁷⁴ Tuan Yü, "Ch'ü-kung Ni-pien-chung yü Chou Hsüan-wang Fa Ch'u," HCCHS 2004:3, 46–52. The following account is based on Tuan's analysis and reconstruction. ⁷⁷⁵ Tuan Yü attributes the southern campaign date to Hsüan's thirty-ninth year, or 789, (which might make the award something of an afterthought). Although the transcription and interpretation of the somewhat damaged inscription continues to be debated, without doubt it shows that Ch'u's leaders considered themselves to be ruling a "great state" (*ta pang*) and that they were able to cower others into contributing vast amounts of copper in honor of the ceremony. Among suggestions, two seem most likely: first, that the king had decided to offer sacrifice to his ancestors, meritorious forerunners, and the "heads of the four quarters" (possibly understood as the four seasons) and therefore initiated a hunting expedition to acquire suitable sacrificial victims and second, that he was planning to honor his ancestors who had undertaken the responsibility of being chiefs (*shou* /head) of the four quarters and therefore mounted the hunt. (Proponents of the first view include Tuan Yü ["Ch'ü Ni Kung Pien Chung yü Chou Hsüan Wang Fa Ch'u," 46–52], while Wang Chien ["Ts'ung Ch'ü-kung Ni-chung Ming-wen Lun-tao Hsi-Chou te Fang-po Chih-tu," HCCHS 2002:6, 51–54] and Luo K'un [*Hsia Shang Hsi-Chou Chün-shih-shih*, 401] uphold the second. However, also see Edward L. Shaughnessy ("Recent Discoveries of Inscribed Bronze Vessels," EC 26–27 (2001–2002), 86) and Yang K'uan (*Hsi Chou Shih*, 605–7), who emphasizes the shamanistic aspects and believes that the victims included humans. ⁷⁷⁶ Based upon the *Hou Han Shu*'s "Hsi Ch'iang Chüan" Tuan Yü ascribes a royal campaign against the Shen Jung, attributed by the *Bamboo Annals* to King Hsüan's forty-first year, to the thirty-ninth, with Fang Shu's victory coming afterward. However, as this seems problematic, the traditional sequence is retained here. As shown by Shaughnessy and Nivison, the apparent two-year discrepancy simply results from their not commencing the ruler's personal calendar until two years after his ascension due to mourning considerations. (See their discussion of this case in "The Jin Hou Su Bells Inscription and its Implications for the Chronology of Early China," EC 25 (2000), 36–37.) ⁷⁷⁷ For a discussion of this first census at T'ai-yüan, including population ratios, see Liu Shu-ho, "Hsi Chou te Kuan-chih yü T'ung-chi," HCCHS 1991:11, 5–14. ⁷⁷⁸ According to the *Kuo-yü* and *Shih Chi*, "When King Hsüan lost the regiments of the southern states, he then enumerated the people in T'ai-yüan." ⁷⁷⁹ Or the Jung, according to the *Ku-pen Bamboo Annals*. ⁷⁸⁰ Yang K'uan calculates it as his thirty-eighth year, just one among many minor discrepancies in dating that exist between the various historical records, including the *Ku-pen Bamboo Annals*. ⁷⁸¹ The Shen Jung's identity and location are somewhat problematic, with one possibility being the king attacked the Western Shen that preexisted the establishment of a second state named Shen (whether a splinter group or not) to the south at Nan-yang. (See Yang K'uan, *Hsi Chou Shih*, 543–4 and and

the discussion on King Yu's overthrow, below.) ⁷⁸² Mei-hsien was clearly the site of an important fief city and other "Lai" vessels have been found here and in the core southern Chou-yüan area. Although opinion varies, the vessels almost certainly date to King Hsüan rather than his predecessor. A number of articles have reviewed the findings and contents; while generally concurring in the conclusions, they differ in certain details, including the transcription of some characters. The more important include Shaan-hsi-sheng KK YCS et al., "Shaan-hsi Mei-hsien Yang-chia-ts'un Hsi Chou Ch'ing-t'ung-chi Chiao-ts'ang Fa-chüeh Chien-pao," WW 2003:6, 4–42; Shaan-hsi-sheng KK YCS et al., "Shaan-hsi Mei-hsien Ch'u-t'u Chiao-ts'ang Ch'ing-t'ung-chi Pi-t'an," WW 2003:6, 43–65; Li Hsüeh-ch'in, "Mei-hsien Yang-chia-ts'un Hsin-ch'u Ch'ing-t'ung-chi Yen-chiu," WW 2003:6, 66–73; Ch'iu Hsi-kuei, "Tu *Lai-ch'i* Ming-wen Cha-chi San-ts'e," WW 2003:6, 74–77; Chang P'ei-yü, "*Lai-ting* te Yüeh-hsiang Chi-jih ho Hsi Chou Nien-tai," WW 2003:6, 78–84; Liu Huai-chün et al., "*Ssu-shih-erh-nien*, *Ssu-shih-san-nien Lai-ting* Ming-wen Shih-shih," 85–89; Liu Huai-chün et al., "*Lai-p'an* Ming-wen Shih-shih," WW 2003:6, 90–93, 95; Chou Shao-lu, "*Lai P'an* Tu-chien," HCCHS 2004:1, 6–14, 32; Sun Ya-ping, "Mei-hsien Yang-chia-ts'un Ssu-shih-erh, Ssu-shih-san Nien *Lai Ting* K'ao-shih," CKSYC 2003:4, 25–32. ⁷⁸³ Sun Ya-ping, "Mei-hsien Yang-chia-ts'un Ssu-shih-erh, Ssu-shih-san Nien *Lai Ting* K'ao-shih," CKSYC 2003:4, 25–32. ⁷⁸⁴ The tale of Tu Po's death appears in the late compilation known as the *Shuo-yüan*, and assertions that he was assassinated in *Mo-tzu* ("Ming Kuei, Hsia") with commentaries to the "Chou Pen-chi" originating in the *Chou Ch'un-ch'iu*. Stories from the tomb text known as the *Suo Yü* (whose contents are similar to those found in the *T'ai-p'ing Kuang-chi*) speak of the king's licentiousness and of Nu Chiu, one of his consorts, wanting to seduce Tu Po who refused her advances. Rebuffed, she vilified him to the king, resulting in his imprisonment, though surprisingly only that. However, the king readily slew one of Tu Po's friends who audaciously remonstrated on his behalf. Having somehow gained his freedom, Tu Po then shot the king with an arrow three years later. (See E. L. Shaughnessy, *Rewriting Early Chinese Texts*, 167–68.) ⁷⁸⁵ Mao #177 and 178 respectively. ⁷⁸⁶ Mao #179 ("Chariot Attack") and #180 respectively. ⁷⁸⁷ Mao #258. ⁷⁸⁸ Mao #232, generally attributed to King Yu's era without any inherent basis, more likely dates to King Hsüan's era. ⁷⁸⁹ Mao #234, "What Grass Hasn't Yellowed?" is similarly often associated with King Yu but more likely stems from King Hsüan's era. ⁷⁹⁰ Generally understood by the commentators as meaning bereft of the company of their wives. ⁷⁹¹ Throughout the ode, both are called *po* rather than *kung*, a title that implies local power and may be historically accurate in reflecting how the king was grudgingly compelled to acknowledge these overarching regional dukes. ⁷⁹² Both versions of the *Bamboo Annals* record that, in his seventh year, King Hsüan appointed him a *po* /duke. ⁷⁹³ As will be discussed in the concluding section, Luo K'un (*Hsia Shang Hsi Chou Chün-shih Shih*, 405) believes King Hsüan's continued dependence upon a core of elder statesmen / generals adversely impacted the state's military flexibility and therefore the Chou's ability to defeat the Hsien-yün. ⁷⁹⁴ Mao #261. ⁷⁹⁵ Cheng's history is briefly discussed by Hsu and Linduff, *Western Chou Civilization*, 117–19; Luo K'un, *Hsia Shang Hsi-Chou Chün-shih Shih*, 268; and Yang K'uan, *Hsi Chou Shih*, 812–13, as well as more extensively by Li Feng, *Landscape*, 246–50 and 349–54. Hsu and Linduff emphasize the state's Shang origins and its importance in the Shang prior to apparently migrating to western Shaanxi. ⁷⁹⁶ Luo K'un, *Hsia Shang Hsi-Chou Chün-shih Shih*, 268. ⁷⁹⁷ It appears in the "Cheng-yü" portion of the *Kuo Yü*. (For an overview of the development of subversive techniques in the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods see Sawyer, *Tao of Spycraft*.) ⁷⁹⁸ Generally located in the area of Hsing-yang and Mi-hsien respectively, with the fortified town of Ta-fan-chuang recently being suggested as the actual site of the latter. ⁷⁹⁹ Following Li Feng's analysis, *Landscape*, 351–54, and "Hsi Chou

Chin-wen-chung te Cheng-ti ho Cheng-kuo Tung-chien,” WW 2006:9, 70–78. Preference here is given to the *Shih Chi* and *Kuo Yü* accounts rather than the *Bamboo Annals* that indicates these attacks were made during Duke Huan’s lifetime. (Luo K’un [p. 268] believes Cheng and [Western] Kuo moved about same time, leaving the northwest bereft of defensive forces, but it appears that the basis for Duke Huan’s ability to act in the east and shift his wealth and a portion of the populace was his appointment as Ssu T’u in King Yu’s eighth year (774 BCE), giving him exposure in other areas. [Kuo’s movement is another issue.])⁸⁰⁰ It is frequently noted that Tzu Ch’an remarked that the state was founded through opening fallow lands and the existence of a covenant with the merchants who accompanied the state’s shift whereby they guaranteed to remain loyal if the state did not impose onerous taxes. (*Tso Chuan* , Chao Kung, 16th year. The implication of this sort of highly puzzling, probably unique, agreement merit further investigation.)⁸⁰¹ *Mao* #260. For a translation see James Legge, *The She King* , 541–45.⁸⁰² “Chou Pen-chi.” A lengthy metaphysical explanation about the rivers and earthquakes, as well as the implications, may be found in “Pien Wu” in the *Shuo Yüan* .⁸⁰³ Most commentators misinterpret this as *yin* pressing upon *yang* , keeping it from being released. The idea is just opposite: being submerged, *yang* cannot act from above as the sun normally does on watery terrain, so *yin* will not be vaporized.⁸⁰⁴ This refers to the so-called ten “Heavenly Stems” (*T’ien Kan*) that, when conjoined with the twelve *Ti Chih* or “Earthly Branches,” form the well known sixty day cycle.⁸⁰⁵ Also found in the *Hou Han-shu*’s “Hsi Ch’iang.”⁸⁰⁶ One of the well known thirty-six strategies, the ploy of beautiful women has a history dating back at least to the Hsia. (For further discussion, see Sawyer, *Tao of Spycraft* ; for the earliest reputed employment, Sawyer, *Ancient Chinese Warfare* , 106ff.)⁸⁰⁷ Pao is also said to have been a Ssu clan state and therefore a descendant of the Hsia whose surname had also been Ssu. The *Shih Chi* account is unusually brusque and choppy, as if Ssu-ma Ch’ien found the effort distasteful or not worth the time.⁸⁰⁸ In some accounts he endures the situation until the 8th year or 774 BCE.⁸⁰⁹ According to Li Feng, *Landscape* , 217–18. Li also notes a *Tso Chuan* entry (from Chao Kung, fourth year) that claims the Eastern Yi, the Jung, and the Ti had become estranged from the Chou. However, being a later interpretation of events, its accuracy seems questionable given their fundamental animosity and lack of submission to the Chou.⁸¹⁰ “Cheng-yü,” *Kuo Yü* .⁸¹¹ King Hsüan’s younger brother, who had previously been established there by force (per “Cheng Shih-chia” in the *Shih Chi*). Shen’s “barbarian” allies are thus identified as the Hsi Jung, Ch’üan Jung, and even members of the Yi in the various accounts. Cheng, however, is somewhat problematic because they are otherwise seen as supporting the king’s side. The *Kuo Yü* (“Chin Yü”) names Cheng as one of the key allies but the *Shih Chi* has Tseng.⁸¹² Emending Lu to Tseng in accord with Yang K’uan’s view that Lu is an error for K’uai, which in turn is equivalent to Tseng. (*Hsi Chou Shih* , 545.)⁸¹³ As found in both version of the *Bamboo Annals* .⁸¹⁴ The name of the aggressors vary. The “Chin Yü” in the *Kuo Yü* has Hsi Jung; the “Chou Pen-chi” both the Hsi Yi and Ch’üan Jung; and the *Bamboo Annals* opts for the Ch’üan Jung.⁸¹⁵ Mu Chung-yüeh and Wu Kuo-ch’ing, *Chung-kuo Chan-cheng-shih* , vol. 1, 101, 104.⁸¹⁶ “Military Combat.”⁸¹⁷ “Chou Pen-chi.”⁸¹⁸ According to the “Hsiung-nü Lieh-chuan.”⁸¹⁹ To take just one example, see Wang Yü-che, “Chou P’ing-wang Tung-ch’ien nai Pi-Ch’in Fei Pi-Ch’üan-Jung Shuo,” HCHS 1986:10, 21. Li Feng, *Landscape and Power* , 198–202, has shown that Ssu-ma Ch’ien added the fire beacons to the core account.⁸²⁰ See Sawyer, *Ancient Chinese Warfare* , 228–29.⁸²¹ The account appears in the *Lü-shih Ch’un-ch’iu* .⁸²² A complete translation of the *Liu-t’ao* may be found in Sawyer, *Seven Military Classics of Ancient China* .⁸²³ In *Landscape and Power* (203–15) Li Feng has integrated information from numerous sources to provide an extensive analysis of the court struggle that may have arisen in

the final debacle. ⁸²⁴ Those usually said to criticize King Yu or pertain to his reign include *Mao* numbers 191– 97, 200–5, 208–34, 264, and 265. For example, *Mao* #219 generally rails against slander; *Mao* #222 which, in praising virtuous court officers, is viewed as offering a rebuke; and *Mao* #223. ⁸²⁵ That is, *li*. ⁸²⁶ *Mao* #265. Yang K'uan, *Hsi Chou Shih*, 546, believe “Shao Min” shows the suffering endured under Yu. “Yü Wu Cheng” (*Mao* #194), variously attributed, including to the period after Yu’s death, also refers to the famine’s severe effects. ⁸²⁷ *Mao* #191. The ode is attributed to Yu’s era but once again probably was composed rather later by someone meditating on the past. ⁸²⁸ *Mao* #192. ⁸²⁹ *Mao* #193 (*The She King*, 320), which is definitely attributable to Yu’s reign rather than King Li’s, as sometimes said. Li Feng (*Landscape*, 203–15) believes this poem confirms Huang Fu’s departure for the east as noted under the fifth year in the *Bamboo Annals*, whether in retirement or a sort of exile, and that his absence weakened Yi Chiu’s coalition, as well as the government in general. This presumably allowed the widely condemned Kuo Shih-fu, allied with Pao Ssu, the free rein that resulted in his monopolization of the government and many consequent abuses. ⁸³⁰ *Mao* #229 and *Mao* #197. ⁸³¹ “Ta Tung,” *Mao* #203. ⁸³² *Mao* #207. ⁸³³ *Mao* #208 (*She King*, 366). There is no inherent basis for the traditional attribution of this ode to King Yu; it may more appropriately belong to a slightly earlier reign. ⁸³⁴ According to the *Kuo Yü*, in King Hsüan’s thirty-ninth year, the royal armies were defeated by the Chiang-shih Jung. ⁸³⁵ It is not impossible that, as a result of the conflict, Shen had provided a consort for the future King Yu in order to cement their relationship, as was common. ⁸³⁶ Jen Wei, “Kuo-kuo K’ao,” HCCHS 2001:4, 61–66. (Wang Yü-che has concluded that north and south Kuo were simply a single entity divided by a river.) Kuo’s history is quite complex and subject to argumentation. (For an overview, see Li Feng (*Landscape and Power*, 251–62) who concludes that the enclave at San-men-hsia was established during King Hsüan’s rule.) ⁸³⁷ Chang Yen-hsiu, “Ho-nan San-men-hsia-shih Kuo-kuo Mu-ti M2001 Mu-chu K’ao,” KK 2004:2, 76–78. ⁸³⁸ P’eng Yü-sheng, “Kuo-kuo Tung-ch’ien K’ao,” HCCHS 2007:1, 47–55. ⁸³⁹ Numerous scholars (including Hsu and Linduff, *Western Chou Civilization*, 161) believe that Kuo moved to P’ing-lu in Shanxi during King Yu’s reign. ⁸⁴⁰ Wang Yü-che, “Chou P’ing-wang Tung-ch’ien nai Pi-Ch’in Fei Pi-Ch’üan-Jung Shuo,” HCCHS 1986:10, 21–24. ⁸⁴¹ Cheng-yi (commentary) to the *Tso Chuan* for Chao Kung’s twenty-sixth year. ⁸⁴² Ch’ao Fu-lin, “Lun P’ing-wang Tung-ch’ien,” LSYC 1991:6, 12–15. ⁸⁴³ Wang Yü-che, “Chou P’ing-wang Tung-ch’ien nai Pi-Ch’in Fei Pi-Ch’üan-Jung Shuo,” HCCHS 1986:10, 21. ⁸⁴⁴ The “Cheng Shih-chia” notes that the “Ch’üan Jung killed King Yu at the foot of Mount Li and also killed Duke Huan.” ⁸⁴⁵ According to the “Chou Pen-chi,” King P’ing’s coalition included Shen, the Hsi Yi, the Ch’üan Jung, and Tseng. However, Tseng does not appear in the “Ch’in Pen-chi.” ⁸⁴⁶ Most recently these different views (as discussed below) have been advanced by Yü Feng-ch’un, “Chou P’ing-wang Tung-ch’ien Fei Pi-Jung nai T’ou-Jung P’ien,” HCCHS 1984:1, 19–25; Wang Yü-che, “Chou P’ing-wang Tung-ch’ien nai Pi-Ch’in Fei Pi-Ch’üan-Jung Shuo,” HCCHS 1986:10, 21–24; Ch’ao Fu-lin, “Lun P’ing-wang Tung-ch’ien,” LSYC 1991:6, 8–23; and Wang Lei-sheng, “P’ing-wang Tung-ch’ien Yüan-yin Hsin-lun,” HCCHS 1998:4, 37–41. Unfortunately, neither *The Cambridge History of Ancient China* nor Hsü and Linduff’s *Western Chou Civilization* consider the issues. However, Li Feng’s *Landscape and Power* provides an extensive, detailed analysis of the Chou’s fall. ⁸⁴⁷ Although the most popular accounts indicate that the Ch’üan Jung sacked the city, there is little unanimity on this aspect. For example, Yü Feng-ch’un sees no evidence that they invaded it but instead believes that Tsung Chou remained under Chou control throughout the turmoil and that a large portion of the population continued to inhabit Kuan-chung thereafter. (“Chou P’ing-wang Tung-ch’ien Fei Pi-Jung nai T’ou-Jung P’ien,” HCCHS 1984:1, 21–22.) ⁸⁴⁸ It is also

questionable whether Ch'eng Chou was economically and politically more viable even though open areas existed where the members of the core nobility could be emplaced. (Ch'ao Fu-lin ["Lun P'ing-wang Tung-ch'ien," LSYC 1991:6, 20] supports the traditional view that the destruction of Feng/Hao was a key factor, but Yü Feng-ch'un ["Chou P'ing-wang Tung-ch'ien Fei Pi-Jung nai T'ou-Jung P'ien," HCCHS 1984:1, 19–25] is among those who emphasize environmental factors.). ⁸⁴⁹ "Kuan Ts'ai Shih-chia," *Shih Chi*. Yü Feng-ch'un claims that by moving east he would be closer to his supporters in Shen, Tseng, etc. and away from the court interference, especially Kuo. (Yü also sees Lu, Hsü, and Cheng as key supporters, but Lu's subsequent behavior makes its inclusion highly debatable.) See "Chou P'ing-wang Tung-ch'ien Fei Pi-Jung nae T'ou-Jung P'ien," HCCHS 1984:1, 19–25. ⁸⁵⁰ Ch'ao Fu-lin, "Lun P'ing-wang Tung-ch'ien," LSYC 1991:6, 8–23. ⁸⁵¹ Although unlikely, the *Shih Ching* ode "Yü Wu-cheng" (*Mao* #194) has been said to depict the turmoil and chaos marking the interval of two kings. ⁸⁵² See Yü Feng-ch'un, "Chou P'ing-wang Tung-ch'ien Fei Pi-Jung nai T'ou-Jung P'ien," HCCHS 1984:1, 19–25, who cites the *Tso Chuan*, Hsi Kung, 11th year. ⁸⁵³ Oddly, Yü Feng-ch'un ("Chou P'ing-wang Tung-ch'ien Fei Pi-Jung nai T'ou-Jung P'ien," HCCHS 1984:1, 19) concludes from the text that the enemies P'ing was trying to avoid were Shen, Tseng, and the Ch'üan Jung, even though all the texts identify them as his supporters. (Tseng is thought to have been located near Fang-ch'eng-hsien in Henan.) ⁸⁵⁴ An assertion well attested by subsequent historical events and made by scholars such as Yü Feng-ch'un, "Chou P'ing-wang Tung-ch'ien Fei Pi-Jung nae T'ou-Jung P'ien," HCCHS 1984:1, 20. ⁸⁵⁵ Wang Yü-che, "Chou P'ing-wang Tung-ch'ien nai Pi-Ch'in Fei Pi-Ch'üan-Jung Shuo," HCCHS 1986:10, 21–24. ⁸⁵⁶ It is claimed that Ch'in attacked the Jung after King Yu was slain. Following a setback and the establishment of marriage relationships with the royal clan, they eventually managed to drive out the Jung, ending up with the terrain west of Mount Ch'i. (Wang Lei-sheng, "P'ing-wang Tung-ch'ien Yüan-yin Hsin-lun," HCCHS 1998:4, 37–41.) Dissenters such as Wang Yü-che point out that Lü and Shen were stronger than the Hsi Jung and believe that the Jung would just have plundered, not occupied, the land. ("Chou P'ing-wang Tung-ch'ien nai Pi-Ch'in Fei Pi-Ch'üan-Jung Shuo," HCCHS 1986:10, 21–24.) However, even if they lacked any interest in establishing permanent settlements, they (or components thereof) may well have lingered to enjoy the fruits of civilization for months or years. (For a somewhat different view on Ch'in's position, see Ch'ao Fu-lin, "Lun P'ing-wang Tung-ch'ien," LSYC 1991:6, 17–19.) ⁸⁵⁷ Wang Yü-che, "Chou P'ing-wang Tung-ch'ien nai Pi-Ch'in Fei Pi-Ch'üan-Jung Shuo," HCCHS 1986:10, 21–24. Others emphasize the "compulsion" aspect. ⁸⁵⁸ For example, Yü Feng-ch'un interprets this "sending off" as really meaning "chasing away" because Ch'in had interceded on behalf of King Yu. ("Chou P'ing-wang Tung-ch'ien Fei Pi-Jung nai T'ou-Jung P'ien," HCCHS 1984:1, 22.) ⁸⁵⁹ Wang Lei-sheng, "P'ing-wang Tung-ch'ien Yüan-yin Hsin-lun," HCCHS 1998:4, 37–41; Wang Yü-che, "Chou P'ing-wang Tung-ch'ien nai Pi-Ch'in Fei Pi-Ch'üan-Jung Shuo," HCCHS 1986:10, 23. Although not one of the original *fang-po*, Chin had been established when Chief Fu (Yao Kung) was enfeoffed with the former state of T'ang. (For further discussion, see Chu Feng-han, "Yao Kung Kuei yü T'ang Po Hou yü Chin," KK 2007:3, 64–69.) Chin wealth and power is particularly reflected in large tombs dating to the middle to late Western Chou Period. (See, for example, Shan-hsi-sheng KK YCS and Ch'ü-wo-hsien Wen-wu-chü Yang-shieh Chin-hou Mu-ti Fa-ch'üeh Chien-pao," WW 2009:1, 4–14, 26.) ⁸⁶⁰ According to one spokesman in the *Tso Chuan* (Yin Kung, 6th year), the move eastward was basically sustained by Cheng and Chin. ⁸⁶¹ Apart from Luo K'un's focal volume, *Hsia Shang Hsi-Chou Chün-shih*, minimal discussions of Chou military issues other than combat history may be found in Herrlee Creel, "The Military" in *The Origins of Statecraft in China*, 242–316; Hsu and Linduff, *Western Chou*

Civilization", 241–45; Yang K'uan, *Hsi Chou Shih*, 373–86; and Kao Jui's dedicated *Chung-kuo Shang-kuo Chün-shih-shih*, 88–103.⁸⁶² Walls obviously require gates, and it is claimed that the practice of having watch towers about the gates dates back to the Chou. (See Hang Chao, "Ku-tai Ch'üeh-men chi Hsiang-kuan Wen-t'i," *KKWW* 2004:5, 58–64.)⁸⁶³ As previously noted in the discussion on the Duke of Chou. However, see for example Kuo Hsü-tung, "Yin-hsü Chia-ku-wen Suo-chien te Shang-tai Chün-li," *CKSYC* 2010:2, 47–69.⁸⁶⁴ The king had the power to order attacks and the authority to execute people. (T'ang Chia-hung, "Lüeh-lun Hsia Shang Chou Ti-wang te Ch'eng-hao chi Kuo-chia Cheng-t'i," *LSYC* 1985:4, 3–15, and Li Chün-feng, "Shih-lun Chung-kuo Li-shih-shang te 'Wang-cheng Shih-tai'," *HCCHS* 1992:1, 24–30.) Hao T'ieh-ch'uan, "Hsi Chou Chung-yang Kuan-chih te Yen-pien," *HCCHS* 1985:9, 49–54, emphasizes that the early Chou monarchs were called kings, not *t'ien-tzu* ("Son of Heaven"), and that one possible origination for the character of king is the image of an axe blade descending, emphasizing the martial derivation of the king's (punitive) power. Only after their enemies were pacified would civilization become more ritualized and apparently "civil" in nature.⁸⁶⁵ To take just one example, Yang-fu, who was *Ssu-kung* (supervisor of construction) was deputed to attack the Eastern states (according to the *Chin-hou Su Chung*.)⁸⁶⁶ Li Feng, "Offices' in Bronze Inscriptions and Western Zhou Government Administration," *EC* 26–27 (2001–2002), 1–72; Ch'ao Fu-lin, "Lun Chou-tai Ch'ing-ch'üan," *CKKTS* 1994:1, 45–62; Hsu Cho-yun, "Some Working Notes on the Western Chou Government," *BIHP* 36 (1966), 513–24; Hsu Cho-yun and Katheryn M. Linduff, "The Chou Government," *Western Chou Civilization*, 227–57; Yang K'uan, *Hsi Chou Shih*, 295–350; Liu Shu-ho, "Hsi Chou te Kuan-chih yü T'ung-chi," *HCCHS* 1991:11, 5–14; Hao T'ieh-ch'uan, "Hsi Chou Chung-yang Kuan-chih te Yen-pien," *HCCHS* 1985:9, 49–54; Hsü Chuo-yün, *Hsi Chou Shih*, 208–36; and Herrlee Creel, *Origins of Statecraft in China*, 101–32.⁸⁶⁷ Ch'ao Fu-lin, "Lun Chou-tai Ch'ing-ch'üan," *CKKTS* 1994:1, 52, claims that the position of *ch'ing* was higher than any of the feudal lords and that they even had the power to initiate military action against them. Without doubt they had great military authority at the outset, but whether they ever enjoyed this degree of independence from the king requires further scrutiny. However, it would be the powerful ministerial families that gained control of many of the remaining states in the Spring and Autumn Period.⁸⁶⁸ Hsi Kung, 5th year.⁸⁶⁹ Although variously interpreted, the term *ch'ing-shih-liao* appears in two vessels (arguably) attributed to King Ch'eng's reign. (For a discussion, see Ch'ao Fu-lin, "Lun Chou-tai Ch'ing-ch'üan," *CKKTS* 1994:1, 48–49.) Hao T'ieh-ch'uan ("Hsi Chou Chung-yang Kuan-chih te Yen-pien," *HCCHS* 1985:9, 33–34) claims that the *ch'ing-shih-liao* were derived from the nobility and advances the interesting view that they exercised a constraining effect through deliberative convocations and wine drinking, which he believes was really a ritually bound conclave in which policy was formulated and actions decided. (Conversely, Ch'ao Fu-lin, "Lun Chou-tai Ch'ing-ch'üan," *CKKTS* 1994:1, 47–48 believes the *ch'ing-shih-liao* originated in the drinking ceremony itself.)⁸⁷⁰ For example, by Herrlee B. Creel who characterized the Western Chou as a protobureaucracy that lacked the means to be effective. Needless to say, his view has been strongly disputed, but the number of bronze vessels available at the time of his writing was far more limited.⁸⁷¹ For a discussion of this aspect see Hsu and Linduff, *Western Chou Civilization*, 252–57. (Useful materials on military organization may be found in Hsu and Linduff, 241–49; the volume entitled *Wu Kuan* in the *Chung-kuo Chün-shih Chih-tu-shih* series edited by Ch'en Kao-hua; Luo K'un's *Hsia Shang Hsi-Chou Chün-shih-shih*; Yang K'uan's *Hsi Chou Shih*, 373–86; Herrlee Creel's dedicated section, "The Military," in his *Origins of Statecraft in China*; and Chang Huai-t'ung, "'Ch'ang Mai' Hsin-yen," *HCCHS* 2008:3, 49–57.)⁸⁷² The *Ssu-ma* or "officer in charge of horses" who seems to have had military responsibility

from inception on an ad hoc basis and therefore theoretically included war chariots but numerous scholars (including Creel) disagree that he had any warfare responsibilities at this stage. Some inscriptions show the *Ssu-ma* apparently exercising military command and administering justice in the military.⁸⁷³ In the *Chou Li*, the title is less exalted and primarily responsible for ethical instruction. However, Li Feng (“‘Offices’ in Bronze Inscriptions and Zhou Government Administration,” EC 26–27 (2001–2002), footnote 60, 21) asserts that the title “*shih*” indicates previous military experience rather than a title with defined functions.⁸⁷⁴ For one useful discussion of “*shih*,” see Lai Ch’ang-yang and Liu Hsiang, “Liang Chou Shih-kuan K’ao,” CKSYC 1985:2, 97–108.⁸⁷⁵ Often attributed (albeit spuriously) to the Duke of Chou, the *Chou Li* has a varied history. “Discovered” in the Han, it was originally known as the *Chou Kuan* or *Offices of Chou* but apparently languished because of the prevalent influence of the New Text school until Wang Mang sought to justify his usurpation of the throne. Although Karlgren and Ku Chieh-kang date it to late in the Warring States Period, it clearly was not forged by Liu Hsin but appears to be a compilation of disparate ritual and other material that may date back into the early Warring States and possibly late Spring and Autumn Period. (For classic evaluations, see William G. Boltz, “*Chou li*” in M. Loewe, ed., *Early Chinese Texts*, 24–32; Karlgren, “The Early History of the *Chou li* and *Tso chuan* Texts,” BMFEA 3 (1931), 1–59; or Sven Broman, “Studies on the *Chou li*,” BMFEA 33 (1961), 1–89.) The chief proponent of the *Chou Li*’s applicability to these ancient times has been Yang K’uan (*Hsi Chou Shih*, 373), who claims the system represents one of the chief characteristics of Western Chou and Spring and Autumn social organization and that the *Chou Li* still preserves key information about it. (His discussions may be found on 352–56, 373–80, and 394–402.) Outright denial of its having any possible validity has been expressed by historians such as Chang Jung-ming (“*Chou Li* Kuo-yeh, Hsiang-sui Tsu-chih Mo-shih T’an-yüan,” HCCHS 1998:5, 9–15), who sees no evidence whatsoever for the existence of the *hsiang / sui* distinction in Western Chou bronze inscriptions and believes it contravenes the basic clan nature of Chou organization. (The “*Fei Shih*” in the *Shang Shu* refers to Lu having three *chiao* and three *sui* but, having probably been composed late in the Spring and Autumn Period, similarly cannot be considered primary evidence for their existence. However, the *Shih Mi Kuei* previously cited does contain a reference to *sui-jen*, which is discussed by Chang Mao-jung [“*Shih Mi Kuei* yü Hsi-Chou Hsiang-sui Chih-tu,” WW 1991:1, 26–31].)⁸⁷⁶ Ch’ao Fu-lin (“Lun Chou-tai Kuo-jen yü Shu-min She-hui Shen-fen te Pien-hua,” HCCHS 2000:6, 63–70) claims that in the Western Chou Period, the *kuo-jen* were always members of the main clan.⁸⁷⁷ “*Ti Kuan Ssu-t’u*.” *Tsu* is probably not “clan” here even though it could encompass the two lower levels and thus be a sort of subclan or cluster of extended families dwelling in a particular area. (The persistence of clan towns through the ages suggests it’s not impossible.) In the “*Ch’i Yü*” section of the *Kuo Yü*, what appears to be another system is mentioned. According to the numbers provided, state capitals (*kuo-tu*) would be based upon a hierarchy of four levels, 5 / 50 / 200 / and finally 2000, the latter being the number for the *hsiang*.⁸⁷⁸ “*Ti Kuan Ssu-t’u*, *hsia*.” The “*Ch’i Yü*” outlines a hierarchy of 30 / 300 / 3,000 / 9,000 / 90,000.⁸⁷⁹ Chang Jung-ming (“*Chou Li* Kuo-yeh, Hsiang-sui Tsu-chih Mo-shih T’an-yüan,” HCCHS 1998:5, 9–15) rejects the possibility that the system was ever actualized because it would be based upon habitation and terrain rather than the clan/ blood ties he believes underpinned the Chou military.⁸⁸⁰ *Lun Yü* or the *Analects*, XIII A20. In the immediately preceding pronouncement (XIII A19), he notes that the people can only be employed in warfare after being instructed for (the lengthy period of) seven years, though his idea of instruction emphasized ethical education more than military arts.⁸⁸¹ The Western equivalents are of course relative, dependent for their

definition upon the era and country of organization. The columns represent a set of alternatives so that if regiment is used for *lū*, then brigade (or perhaps division) should be used for *shih*. The term *lū* is also an ancient one, originally employed by the Shang to designate a military unit that reportedly expanded to ten thousand for one campaign. Subsequently, in the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods it would be combined with the character for army, *chün*, as *chün-lu*, to indicate the army or military units in general. (In its original meaning it apparently refers to “men serving under a flag.”) ⁸⁸² Based upon the *Shih Hsiin Kuei*, Yang K’uan (*Hsi Chou Shih*, 391) concludes the Yung mentioned in the inscription were slaves, presumably surrendered (or captured) Yi that participated as military units. (Apart from the status of the *yung*, there seems to be evidence that these [more likely early on submissive] Yi played a protective role as security forces in the cities, even for the king’s palace and external storehouses. Entrusting them with this sort of power is certainly a strong indicator of real integration.) ⁸⁸³ Several examples of armies such as from Tseng and Eh participating in southern campaigns have already been seen. In addition, Hsu and Linduff (*Western Chou Civilization*, 241–42), citing Shirakawa, also note the existence of six Yang armies that participated in a southeastern campaign, so named because they were composed of members of the Yang, a Huai Yi group. However, Yeh Ta-hsiung, “Hsi Chou Ping-chih te T’an-t’ao,” 1979:6, 13, claims that *tsu* became irrelevant, but inscriptions such as the *Shih Mi Kuei* show otherwise. ⁸⁸⁴ “Ku Yüeh.” Note that the “Ku Ming” in *Shang Shu* is among the works that note six armies. ⁸⁸⁵ The Pa must have been capable of fielding a significant military force because twenty chariot and horse pits have been found in the cemetery area of Ta-ho-k’ou in Yi-ch’eng, Shanxi. (For one report see Shan-hsi-sheng KKYCS Ta-ho-k’ou Mu-ti Lien-ho K’ao-ku-tui, “Shan-hsi Yi-ch’eng-hsien Ta-ho-k’ou Hsi-Chou Mu-ti,” KK 2011:7, 9–18.) ⁸⁸⁶ Later on, the period more distant states, such as Ch’i, had to participate in campaigns. ⁸⁸⁷ For a typical enunciation of this view, see Yeh Ta-hsiung, “Hsi Chou Ping-chih te T’an-t’ao,” *T’ai-wan Ta-hsiieh Li-shih-hsiieh-hsi Hsiieh-pao* 1979:6, 5–6. ⁸⁸⁸ “Waging War.” ⁸⁸⁹ Traditional accounts claim that some four hundred thousand men from Chao were buried alive after surrendering to Ch’in at the Battle of Ch’ang-p’ing, and Hsiang Yü ordered the execution of two hundred thousand members of Chang Han’s troops after reducing Chü-lu. ⁸⁹⁰ It is generally held that they were composed of former Yin personnel. For example, see Yeh Ta-hsiung, “Hsi Chou Ping-chih te T’an-t’ao,” *Tai-wan Ta-hsiieh Li-shih-hsiieh-hsi Hsiieh-pao*, 1979:6, 7–8; Wang Jen-tung, “Hsi Chou Chin-wen-chung te Yin Pa-shih yü Ch’eng-Chou Pa-shih,” KKWV 1993:3; Yang K’uan, *Hsi Chou Shih*, 357; and Yü Sheng-wu, “Lüeh-lun Hsi Chou Chin-wen-chung te ‘Liu-shih’ ‘Pa-shih’ chi-ch’i T’un-t’ien-chih,” KK 1964:3. Liu Chao-hsiang (*Chün-shih Tsu-chih T’i-chih Pien-chih*, 55) asserts they were drawn from the seven Yin clans in Wei. However, Li Hsiieh-ch’in (“Lun Hsi Chou Chin-wen-chung te ‘Liu-shih’ ‘Pa-shih’,” *Hua-hsia K’ao-ku*, 1987:2) sees them as composed of Chou personnel and established after Ch’eng Chou’s completion. ⁸⁹¹ Proponents of this view include Hsü Chung-shu (“Yü-ting te Nien-tai chi-ch’i Hsiang-kuan Wen-t’i,” KKH 1959:3), who sees six in the west, eight at Ch’eng Chou, and another eight at Yin’s ancient capital; Liu Chao-hsiang (*Chün-shih Tsu-chih T’i-chih Pien-chih*, 54), who concurs; Yeh Ta-hsiung, “Hsi Chou Ping-chih te T’an-t’ao,” *Tai-wan Ta-hsiieh Li-shih-hsiieh-hsi Hsiieh-pao*, 1979:6, 7–8; Wang Jen-tung, “Hsi Chou Chin-wen-chung te Yin Pa-shih yü Ch’eng-Chou Pa-shih,” KKWV 1993:3; and Yang K’uan, *Hsi Chou Shih*, 357. Critics and opponents include Liu Chan (*Chung-kuo Ku-tai Chün-shih Shih*), who notes that authority over the two royal forces was initially split between the Duke of Shao and Duke of Chou, and Luo K’un, *Hsia Shang Hsi Chou Chün-shih Shih*, 315. ⁸⁹² For an enunciation of this view, see Yang K’uan’s discussion in two early articles—“Lun Hsi Chou Chin-wen-chung ‘Liu-shih’ ‘Pa-shih’ ho Hsiang-sui Chih-tu te Kuan-hsi” and “Tsai-lun Hsi

Chou Chin-wen-chung 'Liu-shih' ho 'Pa-shih' te Hsing-chih"—which have essentially been incorporated as subchapters in his *Hsi Chou Shih* , 373ff. Yang K'uan (*Hsi Chou Shih* , 357) also notes that the Ch'eng Shih (synonymous with the Ch'eng Chou Eight Armies) went forth under royal mandate to attack the Nan Yi and that the *Hsiao K'e Ting* shows a Shan-fu known as K'e being ordered to Ch'eng Chou where he *cheng* (rectifies) the eight armies (making it clear that the eight were deployed at Ch'eng Chou.) However, also see Liu Chao-hsiang, *Chün-shih Tsu-chih T'i-chih Pien-chih* , 55. ⁸⁹³ A statement in the *Tso Chuan* (Yin Kung 5th year) has been construed as indicating only two functional field forces existed: "The Duke of Chou administered [the territory] from Shaan eastward, the Duke of Shao controlled [the territory] from Shaan westward." However, it merely indicates the apportionment of overall authority, not the employment of a fixed number of armies. ⁸⁹⁴ For example, the *Yi Hou Che Kuei* refers to the king's inspecting the maps of King Wu and King Ch'eng's attacks on the Shang, the late *San* (?) *Shih P'an* refers to a map of relinquished territory, and odes depict men working according to plans. ⁸⁹⁵ Wang Chien ("Ts'ung Ch'u-kung Ni-chung Ming-wen Lun-tao Hsi-Chou te Fang-po Chih-tu," HCCHS 2002:6, 50–64) has particularly emphasized the greater authority allocated to these fiefs from the outset; Tu Cheng-sheng ("Chou-tai Feng-chien te Chien-li," BIHP 50:3 (1979), 485–500) stresses their military character. (Also see Shao Pei, "Hsi Chou Po-chih K'ao-suo," CKSYC 2008:2, 3–12, and Ch'en En-lin, "Hsien-Ch'in Liang-Han Wen-hsien-chung Suo-chien Chou-tai Chu-hou Wu-teng-chüeh," CKKTS 1995:2, 51–64.) ⁸⁹⁶ For example, see Tu Cheng-sheng, "Chou-tai Feng-chien te Chien-li," BIHP 50:3 (1979), 490–92, or Li Feng, *Landscape and Power* , 72–75. (Perhaps more importantly, Li Feng [74] also points out that many of the fiefs were established on the edge of the alluvial plain rather than in the main flood zone.) ⁸⁹⁷ "All under Heaven Know." ⁸⁹⁸ The Chou were not invincible and certainly realized it would always be difficult for northern forces with their increasing chariot components to operate in the south's mountainous and often marshy terrain. Frustrating topographical constraints thus at least partially thwarted their ability to project power southward and coerce the Ch'u in ways that would preclude its rising strength from proving problematic. ⁸⁹⁹ The only reference to a significant incursion appears in the *Bamboo Annals* for King Li's eleventh year where a note that a Ching Man invasion had been repulsed has prompted commentators to claim it had penetrated above the Luo River, threatening Ch'eng Chou. Apart from its most likely being at most a raiding party, there is no evidence how extensive the attacking force might have been, how deeply they advanced, and whether members of the proto-Ch'u were involved or just inhabitants of the Ching area. ⁹⁰⁰ Ch'u's history and culture have recently drawn intense interest. Focal works include Chang Cheng-ming, *Ch'u Shih* , and Constance A. Cook and John Major, *Defining Ch'u: Image and Reality in Ancient China* . Important materials are also found dispersed through Hsu and Linduff, *Western Chou Civilization* ; Yang K'uan, *Hsi Chou Shih* , 595–609; and *The Cambridge History of Ancient China* , 513–25. ⁹⁰¹ The numerous bronzes inscriptions already cited, including on the *Kuo Po Kuei* (which speaks about attacking the "rebellious Ching"), *Tso Ts'e Tse Kuei* , *Shih Ch'iang P'an* , *Yi Yü Kuei* , *Ling Kuei* , *Mei Kuei* , *Ling Yi* , and *Hsiao Tzu Sheng Tsun* , all attest to aggressive Chou campaigns targeting Ching and/or Ch'u. ⁹⁰² *Tso Chuan* , Chao Kung 12th year. ⁹⁰³ Although Chou receptivity to talented individuals (such as the T'ai Kung) appears to have been a defining characteristic, the *Shih Chi* was compiled in an age with a heritage of several centuries of "knowing men" and should probably be somewhat discounted. ⁹⁰⁴ Again, see Chu Feng-han, "Tso-Po Ting yü Chou Kung Nan-cheng," WW 2006:5, 67–73, 96. ⁹⁰⁵ Chu Feng-han, "Tso-Po Ting yü Chou Kung Nan-cheng," WW 2006:5, 71. ⁹⁰⁶ *Shih Chi* , "Ch'u Shih-chia." Although Tan-yang may have been located between Mount Ching and Mount Sui at this time, its site continues to be a matter of

ongoing debate. The *Shih Chi* chapter devoted to Confucius (unreliably) notes that Ch'u's progenitors had been enfeoffed with (the ideal amount of) fifty *li*.⁹⁰⁷ See the account in *Kuo Yü*, "Chin-yü," 8.⁹⁰⁸ For this explanation, see Chang Cheng-ming, *Ch'u Shih*, 29–34.⁹⁰⁹ The *Tso Chuan* (Chao Kung, 12) speaks about these bows and arrows being used in Ch'u, but it should be noted that nothing in the historical records would suggest they supplied anything other than regular bows to the Chou.⁹¹⁰ The only real indication of this early predatory activity is a mention in the *Tso Chuan* (Hsi Kung, 28), which states that Ch'u had absorbed the Chi-surnamed states in the Chiang-Han region, projected by Luo K'un (*Hsia Shang Hsi-Chou Chün-shih-shih*, 401) and others as beginning about this time. However, this might well have been the meaning of "establishing peaceful relations" or in other words cowering them into submissive status. (Also see Tuan Yü, "Lun Chou, Ch'u Tsao-ch'i te Kuan-shih," HCCHS 1986:11, 49–56.)⁹¹¹ This is one of the few references to internal conflict; however, the nature and scope of these attacks remain unknown.⁹¹² "Ch'u Shih-chia." (Yung is not the state located to the north of the Yellow River, far above Ch'eng Chou, but instead another entity with the same name variously said to have been located somewhat to Ch'u's northwest or by Wu-han.)⁹¹³ Although Hubei has considerable copper resources (evidenced by the mines at T'ung-luo), the earliest known large copper deposits to be exploited were located in the middle and lower Yangtze region.⁹¹⁴ Whether he actually expressed this sentiment is to be doubted because the account appears in the "Ch'u Shih-chia," compiled in the Han Period long after concepts of Ch'u's barbaric nature had been formulated.⁹¹⁵ Crucial aspects include its effects on the populace, the degree to which the inhabitants are willing to forego ties to previous overlords and emotionally accept their change in status, and how extensively they might be integrated into the administrative and cultural realms. Often inconsequential and meaningless, noticeable differences only arose with brutality and exactions.⁹¹⁶ Disagreement exists as to whether they represent an old or new enemy or were already violating the perimeter in King Li's era as, for example, Li Feng, who ascribes the *Tuo Yu Ting* to this reign, believes.⁹¹⁷ Kuo Mo-juo and others saw them as a splinter group of the Hsi Jung or simply the latter renamed, but others (citing the appearance of both names in the odes) have long held otherwise. More recently Chia Hai-sheng ("Lun Pu Ch'i Kuei Ming-chung te Po Shi chi Nan Chung," HCCHS 2005:4, 48–51) reasserted the traditional belief that the odes cited in this section—"Ts'ai Wei," "Ch'u Ch'e," "Liu Yüeh" and "Ts'ai Ch'i"—all date to King Hsüan's reign and, being the first mention of the Hsien-yün, indicate that ongoing changes in Central Asia had compelled them to move from the Ordos region, resulting in pressure on Southern Shaanxi. However, E. L. Shaughnessy ("The Date of the 'Duo You Ding' and its Significance," 66), concluded that the Hsien-yün did not originate in the Fen River Valley but in the northwest, probably Gansu, Ningxia, and northern Shaanxi whereas Li Feng (*Landscape and Power*, 143–45) sees them as successors to the Ordos bronze cultures. However, Ko Chih-yi, "Chou-jen Pien Jung Fu Hsia K'ao-lun," CKSYC 1991:4, 122–29, argues that Wang Kuo-wei's conclusion that Chou use of troops against the Hsien-yün dates to King Hsüan's era is not sustainable. (Based on the *Mu-tzu Chuan* he claims that King Mu previously attacked them and that the preface to "Ts'ai-wei" [and, it might be noted, the *Yi Chou-shu*] states that "when King Wen was established, to the west he resisted the K'un Yi, to the north defended against the Hsien-yün.") Their location is also a matter of debate with, for example, Wang Yü-che ("Hsi Chou P'ang-ching Ti-wang te Tsai T'an-t'ao," CKKTS 1994:4 42–43) asserting that they dwelled in the Shanxi Lin-fen area (T'ai-yüan), not the T'ai-yüan of Chin-pei.⁹¹⁸ For the Chou's early presence in the Upper Ching River Basin see, for example, Li Feng, *Landscape and Power*, 49–55.⁹¹⁹ As pointed out by Wang Yü-che, "Hsi Chou P'ang-ching Ti-wang te Tsai T'an-t'ao," CKKTS 1994:4, 42–43.⁹²⁰ Even a few traditional scholars

such as Tu Cheng-sheng have recognized that the Shang and Chou expanded by military colonization and that their postconquest fiefs were all based on military achievement, a practice that continued throughout the Western Chou Period. (See Tu Cheng-sheng, "Chou-tai Feng-chien te Chien-li," BIHP 50.3 (1979), 485–89.) ⁹²¹ For comparison, see Michael Kulikowski's discussion of the Goths, *Rome's Gothic Wars: From the Third Century to Alaric*, Cambridge: University Press, 2007. The recently articulated concept of frontiers as zones of dynamic, complex interaction provides a particularly useful approach to analyzing state ascension and failure. (For a brief discussion, see Jeremy Black, "Frontiers and Military History," JMH 72 (2008), 1047–59.) ⁹²² Allies would often prove problematic throughout Chinese military history (such as at the battles of Po-chü and Ch'eng-p'u), and it is unlikely that every single one of them would have been loyal or maintained secrecy. ⁹²³ The quest for a decisive battle and the latter's place in the history of warfare has become a focal topic in recent decades. For example, see Russell F. Weigley, *The Age of Battles: The Quest for Decisive Warfare from Breitenfeld to Waterloo*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993. ⁹²⁴ *Art of War* points out the inherent relationship of offense and defense within the parameters of available forces: defensive fallback is necessary to anchor offensive actions (except when bridges are deliberately burned or boats smashed), without which retreat is impossible and risks have to be more prudently managed to preclude being forced into an impossible position. ⁹²⁵ Historical commanders have frequently seen their troops drastically reduced by uncontained disease. (For a recent discussion focused on the Civil War see Andrew Bell, "'Gallinippers' & Glory: The Links between Mosquito-borne Disease and U. S. Civil War Operations and Strategy," JMH 2010:2, 379–405. Similar effects would also be expected in the south of China as the Jurchen discovered in the Sung.) ⁹²⁶ For a recent consideration of issues of annihilation versus attrition, see J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr., "The Issue of Attrition," *Parameters* 2010 (Spring), 5–19. ⁹²⁷ In addition to inscriptional evidence, several bronze vessels including the *Ni-pien-chung* and *Kuo Po Kuei* provide evidence that plundering remained an essential objective of Chou military campaigns. ⁹²⁸ For discussions of steppe-sedentary interaction, see Nicola Di Cosmo, *Ancient China and Its Enemies: The Rise of Nomadic Power in East Asian History*. Useful information may also be found in his *Warfare in Inner Asian History (500–1800)*. ⁹²⁹ Evidence is beginning to appear that the Chou early on also established at least a few bastions at the presumed limits of the realm, including in the south. For example, a citadel dating to the early Western Chou, located only fifteen hundred meters from the former Shang bastion of P'an-lung-ch'eng, has recently been discovered. (See Wu-han-shih Huang-p'o-ch'u Wen-wu Kuan-li-suo and Wu-han-shih P'an-lun-ch'eng Yi-chih Po-wu-kuan Ch'ou-chien-ch'u, "Hu-pei Wu-han Mo-yüan-ch'eng Chou-tai Yi-chih Tiao-ch'a Chien-pao," WW 2011:11, 61–63.) ⁹³⁰ For a general discussion of unorthodox measures in China and specific examples of unorthodox tactics that were employed in border conflicts see Sawyer, *The Tao of Deception: Unorthodox Warfare in Historic and Modern China*. ⁹³¹ As calculated by Li Feng (*Landscape and Power*, 189) as part of his detailed geographic analysis of the Hsien-yün threat, 141–92. ⁹³² All the classic military writers would advise attacking when the enemy is tired, is rushing about, or has traversed difficult terrain. ⁹³³ The *Hsiün Kuei*, for example, shows that people from Ch'in were already among those dwelling in the interior. ⁹³⁴ See, for example, Chiang Chung-yüeh, "Chou-tai te Feng-kuo Shih-fou Ch'eng-pang," HCCHS 2006:4, 47–52. Ho Ts'u-ch'uan ("Chou Ch'in Shih Erh-san Shih," HCCHS 1989:7, 59–62) describes the Chou as a loose amalgamation of urban states. (Ho believes real unification was only achieved under the Ch'in, which prevailed due to its increasing economic wealth and thoroughgoing internal reforms while the other states suffered from internal conflict and aristocratic remnants.) In contrast, P'eng Hsien (HCCHS 1992:11, 19–24) believes

the Chou truly unified China. However, not only is it generally agreed that the central government dispatched supervisors or inspectors to the states early on, based on vessels (including the earlier *Chung Chi-fu Kuei*) it is also claimed that the practice continued right until the end. (For example, see Wu Wan-li, "Chi Hsin Fahsien te Chi-chien Hsi-Chou T'ung-ch'i," *KKWW* 2010:4, 41–44.)⁹³⁵ Current interpretations somewhat questionably tend to turn the king into a mere visage of potency, a ritual performer sitting at the apex of power, rather than view him as a strong man, a powerful chieftain who sometimes resorts to formalized processes and ceremonies to augment his authority and reestablish hierarchical lines. In discussing the role of ritualists in supporting the divine authority of Chou kings, Constance A. Cook ("Scribes, Cooks, and Artisans: Breaking Zhou Tradition," *EC* 20 [1995], 245–47) stressed the reconnection with the original conquest in the giving of gifts and also surprisingly asserted that "the king, as the central pillar connecting the present Zhou authority to the primal event, had to prove through warfare and ritual action that he "modeled" (*xing*) himself upon the behavior of his ancestors who received the Charge or Mandate of Heaven (*tianming*)." If so, in terms of warfare, most of the Chou kings fell far short and the emphasis upon ritual represents an overcompensation for the inadequacy of their prowess. (In the same article, Prof. Cook also asserts that "ritualists trained in Zhou rhetoric continued as close aids to the local rulers, helping them interpret the ritual behavior of guests at these feasts and advising them on the most efficacious military or ritual response.")⁹³⁶ For an early discussion of the multiple, often contradictory, functions of the *li* as conceived by the *Li Chi*'s compilers see Ralph Sawyer, *Psycho-emotional Conceptualization and Therapeutic Effects in Chinese Ritual Thought* (Taipei: Kao-feng, 1975). (It should be remembered that even though ceremonies were instituted, bronze vessels cast, and awards made far more commonly than may have been imagined, these were exceptional events, making them noteworthy, not daily occurrences in the court or the hinterland.)⁹³⁷ Chapter 38 of the *Tao Te Ching*, "Superior Virtue is not Virtuous," as translated in Sawyer, *The Tao of War*.⁹³⁸ Despite interference in local succession and occasional orders to undertake military activities, the increasing loss of familiarity and royal control over the fief lords is evident in the general absence of appointment inscriptions in the late Western Chou Period. (See Virginia C. Kane ["Aspects of Western Chou Appointment Inscriptions: The Charge, the Gifts, and the Response," *EC* 8 (1982–1983), note 3, 24], who notes that rather than such outer lords such as Lu, Ch'i, or Yen, only the "minor gentry living on relatively small estates within the Royal Domain" were recipients.) The increasing uniformity and simplicity from the mid Western Chou onward also reflect a sort of standardization coincident with a loss of individuality and inventiveness. (See Jessica Rawson ["Western Zhou Archaeology," in *The Cambridge History of Ancient China*, 433–40] for a discussion of these changes.) Moreover, most of the late bronzes have been recovered from the Shaanxi area, suggesting they had become essentially irrelevant to the maintenance of strong relations with the protostates. (The Chou initially had two styles of vessels, their own and Shang, but their indigenous variants quickly displaced the Shang style as rituals were shaped and reformed. [See Chang Mao-jung, "Hsi Chou Ch'ing-t'ung-ch'i Tuan-tai Liang-hsi-t'ung Tang-yi," *KKHP* 2005:1, 1–26.])

⁹³⁹ Yüan Yen-ling, "Chou-tai Ch'ing-t'ung Li-ch'i te Sheng-ch'an yü Liu-tung," *KK* 2009:10, 68–77.

⁹⁴⁰ See Constance A. Cook, "Scribes, Cooks, and Artisans: Breaking Zhou Tradition," *EC* 20 (1995), 255.

⁹⁴¹ The *Hu T'ing* (JC 2838) records a dispute between two relatively powerful aristocrats over slaves and grain while the *San Shih P'an* indicates that Tse attacked

San in King Li's thirteenth year.

942 It might be noted that inscriptions and odes that speak about revitalizing the army and appointing supervisory officials for military land do not appear until the middle of the dynasty when the royal economic base had declined and the escalating importance of civil values may have inclined people to slight the military and its requirements except in moments of urgent need. (Hsu and Linduff, *Western Chou Civilization* , 249, believe the armies had their own fields and other resources, making them independent. However, see Liu Chao-hsiang, "*Chiün-shih Tsu-chih T'i-chih Pien-chih* , 54.)

943 Sun-tzu would be the first theoretician to assess and decry the costs of campaigns. (See the Art of War, "Waging War.")

944 See Li Feng's discussion of the growth of aristocratic power and its implications for the royal coffers, *Landscape and Power* , 126–34.

945 Herrlee Creel discusses the question of Chou finances, albeit somewhat speculatively, in his *Origins of Statecraft in China* , 133–60.

946 For example, P'eng Nien, "Chung-hua T'ung-yi Kuo-chia Shih-chien yü Ho-shih?" HCCHS 1992:11, 19–24, claims that initially the feudal lords had to contribute to the royal house, provide forces and provisions for military campaigns, and levy laborers for major projects.

947 Citing the *Yü T'ing* as evidence, Hsü Chung-shu believes that because the capability of the six and eight core armies had declined significantly, the king sometimes had to rely on his personal forces to wrest victory late in the period.

948 As vividly characterized in the *Ssu-ma Fa's* "Obligations of the Son of Heaven."

949 Even though some of the states provided forces or directly undertook missions, their contributions did not replicate the Shang model in which the ruler could simply levy large numbers of troops and demand logistical contributions from the satellite states in addition to the tribute normally being received.

950 See Li Hsüeh-ch'in, "Yin Shang chih Chou-ch'u te Ko yü Ko-ch'en," HCCHS 2009:1, 3–5. Li indicates their name is commonly seen in inscriptions; the character's pronunciation as *ko* is based on his conclusions despite a more common pronunciation of "*hua* " (such as in the *Chung-wen Ta Ts'u-tien* , entry 11830). For a discussion of China's unique fighting weapon, the *ko* or dagger-axe, as well as its early history, see the dedicated chapter in Sawyer, *Ancient Chinese Warfare* .

951 Tu Cheng-sheng ("Chou-tai Feng-chien te Chien-li," BIHP 50.3 [1979], 485–89) believes the authority of the Shang and Chou monarchs was much more circumscribed and while jointly recognized, limited to their royal domains, interference in the affairs of distant states being primarily limited to external matters such as military efforts.

952 Mao # 256, author's translation, but compare to James Legge, *The She King* , 513. Apart from the final debacle, even the most significant clashes including the early Hsien Yün penetrations and the two great Huai Yi invasions under the Lords of Eh and Hsü were never of the magnitude nor import of the Persian invasions of Greece, the frequent battles for survival between the European states, or the clashes at Waterloo, Stalingrad, and Kursk.

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